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Abstract 
The over-arching concern of the three parts of the dissertation is how economics can 
and should influence education policymaking, the emphasis on the economics side 
being models of country development and the contribution made by human capital.  
Part I begins with a review of economic growth theory. How educational performance 
and country development have been measured is then discussed, with considerable 
attention going towards conceptual and measurement complexities associated with the 
latter. An approach is presented for expanding the number of countries whose 
educational quality can be compared, by expanding the number of linkable testing 
programmes. This approach, which above all allows for the inclusion of more African 
and Latin American countries, is one of the key contributions made by the dissertation 
to the existing body of knowledge. Three existing empirical growth models are 
examined, including work by Hanushek and Woessman on the relationship between 
educational quality and income. Part I ends with a discussion on how the economics 
literature can best be packaged to influence education policymaking. A ‘growth 
simulator’ tool in Excel for informing the policy discourse is presented. The 
production of this tool includes establishing empirically a feasible improvement 
trajectory for educational quality that policymakers can use and some analysis of how 
linguistic fractionalisation in a country evolves over time. This tool can be considered 
a further key output of the dissertation. A basic model for relating educational quality, 
via income growth, to teacher pay, is presented.  
Part II offers an analysis of UNESCO country-level data on enrolment and spending 
going back to 1970, with a view to establishing historical patterns that can inform 
education planners, particularly those in developing countries, on how budgets and 
enrolment expansion should be distributed across the levels of the education system. 
The analysis presented in Part II represents a novel way of using existing country-
level data and can be seen as an important step towards filling a gap experienced by 
education policymakers, namely the paucity of empirical evidence that can guide 
decisions around the prioritisation of education levels.  Part II moreover arrives at a 
few empirical findings, including the finding that enrolment and spending patterns 
have been systematically different in countries with faster economic growth and the 
finding that historical per student spending at the secondary level appears to play a 
larger role in development than was previously thought.  
Part III contrasts the available economic advice for education policymakers with what 
policymakers actually appear to believe in. The focus falls, in particular, on four 
developing countries: South Africa, Brazil, Chile and China. A few areas where 
economists could explore the data to a greater degree or communicate available 
findings differently, in the interests of better education policies, are identified. Part III 
partly serves as a demonstration of how comparisons between education systems can 
be better oriented towards providing advice to education policymakers on questions 
relating to efficiency and equity.  
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Opsomming 
Die oorkoepelende fokus van die drie gedeeltes van die verhandeling is hoe die studie 
van ekonomie beleid in die onderwyssektor kan en moet beïnvloed. Veral belangrik is 
modelle van die ekonomiese groei van lande en die rol van menslike kapitaal in 
hierdie modelle.  
Die eerste gedeelte van die verhandeling bied ŉ oorsig van die teorie rakende 
ekonomiese groei. Hoe onderwysprestasie en nasionale ontwikkeling gemeet word, 
word dan bespreek, met ŉ sterk fokus op die konseptuele en tegniese kompleksiteit 
van laasgenoemde. ŉ Metode word aangebied waardeur meer lande se 
onderwysgehalte vergelyk kan word, deur middel van die koppeling van data van ŉ 
groter aantal toetsprogramme. Hierdie metode, wat veral die insluiting van meer lande 
uit Afrika en Latyn-Amerika toelaat, is een van die kernbydraes van die verhandeling 
tot die bestaande korpus van kennis. Drie bestaande empiriese modelle van 
ekonomiese groei word geanaliseer, insluitende die werk van Hanushek en Woessman 
oor die verhouding tussen onderwysgehalte en inkomste. Die eerste gedeelte sluit af 
met ŉ bespreking oor hoe die ekonomiese literatuur optimaal aangebied kan word om 
beleidmaking in die onderwys te beïnvloed. ŉ Groei-simulasie hulpmiddel in Excel 
wat die beleidsdiskoers kan vergemaklik word aangebied en verduidelik. Die 
ontwikkeling van hierdie gereedskap maak dit moontlik om op ŉ empiriese basis ŉ 
moontlike trajek vir die verbetering van onderwysgehalte te bepaal, wat vir 
beleidsmakers nuttig kan wees, sowel as ŉ ontleding van hoe linguïstiese 
verbrokkeling in ŉ land histories kan ontwikkel. Hierdie gereedskap kan as ŉ verdere 
sleutelproduk van die verhandeling beskou work. ŉ Basiese model van hoe 
onderwysgehalte en die inkomste van onderwysers deur middel van ekonomiese groei 
gekoppel is, word ook aangebied.  
Die tweede gedeelte van die verhandeling bied ŉ ontleding van UNESCO se 
nasionale statistieke van lande oor skoolinskrywings en onderwysuitgawes vanaf 
1970, met die oog op die identifikasie van belangrike historiese tendense vir 
onderwysbeplanners, veral in ontwikkelende lande. Die fokus hier is veral op hoe 
begrotings en inskrywings ideaal oor die verskillende vlakke van die onderwysstelsel 
versprei behoort te wees. Die ontleding in die tweede gedeelte verteenwoordig ŉ 
innoverende manier om die bestaande nasionale statistieke te gebruik en kan beskou 
word as ŉ belangrike stap om ŉ gaping te vul wat deur beleidsmakers in die onderwys 
ondervind word, naamlik die gebrek aan empiriese gegewens vir besluite oor 
prioritisering tussen onderwysvlakke. Die tweede gedeelte bied ook verskeie 
empiriese bevindinge,  soos dat die tendense rakende inskrywings en besteding per 
student sistematies tussen lande met vinniger ekonomiese groei en ander lande 
verskil, asook dat historiese besteding per student op die sekondêre vlak blykbaar ŉ 
groter invloed op ontwikkeling het as wat vroeër gedink is.  
Die derde gedeelte van die verhandeling vergelyk die advies wat die ekonomiese 
literatuur aan beleidmakers in die onderwys bied met wat beleidmakers self blykbaar 
glo. Die fokus val op veral vier ontwikkelende lande: Suid-Afrika, Brasilië, Chili en 
China. Gebiede word bespreek waar ekonome in die belang van beter onderwysbeleid 
tot ŉ groter mate data kan analiseer of bevindings op beter maniere kan kommunikeer. 
Die derde gedeelte kan beskou word as ŉ demonstrasie van hoe vergelykings tussen 
verskeie onderwysstelsels beter georiënteer kan word om vir die beleidmaker in die 
onderwys advies te verskaf rakende kwessies van doeltreffendheid en gelykheid. 
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ACRONYMS USED 
The following are acronyms used across the three parts of the dissertation. Only 
acronyms that are used without an adjacent explanation within the text are listed here. 
For details on the ISO country codes used in many of the tables and graphs, see Table 
21 in Part I of the dissertation.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Key texts in the economic growth literature identify the economic growth process as a 
combination of imitation and innovation. Both are necessary, though less developed 
countries tend to depend more on imitation, as opposed to innovation. This 
dissertation can be thought of as a combination of imitation and innovation. The 
sections of the dissertation where imitation predominates take existing analyses and 
redo them, sometimes using more recent data, they compare the methodologies of 
existing analyses, and they test the degree to which existing models can assist in 
specific policymaking questions. The more innovative sections focus above all on 
using country-level data in new ways that can inform policymakers.  
If there is an over-arching question that the three parts of the dissertation deal with it 
is perhaps the following: What is the utility of the economic growth literature and 
models using country-level data for education policymakers and to what extent have 
these policymakers made use of the available evidence? Part I of the dissertation is 
mainly a critical review of existing theory and empirical texts that could be of use to 
the policymakers. The various sections of Part I are introduced below. Part II 
addresses what appeared to be a gap in the literature, namely the need for greater 
empirical guidance with respect to the prioritisation of the various levels of the 
education system, in particular the secondary and post-school levels. Here, as in Part 
I, the focus is on models that use country-level data and implement some type of 
cross-country comparison. The justification for this focus is presented below. Part II is 
the more innovative part of the dissertation due to its emphasis on new ways of 
analysing the data.  
Part III moves furthest from the over-arching question referred to above, yet the topics 
it covers are relevant for this question. The focus in Part III is on analysing the 
education policy directions of developing countries, specifically four fairly diverse 
developing countries from three continents, within an economic framework of internal 
and external efficiency. The aim of the analysis is to assess to what degree and how 
education policymakers have embraced the recommendations of economists, and what 
this means for the kind of conversation economists should be having with education 
policymakers. Part III is thus, like the two preceding parts of the dissertation, focussed 
on cross-country analysis, except in Part III this analysis uses not data points (as in the 
first two sections), but the institutional architecture and key dimensions of the 
education systems of the countries in question. To some extent Part III considers if 
and how policymakers have taken into account growth models in economics, but this 
is presented within a broader consideration of whether evidence and theory from the 
field of economics in general is influencing education policymaking. This broader 
approach seemed more interesting and feasible. The reception amongst policymakers 
to growth modelling specifically receives attention in Part I of the dissertation.  
Turning to the sections of Part I, section 2 addresses the following question: What are 
the theoretical roots of economic models that link education to economic growth and 
how relevant is this theory for education planning? The focus here is on eight key 
theoretical models that have influenced the thinking and empirical modelling we see 
today. The models examined range from Solow’s (1956) neo-classical model to recent 
Schumpeterian creative destruction models. The models selected focus not only on 
how education and human capital contribute towards economic growth. They also 
deal with other contributing factors. Yet as will be seen, human capital became an 
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increasingly central concern. Several of these models are from an era when a lack of 
data to a large degree forced economists to present theoretical (and mathematical) 
models with no or very little empirical evidence. There is some discussion of the 
historical developments, in particular the emergence of electronic data and computing, 
which helped economics adopt a more empirical approach, as well as the arguments 
that are still made for an economics discipline that is even better at using empirical 
analysis to test theory, partly so that policymakers can receive the advice they need.  
In section 3, the following question is addressed: How have economists measured 
human capital and economic growth at the country level and what are some of the key 
problems and caveats associated with this measurement? Various attempts, starting in 
the 1990s, to produce comparable country-level indicators of the years or levels of 
schooling attained amongst the adult population are evaluated. Moreover, a recent 
attempt at taking test score data from several testing programmes and normalising 
these data is discussed. One innovation presented here is a new method for doing this 
that permits data from a wider variety of programmes to be used. Turning to economic 
growth, the literature on this is vast and much of the focus is on evaluating an existing 
and excellent meta-analysis of the literature. To some extent, new data analysis is 
presented to illustrate a few of the measurement problems. Apart from measurement 
problems, the welfarist debates around whether economic growth is an appropriate 
measure of human progress are discussed. Some discussion of the rapidly evolving 
theory and evidence around economic and social development in a context of climate 
change (and other environmental pressures) also occurs. These human development 
issues are of great importance for education policymakers, for a number of reasons, as 
will be discussed in section 3.  
Section 4 offers a detailed analysis of three empirical models, all from the period 
since 1990, which analyse the relationship between human capital (and other 
variables) and growth, using country level data. These three models are used as points 
of departure to assess a number of other similar models found in the literature. Key 
considerations are: How robust and reliable are the available models and what do 
their differing conclusions mean for education policymakers? The model (or, strictly 
speaking, set of related models) considered first is that of Mankiw, Romer and Weil 
(1992). Their augmented Solow model, where human capital is the augmenting factor, 
represents a milestone within the neo-classical view of country development. 
Thereafter a model using a so-called Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates 
(BACE) approach proposed by Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004) is 
discussed. The approach represents an apparently promising, though still not widely 
used, way of dealing with variable selection problems. Finally, innovative work by 
Hanushek and Woessman (2009) that challenges the traditional focus on years of 
schooling in growth modelling and proposes the use of increasingly available data 
emerging from international testing programmes, is critically assessed.  
Section 5 represents the data in ways that go beyond the models of section 4 with a 
view to providing policymakers with representations that assist in clarifying important 
education policy matters. A key question is thus: How can economic models be 
meaningfully presented to policymakers, and specifically how could this be done with 
respect to models examining the relationship between economic growth and 
educational progress? How the policymaker can use data to underscore the 
importance of quality improvements in the schooling system needed for economic and 
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social development is examined. Ways in which the magnitudes of certain effects, in 
particular the effect of qualitative improvements in education on economic growth, 
can be represented graphically in the interests of better planning receives attention. 
Given the importance of teachers and their unions in improving the quality of 
education, how the future quantity and pay of teachers can be explicitly linked to 
qualitative improvements and economic growth is explored. Here the focus is largely 
on South Africa, as policy advice must to a large degree be country-specific. Yet the 
forms of data representation and the policy arguments would be relevant for many 
countries, in particular developing ones. These forms and arguments are not entirely 
new and to some extent the section offers a critique of previous attempts to do similar 
things.  
Section 6 provides an overall conclusion for Part I of the dissertation.   
The dissertation as a whole draws from a wide range of the literature. This is 
inevitable if one’s ultimate focus is policy advice. Policymakers, at least good ones, 
are according to Curle (1969) characterised by their multi-disciplinary approach to 
problems. In terms of fields and disciplines, where does one locate this dissertation? 
To some extent, the dissertation draws from literature situated outside economics. 
Despite its name, the ecological economics literature discussed in section 3 falls 
outside what departments of economics in universities would generally consider their 
terrain. Part III, in examining education policy positions in various countries, draws 
from texts in the field of education. However, most of the literature dealt with in the 
dissertation, roughly 80% of it, is from economics. Within economics, the dissertation 
draws to a large degree from the literature on the economics of growth and, 
specifically, cross-country growth modelling. In terms of the micro- against 
macroeconomic distinction, this places the dissertation on the macro side, though the 
treatment of macroeconomics is not sufficiently wide or deep to allow one to describe 
the key focus of the dissertation as macroeconomic. Literature from the field of 
development economics, in some ways the economics of growth of developing 
nations specifically, receives some attention, in particular where definitions of growth 
and development are discussed in section 3. However, it is probably best to locate the 
dissertation within what has come to be considered an economics field in its own 
right, namely the economics of education. A possible problem with this categorisation 
is that the focus within this field, as reflected for instance in the field’s pre-eminent 
journal, the Economics of Education Review (started in 1979), is largely 
microeconomic. Specifically, much of the focus has been on understanding, firstly, 
the production of educational outcomes within schools, on the internal efficiency side, 
using institutional data and, secondly, the relationship between education and 
earnings, on the external efficiency side (viewed from the education perspective), 
using household data. Yet cross-country analysis has not been absent in this journal1. 
Moreover, economists such as Hanushek and Woessman, whose work inspires much 
of this dissertation, are considered to be economists of education and Hanushek has 
published extensively in the Economics of Education Review. (Further discussion of 
the elements that make up the economics of education field is provided in both Part II 
and Part III of the dissertation.) 
What warrants acknowledgement and some justification is the exclusion of certain 
types of economic analysis from the dissertation. The focus of the dissertation with 
                                                     
1
 See for instance Jamison, Jamison and Hanushek (2007).  
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respect to economic models is on cross-country growth models. Such models seem 
especially informative for the policymaker wishing to understand the relationship 
between education and economic growth, or country development more generally. 
Yet there are other models which appear to throw light on the same policy question. 
Two such models, or clusters of models, stand out. The first is rates of return to years 
of education analysis, an area where the work of renowned education economist 
George Psacharopoulos has played an important role (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 
2002). Rates of return have been extensively used to guide policymakers. Specifically 
they have been used by organisations such as the World Bank to provide guidance on 
what levels of the education system, or what types of education (in particular general 
versus vocational) should be prioritised for expansion in order to accelerate country 
development (Psacharopoulos, Tan and Jimenez, 1986). This guidance, which has 
tended to include the notable recommendation that developing countries ought to 
prioritise primary education to a larger extent, has been criticised by both 
policymakers and economists such as Glewwe (1996). Policymakers in developing 
countries have at times seen the call for a greater prioritisation of primary schooling 
as an implicit under-valuation of tertiary education and thus a geopolitically 
controversial call. Glewwe (1996: 283) criticises the World Bank-type policy 
recommendations based on rates of return in two respects. Rates of return are unable 
to gauge the positive externalities associated with human capital development, beyond 
the income returns to individuals. This concern would encompass the policymaker’s 
concerns around innovation within tertiary education research and its link to 
geopolitical influence. Secondly, Glewwe (1996) uses an analysis of data from Ghana 
to demonstrate how the poor correlation between years of schooling and actual human 
capital acquired through the schooling process can render rates of return analyses that 
use only years of schooling virtually meaningless. He further demonstrates that 
replacing years of schooling data with data on actual human capital, obtained through 
test scores, results in a much truer picture of the relationship between education and 
earnings. In this sense, Glewwe’s (1996) contribution with respect to rates of return 
analyses parallels the contribution of the Hanushek and Woessman analyses (see 
section 4.4) with respect to cross-country growth models. All overturn, to a notable 
degree, the credibility of the years of schooling variable in economic analysis. In the 
case of Glewwe (1996), however, the use of test score data is not able to resolve the 
matter of unaccounted for externalities, something that cross-country modelling 
would by its nature account for. This is a key reason why the dissertation focuses on 
the latter type of modelling. Moreover, a paucity of data in South Africa that would 
allow one to gauge the relationship between, on the one hand, knowledge and skills 
demonstrated in tests and, on the other hand, earnings, imposes a serious limitation 
with respect to rates of return analysis2. 
A second noteworthy model not considered in the dissertation is the computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model, which models over time household and firm 
behaviour and government policy, generally within one country, and their impact on 
                                                     
2
 One apparently feasible dataset is the 2008 to 2010 collection of the National Income Dynamics 
Study (NIDS). This dataset is analysed by Du Rand, Van Broekhuizen and Von Fintel (2011), who find 
that considerable noise in the test data limit their utility for a rates of return analysis. Branson and 
Leibbrandt (2013) circumvent the problems with the test data by linking the NIDS data to measures of 
secondary school examination results and produce an analysis which is arguably the most promising 
South African analysis to date of the conditional relationship between educational outcomes, on the one 
hand, and earnings and employment probabilities, on the other.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Part I  16 
 
macroeconomic variables such as growth. A common use of the CGE model is to 
gauge the impact of changes to tax policies on macroeconomic variables. 
Infrequently, education variables have been included in this type of model. Hong-
Sang Jung and Thorbecke (2001) offer an example of a model with education 
variables using data from Zambia and Tanzania and with an education policy focus. In 
their modelling, done separately for the two countries, changes in government’s 
education expenditure are tracked, which in turn are seen to influence the skills level 
of labour supply. The analysts conclude that increasing education expenditure would 
lead to faster economic growth. There appears to be little discussion in the literature 
of the merits of a CGE approach for assessing the impact of education policy changes. 
What one can safely assume, however, is that not accounting for qualitative 
educational outcomes and the efficiency of education institutions will bias any CGE 
model in a manner that would make any education policy conclusions problematic. 
CGE modelling is a highly specialised field within economics. Exploring credible 
ways of incorporating government’s education decisions within this model would 
require a dissertation of its own. For this reason CGE models are not considered 
within this dissertation.   
Quite apart from any debate on what areas of economics to draw from, and what 
quantitative models to use, when attempting to make a contribution to education 
policymaking, there is a debate, a curious and often infuriating one for many 
economists and education planners, around whether economics and quantification 
have a role to play at all in education policymaking. This debate is described, to some 
extent, in Part III, when certain academic education texts and teacher union policy 
documents are discussed. The debate is often completely shunned by economists, 
though Psacharopoulos has entered the fray on at least one occasion. 
Psacharopoulos’s (1990) view of the debate is reflected in the following extracts from 
his article in the Comparative Education Review, a journal he was in fact criticising: 
If you are reading this, you must be associated with the field of comparative education. Are 
you a “relativist,” “hologeistic,” a “neopositivist,” ... or, perhaps, “morphogenetic?” ... Before 
you decide, you may wish to ask yourself a question: Does it really matter? I think not ... 
What matters is your position on a substantive issue. ... I have expressed uneasiness about the 
contents of the two major comparative education journals, Comparative Education Review 
and Comparative Education. My conclusion is that the articles in … these journals are overly 
descriptive, in the sense that they provide long, nonquantitative accounts of the educational 
system of a single country. Seldom are the papers analytical, in the sense of statistically 
testing hypothesized relationships. As a result, few comparative lessons can be drawn to 
assist decision makers in educational planning.  
Importantly, Psacharopoulos was not questioning the utility for education 
policymaking of the academic field known as comparative education, but rather 
arguing that it ought to be better focussed. In fact, Psacharopoulos (1989) puts 
forward an example of what good comparative education analysis, in his view, should 
look like. Part III of the dissertation attempts to do something similar. Comparative 
education and the kind of cross-country modelling seen in Parts I and II ought to be 
complementary areas of study. The latter covers a sufficient range of countries to 
allow for meaningful and robust patterns in the data to be detected, whilst the former 
narrows the focus to a few countries, thus permitting in-depth analysis of policies and 
the influence of specific national contexts.  
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Whilst there is sympathy in this dissertation for the frustration expressed by 
Psacharopoulos in the above extract, there is also an attempt to uncover the 
institutional and ideological explanations for ‘anti-economist’ views, and also to 
demonstrate that if the economic approach to understanding education systems is 
pursued with sufficient care and sufficient recognition of context, misunderstandings 
can be minimised and quantification can be made appealing.  
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2 AN OVERVIEW OF KEY THEORETICAL MODELS 
2.1 Introduction 
Theories of economic growth in the last fifty years have mostly been expressed 
through mathematical formulas accompanied by a narrative, but different economists 
tend to use slightly different terms and mathematical notation. To assist the discussion 
presented below, the mathematics and language used in Aghion and Howitt’s (2009) 
growth textbook is used. This is a textbook written for graduate students and 
professionals, and is a reworking of the authors’ original 1998 textbook (Aghion and 
Howitt, 1998). The selection, sequencing and assessment of models presented here are 
also influenced by this book. At the same time, this section is not a summary of 
Aghion of Howitt (2009). The education policy concerns of the dissertation influence 
the selection and interpretation of the models, and for certain models the original 
texts, rather than Aghion and Howitt (2009), were used as the principal source. The 
key original texts referred to by Aghion and Howitt (2009) were all consulted. 
Robert Lucas, author of one of the models discussed below, refers to economic theory 
as ‘an explicit dynamic system, something that can be put on a computer and run’ 
(original italics) and ‘the construction of a mechanical, artificial world, populated by 
the interacting robots that economics typically studies, that is capable of exhibiting 
behavior the gross features of which resemble those of the actual world’. In this 
section, the criterion that a theoretical model should be implementable on a computer 
is taken seriously. All eight models are simulated in Excel, and results in the form of 
graphs are discussed. Tiny fabricated datasets and not actual economic data were 
used, partly because the models studied, being theoretical, are often not replicable 
with real world data. To illustrate, the discussion that follows will show how notions 
of duration and lags implied by the models are not realistic. This is not necessarily a 
problem if one considers one is dealing with an ‘artificial world’ designed to 
‘resemble ... the actual world’. To use the terminology of McCloskey (1994: 42), 
economic models are metaphors. Both the smallness of the fabricated datasets and the 
fact that simulating the models often required adjusting the data through an 
optimisation process, made Excel an appropriate tool to explore the models. 
Moreover, an aim in this section is to present the eight models in as standardised a 
fashion as possible, to facilitate comparison between the models.  
A short look at some pre-twentieth century thinking seems in place. In Adam Smith’s 
(1991) Wealth of Nations, originally published in 1776 and often considered the 
original treatise on classical economics, it is investment, the division of labour and (to 
some extent) colonial exploitation that bring about a growth of national income. 
Investment allows for more capital intensive production and the division of labour 
allows for specialisation, all of which result in more efficient production. Investment 
in human capital is explicitly recognised (Smith, 1991: 247): 
[Fixed capital includes] the acquired and useful abilities of all the inhabitants or 
members of the society. The acquisition of such talents, by the maintenance of the 
acquirer during his education, study or apprenticeship, always costs a real expense, 
which is a fixed capital and is realised, as it were, in his person. 
Marx, though not primarily known for his theory of economic growth, did put one 
forward, and the nature of his theory influences his better known historical 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Part I  19 
 
determinism. Like Smith, Marx views investment, the division of labour and colonial 
exploitation as growth-enhancing. However, human behaviour in the growth process 
is rather different in Marx in at least two important ways. Firstly, by allowing for high 
levels of human exploitation in his theory, Marx permits capitalists to run 
extraordinarily high social risks to the extent that capitalism itself collapses (Mandel, 
2002). This part of Marx is of course well known. What is less widely discussed is the 
fact that in Marx labour, whilst specialised, remains rather undynamic with respect to 
its level of knowledge and skills, or its human capital. Workers do not invest in their 
own human capital (or that of their children) to improve their productivity and wages, 
nor do capitalists improve the human capital of their labour to increase their profits. 
Even a basic awareness of investment in human capital, as reflected in the above 
extract from Smith, seems absent in Marx. The absence of rigorous attention to human 
capital in Marx is arguably a key factor explaining his historical determinism and his 
inability to foresee the ability of capitalism to adapt and gain acceptance in a 
sufficiently large portion of society to survive in ways he did not foresee.  
A further difference between Smith and Marx is noteworthy, given what growth 
models have to say about competition between firms. For Marx, market dominance by 
monopoly firms is inevitable. Smith, who regards monopoly as having a negative 
effect on welfare, sees no such historical trend. We shall see that recent growth 
models focussing on imitation and innovation consider monopolisation as a positive 
trend, and in some senses inevitable, though in a completely different manner to 
Marx.  
The fact that Marx and Smith should have had such vastly different views of the role 
of human capital in economic development and that both should have exerted such a 
strong influence on governments over an extended period of time, underlines the 
importance and power of formally stated theory on human development, even where 
this theory is not empirically based. Education policymakers are guided by various 
theories on the contribution made by education towards the development of society. 
The more economically and sociologically oriented theories that guide the education 
sector are sometimes studied formally within philosophy of education classes, which 
are mainly offered by university faculties of education and teacher training 
institutions. At least three theories commonly found amongst education experts, other 
than the human capital model economists would be familiar with, are described by 
Gilead (2012), writing in the Journal of Philosophy of Education. One theory is in a 
sense a non-theory, an inward-looking view of education coupled with a notion that 
there is no need to dwell on the relationship between education and social 
development. Another theory explicitly rejects the human capital theory of the 
economists on ethical grounds, arguing that its portrayal of human subjects as 
contributors towards economic growth is de-humanising. Theodore Schultz, 1979 
Nobel laureate in economics for his work in development economics and one of the 
earliest proponents of the term ‘human capital’, sees ethical concerns as a reason why 
economists themselves took so long to incorporate human quantity and quality into 
economic models: 
The mere thought of investment in human beings is offensive to some among us. Our values 
and beliefs inhibit us from looking upon human beings as capital goods, except in slavery, 
and this we abhor. ... to treat human beings as wealth that can be augmented by investment 
runs counter to deeply held values. (Schultz, 1961: 2) 
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Thirdly, some educationists reject the determinism they see in the economic notion of 
human preferences, specifically preferences for maximum earnings. This, the 
argument goes, denies the role played by education systems in shaping and changing 
human preferences. Gilead (2012) finds the latter objection to human capital theory 
the most interesting one, partly because it is most likely to lead to a constructive and 
mutually educational conversation between educationists and economists. This is a 
conversation that Gilead (2012: 114) believes is lacking amongst philosophers of 
education: 
By exploring economic ideas, philosophers of education, for their part, can render their work 
more relevant for policy-making and hence play a greater role in shaping it 
In examining the theories of economic growth in this section, some attention will go 
towards understanding how these theories might be received by education 
policymakers and how they could constructively challenge policymakers to question 
pre-conceived notions of education’s role in society.  
Theoretical models are dealt with in this section, separately from the often related 
empirical models discussed in section 4, which comes after section 3 has introduced 
the data used in the empirical modelling. This separation between the theory and 
empirical modelling is followed for two reasons. Firstly, this allows one to deal with 
conceptual issues arising from the theoretical models in a more integrated way and, 
similarly, data issues arising from the empirical models can be dealt with more 
integrally. Secondly, the links between theory and empirical analysis in the growth 
literature are arguably weaker than what one might expect. Many theorists, in 
particular the ones writing before the 1990s, did not do any empirical testing of their 
theories. But even when the same economist presents both theory and empirical 
testing, the structure of the two is sometimes rather different.  
The order of the eight models discussed below is only roughly chronological. The 
oldest model, Solow’s neoclassical model, comes first, but this is followed by a fairly 
recent vindication of Solow’s model, by Mankiw, Romer and Weil. Then comes a 
discussion of the basic AK model, an attempt to move beyond the confines of 
neoclassical economics, followed by a specific and recent formulation of the AK 
model, by Lucas. Next is the product variety model, which introduces the role of firms 
in the growth process. Lastly, three Schumpeterian models, the Nelson and Phelps 
model, a ‘creative destruction’ model and a model with two levels of human capital, 
are discussed.  
Some consideration of McCloskey’s arguments relating to the relevance of economic 
theory is informative at this point. In Knowledge and persuasion in economics, 
McCloskey (1994: 127-145, 164-178) argues that the surge in ‘mathematical 
formalism’ beginning in the 1950s, whilst initially a healthy response to insufficient 
rigour in economics, ended up becoming an obsession that obscured the actual 
purpose of economics. To illustrate the trend, McCloskey points to statistics such as 
the increase in the percentage of pages in the American Economic Review ‘containing 
a mathematical expression without empirical use’ from 2% to 44% between 1951 and 
1978 (McCloskey, 1994: 127). McCloskey would support some of this trend, and 
some of its proponents, such as Solow, who saw mathematics as a means to 
encapsulate, clarify and develop further the largely narrative approach to economic 
argument that had predominated. But, according to McCloskey, mathematical 
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formalism was also driven by less noble motives, and hence went too far. One such 
motive was the need to make economics departments at universities seem more 
worthy of support through making economics more ‘scientific’, and hence more like 
rapidly growing scientific departments. McCloskey has examined this notion of 
‘science’ at length and argues that the economists were fundamentally misguided. The 
science departments at universities, she argues, are in fact more pragmatic and less 
mathematical than the economics departments. The economists misunderstood 
‘science’. McCloskey rejects the argument, put forward by some economists, that 
economics was forced to become mathematical and relatively abstract due to a 
shortage of experimental data. She points to geology, which is similarly lacking in 
experimental data, but has remained more faithful to solving practical problems. 
Another motive is a cultural one. Many economics departments (she is referring 
almost exclusively to those in the US) are in the grips of an ‘extreme aestheticization’ 
in which the elegance of mathematical theory becomes valued more than inelegant 
dealings with historical, social and political realities (McCloskey, 1994: 167). 
McCloskey would like to see economics become more practically oriented, focussing 
on more empirical analysis and simulation using real world data, and within the area 
of empirical analysis focussing more on the magnitude of effects and less on whether 
an effect exists at all (these points relating to empirical analysis receive considerable 
attention in this dissertation). It is important to bear in mind that the arguments 
mentioned here with respect to mathematical theory in economics are from a book 
published in 1994, when access to computers, and skills to use them, were still 
relatively rare amongst departments of economics staff and their students. Computers 
have undoubtedly shifted economics in a more practical and empirical direction, and 
one presumes McCloskey would approve of this. Yet her arguments against excessive 
mathematical formalism are a useful backdrop against which to examine the evolution 
of the theory of economic growth, and to inform the conclusion to this section. 
2.2 Solow’s neoclassical model 
Solow’s model, like several of the theoretical models receiving attention, are based on 
a Cobb-Douglas form, so a short review of this form is provided. Cobb and Douglas 
(1928) provide a rare example of an early empirical examination of growth, though 
their focus is on growth in production, and in one country, the United States. The 
Cobb-Douglas form can be considered one of two basic, and to some extent 
competing, forms in the growth literature, the other being the Harrod-Domar form, 
which is discussed below (Frankel, 1962). The Cobb-Douglas form can be represented 
as follows (Cobb and Douglas, 1928: 151; Sydsæter and Hammond, 2002: 378):  
βα LAKY =  (1) 
The exact meanings of the values may differ somewhat, but generally Y is income or 
output during some period of time which is typically a year, K is the stock of physical 
capital in the economy, L is the stock of labour (or the flow of labour time) and A is 
the level of technology or productivity. A which, as will be seen, became a central 
concern for growth economists, thus partly reflects the nature of K (better technology 
and productivity is often a feature of the machines people use) and partly the nature of 
L (technology and productivity enhancements require more able labourers). Typically, 
the exponents α and β add up to 1 or unity and each is greater than zero. This means 
that constant returns to scale hold. If AK and L are doubled, then Y doubles in value. 
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However, if, say, L is kept constant, then Y is a decreasing function of K, meaning in 
this instance there are diminishing marginal returns to K. Each additional unit of K is 
associated with a smaller increase in Y until the increase in Y is barely differentiable 
from zero. We can express this in terms of derivatives: 
( ) 0' >KY  and ( ) 0'' <KY  
 
The first derivative of Y as a function of K is never less than zero because more capital 
can never reduce income. But the fact that returns are diminishing is captured in the 
fact that the second derivative of Y as a function of K is always negative. On the other 
hand, if both K and L are increasing at, say, 1% per year, Y will increase by 1% a year, 
no matter what values the exponents have, as long as they add up to unity, and the 
second derivative will equal zero:  
( ) 0'' =KY  
Solow’s model is neoclassical in the sense that it implicitly assumes there is perfect 
competition, profit maximisation by firms and rational behaviour amongst all 
economic agents. Solow’s model is sometimes referred to as the Solow-Swan model 
due to the coincidental publication in the same year, 1956, of a similar model by the 
Australian economist Trevor Swan (Solow, Nobel laureate for his work on the 
modelling of economic growth, is American). Both Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) 
presented purely theoretical models, with no empirical application. The form used was 
the Cobb-Douglas form with the sum of the exponents explicitly being equal to unity 
(Aghion and Howitt, 2009: 23; Solow, 1956: 84-85; Swan, 1956: 335):  
αα −
=
1LAKY  (2) 
K is determined endogenously through the next formula, where s refers to saving, or 
conceivably what the System of National Accounts (SNA) calls the ‘gross savings 
rate’, and δ refers to depreciation, or ‘consumption of fixed capital’ in the SNA. The 
value of the addition to the stock of capital from one year to the next is equal to the 
amount of income from the previous year saved and invested in new capital stock 
minus the value of the capital stock that has depreciated.  
KsYK δ−=&  (3) 
In many applications of the neoclassical model, and for the discussion that follows, s 
and δ are assumed to remain constant over time. Swan (1956: 345), whilst not 
including δK explicitly in his model, does make important points about depreciation. 
The capital stock, he argues, is not ‘instantaneously adaptable’ and it is thus not 
enough to consider normal depreciation in the sense of capital that ceases to function, 
but also loss of capital due to equipment and machines becoming redundant as the 
technology of production progresses.  
A is the ‘productivity’ (Aghion and Howitt: 2009: 13) or ‘technological change’ 
(Solow, 1956: 85) or efficiency whereby capital and labour are converted to income. 
As mentioned earlier, A could encompass both features of L, such as level of 
education and skills, and features as K, such as the quality and efficiency of 
equipment. The Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Griliches, 2002) describes 
productivity as being ‘embedded in the current range of equipment and in the training 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Part I  23 
 
of the existing work-force’. However, Solow’s model, unlike many of the later 
models, implicitly considers A being attached primarily to K.  
Simulating Solow’s model in Excel requires at least some realism in the numbers if 
one is to avoid nonsensical results. However, one arbitrary value used for Figure 1 
below and in many subsequent graphs is the value 100 as the starting point for income 
Y. This was done to facilitate comparison across the graphs. For Figure 1, recent 
South African values3 were used to inform the starting value of K, relative to Y, so in 
the starting year K is about double the value of Y, or 200, implying a capital/output 
ratio of 2.0. The gross savings rate s is 0.2 and consumption of fixed capital δ is 0.06, 
more or less the values for South Africa. A, which refers to an abstract concept outside 
the national accounting system, was assigned the value 1. Labour L was also assigned 
the value 1 for the sake of simplicity (an approach frequently followed in the literature 
and implicitly followed in many of the models described below where L is omitted). 
The exponent α attached to K was assigned the value 0.87 so that equation (2) would 
balance4. The following application of equation (3) was followed in the simulation: 
111 −−− −+= tttt KsYKK δ  (4) 
The simulated model over twenty years can be illustrated as follows: 
Figure 1: Solow’s neoclassical model 
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The position of the symbols indicate whether the curve should be read against the left-
hand or right-hand vertical axis. Thus K and Y should be read against the left-hand 
axis and gK and gY against the right-hand axis. It is noteworthy that the simulation 
                                                     
3
 From South African Reserve Bank (2009).  
4
 As Aghion and Howitt (2009: 58) point out, although in an economy that is in a state of equilibrium 
the exponent for capital α should be close to the savings rate (around 0.2 for South Africa), its true 
value is often much higher, between 0.7 and 1.0 (as suggested in the simulation described here), which 
is indicative of externalities arising out of capital accumulation.  
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results in growth rates for Y, or gY, that are realistic. They begin at 3.5% and drop to 
2.8%. The following patterns can be observed: 
 In this simulation growth in the capital stock gK is greater than growth in income 
gY (4.0% against 3.5% initially). This means that over time the capital/output ratio 
increases, from 2.00 to 2.18 over the 20 years.  
 Both gY and gK are falling, and falling at the same rate (the slopes of the gY and gK 
curves are the same). 
Plausible changes to the starting values do not change these patterns substantially, but 
the following can be noted: 
 If the starting values of Y and K are multiplied by a factor, and L is multiplied by 
the same factor, gY and gK remain the same, implying that the size of the country 
has no bearing on growth.  
 If the savings rate is reduced by multiplying it by a factor i, where i is less than 1, 
gY and gK drop by factor that is even less than i. For instance, reducing the savings 
rate to 0.15 decreases initial growth in Y to 1.3%. 
 If the capital/output ratio is reduced, growth in K and Y rise sharply. For instance, 
reducing initial K to 150, so the capital/output ratio becomes 1.5, results in an 
initial gY of 6.7%. In this adjustment, it is necessary to increase the value of α 
slightly from the 0.87 referred to above to 0.92. If α is not adjusted in this manner, 
the model does not balance in the sense that one obtains a strange drop in Y 
between year 1 and year 2. That less capital should be associated with higher 
growth seems at first counter-intuitive. However, a country that has a relatively 
high starting income relative to its capital stock must be very efficient at 
converting capital into income, hence the higher value for the coefficient α, and 
the high growth must be understood as the product of high efficiency.   
 If the adjustments from the previous two bullets are effected simultaneously, in 
other words if both the savings rate and the capital/output ratio are reduced, then 
gY and gK decrease, but only slightly (starting gY becomes 3.7%). This means that 
a country that has less capital stock because it saves less will grow at a lower rate. 
This makes intuitive sense. In this scenario, α must be adjusted upwards to the 
extent described in the previous bullet for counter-intuitive jumps between years 1 
and 2 to be avoided.  
In the long run, what will happen to gY? Figure 2 illustrates the simulation from Figure 
1 in the long run. Growth in Y decreases to 1.0% in year 118, 0.5% in year 196, and 
approaches zero but never reaches zero, meaning Y"(t) approaches zero in the long 
run. The graph suggests that the ‘steady state’ of Y of around 3,000 is reached after 
some 600 to 700 years.  
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Figure 2: Solow’s neoclassical model in the long run 
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It is also possible to calculate the steady state level of Y mathematically5: 
α
α
α
δ
−






=
1
1
sY  (5) 
Different starting values for K and different savings rates s result in different steady 
states. If our adjustment of the savings rate to 0.15 is applied, Y reaches a steady state 
at around 450 in more or less the year 500. If our adjustment of initial K to 150 is 
applied, the steady state is at around 800,000 by the year 1000 (and arguably the 
steady state has not been reached yet). The combination of these two adjustments 
produces a steady state at around 30,000 in the year 1000.  
So what does all of this mean for the theoretical country? Above all it means that 
there is a steady state level of Y in the long run, but that this steady state depends on 
the size of one’s initial capital stock, its productivity (as reflected in α), and the extent 
to which one restocks it. Countries with the same initial values for these three 
variables must end up at the same steady state of Y. Though this implies that countries 
may not all converge to the same steady state, as not all would have these three 
starting values, the possibilities for non-convergence are generally considered so 
restricted that Solow’s model is often said to predict convergence amongst all 
countries to the same or at least a very similar steady state. Importantly, using 
plausible values results in the steady state being reached very far into the future, often 
after hundreds of years. Though the fact of a steady state is referred to as a key feature 
of neoclassical models, the time required for this to occur is seldom made clear6. 
From the perspective of what could happen within one or two generations, perhaps a 
more important pattern in the Solow model is that there are diminishing returns to 
                                                     
5
 This is derived from a similar formula in Aghion and Howitt (2009: 289) dealing with the Mankiw, 
Romer and Weil model.  
6
 For instance Aghion and Howitt (2009) do not explain this.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Part I  26 
 
capital. Such diminishing returns over time would not be a sign of failed economic 
policies, but rather of dynamics inherent in the productivity of capital. These 
dynamics are not difficult to grasp intuitively. If one has no or very little physical 
capital (be this in the form of ploughs, brickmaking machines or computers), then 
adding some makes each person more productive. But eventually, the addition to the 
capital stock used by a finite number of people will not change productivity to any 
significant degree (what will an economist do with five computers?). 
Two provisos must be noted. An increase in labour L means that the diminishing 
returns for total additions to the capital stock can be slowed down, but per worker 
diminishing returns will remain the same. Moreover, according to the model, total 
income can grow infinitely as long as population and labour grows infinitely. The 
second and more relevant proviso is that if A were to increase infinitely, so would 
growth, even growth in income per capita. 
The Solow model says almost nothing about human capital and, by implication, 
education, with the possible exception that the model implies education systems 
should teach the young to save. As mentioned above, one would expect human capital 
to reside within A. Apart from human capital, another element of A is not specified in 
Solow’s model (though it is in the Schumpeterian models that will be examined). In 
Palgrave (Griliches, 2002), productivity, or A, is a function of both ‘the average set of 
recipes for doing things’ and ‘the currently known best way of doing things’ (own 
italics). Put differently, productivity is a function of two things: the extent to which 
we have adopted the best technologies available and what technologies we have not 
adopted yet, though they are available for adoption in the near future because they 
have been tested elsewhere. A further element of productivity (also from Palgrave and 
also not dealt with in Solow’s model) deserves mention. Productivity is enhanced by 
human capital, by the available capital stock, but also by ‘the current organizational 
arrangements for using these resources in production’ (Griliches, 2002: 1010), 
whether these arrangements be at the micro level, in for instance the managerial 
culture of firms, or at the macro level, in for instance the governance of the country. 
Clearly, much of the work in growth modelling should be, and indeed is, oriented 
towards unpacking A.  
Solow’s model has served as an important point of reference and target for critique for 
subsequent theorists. Apart from the absence of an explicit human capital variable, the 
element of his model that has probably attracted the most criticism is diminishing 
returns to capital (and this is of course a fundamental element). Romer (1986: 1008), 
for instance, in arguing against the neoclassical growth paradigm, indicates that the 
data do not support convergence towards a steady state of income resulting from 
diminishing returns to capital. Using historical country-level data going back to 1700 
for some countries, Romer demonstrates that contrary to the predictions of the 
neoclassical model, economic growth tends to increase over time.  
The rise and fall of Solow’s neoclassical model was part of a larger and highly 
significant trend in policy thinking. Development economists and institutions such as 
the World Bank behaved for many years in ways that reflected a strong belief in the 
power of physical capital investments, and relatively weak attention to the role of 
human capital. As discussed by Emmerij (2002), in his historical account of 
international development aid, up until the strong shift towards investments in social 
programmes, in particular education, in the 1970s, development agencies had assumed 
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that raising investments in physical capital and focussing on strengthening niche 
industries were the most efficient ways of stimulating development. They were not 
entirely incorrect, as ‘economic miracles’ in the 1960s in countries such as Brazil 
seemed to demonstrate. However, questions about the sustainability of this type of 
development were raised. In the case of Brazil, rapid industrialisation did not appear 
to alleviate poverty as expected and income inequalities worsened.  
Though the development economics literature began elevating the role of human 
capital from the 1970s, it was only in 1992 that Mankiw, Romer and Weil re-designed 
Solow’s model in order to incorporate an explicit human capital variable. This delay 
was partly due the fact that the required data for the empirical part of Mankiw, Romer 
and Weil (1992) only became available towards the end of the 1980s.  
Though in the economic literature a model of industrial development and GDP growth 
that does not pay close attention to human capital may have reached redundancy many 
decades ago, such a model can be said to exist in the minds of many education 
policymakers even today. To illustrate, in South Africa the argument that better 
education cannot tackle poverty and that policies dealing with industry and the labour 
market need to accomplish this, is not an argument that one would easily find in the 
academic literature. Yet it is an argument that one can hear being made even by high-
ranking government policymakers from time to time. Solow’s industry-focussed 
model is thus by no means dead. Of course it is beyond argument that industry policy 
is important for growth. But why would anyone deny that human capital development 
has a vital role to play? One explanation would be an overly simplistic adoption of a 
Marxist framework where, as was discussed above, human capital development is not 
an important element. Another would be that the transmission between better 
education and higher income, for the individual and the country, has not been 
understood. Specifically, the link between human capital and productivity in the 
workplace may not be clear. Perhaps it should not surprise us that this link is not 
always understood as what it actually means, in terms of actual human behaviour, is 
often not clear in the literature. According to Boissiere (2004), this topic has received 
attention in the economic literature, though much of it has focussed on one 
occupation, namely farming.  
Scepticism about the productivity-enhancing power of better education is likely to be 
driven by lingering notions that screening plays a large role in the labour market. 
Roughly, screening theory says that education serves as a sorter of workers in the 
labour market. The individual therefore acquires more education not because this 
makes her more productive, but because there is a general move towards more 
education and hence in order to maintain one’s place in the queue, one is forced to 
acquire more education than one otherwise might (Spence, 1973; Stigitz, 1975). In his 
review of the literature, Boissiere (2004: 5) concludes that the evidence suggests that 
whilst screening is not non-existent, its impact in the labour market is relatively small.  
2.3 The augmented Solow model 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) (henceforth MRW) offer a persuasive and 
empirically supported defence of Solow’s model. (David Romer of MRW is not the 
same as Paul Romer mentioned in the previous sub-section, and neither are the two 
related.) MRW do not respond directly to Romer’s (1986) challenge, but they do 
present a robust empirical rendition of what they call the ‘augmented Solow model’. 
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The theoretical version of this model is dealt with here, and the empirical version is 
one of the three empirical models examined in depth in section 4. The augmentation 
consists of adding a human capital variable H to equation (2), resulting in the 
following: 
βαβα −−
=
1LHAKY  (6) 
H has the same saving and depreciation dynamics as K and as reflected in equation 
(3). Presumably (this is not made explicit in MRW) saving occurs through 
investments in education (to a large degree the cost is an opportunity cost given the 
time intensity of education) and depreciation occurs when people become too old to 
work, or die.  
Equation (6) is Aghion and Howitt’s (2009: 289) rendition of MRW’s model. The 
original in MRW (1992: 416) is slightly different and appears as follows.  
( ) βαβα −−= 1ALHKY  (7) 
The two versions are not fundamentally different. Equation (7) implies considering 
effective labour AL and not raw labour L as a factor of production. Moreover, because 
the exponent of A in equation (6) is 1 whilst in equation (7) it is always less than 1, 
the first equation will always yield a higher value of Y and also greater growth in Y 
over time if the four right-hand variables and α and β are equal across the two 
equations.  
The next graph illustrates the simulation of Figure 1 with a very small quantity of 
human capital H added in order to examine what the marginal impact of H might be. 
The starting values for the variables in equation (2) remained the same. The starting 
value for H is 1 and in order not to change the Solow model patterns too much β (the 
exponent for H) was set at 0.04, s for human capital was set at 0.0006 and δ for 
human capital at 0.0002.     
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Figure 3: MRW’s augmented Solow model 
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The insertion of the human capital variable results in a higher growth rate. Where 
growth declined to 2.8% in year 20 in the un-augmented Solow model, it declines 
only to 3.2% in the augmented model. As a result, Y in year 20 is now higher. 
Importantly, growth is enhanced not only by the direct effect of H on Y, but also 
through an indirect effect whereby the direct effect allows for more income to be 
invested in K. Very importantly, for H to have an effect on growth, H itself must 
grow. If human capital accumulation does not exceed human capital depreciation, 
then human capital does not enhance growth. In education terms, it is not enough for 
the country to be educated, the educational level of workers must improve over time if 
education is to have an impact on growth. This is why the augmented Solow model of 
MRW is said to belong to a class of models emphasising human capital accumulation, 
and not the stock of human capital (Aghion and Howitt, 2009: 287). 
The long run version of Figure 3, given below, illustrates an important defining 
feature of the model. Eventually, a steady state level of Y is reached, but with human 
capital in the model this is higher and it takes longer to get there (compared to a 
similar model without human capital). Y* and gY* are from the un-augmented Solow 
model of Figure 2. Even without changes over time in the proportion of income 
devoted to human capital investment, differences in the human capital starting values 
between countries are, according to MRW, likely to cause different future steady 
states, and work against convergence between countries. That the inclusion of human 
capital should make the original Solow model much more compatible with non-
convergence between countries, and hence vindicate the basic structure of the model, 
is a key argument in MRW.  
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Figure 4: MRW’s augmented Solow model in the long run 
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The basic notion that levels of human capital and its growth over time should 
influence income and its growth to the degree that human capital deserves separate 
treatment in a growth model, would make sense to most education policymakers. 
Non-convergence, on the other hand, is less likely to be accepted as a feature of 
development by policymakers who consider the strong growth of certain Asian 
countries in the three decades between 1980 and 2010. The success of these countries 
has served to inspire hope that all developing countries can eventually become high 
income countries, and that the world can converge towards more or less the same high 
level of human welfare. To illustrate the pattern, between 1980 and 2010 Taiwan 
quadrupled its GDP per capita in real terms and surpassed Italy, in purchasing power 
parity terms. China, which in 1980 had an income per capita around one-fifth of that 
of South Africa, had more or less caught up to South Africa by 2010 (own analysis, 
using Heston, Summers and Aten, 2011). Even the general pattern has been weakly in 
the direction of convergence if one considers that the quintile of poorest countries in 
1980 had on average a GDP per capita that was 3% of that of the richest quintile of 
countries, whilst by 2010 this percentage, using the same two groups of countries, had 
risen to 6%. However, if one does not use the same groups of countries for each year, 
and simply compares the average income of the bottom quintile to the top quintile, 
using all countries with non-missing data in both years, a less hopeful picture 
emerges. The percentage in fact drops from 3% to 2%. There is thus not unambiguous 
evidence supporting convergence over the last few decades. It is should be 
remembered that MRW’s augmented Solow model does not imply that convergence 
cannot occur, but rather that non-convergence may occur as a result of different initial 
levels of human capital, or different human capital accumulation rates. The notion that 
not all countries will eventually converge to exactly the same level of per capita 
income seems uncontroversial.  
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2.4 The AK model 
The AK model was an early attempt to explain non-convergence and non-diminishing 
returns to capital investment in per capita terms. It started as an entirely theoretical 
exercise centred to a large extent around articles by Frankel (1962) and Arrow (1962). 
The AK model uses as its point of departure the following Harrod-Domar form 
(Frankel, 1962: 995): 
AKY =  (8) 
The model takes its name from this basic form, which can be seen as a special case of 
the Cobb-Douglas form with the exponent for K set to 1 and the exponent for L set to 
0 (making L equal 1). Clearly, if A is constant then growth in Y will be proportional to 
growth in K, meaning constant returns to scale, and if A grows there will be increasing 
returns to K. Diminishing returns to K are impossible. This puts the model firmly 
outside the neoclassical class of models, which consider diminishing returns to be 
indispensible.   
The AK model is said to be endogenous as it provides an explanation, albeit a very 
simple one, for growth of A. Physical capital generates positive externalities in the 
form of improved knowledge and skills in society, so A is a positive function of K 
(Aghion and Howitt, 2009: 50). The suggestion is that economies of scale are 
important. A larger country would have a higher value of A than a smaller country 
with the same amount of K per capita. A is thus barely endogenised, given the obvious 
complexity of A. As Aghion and Howitt (2009: 323) put it: ‘There are many channels 
through which societies accumulate knowledge, including formal education, on-the-
job training, basic scientific research, learning by doing, process innovations, and 
product innovations.’  
In one sense the AK model is thoroughly neoclassical. It assumes that firms are 
competitive and profit-maximising and that publicly accessible knowledge (in many 
senses A) grows due to positive and unintended externalities in the capital 
accumulation process. The model does not see a conflict between competition and 
innovation in the way that the Schumpeterian models examined below in sections 2.7 
to 2.9 do.  
The AK model combines equations (3) and (8) to obtain the following equation for 
growth: 
δ−= sAgY  (9) 
The next graph illustrates the AK model. In this simulation, A is kept constant. It was 
critical to set this variable at a value which did not result in implausible trends. The 
other variables were all given the same starting values as in the Figure 1 simulation of 
Solow’s neoclassical model.  
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Figure 5: The AK model 
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The main difference between this outcome and that of the Figure 1 simulation is that 
growth is constant here, implying no movement towards a steady state of Y. The most 
developed countries will always remain ahead in the development trajectory.   
If the savings rate s is reduced to 0.15, a result similar to that for the neoclassical 
model is obtained. Growth in Y diminishes, in the case of the AK model to 1.5% 
(though it remains constant).  Interestingly, if we simulate once again a country with a 
low saving rate (s is 0.15) and a low initial capital endowment (capital is 150), then gY 
does not fall. Instead, it remains at the 4% level seen in Figure 5. But this adjustment 
requires one to increase A to balance the equation. The model therefore forces one to 
compensate for lower capital intensity with higher productivity A (the starting value 
for Y has not been adjusted).  
The idea that physical capital should in itself stimulate human capital, as implied by 
the AK model, is an idea that education policymakers often consider. Specifically, in 
a context of weak teachers, policymakers often turn to the possibility that computers, 
computer software, textbooks and science equipment could in some way compensate 
for the poor human capital of the teachers, in particular if the latter is such a serious 
problem that the scope for in-service training solutions is severely limited. Of course 
the AK model is not making this claim specifically for the education system, but 
rather in terms of the labour market and the economy as a whole (which would 
include the education system).   
2.5 The Lucas model 
Lucas’s (1988) model is entirely theoretical, though it is informed by Denison’s 
(1974) empirical work on the growth of the US economy using the Solow model. 
Aghion and Howitt (2009: 287) consider Lucas’s model to be an AK model due to its 
non-convergence structure. They also consider it to be one of two models emphasising 
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human capital accumulation, as opposed to the stock of human capital (the other 
model is the MRW model discussed above).  
Despite its AK qualities, the Lucas model does assume diminishing returns to K. The 
exponent β in the following is always less than 1:  
( ) ββ −= 1uHKY  (10) 
The variable u represents the proportion of a person’s (or all people’s) time spent 
working, and not studying. Income Y is thus explicitly a function of both physical 
capital K and that part of human capital H not invested in creating further human 
capital. Lucas’s equation reflects his insistence that macroeconomic models need 
microeconomic foundations (in this case a basis in the education investment decisions 
of households and individuals), and his interest in incorporating elements of human 
capital theory into a growth model (Lucas, 1988: 15). Lucas’s full rendition of the 
equation includes an additional element, an external effect of H, or an income-
enhancing effect that is not perceived by the individual but is felt by the economy as a 
whole (Lucas, 1988: 18). Put differently, there is a positive externality arising out of 
the individual’s investment in education. Here this element is ignored for the sake of 
simplicity.  
In the Lucas model physical capital is accumulated according to the following 
equation, which excludes depreciation (represented in the earlier equation (3) by δK): 
CYK −=&  (11) 
C is aggregate consumption. This is of course just a different way of saying that the 
capital stock grows by the amount saved, as in the neoclassical model. The next 
equation explains how H changes across two periods of time.   
( )uHH −= 1γ&  (12) 
Here γ refers to the productivity of the education system. Growth in human capital is 
thus higher the more time is spent in education, and the more productive the schools 
are. The above implies that growth in H will be constant as long as the parameters γ 
and u remain the same.  
The combination of the previous three equations allows for the simulation illustrated 
in Figure 6. Whilst in the AK model simulations discussed above growth of Y and K is 
always constant, plausible manipulation of the values in the Lucas model allows 
growth of Y and K to increase, decrease or remain constant. In Figure 6 decreasing 
values of gY and gK are simulated so that scenarios comparable to those in Figure 1 
and Figure 3, where these two variables also reduce over time, are produced.  
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Figure 6: The Lucas model 
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The above scenario uses the following parameters: β is 0.87; u is 0.9; consumption C 
is always 0.8 of income Y; γ is 0.2. Maintaining a constant ratio of consumption to 
income results in a constant value for gH.  
Where the AK model sees improvements in human capital, in the sense of 
improvements in A, as a function of the interaction between physical and human 
capital, the Lucas model discussed above presents a notion of human capital growth 
that would be more familiar to education planners. Time is a core ingredient in the 
education process and it is not easily substituted in the education production process. 
Whilst in the production of, say, cathedrals, it has been possible to reduce the time 
input through better machinery, no such substitution seems possible in education, at 
least not in any comparable sense. However, though there may be constraints insofar 
as it appears difficult, for instance, for the average child to become literate and 
numerate in less than around six years, within this constraint there is a large range 
with respect to the possible depth and quality of the literacy outcomes of a schooling 
system. Even similarly resourced schooling systems with apparently similar 
organisational structures can be significantly different with respect to their 
educational outcomes. Lucas’s acknowledgement of this through the internal 
efficiency parameter γ is thus important.  
Within economics, Lucas can be said to be a proponent of what educationists refer to 
as lifelong learning and economists ‘learning by doing’. As Kenneth Arrow, Nobel 
laureate for his work on general equilibrium theory and the economist generally 
considered to have introduced ‘learning by doing’ into the economics lexicon, puts it 
(Arrow, 1962: 155):  
Learning is the product of experience. Learning can only take place through the attempt to 
solve a problem and therefore only takes place during activity. Even the Gestalt and other 
field theorists, who stress the role of insight in the solution of problems ... have to assign a 
significant role to previous experiences in modifying the individual’s perception.  
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This has two implications for human capital accumulation. On the one hand, it points 
to the importance of having a sufficient degree of experiential learning and problem-
solving activities within the formal education system. On the other, learning outside 
of formal education contexts needs to be acknowledged as an important contributor 
towards human capital accumulation, in modelling growth and formulating policy on 
productivity. These are ideas virtually all education policymakers embrace. Lucas’s 
emphasis on time in the sense of the 1 minus u seen in equation (12) should be seen in 
this context. Sufficient time must be devoted to formal education, but organising the 
workplace in a manner that maximises on-the-job learning, in effect blurring the 
distinction between work time and learning time, is important too.  
2.6 Product variety model 
The product variety model is described by Aghion and Howitt (2009: 14) as part of a 
second wave of endogenous and post-neoclassical models incorporating considerable 
attention to innovation, and explaining the determination of A in a more detailed 
manner than in the AK model. They see the product variety model as the first branch 
of this wave, the second being the Schumpeterian models described below.  
What Aghion and Howitt (2009) call the product variety model stems from the 
theoretical model of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) titled ‘Monopolistic competition and 
optimum product diversity’. The most basic form of the model is as follows (Aghion 
and Howitt, 2009: 15): 
αα KNY −= 1  (13) 
The structure resembles a Cobb-Douglas one. N is the number of industries in the 
country. In the simplest form of the model, K is exogenous, meaning that in the 
simulation, values in each year can be calculated without reference to values in the 
previous year. The starting value for N was set at 230 (the number of major industry 
categories used by Statistics South Africa, based on ISIC7), and this was the only 
exogenous variable that was allowed to increase (it increased by 2% per year). It is 
thus assumed that innovation creates entirely new industries. The capital/output ratio 
in year 1 was set at 2.0. The value of α was adjusted to create a plausible scenario, 
which is illustrated below.  
                                                     
7
 United Nations International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities. See 
United Nations Statistics Division (2009b). 
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Figure 7: Product variety model 
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The fact that the simulation allowed for non-integer values of N obviously makes the 
pattern smoother than it would be in a more realistic simulation. The product variety 
model assumes that the greater the number of industries, and hence the more 
diversified the economy, the more the innovation, and this is what stimulates growth. 
The simulation in Figure 7 has constant growth in N, and constant growth in Y at just 
under 1.5%. The explanation for this lower rate of growth in Y (compared to the 2.0% 
for N) reveals an important point about the model. Because K is kept at a constant 
value of 200 in the simulation, the same amount K is being spread ever more thinly 
across a greater number of industries N. The declining capital stock within each 
industry offsets some of the growth effects of greater diversity. If, on the other hand, 
K increases at 2% per year (like N), then Y will also grow at 2%.    
The product variety model implies that industry policy should encourage diversity, 
and that education policies should nurture new technology specialisations. A key 
question in the current industrial development debates as reflected in, for instance, Lin 
and Chang (2012), is the degree to which the state, in increasing N in equation (13), 
should use temporary protectionism to nurture new industries (a comparative-
advantage-defying approach), as opposed to just creating an enabling environment for 
competitive industries (a comparative-advantage-following approach). The education 
policymaker’s segment of this important policy question is the degree to which 
training in new technologies is possible in the absence of that technology within 
industry. For instance, if the use of nanotechnology is to be stimulated within the 
economy, to what extent is training in this technology dependent on the existence of at 
least some presence of this technology in some industrial sector? This presence could 
have been introduced through a government programme that incentivised foreign 
investment and the importing of foreign skills. To put the question differently, how do 
complementarities between the education system and industry work when new 
technologies grow within a country? This question does not seem to have received 
significant attention in the academic literature, perhaps because measuring these 
complementarities would be difficult. At least on a theoretical level, one can speculate 
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that the presence of the new technology in industry would improve the quality of 
training in this technology within the education sector through two channels. Firstly, 
education institutions could draw from the human expertise existing within the 
country and, secondly, students would be incentivised by the existence of concrete 
opportunities of employment within the country in the new field.  
2.7 Schumpeterian model of Nelson and Phelps 
Three Schumpeterian models are discussed in this sub-section and the subsequent 
two. The Nelson and Phelps (1966) model, an early growth with education model 
often referred to in the subsequent literature, is considered an early Schumpeterian 
model by Aghion and Howitt (2009: 298).  
Some background on the work of Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950), an Austrian 
economist, seems in place. Schumpeter, who used an exclusively narrative and non-
mathematical style of argument, views capitalism as an economic system harbouring 
the seeds of its own destruction, and predicts high levels of monopolisation. In this 
respect he is similar to Marx, but this is as far as the similarity goes. For Schumpeter, 
society’s support for capitalism rests largely on the opportunities afforded to 
entrepreneurs, who innovate in the production process. He distinguishes innovation 
from invention, the latter being more technical, and the former more economic and 
organisational. Innovation involves continual ‘creative destruction’, a term 
Schumpeter is often associated with. Innovations result in the success of innovating 
firms and the demise of firms that do not innovate successfully. Over time firms learn 
this is the pattern, and increasingly they try to organise innovation rationally, through 
research institutions, which become increasingly bureaucratised. Successful firms are 
increasingly large firms, and monopolies begin to dominate the market. A situation 
arises in which ‘innovation itself is being subjected to routine’ in order to ‘make 
technical change a predictable process’ and this is what leads to dissatisfaction 
amongst more traditional entrepreneurs and ‘an army of critical and frustrated 
intellectuals’, who then bring about the demise of this highly monopolistic form of 
capitalism (Heertje, 2008: 321). One presumes that this demise would lead to the re-
emergence of a more competitive capitalism, and a repeat of the whole cycle, but this 
does not seem to be clear in Schumpeter’s work. Schumpeter’s version of historical 
determinism has been criticised, but his view of innovation and imitation as two key 
organising phenomena within capitalism has been embraced, for instance by Aghion 
and Howitt (2009).  
The simpler of two models put forward by Nelson and Phelps (1966: 72) is discussed 
here. (Edmund Phelps is a Nobel economics laureate for his work on inter-temporal 
tradeoffs in macroeconomic policy.)  In this model growth in Y is considered to be 
synonymous with growth in A, as in the subsequent two Schumpeterian models. 
Human capital H is a determinant of A (and Y), but unlike the MRW and Lucas 
models, the Nelson and Phelps model emphasises within its basic form the stock of 
human capital, as opposed to its accumulation, in the growth process. The basic form 
is as follows: 
( )( )Hwt
tt eAA
−
=
=
λ*
0  (14) 
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A, called the ‘index of technology’ in Nelson and Phelps (1966), is specific to a 
country, as in At above, but there is also a ‘global technology frontier’ A*, or what was 
referred to earlier as the currently known best way of doing things. At any point in 
time, A is less than A* as there is a perpetual lag whereby countries take some time to 
adopt the best available technologies, and what is best is continually advancing. 
Conceivably, all countries could experience this lag as even the most advanced 
countries would have reached the frontier in some industries, but not in others. In 
equation (14) A at current time t is equal to A*, or the global technology frontier, at 
time 0, multiplied by the base of the natural log e to the power of λ, a constant 
determining how fast A* grows, multiplied by current time t minus a lag w which is a 
decreasing function of human capital H. The lag is thus shorter the more educated the 
country’s human capital is. For a country to decrease the lag, it must increase its stock 
of human capital H. The next graph illustrates the case of a country that is continually 
increasing its stock of H. Though not clearly visible in the graph, the horizontal 
distance x is diminishing over time due to the increase in H. Logically, whilst the gap 
is being closed, growth in A will exceed growth in A*, but when H stabilises, the 
country will simply follow the growth of A*.  
Figure 8: Nelson and Phelps 
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2.8 Schumpeterian model with creative destruction 
This and the next Schumpeterian model both stem from work by Phillipe Aghion, a 
French economist. The model discussed here is a relatively simple one from Aghion 
and Howitt (2009: 15) which does not include a human capital variable (the next one 
includes several). The basic form resembles the Cobb-Douglas form of equation (1): 
αα KAY −= 1  (15) 
Here, however, A carries an exponent less than 1, assuming α>0, meaning there are 
diminishing returns to A (there are also diminishing returns to K). The creative 
destruction element of this model appears in the determination of A: 
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( ) ( )1* 111 1 −−−− −+−+= ttmtntt AAAAA µγµ  (16) 
To simplify the discussion and the simulation, K is assumed to be constant (the 
emphasis in the model is on the determination of A, not of K). Again A* is the global 
technology frontier. In the full specification of the model, A* is the global technology 
frontier for one industry and equation (16) refers to the dynamics of one industry. In 
the interests of simplicity the industry subscripts are excluded from equation (16). 
Growth of Y in the country is the aggregation of the industry-specific growth. The 
variables µn and µm are the frequency of innovation and imitation. This is best 
understood through reference to the country as a whole. If there are 20 industries, for 
instance, and we expect there to be a successful imitation of a technology from 
elsewhere occurring in one industry in each year, we can think of µm as 0.05 (1 over 
20). Similarly, if µn is 0.05 this could mean that in any year 1 of 20 industries 
advances its technology to a point beyond the global technology frontier for that 
industry. How much further than the frontier is indicated by the factor γ, which must 
logically be greater than 1 and is also indicative of the productivity enhancement 
achieved as a result of the innovation. The innovation would result in an increase in 
not just A but also A*. Imitation on the other hand, changes just A of the country. The 
global A* remains unchanged. 
There are several ways in which one could represent this Schumpeterian model 
graphically. In Figure 9 below µm is considered to be a constant 0.08 every year, 
whilst µn is considered to be zero in all years, except for year t=7 when it becomes 
0.03 so that an innovation (in at least one of the country’s industries) is forced to 
occur. γ is set at 5.0, the starting point for A is 100, and that for A* 150. A* is assumed 
to increase at an exogenous rate of 4% per year, which would be caused by countries 
jumping the global technology frontier in specific industries on a continuous basis. In 
order to obtain a starting value for Y of 100 and for K of 200 (K will not change), in 
line with previous simulations, we must adjust the exponent α from equation (15). 
This adjustment forces α to become almost zero indicating that in our simulation Y is 
virtually equal to A.         
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Figure 9: Schumpeterian with creative destruction 
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There is a spike in the growth of Y in year 7, from 4% to 16% and then down to 2.8%. 
The increase in gY occurs due to the improved productivity brought about by the 
innovation, which moves the country abruptly to a new level of income Y. The fact 
that there is some growth even in other years is due to the fact that there is new 
imitation being initiated in each year. If there had been a year with no imitation or 
innovation (with both µn and µm equal to zero in other words), there would have been 
no growth in that year.  
Very importantly, after the innovation in year 7, growth declines to a level that is 
lower than it was before year 7 – it drops to 2.8% in year 8. This is because the gap 
between A and A* has been narrowed, and with constant µm equation (16) tells us that 
the growth in A due to imitation would have to decrease with a reduction in the ratio 
of A* to A – in our simulation this ratio decreases from 1.50 in year 6 to 1.35 in year 7. 
However, in the absence of further innovations in our country the ratio of A to A* rises 
again to 1.47 by year 20, and consequently gY increases from 2.8% to 3.7% from year 
8 to year 20. Basically continual innovation elsewhere has introduced more room for 
local imitation. The fact that growth is a positive function of the distance to the global 
technology frontier, measured as the ratio of A* to A, can be seen in the following 
equation for gY: 
( ) 





−+−= 1*1
A
Ag mnY µγµ  (17) 
The full version of this Schumpeterian model explains µn in microeconomic terms 
(Aghion and Howitt, 2009: 88).  
σ
λµ 





=
*A
R
n  
(18) 
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Here R is expenditure on research. The higher the productivity of the research sector, 
or the higher λ is, the greater the probability of an innovation. And the greater the 
investment in research R by firms, the greater this probability. However, there is an 
important relationship between R and the global technology frontier A*. The more 
advanced the frontier, the smaller the returns to investment in research R. In other 
words, there are diminishing returns to research investments over time. Investing 
resources in innovation research in the year 1900 was likely to yield better returns 
than investing the same resources in 2000, by which time knowledge advancements 
would have made research more complex and costly. Finally, σ represents a Cobb-
Douglas type exponent representing the expenditure elasticity of the level of research 
outputs.   
2.9 Schumpeterian model with two levels of human capital 
The final Schumpeterian model examined here is one put forward by Vandenbussche, 
Aghion and Meghir (2006) (henceforth VAM). The empirical version of VAM’s 
model is discussed in Part II of the dissertation. As in the previous model, the focus is 
at the industry level, and the country picture consists of the aggregation of all 
industries. Again, for the sake of simplicity, industry subscripts are dropped. The 
basic form of the model is again a Cobb-Douglas one.   
αα xAY −= 1  (19) 
Instead of using capital stock K as a determinant of growth, this model uses 
intermediate product x. This latter variable could, for instance, refer to the plastics 
used to produce a computer. The computers produced, and encapsulated within 
income Y, would be a function of the value of the plastic used x, the productivity of 
the manufacturing process A and the Cobb-Douglas exponents 1-α and α. The 
following equation demonstrates how A would be determined.  
( )( )1* 11111 −−−−−− −++= ttmmtnntt AAsuAsuAA σσφφγλ  (20) 
This equation is similar to equation (16), but there are some key differences. There are 
Cobb-Douglas forms for innovation (n) and imitation (m). For instance, innovation 
has two inputs with exponents adding up to 1. The two inputs are the amount of 
unskilled labour un and the amount of skilled labour sn dedicated towards innovation 
activities. The structure is similar for imitation activities. One may wonder why 
unskilled labour would be dedicated towards innovation. This is not explained by 
VAM, but the value of un can be zero, and ‘unskilled’ is somewhat of a misnomer as 
VAM regard workers without post-secondary education as unskilled. λ refers to the 
efficiency of the overall process of technological development, γ refers to the 
efficiency of innovation relative to that of imitation, and σ and φ are the familiar 
Cobb-Douglas exponents. The model borrows from the Rybczynski model of 
international trade, the difference being that here different countries are converted to 
two different sectors of the economy, imitation and innovation. The total number of 
unskilled workers U and the total number of skilled workers S are exogenous (and 
would largely be an outcome of the country’s education policies), but the allocation of 
the two types of workers across the imitation and innovation sectors is endogenously 
determined according to the following two formulas: 
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( ) m
m
m
sS
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u
1−+
=
ψ
ψ
 (22) 
Here a represents the ratio A / A* where 1 is the maximum and would mean the 
country had caught up to the global technology frontier (the ratio referred to here is 
the inverse of the ratio referred to in (17)). ψ is calculated as follows: 
( )
( )φσ
φσψ
−
−
=
1
1
 (23) 
The essence of the previous three equations is that the allocation of skilled and 
unskilled labour across the two sectors depends on, firstly, the sizes of the two pools 
of labour and, secondly, the distance of the country from the global technology 
frontier (the details of these dynamics are explained below).  
The VAM model includes the determination of the amount of intermediate products x 
in equation (19) according to equation (24) below. x is a function of A in the sense 
that the better the technology and productivity A in the country (or industry), the more 
x is produced. In the complete dissection of equation (24), which is not explained 
here, monopoly firms are a necessity as competitive firms would not have a large 
enough incentive to invest sufficiently in research as they would not enjoy monopoly 
profits following the successful innovation.   
Ax αα −= 1
2
 
(24) 
This Schumpeterian model was first simulated below with just 13% of all workers 
assumed to be skilled across all years. Figure 10 indicates that the proportion of all 
skilled workers engaged in the innovation sector would rise, from around 40% to 
around 55%. Though this is not clearly visible in the graph, the proportion of 
unskilled workers in the innovation sector would, whilst remaining low, also increase 
slightly. This is because imitation activities are continuously improving the closeness 
to the global technology frontier, or a, which in turn increases the marginal returns to 
both types of labour in the innovation sector. Put differently, the more advanced the 
country is technologically, the more likely it is that firms in the country will be able to 
add something new to the world’s stock of innovations.  As a result of a mix of 
imitation and innovation, aggregate income Y (or A) expands by 53% altogether over 
the 20 years, or 2.1% a year8. This is not an impressive growth rate, but it should be 
remembered that over the period there has been no human capital improvement in the 
sense of the percentage of workers who are skilled. 
                                                     
8
 In simulating the model, it was necessary to use a from the previous year in equation (21) in order to 
avoid a circular reference problem in Excel.  
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Figure 10: Schumpeterian with two levels of HC (I) 
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Figure 11 below illustrates an alternative simulation where the proportion of workers 
who are skilled does increase exogenously from 13% to 53% over the 20 years as a 
result of education policy interventions. As will be seen, this very large degree of 
human capital improvement seems to be necessary for even modest gains in growth to 
be realised. The shift has the effect of improving the outputs of both the imitation and 
innovation sectors, relative to the previous scenario. This results in a somewhat higher 
level of a in year 20. Put differently, the distance to the technology frontier has been 
narrowed to a greater degree than in the previous scenario. Growth in Y improves. The 
growth in Y over 20 years is now 57% (against 53% in the previous simulation). This 
seems a rather limited reward for the very large increase in the proportion of skilled 
workers, but it seemed difficult to adjust the model to simulate higher growth. With 
respect to the allocation of workers across the two sectors, the movement of both 
skilled and unskilled workers towards innovation is much larger than before. In fact, 
the simulation indicates that by year 30 (off the graph) 100% of skilled and unskilled 
workers would be engaged in innovation.  
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Figure 11: Schumpeterian with two levels of HC (II) 
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VAM summarise the dynamics of their model in a graph that is reproduced below as 
Figure 12, using more or less the values from the two simulations presented above. 
Figure 12 illustrates what happens when the percentage of skilled workers remains 
constant, but instead of the constant level of 13% seen in Figure 10, a level of 30% is 
used as this produces a clearer picture. The problem with the 30% level, however, and 
the reason why a lower level was used earlier, is that 30% results in a situation where 
the majority of both skilled and unskilled workers are in the innovation sector. It 
seems unrealistic for such a low level of education (30% of workers are skilled) to be 
associated with an economy that innovates more than it imitates. This could be 
indicative of a limited real world relevance of the model. In Figure 12, point E 
indicates the total initial number of skilled and unskilled workers. Of a total of 100 
workers, 30 are skilled (vertical axis) and 70 are unskilled (horizontal axis). The 
thick-lined parallelogram between the origin of the graph and point E represents the 
situation in year 1. The slopes of lines N1 and M1 in that year are a function of the 
distance to the global technology frontier and this, plus the percentage of workers who 
are skilled, determine the number of skilled workers engaged in innovation, sn1, and 
the number of unskilled workers engaged in imitation, um1 (and by implication skilled 
workers in imitation and unskilled workers in innovation). For instance, of the 30 
skilled workers in year 1, 25 are employed in innovation industries – read the top-left 
corner of the thick-lined parallelogram against the vertical axis. Thus 5 skilled 
workers must be working in the imitation sector. After 20 years, the economy has 
moved closer towards the global technology frontier, and consequently lines N and M 
have tilted clockwise. This results in a slightly higher number of skilled workers 
engaging in innovation, and in slightly fewer unskilled workers engaging in imitation 
– see the thin-lined parallelogram and its corners sn20 and um20. The total number of 
workers has remained 100 and the number of skilled workers is still 30. 
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Figure 12: A swing towards innovation (I) 
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In Figure 13 we see what happens if over 20 years the proportion of the 100 workers 
who are skilled increases from 30 to 50. The change in the composition of the 
country’s human capital shifts E from E1 to E20. The fact that by year 20 the country 
has moved closer to the global technology frontier (compared to the Figure 12 
scenario) results in a more pronounced tilting of the N and M lines. This tilting results 
in a larger proportion of skilled workers being in innovation, and a lower proportion 
of unskilled workers being in imitation.    
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Figure 13: A swing towards innovation (II) 
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One thing that the three Schumpeterian models discussed above share, but not the 
models preceding those, is an explicit recognition that countries learn from each other. 
Indeed, cross-country learning is a key element of the development process according 
to these models. By implication, cross-country competition is important and one 
presumes that some of the Schumpeterian ‘destruction’ would take the form of 
countries that fail to compete successfully in a globalised economy. Competing is a 
matter of both innovation and imitation. The emphasis on imitating seems important, 
partly because imitation may appear to be a less noble pursuit than innovation, to the 
education policymaker and others. The Schumpeterian models imply imitation needs 
to be taken seriously, in particular in the case of a developing country. This means 
studying carefully what other countries do, assessing the transferability of certain 
technologies and accepting that one may do better by emulating someone else than 
developing a completely home-grown solution. One can think of the education system 
itself as a key industry that is subject to the dynamics of equation (16), in other words 
the need for the right mix of ongoing imitation and occasional innovation, where the 
latter carries benefits for other countries in the form of new knowledge and new 
recipes for improving the education system. The academic contribution towards cross-
country learning in education policymaking should lie largely within the field of 
comparative education. To quote Psacharopoulos (1990: 371): 
Comparative education – or sheer history – can teach us a lot from different country 
experiences in expanding coverage and serving efficiency and equity goals.  
As was discussed previously, Psacharopoulos (1990) believes comparative education 
could make a stronger contribution to cross-country learning in education, and hence 
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educational improvement. The literature could be more practical and focus less on 
abstract and conceptual matters.  
Globalisation, which is implicit in the Schumpeterian models, is considered a 
malevolent force by several educationists. As argued by Carnoy and Rhoten (2002), a 
deeper look at the impacts of globalisation on education reveal that much of the 
unease amongst analysts of the education sector (not so much education 
policymakers) can be attributed to certain misunderstandings of, for instance, the past 
impacts of globalisation. Global learning and even competitiveness can strengthen a 
country’s education system, even though there are risks, such as insensitivity to local 
context within policy design, which are mostly avoidable if policymakers take the 
necessary precautions.  
2.10 Conclusion 
The overview of fifty years of growth theory presented above can only scratch the 
surface of the available literature. Virtually all of the concepts dealt with seem 
fundamental for an understanding of growth. The evolution of growth models has not 
been a matter of new concerns simply being added to previous concerns, or a matter 
of increasing complexity. There has been a ‘creative destruction’ of sorts as new 
concerns replaced older concerns. For instance, the concern with whether or not there 
are diminishing returns to physical capital has to a large extent given way to concerns 
around how human capital impacts on growth and how monopolies influence 
innovation. The inherent constraints of the modelling process require us to select only 
a few items from the ‘menu’ at a time. However, it is important to distinguish between 
the model itself, and the narrative about the model. It is possible to deal with a 
broader range of issues in the narrative than in the model itself. The narrative should 
partly be about discussing what did not fit into the model, and how this might affect 
the model’s policy application.  
Table 1 offers a structure that can assist the summing up. Differences in the 
interpretation of A across the various models serve to remind us of the importance of 
being clear on this matter. Concepts such as ‘level of technology’ and ‘productivity’ 
overlap, but they are not synonymous. Explaining the determination of A, however 
one defines this, is important for the modelling of growth. Where the macroeconomic 
model is grounded on microeconomic concepts of the firm, more specificity is 
introduced, which can assist in understanding precisely what policies promote growth. 
Just one of the models presented an endogenous explanation of human capital growth. 
This was the Lucas model, where both more time spent on education, including 
learning-by-doing at the workplace, in combination with efficiency improvements 
within the education system, lead to higher levels of human capital. The modelling of 
two levels of human capital, as in the final model by Vandenbussche, Aghion and 
Meghir (2006), also seems valuable, though here what actually contributes to human 
capital growth was not dealt with. Contrasting accumulation to stock effects when 
looking at human capital receives considerable attention in the literature. This is 
perhaps the most difficult aspect of the models to translate into practical terms. Both 
accumulation and the level of human capital, in the sense of the capabilities of the 
average person in the economy, are important in the real world and it is difficult to 
explain, from a practical policymaking perspective, why one would want to emphasise 
the one over the other. The theoretical nature of the models discussed, or their lack of 
concrete timeframes and historical contexts, makes it especially difficult to interpret 
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the implications of the accumulation versus level debate. Lastly, the question of 
whether there is convergence towards a steady state of income is perhaps largely 
academic, especially if the implication of a convergence model is that this steady state 
is reached hundreds of years into the future. Yet that some non-rich countries develop 
faster than others is an inescapable reality and the basis for much enquiry, and a key 
point of departure for this dissertation. As Lucas (1988: 4-5) puts it: 
I do not see how one can look at figures like these [on differences in economic growth] 
without seeing them as representing possibilities. Is there some action a government of India 
could take that would lead the Indian economy to grow like Indonesia’s or Egypt’s? If so, 
what exactly? If not, what is it about the ‘nature of India’ that makes it so? The consequences 
for human welfare involved in questions like these are simply staggering: Once one starts to 
think about them, it is hard to think of anything else.  
Table 1: Summary of model features 
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Solow’s neoclassical model technological 
change 
No No No 
(no H) 
n/a No 
MRW’s augmented Solow 
model 
level of 
technology 
No No No Yes Yes 
The AK model productivity Yes No No 
(no H) 
n/a Yes 
The Lucas model No A n/a No Yes No Yes 
Product variety model No A n/a Yes No 
(no H) 
n/a Yes 
Nelson and Phelps index of 
technology 
Yes No No No Yes 
Schumpeterian with creative 
destruction 
productivity Yes Yes No 
(no H) 
n/a Yes 
Schumpeterian with two levels 
of human capital 
productivity Yes Yes No No Yes 
 
What is it in the models that have been discussed that education policymakers might 
find most interesting or useful? One thing that stands out is a growing emphasis on 
human capital. To illustrate, whilst Solow’s original neoclassical model did not make 
explicit reference to human capital, in the last of the three Schumpeterian models the 
level of education of the adult population is a central determinant of the mix of 
imitation and innovation in the economy and also the rate of income growth. The role 
of the education policymaker is thus central in the development process. The models 
include ideas on how to improve the stock of human capital that would sound familiar 
to informed education policymakers. Whilst the term imitation may carry a somewhat 
pejorative meaning implying a lack of creativity and an insufficient grasp of different 
contexts, carefully considered imitation is undoubtedly an element of industrial 
development, institutional development, the development of education systems with 
the right structures and incentives and indeed learning in the classroom. Effective 
imitation requires careful studying of how successful societies and systems produce 
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goods and services, including education. For this, communication and information-
sharing technologies such as the internet have a vital role to play. In fact, as suggested 
by the ‘AK model’ examined in section 2.4 above, the availability of technologies 
such as the internet can in itself influence human development. Potentially, countries 
with the lowest levels of development can make the easiest gains because these 
countries can learn from the mistakes of more developed countries. Put differently, 
their scope for imitating their way out of under-development is large. As Lin and 
Chang (2012: 484) put it, ‘poor countries should be able to take advantage of their 
backwardness, by importing modern technology and institutions developed 
elsewhere’.   
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3 MEASURING HUMAN CAPITAL AND COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
Both the education and growth variables of the models that are the focus of the 
dissertation are associated with lively debates around how best to measure the two 
phenomena. This section examines these debates, which occur on both a more 
technical level and a more fundamental level. On a technical level, analysts have 
looked at how educational attainment data can be made internationally comparable 
when education systems are so country-specific. On the growth side, there are 
important questions around how to make per capita income comparable over time 
when, due to technological change, new goods and services emerge which are 
difficult to compare to their predecessors. In making price adjustments, can fixed line 
telephones be equated to cellular telephones, for example? More fundamental 
questions include whether the duration of one’s past education means much when 
what one has learnt should perhaps be the key concern, or whether one can examine 
current income without considering how the generation of this income impacts on the 
income of future generations in a context of ecological change.  
Section 3.2 focuses on the kinds of measures economists have developed to describe 
the amount of education received by adults in the population. As will be seen, this 
work, which has been tackled by a variety of economists, has not been easy, largely 
due to data problems.  
Section 3.3 looks at measures of actual learning achieved by the adult population or 
pupils at a specific level of the education process. This is an area that is relatively new 
and has been made possible due to the increasing availability of internationally 
comparable and sample-based test data.  Analysis of existing techniques aimed at 
making test results from different testing systems comparable leads to the proposal of 
a new approach that would make a larger variety of testing systems linkable.  
Section 3.4 turns to growth or country development. Technical questions relating to 
the suitability of typically utilised measures of per capita income are explored. 
Alternatives to the typical measures, but also the data difficulties associated with these 
alternatives, are discussed. Two interesting alternatives discussed are subjective 
measures of wellness and the human capabilities measures promoted by Amartya Sen.   
Finally, section 3.5 looks beyond measures of the current and past welfare of 
countries and individuals and brings in the matter of future sustainability. This is an 
area of analysis which has grown very rapidly as evidence on the relationship between 
economies and the ecology has strengthened, providing insights into matters such as 
climate change that were not available, or not widely acknowledged, as recently as the 
1990s.  The debate around how economists can properly model ecological impacts 
and the feedback of these impacts on the economy is one of the most dynamic and 
interesting debates within economics currently. The implications of new evidence on 
ecological patterns for the education planner are discussed.     
3.2 Indicators of the quantity of education 
Human capital is clearly a very multi-faceted concept. It embraces health, individual 
and collective knowledge, physical and mental skills acquired in life, mental and 
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physical qualities individuals are born with, and cultural values that contribute 
towards economic progress. In the growth literature, what matters are those aspects of 
human capital which are changeable and which one suspects contribute towards 
improvements in the more economic dimensions of human welfare. Gary Becker 
(1993: 392), Nobel economics laureate for his work in the role of human behaviour in 
economic models, makes the following points about understanding human capital in 
terms of its returns, but also about the need to view human capital broadly: 
Human capital analysis starts with the assumption that individuals decide on their education, 
training, medical care, and other additions to knowledge and health by weighing the benefits 
and costs. Benefits include cultural and other nonmonetary gains along with improvement in 
earnings and occupations, whereas costs usually depend mainly on the forgone value of the 
time spent on these investments. The concept of human capital also covers accumulated work 
and other habits, even including harmful addictions such as smoking and drug use. Human 
capital in the form of good work habits or addictions to heavy drinking has major positive or 
negative effects on productivity in both market and nonmarket sectors.  
Measures of the amount of education adults have received, in terms of years of 
education or levels of education begun or completed, have featured prominently in 
growth modelling from at least the work of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) to more 
recent work such as that by Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2006). However, in 
more recent years there has been a shift towards the indicators of schooling quality 
discussed in section 3.3 below. Measures of the quantity of education received clearly 
have the advantage that they use data that have been relatively available for many 
decades for many countries and that they can deal with different levels of education, 
such as the completion of primary schooling and the completion of tertiary education.  
Regular within-country reporting on the amount of schooling occurring has existed for 
some time. Benavot and Riddle (1988) were able to find enrolment data for 126 
countries or colonies within the 1870 to 1940 range. However, these data suffer from 
serious cross-country comparability problems. Concerted efforts to ensure that 
countries generated internationally standardised data on the quantity of education only 
began after the Second World War and were led by UNESCO.  
There are two indicators of the quantity of education attained by adults that have 
received attention amongst economists. One is average years of formal education 
attained by adults. Though this is often not made clear, what is actually meant by this 
indicator is non-repeated years of formal education received. Thus years spent 
repeating grades at school due to poor performance are not counted and nor are years 
spent repeating the same educational level through choice, something that can occur 
when for instance someone obtains two first degrees at the tertiary level. The indicator 
is thus based on the question of what the highest level of education attained is of the 
individual. The second indicator is the proportion of adults having completed (or even 
commenced) specific levels of education, such as primary schooling and tertiary 
education. The preferred data source for calculating both of these indicators is 
household surveys. However, as will be seen below, enrolment data have often been 
used to impute gaps in the household data.  
In a few instances, enrolment data on their own have been used by economists as a 
proxy for levels of education attained amongst adults. This is the case in the work of 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), discussed in section 4.2, where historical 
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participation in secondary schooling is considered a sufficient indicator of the level of 
education of the workforce in later years.  
For the second of the two indicators, the International Standard Classification of 
Education, or ISCED, maintained by UNESCO, is important. This classification 
system, first published in 1997 and then reissued in 2011 with some changes 
(UNESCO, 2011b), defines eight education levels, from early childhood development 
to doctoral studies, eight education fields, examples being ‘general programmes’ and 
‘social sciences, business and law’, as well as two ‘orientations’, general and 
vocational education.  
UNESCO’s Institute for Statistics, UIS, has focussed mainly on the collection, from 
ministries of education, of enrolment aggregates broken down by dimensions such as 
educational level and gender, not on household-derived educational attainment data. 
The UIS online data query system9 has annual country-level enrolment aggregates 
going back to 1970. These data are described in more detail in Part II of the 
dissertation. Enrolment data were also collected by UNESCO before 1970, but those 
data are not easily accessible and it is not clear why they are not included in the online 
query system. The literature on the calculation of country-level attainment values 
discussed below points to the existence of historical enrolment aggregates within 
UNESCO going back to around 1950. This information seems to have been published 
in past issues of UNESCO’s statistical yearbook. This publication does not exist any 
more, clearly because UNESCO has decided to rather disseminate its statistics 
through the UIS querying facility. The statistical yearbooks, titled in the earliest years 
‘Basic facts and figures’, are registered in UNESCO’s online library catalogue, but 
unlike many other UNESCO documents, are not available as downloadable files. It is 
clearly not easy to access pre-1970 UNESCO enrolment statistics, though such 
historical data would have a number of uses.  
Previously, UNESCO did focus a little on gathering and to some extent standardising 
household-derived aggregates on educational attainment amongst adults. Lutz, 
Goujon, Samir and Sanderson (2007: 201) used attainment statistics for adults drawn 
from the discontinued UNESCO statistical yearbooks. They explain that these 
statistics were derived from national surveys and that UNESCO made adjustments to 
improve international comparability. No educational attainment statistics are available 
on the UIS web facility. What is available online is the 1993 UN statistical yearbook, 
the most recent in this series to have special supplementary tables on educational 
attainment. For instance, this publication includes for South Africa 1985 statistics on 
adult educational attainment, broken down by single years of education attained and 
according to ten-year age cohorts. However, the statistics are of limited use as they 
exclude what were the four independent ‘homelands’ at the time (United Nations, 
1995: 803).  
An important source of household data that includes educational attainment variables 
is the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) datasets. By 2012, this internationally 
standardised initiative had covered 84 developing countries through 366 separate 
surveys, beginning in 198510. The microdata are downloadable in the case of around 
90% of the surveys. It seems that in the remaining 10% of surveys countries decided 
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 Online data-querying facility of UNESCO: UIS, consulted September 2012.  
10
 http://www.measuredhs.com/data/available-datasets.cfm. Accessed November 2012. 
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not to make the data public. Only developing countries are covered by the DHS, 
which is largely funded by the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID). The DHS is clearly an important data source for cross-country comparisons 
if the focus is developing countries. South Africa conducted the survey in 1998 and 
2003, though only the 1998 data are downloadable.  
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is another household survey initiative that aims for 
international comparability. Here the International Labour Organization (ILO) is 
responsible at the global level for standardisation and pursues this largely through 
promoting standard definitions of, for instance, unemployment and industrial sectors 
(Browne and Alstrup, 2006). It seems to be standard practice for LFSs to include a 
question on the highest level of education attained by each household member. Whilst 
the ILO archives on its website official LFS reports produced by countries, LFS 
microdata are not made available through the ILO. Statistics South Africa has 
conducted LFSs since at least 2000.  
One source of household data that is emerging as an increasingly valuable source is 
the IPUMS11 International online querying facility hosted by the Minnesota 
Population Center at the University of Minnesota. This facility is considered by Lutz, 
Goujon, Samir and Sanderson (2007) as having considerable potential for improving 
internationally comparable measures of the quantity of education. The IPUMS 
website12 revealed normalised census data from 211 censuses from 68 countries. The 
data are provided to researchers free of charge following an application process.   
Psacharopoulos and Arriagada (1986) offer what seems to be the earliest attempt 
amongst economists to compile a comprehensive set of educational attainment values 
that could be used for growth modelling. They focus on both average years of 
schooling and the proportion of the labour force completing specific levels of 
education. Using a variety of published reports emerging from national censuses and 
Labour Force Survey data, they managed to piece together values for at least one year, 
for a period beginning in 1970, for 99 countries. For 33 countries values for more than 
one year, mostly two years, were obtained. Their values are included in their article. 
One important input required for their statistics is country-specific information on the 
structure of the education system so that, for instance, they are able to translate a 
category such as ‘incomplete secondary schooling attained’ into years of education. In 
this specific example, they would assume that the respondent had completed half of 
the years normally associated with the secondary schooling cycle.  
Kyriacou (1991) uses gross enrolment ratios calculated by UNESCO, and published 
in UNESCO’s yearbooks, to expand on the Psacharopoulos and Arriagada (1986) 
dataset. Gross enrolment ratios are commonly calculated ratios where total enrolment 
in a level of the education system, for instance primary schooling, is the numerator 
and the population corresponding to that education level, assuming no grade 
repetition, is the denominator. Kyriacou (1991) first runs a regression with the 
following form: 
53521510 −−− +++= tttt TBSBPBBH  (25) 
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 Integrated Public Use Microdata Series. 
12
 https://international.ipums.org/international/index.shtml (accessed November 2012). 
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Ht is the average years of education in year t found by Psacharopoulos and Arriagada 
(1986). P, S and T are the gross enrolment ratios for primary, secondary and tertiary 
education either 5 or 15 years prior to year t. Kyriacou (1991) has sufficient data to 
include 42 countries in his regression, which produces an R2 value of 0.82, and finds 
the value of the coefficients B. He then uses these coefficients to impute H for a larger 
number of countries and years. The end product, included in Kyriacou’s paper, is a 
table of 117 countries, most of which have four values for H corresponding to 
different years in the period 1965 to 1985. One weakness with Kyriacou’s (1991) 
approach is that there is no clear justification for the lags used in equation (25), for 
instance the lag of five years between tertiary enrolments and average years of 
education of adults.  
Barro and Lee (2001) constitutes an update of their earlier work released in 1993 and 
1996. Barro and Lee’s datasets have been widely used by analysts. There are 
downloadable Excel files with results linked to the 2001 article. Both average years of 
schooling and the proportion of adults according to seven levels of attainment are 
provided. The seven levels include incomplete attainment, as in incomplete primary 
schooling. Separate statistics are provided for adults aged 15 and above and adults 
aged 25 and above. Values are given for 111 countries and for every five years in the 
period 1960 to 2000. 2000 values are future projections. Like Kyriacou (1991), Barro 
and Lee (2001) use UNESCO enrolment statistics to impute educational attainment 
data, but they use an alternative approach, the perpetual inventory approach, which is 
often used for physical capital. In this approach, additions to and subtractions from a 
stock in every time period are used to estimate the evolving total of the stock. 
Examining how the tertiary level is dealt with illustrates the general method. In 
equation (26) below, the number of adults with tertiary education (education level 3) 
in period t is the corresponding number from an earlier period, in this case t-5, 
adjusted downwards using the contents of the first brackets on the right, which 
capture demographic trends, and then adjusted upwards using the second term on the 
right, where G is the gross enrolment ratio for the tertiary level and the second term as 
a whole represents the number of tertiary graduates moving into the adult 
population13. The first subscript for each P refers to an age range. One data source 
used by Barro and Lee (2001) but not Kyriacou (1991) is United Nations population 
by age data.     
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Around half of the final Barro and Lee (2001) data points required imputation using 
enrolment ratios according to the above formula. Barro and Lee (2001: 545) 
acknowledge that one drawback with their approach is that they assume, for instance, 
that if 10% of adults have tertiary education, then 10% of those dying also have 
tertiary education, which implicitly amounts to the assumption that educational 
attainment is the same at all ages. Clearly this is a problematic element of the 
methodology. As will be seen, subsequent analysts have strongly criticised the method 
                                                     
13
 More precisely, the tertiary gross enrolment G is adjusted downwards to deal with grade repeaters. 
This is captured in equations (4) and (5) in Barro and Lee (2001: 544-5). This adjusted ratio is 
considered preferable to the more or less equivalent net enrolment ratio, which is published by 
UNESCO. The latter statistic, they argue, is plagued by too many irregularities. 
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but also the usability of the Barro and Lee (2001) data, a criticism worth noting given 
how widely the Barro and Lee data have been used for growth regressions.  
Cohen and Soto (2007a) appear to offer an improved set of figures relative to Barro 
and Lee (2001). Their figures cover 95 countries and the period 1960 to 2010, with 
values provided for every interval of ten years. The 2007 article comes with a separate 
data file. Average years of schooling and attainment by seven levels of education are 
provided, for the population aged 15 and above and the population aged 25 and above. 
Part of the strength of the Cohen and Soto dataset lies in the fact that they break the 
original household data down by age groups and thus avoid the Barro and Lee (2001) 
assumption that educational attainment is the same at all ages. Moreover, Cohen and 
Soto (2007a) make use of a much wider range of data, including new OECD 
household data, covering OECD members and 15 non-members, and a series of books 
by Brian Mitchell published in the 1990s where evidence on enrolments going back to 
1750 are gathered fairly exhaustively. To illustrate, Cohen and Soto (2007a: 55) use 
intake ratios for primary schooling from the 1920s to estimate the attainment of 
people aged 60 to 64 in 1980. 
Cohen and Soto (2007a), in arguing against the usability of the Barro and Lee (2001) 
data, point to a few glaring anomalies in the latter, for instance that in Canada the 
percentage of the population aged 25 and above with tertiary education moved from 
6.9 to 8.2 to 7.1 in the years 1975 to 1985. This statistic is unlikely to change to such a 
large degree in such a short space of time. Moreover, France and Bolivia display the 
same average years of schooling for those aged 25 and over in 1960, of 5.4 years.  
Krueger and Lindahl (2001: 1116) turn to the World Values Survey (WVS) dataset in 
order to verify the accuracy of the Barro and Lee data. At the time of their analysis, 
the WVS dataset was far more limited for this purpose than it subsequently became 
and it was consequently difficult for Krueger and Lindahl (2001) to draw firm 
conclusions in this regard. The WVS data, described further in section 3.4, has a 
downloadable file of all data collected in the 1981 to 2008 period. The data in this file 
were analysed in order to gain a sense of recent enhancements. What is clear is that 
the use of a question explicitly asking the highest level of education attained, as 
opposed to an earlier question that asked just the age up to which the respondent 
schooled, has become more common. Specifically, the 1981 to 2008 data include 57 
countries where the educational attainment question has been asked.  
Krueger and Lindahl (2001) use a simple approach to determine which of any two 
educational attainment datasets are more reliable. They regress, for instance, the 
average years of schooling values in the 1993 version of the Barro and Lee data on the 
corresponding values in Kyriacou (1991), and then perform the reverse analysis, and 
then consider the resultant slope coefficients their ‘reliability ratios’. For instance, the 
slope coefficient on the Kyriacou (1991) values when the Barro and Lee data is 
regressed on the Kyriacou data would be the reliability ratio of the Kyriacou data, and 
vice versa. The underlying assumption is that if two variables are supposed to 
measure the same thing, then if one variable displays greater variance than the other, 
then this is the least reliable variable. The assumption is captured in the following two 
equations. The estimated slope coefficient in the first equation, 1ˆB , is always equal to 
the reliability ratio rX for variable X. 
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Below, the Krueger and Lindahl (2001: 1116) reliability ratio values are reproduced, 
together with a few new ones comparing the more recent 2001 Barro and Lee dataset 
to the Cohen and Soto (2007b) data, and the 2001 Barro and Lee data to the 
downloaded World Values Survey data (World Values Survey Association, 2009). All 
the new comparisons use data covering the population aged 15 and above. The 
proportion of the population that had completed secondary and post-secondary 
education were selected for the WVS comparison, partly because using WVS to 
derive average years of schooling would have meant obtaining institutional 
information from all the countries concerned relating to the duration of specific levels 
of education. The Cohen and Soto data emerge as more reliable that the Barro-Lee 
data when one is dealing with completion of secondary and tertiary education. The 
WVS tertiary education statistic stands out as being particularly unreliable when 
compared to the corresponding Cohen-Soto statistic. When the WVS data were 
examined more closely, it was found that there were clear anomalies. A few 
developing countries, such as Indonesia and Dominican Republic, have unrealistically 
high attainment of tertiary education values in the WVS data of over 60%. In the 
Cohon-Soto dataset, the highest figures for the two countries are 6% and 18%. Some 
developed countries also have clearly incorrect values for the same statistic in the 
WVS dataset, for instance Australia’s 60% against 25% in the Cohen-Soto data.  
Table 2: Reliability of measures of educational quantity 
 
Reliability ratios (standard errors in brakets) 
Krueger and Lindahl (2001: 1116)   
 
B&L93 Kyriacou 
Average years 1985 .773 (.055) .966 (.069) 
∆ Average years 1965-85 .577 (.199) .195 (.067) 
 
B&L93 WVS 
Average years 1990 .903 (.115) .727 (.093) 
New calculations   
 
B&L2001 C&S2007 
Average years 1990 (n=84) 1.052 (.039) .856 (.031) 
∆ Average years 1960-2000 (n=83) .503 (.078) .669 (.104) 
Secondary 1990 (n=84) .864 (.051) .897 (.053) 
∆ Secondary 1960-2000 (n=83) .403 (.067) .763 (.127) 
Tertiary 1990 (n=84) .707 (.039) 1.134 (.062) 
∆ Tertiary 1960-2000 (n=83) .597 (.049) 1.077 (.089) 
 
WVS C&S2007 
Secondary 1990 (n=57) .473 (.179) .238 (.090) 
Tertiary 1990 (n=57) .106 (.051) .694 (.331) 
Sources (for the new calculations): Barro and Lee, 2000 (though the dataset is dated 2000, the journal 
article is from 2001); Cohen and Soto, 2007b; World Values Survey Association, 2009;  
 
Lutz, Cuaresma and Sanderson (2008) provide a high-level summary of an ambitious 
effort not very different from the Cohen-Soto one, but apparently more labour-
intensive. The outcome of the work is known as the IIASA-VID14 dataset, which 
                                                     
14
 The two acronyms stand for International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and the Vienna 
Institute of Demography.  
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covers 120 countries in the 1970 to 2000 period, with values corresponding to four 
levels of education for every five years. One big difference is that the IIASA-VID 
data breaks down the statistics by five-year age cohorts. The data are downloadable15. 
What is also downloadable is a related set of projections for the years 2005 to 2050. 
These projections follow four scenarios: a constant enrolment numbers scenario, a 
constant enrolment ratios scenario, a global education trend scenario, and a fast-track 
scenario (Samir, Barakat, Goujon et al, 2010). The first two scenarios are 
conservative and are different forms of a no-change scenario, whilst the fourth 
scenario represents the greatest change.  
Details on how the 1970 to 2000 dataset was derived can be found in Lutz, Goujon, 
Samir and Sanderson (2007), which indicates that average years of schooling was 
calculated as part of the project, although this statistic is not included in the 
downloadable dataset. Conceptually, the approach followed for the attainment by 
educational level statistics is a relatively simple one. The year 2000 was used as the 
empirical base. For this year they drew from a variety of household datasets in 
producing their enrolment attainment statistics. Then UN population data were used to 
project the education information backwards from 2000. The general approach is 
described as a ‘demographic multi-state method’ (Lutz, Goujon, Samir and 
Sanderson, 2007: 198). The following formula explains the basic operation, for which 
there are a number of exceptions. Essentially a segment of the population of age group 
a-5, with highest level of education attained e, at point in time t-5, of a particular sex 
s, is calculated by taking the corresponding group five years later and dividing this by 
a survival ratio s.  
stea
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The data sources used to establish the breakdown of educational attainment by age in 
2000 (or two years either way, which was adopted as a leeway) included national 
census datasets, DHS datasets, Eurostat datasets (Eurostat is the statistical body of the 
European Union) and LFS datasets. The DHS data proved to be the most difficult to 
use in terms of aligning education attainment data to ISCED levels.  
A greater hurdle was to establish what education-specific mortality rates to use for 
developing countries, where these statistics were not readily available. The solution 
adopted was to analyse household datasets for different points in time for eight 
countries, seven of which were developing countries, and in this way to establish 
patterns of education-specific mortality. This analysis then informed what mortality 
rates to use across those countries without easily available statistics. The basic pattern 
found across several countries was that life expectancy at age 15 became a year longer 
when no schooling became primary schooling completed. Life expectancy rose by a 
further two years if secondary schooling had been completed and by another two 
years if tertiary education had been completed. What was clear was that using the 
same mortality rates for differently educated people was not good modelling practice. 
The education-specific life expectancy values were used to generate education-
specific mortality rates at the different five-year age groups, but in such a way that the 
original age-specific mortality rates in the UN population data were respected. 
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 http://webarchive.iiasa.ac.at/Research/POP/edu07/ (accessed November 2012). 
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Lutz et al (2007) originally considered modelling migration but eventually abandoned 
this due to data constraints and the fact that it was clearly not possible to generalise 
across countries. How education influences in- and out-migration appears to be very 
country-specific. However, it was also concluded that not modelling migration 
explicitly did not affect the results significantly.  
Comparability problems over time within countries are reduced because in any year 
the classifications will correspond to what applied in the base year, ideally 2000. The 
typical concern around how to deal with structural changes in the education system 
over time did thus not apply.  
What are the key advantages of the IIASA-VID data relative to the other education 
datasets that have been discussed above? One is that the IIASA-VID statistics are 
disaggregated by age bins, so it is possible to examine separately the effects on 
growth of younger and older segments of the population, according to educational 
attainment. This type of growth modelling is in fact done by Lutz, Cuaresma and 
Sanderson (2008) and is discussed in depth in Part II of the dissertation, where it is 
relevant because the modelling allows for the impact of different levels of the 
education system to be assessed. The Cohen and Soto (2007b) data could be made 
available with disaggregation by age, because Cohen and Soto model the data using 
age bins. However, their statistics were not presented in this way, but rather for adults 
in general. Yet one fundamental drawback of the Cohen-Soto data relative to the 
IIASA-VID data is that the former implicitly assumes that the mortality rate is the 
same, regardless of the educational background of the population.  
3.3 Indicators of schooling quality 
Indicators of educational attainment can at best be proxies for what economists are 
really interested in in the growth process as far as human capital is concerned: the 
knowledge and skills of the labour force or, probably more accurately, those directly 
or indirectly involved in the production of goods and services in the economy, plus 
those who might have been involved had their human capital endowments been better. 
The latter definition, which essentially amounts to all adults, acknowledges the 
importance of, for instance, women not directly engaged in the labour market and the 
wastage of human capital implied by unemployment.  
Defining what skills and knowledge one should ideally measure in order to 
understand linkages between education and growth is a debatable matter. Heyneman 
(2004a) provides a useful outline of the debate. There are important skills trade-offs 
that must be considered. The trade-off between the promotion of critical thinking and 
the fine-tuning of more mechanistic thinking in the education system is often 
mentioned, for instance in contrasting the resultant human capital of Western Europe, 
on the one hand, and ex-communist Eastern Europe or East Asia, on the other. The 
latter tend to surpass Western Europe in mathematical skills, whilst Western Europe 
tends to perform better when it comes to complex problem solving involving critical 
thinking. Different stages of country development may require different emphases in 
the education system. Another trade-off is one between the number and depth of skills 
(or knowledge) possessed by adults. To illustrate, Heyneman (2004a) contrasts the 
emphasis in the French mathematics school curriculum on a wide range of topics to 
the Algerian emphasis on fewer topics, presumably covered in greater depth. Any 
attempt to gauge the skills levels of the population must consider these issues.  
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Heyneman (2004a) also discusses the impact of the rise of international trade in 
education services, in particular at the tertiary level, on notions of measuring human 
capital. In a context where, for instance, around a fifth of the enrolment in the top 
universities of the United States is not from the United States, it becomes problematic 
to use measures derived from university students enrolled in a country to gauge the 
quality of human capital amongst the adult population of that country, not only with 
respect to the United States, but even countries from which students originate. 
One clearly non-ideal measure of the human capital of adults is the adult literacy rate 
found in the UIS’s online data querying facility. The data source for adult literacy 
rates has traditionally been simple questions included in household surveys where 
subjectivity is a major problem. For example, the 2011 national census in South 
Africa has the question: ‘Does ... have difficulty in reading (e.g. newspapers, 
magazines, religious books, etc.) in any language?’16. As noted by Gustafsson, Van 
der Berg, Shepherd and Burger (2010), in a paper that attempts to gauge the costs of 
illiteracy to South Africa, not only are there unavoidable across country comparability 
problems when self-reported literacy data are used, there are also within-country 
comparability problems over time. With respect to the latter, Gustafsson et al (2010) 
point to changing relationships between highest school grade attained and self-
reported literacy which suggest that over time respondents, at least in South Africa, 
become more demanding with respect to the latter variable, in other words less 
inclined to claim that they are literate. A few economists, notably Romer (1989), have 
used UIS literacy rates on the right-hand side of growth regressions. Romer (1989), 
unsurprisingly given the comparability problems in the data, finds adult literacy to 
have no statistically significant conditional correlation with growth.  
By far the most promising efforts to resolve information gaps around the human 
capital of countries are those of the OECD focussing on testing random samples of 
adults through visits to households. This work has been limited to OECD countries, 
yet its cost-effectiveness makes it likely that it will increasingly occur in developing 
countries too.  
The OECD’s work has occurred within three consecutive testing programmes which 
reflect a series of methodological lessons learnt and adjustments. The first 
programme, the International Adult Literacy Survey, or IALS, involved data 
collection from 21 countries during the 1994 to 1998 period. Each test event was 
conducted by a fieldworker and involved about an hour-long test, taken by adults aged 
16 to 65, which covered both very basic literacy skills, in order to allow for 
differentiation amongst those with low literacy levels, and more advanced skills in 
three areas: comprehension of short narrative texts, comprehension of other 
information sources such as maps, tables and graphs, and the solving of number 
problems people typically encounter in their lives17. IALS was succeeded by the Adult 
Literacy and Lifeskills (ALL) survey, which involved data collection in 2003 and 
2006 in 12 countries, mostly countries that had already participated in IALS18. A key 
enhancement here was a stronger emphasis on skills needed to use modern 
information and communication technologies (ICTs). Finally, the OECD introduced 
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 The census questionnaire is available at http://www.statssa.gov.za. 
17
 The official IALS report is OECD (2000).  
18
 The ALL report for the 2003 wave of testing is OECD (2005). A final report for the 2006 collections 
was not found.  
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the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC), 
which involves an initial wave of data collection across 28 countries in 2011 and is 
expected to produce a final report in 2013. PIAAC involved further strengthening of 
the testing of ICT skills as well as the introduction of a preferred option of testing 
where the test-taker would enter responses on a laptop computer, as opposed to on a 
paper form. Thorn (2009), in an evaluation of the three programmes, points out a few 
concrete examples of the value they have added to policy formulation, in particular 
within the area of national adult literacy programmes.      
Coulombe, Tremblay and Marchand (2004) used the 1994 IALS data from 14 
countries to construct a historical panel dataset for the period 1960 to 1995 of the 
human capital of 17 to 25 year olds, in other words new labour market entrants, using 
the assumption that the literacy levels of older adults in 1994 reflected the literacy 
levels of younger adults in earlier years. The study included growth regressions where 
the test-based literacy data were significantly correlated with growth. This was seen to 
underscore the importance of having reliable human capital data in one’s growth 
models. The data also allowed for more detailed findings, for instance that average 
literacy is more important for growth than top-end literacy, or achievement amongst 
the best test-takers. Interestingly, it was found that female literacy displayed larger 
coefficients in the growth models than male literacy.  
Whilst by 2012 there appeared to be no concrete and decisive moves towards 
internationally standardised adult literacy testing in non-OECD countries, what had 
grown phenomenally in all countries was participation in standardised testing 
programmes aimed at the primary or secondary schooling levels. This is 
understandable given the centrality of schooling in the policy agendas of developing 
countries and the relatively marginalised state of adult literacy programmes in many 
of these countries.  
Hanushek and Woessman (2009) have made extensive use of the emerging school-
level data. Their work on creating comparability across the data of different testing 
programmes is discussed here, whilst their use of the normalised data in growth 
regressions is discussed in section 4.4.  
Hanushek and Woessman (2009: A14) combine country average scores across 
disparate international testing programmes, around 800 country scores pertaining to 
77 countries, into one set of comparable scores, one per country, that can be used 
within a cross-country growth model19. Just over half of the 77 countries for which 
comparable scores are obtained are high income countries. The original data were 
obtained from the NAEP20 programme of the United States, the OECD’s PISA21 
programme, and the IEA’s TIMSS, PIRLS22 and initial programmes, where the initial 
programmes were essentially the precursors to TIMSS and PIRLS. The original 
country scores are all from the period 1964 to 2003, with the mean year of collection 
being 1994 (actual years of collection were weighted by the number of data points per 
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 Hanushek and Woessman provide a slightly different version of the same calculations relating to the 
77 countries in OECD (2010a: 36). 
20
 National Assessment of Educational Progress. 
21
 Programme for International Student Assessment. 
22
 Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study and Progress in International Reading 
Literacy Study, both programmes of the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational 
Achievement. 
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year). Each score is specific to a subject, a grade (or age level) and a test year. There 
were test scores for three subjects, mathematics, science and reading, and for three 
institutional levels, primary, lower secondary and upper secondary. The original data 
are from 32 different tests, where a test is specific to a year, an age (or grade level) 
and a subject. For instance, the 2003 TIMSS test in mathematics for grade 8 would be 
a ‘test’.  
A key phenomenon that greatly facilitates the analysis is the fact that correlations 
between scores from different programmes with a different testing focus for the same 
subject and grade (or age level) are in fact high where countries participated in more 
than one programme. In particular, the correlations between PISA and TIMSS country 
averages for the same subject are found to be in the range 0.86 to 0.97 (Hanushek and 
Woessman, 2009: A3) despite the fact that TIMSS is more oriented towards existing 
curricula whilst PISA is more oriented towards the application of knowledge to the 
real world.  
Hanushek and Woessman (2009: A4) argue that one factor that complicates the 
analysis is the fact that the Item Response Theory (IRT) approach used in the later 
years causes incomparability across years. The technical documentation from the 
programmes themselves argues convincingly that within programmes there is not 
always a comparability problem as long as one is dealing with the same subject and 
grade (or age level). For instance, Mullis et al (2008: 402) explain that in the TIMSS 
mathematics runs after 1995 scaling occurred in such a way that scores were made 
comparable to the 1995 baseline scores. Thus, for instance, the mean of 500 that is 
referred to when TIMSS 2007 country results for grade 4 mathematics are presented 
(Mullis et al, 2008: 34) is the mean for the 1995 run, not for the 2007 run. This is 
what allows for comparisons across years in the official TIMSS reports. Similarly, in 
PISA, reading scores from the 2000, 2003, 2006 and 2009 runs are comparable, 
though in the case of mathematics and science results for 2000 are not comparable to 
those in later years, and in the case of science even for the later years special country 
averages other than the official ones must be used for the comparison to be valid 
(OECD, 2009: 157; OECD, 2010b: 21, 186). There is thus comparability across years 
within the same programme sometimes, but not always.   
The method used by Hanushek and Woessman (2009) to arrive at normalised country 
scores is strongly dependent on the fact that the United States participated in every 
test considered in the analysis. In a nutshell, the method involves comparing each 
country’s score to that of the United States in the same test, and then using the United 
States NAEP results, which are available for virtually every year, age level and 
subject in question, to bring about adjustments that will make all scores comparable 
over time. NAEP results, according to the analysts, provide the only set of results that 
are truly comparable over the entire time period. NAEP tests are only run in the US.  
A key end product of the normalisation process published by Hanushek and 
Woessman (2009: A15), and summarised here with some simplifications, is a general 
and comparable measure of cognitive ability per country, where this measure is an 
average across two subjects, mathematics and science, across all three institutional 
levels and spanning all the years for which the country had data. The main focus is 
thus not on changes in educational quality over time but rather differences in the 
levels of educational quality across countries in implicitly the same time period. In 
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fact, both data availability and caveats relating to the calculation make trends across 
time difficult to discern. 
The aim of the approach is to transform all country scores to the scale followed by 
PISA in 2000. Each transformed country score T can be described as a linear function 
of the original country score O. 
OT βα +=  (30) 
The slope coefficient β in the case of a specific test can be said to be obtained 
according to equation (31) below. Here the original notation is used, but with the 
terms reorganised to display the linearity of the function.   
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The original country score O, for institutional level a, subject s and year t is converted 
to the PISA 2000 scale through multiplication by the ratio of the standard deviation 
across country scores in PISA in 2000 in subject s to the standard deviation across 
country scores with respect to O. But this ratio is based only on a subset of countries 
belonging to the ‘OECD standardization group’, or OSG. This is a group of 13 
countries which displayed consistent participation across many tests.  
The intercept α for the test covering institutional level a, subject s and year t is 
obtained as follows:  
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The first term on the right-hand side is the US country score in PISA in 2000 in the 
subject in question, s. From this is subtracted the original US country score for the test 
in question converted to the PISA 2000 scale using the ratio referred to previously. 
The third term is the change over time in the US NAEP mean converted to the 2000 
PISA scale using a ratio of standard deviations of scores across United States pupils. 
If the test in question is a 2000 PISA test then α reverts to zero (the difference 
between the two NAEP means would be zero as there was no NAEP test in 2000 and 
in its place the 1999 NAEP results would be considered). 
A specific limitation brought about by the requirement that the United States be a 
participant in every test is that the regional programmes SACMEQ23 and PASEC24 in 
Africa and SERCE25 in Latin America cannot be considered. The SACMEQ and 
SERCE regional programmes include 19 developing countries which do not 
participate in programmes where the US participates. PASEC includes a further 11 
such countries, but PASEC statistics are not used in the data normalisation process 
described below because there are no PASEC countries which also participate in some 
                                                     
23
 Southern and Eastern African Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality. 
24
 Programme for the Analysis of Educational Systems of CONFEMEN, where CONFEMEN is the 
Conference of Education Ministers of Countries Using French in Common (from French).  
25
 Second Regional Comparative Study (from Spanish).  
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other international programme26. SACMEQ and SERCE (but also PASEC) are similar 
in many ways to the programmes considered by Hanushek and Woessman (2009): 
they focus on mathematics and reading and, in the case of SACMEQ and SERCE, 
they have used a scale where the mean across participating countries is 500 and the 
standard deviation across all countries at the pupil level is 100. All three programmes 
are limited to the primary level, however.  
An approach to obtaining normalised country scores in a manner that permits the 
inclusion of programmes such as SACMEQ and SERCE is the focus of the discussion 
that follows27. As in the approach of Hanushek and Woessman (2009), in the new 
approach described below the relationship between the original score O and the 
transformed score T is considered linear, implying the solution must involve finding α 
and β within each relationship. The assumption of a linear relationship, both in the 
existing and new approaches, implies an underlying assumption, namely that the 
shape of the distribution of country scores with respect to the same set of countries in 
different tests should be similar.  
The viability of the approach proposed here depends on a requirement being fulfilled 
with respect to the pattern of bridge countries in the data used, where bridge countries 
are countries participating in more than one programme. The following table 
describes the data. Country scores from 20 tests, each represented by a year in Table 
3, were used. All tests are from the period 2000 to 200928. In total 742 country scores 
from 113 countries were used. In the discussion that follows ‘programme’ means a 
group of tests within which scores are comparable. PISA is one programme because 
in the period in question scores within a subject are comparable over time by design. 
Moreover, PISA mathematics and reading scores are comparable insofar as they 
follow the same scale of a mean of 500 and standard deviation of 100,  are anchored 
in a specific year, and involve the same countries in any one year. Similarly, PIRLS, 
SACMEQ and SERCE are each counted as a programme. TIMSS grade 4 and TIMSS 
grade 8 are counted as two separate programmes, however, as different sets of 
countries participate. Around half of the TIMSS participants in 2003 and 2007 opted 
for testing in just one of the two grades.   
                                                     
26
 PASEC country scores can be found in CONFEMEN (2012).  
27
 The approach is also published in the working paper Gustafsson (2012).  
28
 Key datasets that became public after the analysis presented here was done are the 2011 TIMSS and 
PIRLS datasets.  
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Table 3: Summary of the test data 
Test series Years Coun-
tries 
2-
point 
series 
3-
point 
series 
4-
point 
series 
Total 
series 
PISA mathematics (age 15) 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 72 14 10 35 59 
PISA reading (age 15) 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 72 14 11 34 59 
PIRLS reading (Grade 4) 2001, 2006 47 28   28 
TIMSS mathematics (Gr 4) 2003, 2007 41 22   22 
TIMSS mathematics (Gr 8) 2003, 2007 61 36   36 
SACMEQ mathematics (Gr 6) 2000, 2007 14 13   13 
SACMEQ reading (Gr 6) 2000, 2007 14 13   13 
SERCE mathematics (Gr 6) 2006 16    0 
SERCE reading (Gr 6) 2006 16    0 
OVERALL  113 140 21 69 230 
Sources: OECD (2001, 2004a, 2004b, 2007, 2010b) and Walker (2011) (for PISA); Mullis et al (2007) 
(for PIRLS); Mullis et al (2004, 2008) (for TIMSS); Makuwa (2010) (for SACMEQ); UNESCO (2008) (for 
SERCE). 
Note: In the total row there are more 2-point series than countries because some countries have more 
than one 2-point series. There are no overlapping series in the count of series, meaning for instance that 
no 3-point series would also be counted as two 2-point series.  
 
Table 4 indicates the number of bridge countries that join the six programmes to each 
other. For instance, two bridge countries join SACMEQ to TIMSS grade 8, namely 
South Africa and Botswana. South Africa also joins SACMEQ and PIRLS. Mauritius 
joins SACMEQ to PISA. Compared to SACMEQ, SERCE has a greater number of 
bridge countries joining this programme to the large international programmes. 
PASEC has no bridge countries that permit linking of the PASEC programme to the 
other programmes.   
Table 4: Programmes and number of bridge countries 
PIRLS PISA SACMEQ SERCE 
TIMSS 
Gr 4 
TIMSS 
Gr 8 
PIRLS 
PISA 39 
SACMEQ 1 1 
SERCE 2 9 0 
TIMSS Gr 4 31 29 0 2 
TIMSS Gr 8 35 39 2 3 36 
 
The only requirement for the approach described below is that it should not be 
possible to divide the programmes into two sub-sets separated by just one bridge 
country. Any two sub-sets of programmes must always be joined by at least two 
bridge countries. If this condition is not met, the nonlinear programming solution 
explained below will not work as there would essentially be two separate optimisation 
processes instead of one. Figure 14 illustrates the requirement. Table 4 provides 
sufficient information to indicate that the requirement is met with respect to the data 
described in Table 3. Even if SACMEQ and TIMSS grade 8 had not been joined by 
any bridge countries, the requirement would still have been met, because South Africa 
joins SACMEQ and PIRLS and Mauritius joins SACMEQ and PISA. In fact, the 
bridging of SACMEQ to PISA, something which did not occur before Mauritius 
entered PISA, for the 2009 PISA wave, is especially valuable as it permits the 
anchoring of SACMEQ results at the top of the SACMEQ range (Mauritius obtained 
the best scores in the 2007 wave of SACMEQ).   
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Figure 14: Programmes and bridge countries 
 
In the new approach, one programme must be selected to provide the standard scale 
for the transformed country scores. For this, PISA was selected, following Hanushek 
and Woessman (2009). For each country and programme, the mean of the existing 
country scores was calculated. For instance, one SACMEQ mean value for South 
Africa was calculated from the four original country scores for the two years and two 
subjects.  
Transforming the country- and programme-specific values to comparable country 
scores involved solving a nonlinear programming problem whose objective function 
was the following: 
( )11 ,,...,,min −=−== nmnmmmfz βαβα  (33) 
The value z, which must be minimised, is a function of a number of pairs of 
intercepts, α, and slope coefficients, β, which together constitute the decision 
variables of the problem. The number of pairs is equal to the total number of 
programmes minus one, as one programme has been selected as the standard. There 
are n programmes in total, including the standard programme (n equals 6 in our case).  
Function f can be described as follows: 
( )∑
=
=
k
j
jjWDz
1
 (34) 
( )2
,, dmicmiij TTD == −=  (35) 
immmim OT βα +=  (36) 
Value z is the sum of k values, k being the available bridges in the sense of non-zero 
values in Table 4. The variable k equals 13 in our case. D is a value attached to each 
country within a bridge. Equation (34) involves finding the mean for D across 
countries within each bridge (for instance the mean across 39 values within the PISA-
PIRLS bridge) and multiplying this mean by a weight W (explained below). In 
equation (35), D for country i and bridge j is obtained by finding the squared 
difference between transformed country scores T for the two programmes c and d, the 
programmes joined by bridge j. In equation (36) the transformed country score for 
country i and programme m is a linear function of the original score for the country in 
Prog A 
Prog B 
Prog C 
Prog D 
Prog A 
Prog B 
Prog C 
Prog D 
Sufficient 
Insufficient 
Each line 
represents a 
bridge 
country. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Part I  66 
 
the programme (as explained earlier, this original score can be the mean across 
several tests if more than one test exists).   
The weight W attached to each of the k bridges is calculated in such a way that a 
weight of 1.0 for each country (this 1.0 is not the same as W) is distributed across 
those bridges that join the programmes in which the country participates. The sum of 
all the k values of W is thus equal to the number of countries, 113 in our case. The 
weighting system therefore follows the principle generally followed in cross-country 
analysis, which is to assign an equal weight to every country. Without the weighting 
system, in other words if every bridge carried an equal weight, countries which are 
found repeatedly across many programmes would implicitly tend to carry too much 
importance in the nonlinear programming solution. A bridge is weighted more if (1) 
there are more countries in the programmes being bridged, (2) if the countries in the 
programmes being bridged have a lower presence in other programmes and (3) if the 
programmes being bridged have fewer bridges serving them. The following two 
equations describe how W is calculated.   
∑
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Pi is the number of programmes that country i participates in. The value F for 
programme m is the sum of all the reciprocals of P for the e countries participating in 
programme m. Weight W for bridge j is the sum of two values, one for each of the two 
programmes being bridged. The programme-specific value is F over B, where B is the 
total number of bridges that serve programme c (or d).  
Returning to equation (33), what the nonlinear programming solution does is adjust 
the coefficients of the five (n-1) linear relationships between T and O in a way that 
minimises the differences between the values T for the same country across different 
programmes. Because in effect T=O in the case of PISA (or α=0 and β=1), all country 
scores T gravitate towards the scale used by PISA. If the differences between the 
country scores of different programmes were only a matter of different programme-
specific means and standard deviations with respect to the scoring process, then the 
difference in equation (35) would in all instances be zero and z in equation (33) would 
be reduced to zero. 
The nonlinear programming problem is subject to just one constraint, which is that the 
transformed country scores T cannot be negative.  
The results of the application of the new approach, in terms of programme-specific 
values T and the overall mean for each country, are provided in Appendix A29. The 
113 overall mean values can be considered comparable country scores. 
In exploring alternatives, a quadratic as opposed to a linear form was attempted for 
equation (36). This did not appear to come with any noticeable benefits, for instance 
                                                     
29
 The Excel file used for the calculations can be obtained from the author.  
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in terms of the performance of the country scores in the growth models described in 
section 4. The use of the weight W did not make a large difference to the results. The 
largest difference was in the case of Zambia, where the transformed country score 
would have been 265 instead of the 261 reported in Appendix A had unweighted 
bridges been used. Importantly, though, the goodness of fit, in terms of R2, of the 
regression models discussed below was marginally better with country scores 
produced using weighted bridges, compared to unweighted bridges. 
What are the key differences between the nonlinear programming approach described 
above and the approach used by Hanushek and Woessman (2009)? Two key 
differences stand out, both of which point to weaknesses in the nonlinear 
programming approach, or the cost of having more countries in one’s set of 
normalised country scores. One is that the approach presented here is applicable at a 
high level in the sense that it subsumes details relating to year, subject and 
institutional level within the relatively untransparent decision variables of equation 
(33). The approach is thus not amenable to an analysis of trends over time in the way 
the Hanushek and Woessman approach (2009) is. A second key difference is the 
dependence of the approach presented here on a weighting system, the design of 
which is at least partly a matter of subjective judgement. 
The standardised testing systems targeted at the education system and discussed 
above, all focus on primary and secondary schooling. What is relatively under-
developed are testing systems focussing on the pre-primary and post-secondary levels. 
Pre-primary testing systems could play an important role in informing policy dealing 
with this critical level of education. For understanding linkages between education 
and growth, however, comparable data on how well tertiary education institutions 
develop skills at the top end of the human capital spectrum would be important. In 
Part III of the dissertation an unusual and innovative programme in Brazil that focuses 
on the standardised testing of university students completing their first degree will be 
discussed. Such a programme seems to offer valuable lessons for other countries 
wishing to improve within-country monitoring of tertiary education quality. It might 
even be a precursor to internationally standardised testing at the tertiary education 
level, though such testing still seems a relatively distant prospect, for both developing 
and developed countries. Yet, as Heyneman (2004a) argues, the defining and 
measuring of quality at the tertiary education level is likely to open up as an important 
new frontier in education research in the near future.  
3.4 Economic growth indicators and their alternatives 
The notion that human welfare is reflected in the level of income of people is one that 
has been facilitated by the emergence of market economies. The more the goods and 
services that people need are traded and thus have prices, the easier it becomes to 
measure human welfare according to a single monetary metric. It should thus come as 
no surprise that the earliest relatively reliable income per capita figures are those of 
the early industrial countries, such as Britain, for which figures from 1700 are 
available (see Romer (1986)). Arguably, the reliance on income as a measure of 
welfare in market economies has been stronger in the popular media and amongst 
policymakers than amongst the economists who developed the income per capita 
measures in the first place. Even Simon Kuznets, 1971 Nobel laureate for his 
empirical work on development and economic growth and a keen analyst of income 
per capita, was sceptical about the use of income in the absence of considerations 
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around the quality of products, income inequalities and pollution (Kuznets, 1980). 
(The reason why Kuznets does not receive more attention in this dissertation, despite 
his prominence in the area of modelling economic development, is that Kuznets did 
not pay much attention to the role of human capital.) 
There is a rich literature on why income per capita is a limiting measure of human 
welfare and on possible alternative measures. Three strands in this literature can be 
identified. Firstly, better ways of defining and measuring income and the related 
phenomena of consumption and wealth have been examined. Secondly, certain 
analysts, using the first strand as a point of departure, have questioned the very notion 
that, in particular, consumption mirrors welfare and have sought alternatives, partly 
using tools and concepts from the fields of psychology, sociology, political science 
and philosophy. Thirdly, an important strand of enquiry has emerged in recent years 
which again uses the first income strand as a point of departure and focuses not just 
on consumption that is realisable in the near future but on consumption that can be 
sustained over a longer term. Conceivably, it is possible to merge the three strands 
within a common framework for understanding welfare. However, work on this 
appears to be limited. Essentially the critics of the traditional income approach to 
welfare, at least within economics, have tended to focus either on questioning the 
monetary metric without paying too much attention to sustainability, or else on 
whether income is sustainable over time without paying too much attention to whether 
income is the right metric. The division of the debate into the three strands described 
here can be found in a recent and rather comprehensive review of the debates, 
compiled by a team that included two Nobel laureates, Joseph Stiglitz (2001 laureate 
for work on information asymmetries in markets) and Amartya Sen (1998 laureate for 
work on welfare economics). The review, Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi (2009), is 
henceforth referred to as SSF.  
The first two strands of the discussion are dealt with in the present section, whilst the 
third one, on sustainability, is dealt with in section 3.5.  
Beginning with the first strand, on better ways of carrying out the monetary 
measurement, key omissions inherent in the traditional GDP per capita measure can 
be grouped under nine headings: (a) international economics, (b) technological 
change, (c) wealth, (d) non-market production, (e) inefficiencies in government 
services, (f) institutional failure and defensive spending, (g) leisure time, (h) the cost 
of risk, (i) income inequality. Below, how taking each of these nine omissions into 
account represents a departure from traditional GDP per capita is discussed.  
Before the discussion begins, however, it is useful to restate a few basics on how GDP 
per capita is calculated. The rules for ‘national accounts’ are laid down by System of 
National Accounts (SNA) maintained by the United Nations Statistics Division and 
partner organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (United Nations 
Statistics Division, 2009a). GDP is one of most important statistics appearing in these 
accounts. Three definitions of GDP can be identified depending on one’s point of 
departure: total economic output, total expenditure or total income. The three 
definitions are designed to yield the same overall GDP value.  The income approach 
to GDP, which of the three approaches is the approach most relevant for 
understanding welfare, is stated as follows: ‘Income-based GDP is compensation of 
employees, plus taxes less subsidies on production and imports, plus gross mixed 
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income, plus gross operating surplus’30.  Gross mixed income and gross operating 
surplus are essentially earnings received by owners of unincorporated (generally 
smaller) and incorporated (generally larger) firms respectively. Taxes are included as 
roughly it is assumed that these become indirect income in the form of government 
services. A key question is how non-market production common in developing 
countries is treated. For instance, would vegetables grown by a household for its own 
consumption not be counted within GDP, even if similar vegetables purchased on the 
market by another household, using income earned, clearly would?  The question is 
not as readily answered as one might expect. The stated intention within the SNA is 
clearly to count all non-market activities. In explaining the elements of the SNA, the 
following is said (United Nations Statistics Division, 2009a: par. 2.40): 
Given the fundamental role played by the market in modern economies, the SNA 
distinguishes, as an essential feature of its structure, between establishments which 
are market producers, producers for own final use and other non-market producers. 
Market establishments produce mostly goods and services for sale at prices which 
are economically significant. Producers for own final use produce mostly goods and 
services for final consumption or fixed capital formation by the owners of the 
enterprises in which they are produced. Other non-market establishments supply 
most of the goods and services they produce without charge or at prices which are 
not economically significant.  
The vegetables for own consumption described above would be dealt with under 
‘producers for own final use’ whilst charitable work is an example of what would fall 
under ‘non-market producers’. ‘Market producers’ includes producers considered 
formal and informal, as long as goods are traded in a market. In the case of South 
Africa, Davies and Thurlow (2009: 14) find that informal market producers account 
for 7% of GDP. However, what is clear is that neither ‘producers for own final use’ 
nor ‘non-market producers’ are considered in South Africa’s official GDP, despite 
this being the intention of the SNA. The South African practice is in line with 
international practice. Scandinavian countries did at one point count non-market 
household production within their official GDP figures, but this practice was dropped 
in 1950 (Ironmonger, 2001: 9).  
In South Africa the calculation of GDP is a responsibility shared by Statistics South 
Africa, which follows the output approach, and the South African Reserve Bank, 
which follows the income and expenditure approaches (Statistics South Africa, 2010: 
13). Collaboration between the two bodies means that the different approaches lead to 
the same GDP values. In its reports, Stats SA sub-divides GDP according to ten 
different industrial sectors. One of these sectors is ‘general government services’, 
which would include public education. The Reserve Bank, in presenting the income 
version of GDP, uses employee income and the income of owners of businesses as 
key sub-divisions. The expenditure version of GDP uses the sub-divisions household 
consumption, government consumption, investment expenditure and international 
trade adjustments (see for instance South African Reserve Bank, 2009: S104). The 
details behind the three different calculations of GDP are not easily available to those 
outside the two organisations. Little is published on the internet. In contrast, the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, the body in the US responsible for drawing up the 
national accounts, publishes a relatively wide range of guides intended for specialists 
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 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/sna1993/glossform.asp?getitem=206. 
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and non-specialists on its website31. This is likely to reflect a wider pattern whereby 
countries with higher levels of public accountability and education see more technical 
information on the calculation of GDP being made public.     
A discussion of the nine omissions referred to above follows.   
(a) International economics. To deal with the problem that GDP includes, for 
instance, income earned by those living outside South Africa from investments in 
South Africa and excludes income earned by South Africans from investments 
elsewhere, typically one resorts to gross national income (GNI), also referred to as 
gross national product (GNP), a measure that adjusts for these problems so that only 
the income of those living in South Africa is reflected. (The SNA recognises the term 
GNI but not GNP.) SSF (2009: 94) prefer going a step further and using national 
disposable income, a term recognised within the SNA. In this indicator the value of 
remittances is attached to the receiver of the remittances, not their giver. Thus, for 
instance, the total incomes of Lesotho migrant workers in South Africa would be 
counted within South Africa’s GNI, but South Africa’s national disposable income 
would exclude the part of this income sent to family in Lesotho as remittances. The 
argument is that national disposable income would more accurately reflect the 
consumption and hence welfare of the migrant workers in South Africa as well as the 
families of these workers remaining in Lesotho. The data availability problem is that 
whilst GNI values per country are readily available, the same cannot be said for 
national disposable income. For instance, GDP and GNI figures but not national 
disposable income figures for many countries are available on the online data 
querying facility of the UN Statistics Division32. An analyst may be able to access 
sufficient national disposable income values through national sources, but this would 
be costly, apart from the outcome being unpredictable. As an example of this, the 
South African Reserve Bank, in its Quarterly Bulletin, provides values for the 
country’s ‘gross national disposable income’, which in the period 2006 to 2009 have 
generally been around 4% lower than the corresponding GDP values. To compare, 
South Africa’s GNI has tended to be around 3% lower than GDP in the same period. 
These differentials reflect the net outflows of income from South Africa, specifically 
through the remittances from migrant labour and profits paid to foreign investors.  
(b) Technological change. Models examining economic growth by country rely on 
the comparability of income values across countries and over time. In order to 
establish comparability across countries, income is generally measured in purchasing 
power parity (PPP) US dollars. This measure adjusts exchange rates found in the 
market for the fact that the same amount of money has a different purchasing power in 
different countries. For instance, food and labour tends to be cheaper in developing 
than developed countries due to factors such as legal or logistical restrictions in the 
movements of goods and services across borders. At the same time, technologically 
advanced services such as certain medical operations can be expected to cost more in 
less developed countries where the necessary technology is less widespread. The 
estimation of the PPP relationship between different currencies occurs rather 
infrequently and within a research project that is costly. It was only in 1993 that a 
comprehensive set of PPP relationships spanning most countries was obtained (World 
Bank, 2008: 169). As pointed out by Coulombe, Tremblay and Marchand (2004: 11), 
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 See for instance http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm. 
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 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/introduction.asp. 
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these new data were what lay behind the surge in cross-country growth modelling that 
occurred at the time. This PPP analysis exercise was repeated only after twelve years, 
in 2005. The work is largely led by the statistical bodies of the UN, though the 
University of Pennsylvania (the producer of many of the statistics used in section 4) 
was initially involved to a large degree. Income in PPP dollars is published for every 
year, for instance by the University of Pennsylvania. However, the further the year is 
from the year of the last comprehensive review of world prices, the more tenuous the 
comparability of the values across countries as they would become increasingly 
reliant on techniques such as inflation adjustments and decreasingly reliant on 
differences in the actual purchasing power of money relative to a basket of goods. For 
instance, whilst 2005 average income in PPP dollars across countries would be 
strongly influenced by the empirical work on prices in 2005 of actual goods, the later 
2010 values would rely partly on the accuracy and comparability of nationally 
generated inflation indices used to make 2005 and 2010 prices comparable. The 
figures used for the growth models seen in section 4 are therefore less reliable than 
one may initially think. 
What is even more elusive than the comparability of income across countries, is the 
comparability of income over time, even within one country. At the heart of this 
problem is the problem of understanding the welfare implications of technological 
change or, as SSF put it, of quality change. Whilst the consumer price index (CPI) for 
a country will allow for the comparability of income over time with respect to that 
income’s ability to purchase non-changing goods, such as fruit and vegetables, 
complications arise insofar as goods and services that are new or change 
fundamentally are concerned. To illustrate, the computer that can be bought for 1,000 
US dollars in 1990 will be very different to the computer that can be bought for the 
same amount in 2010, even in the absence of price inflation. Moreover, in 1980 it 
would have been impossible to buy a computer for USD 1,000. The question is 
whether the improvements to the quality of life supposedly brought about by 
computers and technological change generally should somehow be quantified when 
income or purchasing power is compared over time. Furthermore, it could be argued 
that certain technologies that did not exist previously, such as the cellular phone, 
become basic necessities over time, implying new costs for a basic quality of life that 
did not exist before. Can these technological considerations be incorporated into, for 
instance, measures of income growth over time so that these measures more 
accurately reflect developments in human welfare? To date, there is insufficient 
agreement around a generally implementable approach to doing this and even whether 
it is possible to introduce this level of complexity into the international accounting 
systems. A few notable analyses exist, however. The 1996 Boskin Commission 
Report of the US government estimated that annual inflation had been over-estimated 
by about 0.6 percentage points over about two decades because the benefits brought 
about by quality change had been under-estimated (United States: Social Security 
Administration, 1996: Section V). However, global indicators on income 
improvements adjusted for the quality benefits inherent in technological change are 
still only a remote possibility. This obviously limits the analysis into how human 
capital development contributes towards welfare, especially if this analysis focuses on 
trends over time.  
(c) Wealth. Wealth, or property or capital owned, is undoubtedly an indicator of 
welfare. For instance, wealth provides insurance against periods of income loss. Put 
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differently, a reduction in the flow of income can be compensated for through some 
depletion of the stock of wealth. The value of one’s physical property tends to reflect 
physical space in which to live, which in turn often correlates with well-being. These 
relationships apply at the level of the individual, the household and a country. 
Important relationships exist between wealth and consumption. More wealth is 
associated with a lower need to invest current income and hence with an improved 
capacity to consume. Traditional welfare measures based on income alone fail to take 
into account these key distinctions. Wealth can be seen to include, apart from physical 
and financial capital, human capital and a sustained ecosystem. Poor human capital 
and a degraded ecosystem limit the extent to which income improvements can lead to 
a better quality of life. The SNA does in fact incorporate substantial wealth 
considerations. However, implementation of this in the actual accounting practices of 
countries is limited. The Quarterly Bulletin of the South African Reserve Bank reports 
subtractions from and additions to the physical assets held by firms and the 
government through the categories gross fixed capital consumption, meaning the 
depreciation of physical assets, and gross fixed capital formation, or investments in 
these assets. However, the physical assets of households, in particular dwellings, do 
not receive this attention. The total level of financial assets in the country is reflected 
in the Quarterly Bulletin, but not the total level of physical assets, let alone the total 
levels of human capital or ecological assets. SSF (2009: 91) advocate using 
consumption variables, such as net domestic product (NDP) and net national 
disposable income, as opposed to pure income variables, so that the need to invest in 
capital formation (possibly due to limited inheritances of capital assets) is properly 
taken into account. The values for these more consumption-oriented variables can in 
fact be imputed from existing national accounts figures (as they appear in South 
Africa’s Quarterly Bulletin, for instance), though they are not explicitly present.  
(d) Non-market production. As discussed earlier, goods such as vegetables grown 
by a household for its own consumption and services such as child-care that is not 
paid for, are not accounted for within actual national accounts. Empirical analysis has 
shown that if non-market production were included in national accounts, figures 
would rise substantially. For instance, the GDP of the USA would increase by around 
30% (SSF, 2009: 130). This has two far-reaching implications for comparisons across 
time and space. Firstly, the exclusion of non-market production results in an 
exaggeration of the income (and implicitly, welfare) gaps between developed and 
developing countries given that the latter tend to have more production outside the 
monetised market. Secondly, income improvements seen over time would be an 
exaggeration insofar as these improvements would partly be a reflection of increased 
marketisation of production, not an increase in production.  
(e) Inefficiencies in government services. GDP always includes the value of 
government services. These services are valued at the cost to the government. 
Government failure, in the sense of inefficiencies in the provision of public services, 
means that GDP per capita will overstate the level of welfare of citizens. Put 
differently, the same amount of money represents less human welfare if associated 
with public services, compared to if it were associated with goods and services in the 
private market. This point can be illustrated through reference to the voucher system 
in education, an education financing system widely debated though infrequently 
implemented where (according to the most market-oriented definition) government 
issues vouchers to households which are redeemable for education services in a 
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private education market where government’s role is reduced to that of quality 
controller. This radical proposal is often associated with Milton Friedman (1955), 
Nobel laureate for his work in consumption analysis (amongst other areas). Voucher 
system proponents point to its ability to reduce government inefficiency through the 
reduction of monopoly effects. Essentially, if a school does not serve a community 
well then an entrepreneur can establish a better school and parents can switch their 
human capital investments to the new school. Such efficiency-enhancing dynamics 
are not possible within a traditional and essentially monopolistic public schooling 
system such as the one existing in South Africa. Economic theory would suggest that 
a school voucher worth a specific amount would represent a higher level of welfare 
than an equivalent level of spending on a pupil by the government through a 
traditional public schooling system. Estimating the bias to GDP per capita 
comparisons across countries and over time associated with different levels of 
government efficiency would be difficult and seems not to have occurred. The key 
problem would be attaching monetary values to government inefficiencies, for 
instance the loss incurred by households as a result of not enjoying the freedoms of a 
voucher system.  
(f) Institutional failure and defensive spending. Defensive spending is undertaken 
by households or firms or the government to deal with institutional weaknesses, 
relative to some standard of what is ideal. For instance, poor performance of 
institutions associated with law and order, combined with a poor level of social 
cohesion and large social inequalities, typically leads to large defensive expenditures 
by all three economic roleplayers in the form of replacement of stolen goods, large 
investments in the securing of properties, and prisons. Poor public transport systems 
are also typically considered a cause for high defensive spending on, for instance, 
private vehicles beyond what can be considered ideal. South Africa’s level of 
defensive spending can be considered especially high with respect to both security 
and transport. Welfare in another country with the same GDP per capita but with 
greater security and better public transport, would be better, even in terms of simple 
consumption criteria. Within the South African education sector defensive spending 
has been put forward as a partial justification for teacher salaries that are higher than 
those in other middle income countries. South African teachers must spend more on 
private transport than their peers in other countries, for example. SSF (2009: 103) 
suggest ways of accounting for defensive spending. However, these methods are not 
easy, nor do they cover a wide range of defensive spending types.  
(g) Leisure time. More leisure, or more time not spent producing out of choice, is 
considered to be positively correlated with welfare. In economics, the value of a 
person’s leisure time is generally taken to be the opportunity cost of not working, in 
other words the monetary rate for leisure equals one’s wage rate. Proper analysis of 
the levels of leisure enjoyed in a society require data on earnings and on time use. To 
deal with the latter, developed countries have increasingly made use of time use 
surveys. One such survey has occurred in South Africa, in 2000 (Statistics South 
Africa, 2001). Cross-country comparisons are typically made complex, though not 
entirely impossible, due to differences in the design of time use surveys and questions 
around the definition of leisure. Just one example of a number of complexities is how 
to deal with what can be referred to as imposed leisure. How should leisure that is not 
chosen, for instance due to labour laws or social norms, be valued? Should a country 
that makes it especially difficult for women to work be considered a country with an 
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enhanced level of welfare, all else being equal? Presumably not. But this would be a 
relatively extreme case. SSF (2009: 135) explain how in general the use of typical 
income measures, without any consideration of leisure, to compare welfare across 
countries has tended to over-state the welfare of countries, such as the USA, where 
considerably less leisure is enjoyed than in other countries, such as France.  
(h) The cost of risk. SSF (2009: 123) discuss the trend in countries such as France for 
saving to become more private and less public over time. This implies greater risk for 
individuals who, for instance, must increasingly take decisions about where to place 
their retirement savings as greater use is made of a diversity of investment options. 
Typically, or ideally, this trend is associated with spending on insurance against the 
risk that particular investment options will perform poorly or even collapse. In some 
ways, this is defensive spending and analogous to spending more on private security 
due to a deterioration in publicly run security services. What SSF do not discuss is the 
possibility of an opposing effect whereby the shift towards more private saving 
improves, for at least a part of society, investment choices, retirement earnings and 
hence welfare.  
(i) Income inequality. A basic principle in welfare economics is that income 
inequality undermines society’s overall welfare. In other words, if two societies enjoy 
an equal average level of GDP per capita and are similar in all respects except for the 
fact that income is distributed more unequally in the first society than the second 
society, then the overall welfare of the second society can be considered superior. 
Within-country inequality with respect to basic income measures are commonly 
referred to, for instance by means of the Gini coefficient in the UNDP’s Human 
Development Report (UNDP, 2010: 152). SSF (2009: 135) point to the need to 
consider inequalities with respect to better measures of welfare, in particular measures 
that take into account real consumption and the amount of leisure enjoyed. One could 
go further and consider the presence of institutional factors that strengthen income 
inequality. The degree of democracy in a country can be expected to be a major 
contributor to income equality. Recent cross-country data analysis in fact supports this 
hypothesis. The political scientists Reuveny and Li (2003) find that degree of 
democracy promotes income equality when controlling for economic openness. They 
argue that it is essential to use economic openness as a conditioning variable. The 
economists Mueller and Stratman (2003) find that the level of voter participation in 
democracies promotes income equality. Both studies use a panel of country-level 
values spanning several decades which includes both developing and developed 
countries. Mueller and Stratman (2003) moreover use an instrumental variable 
approach to test the direction of causality. But there are costs associated with 
democracy. Reuveny and Li (2003) find that the size of the public sector is larger in 
more democratic societies, which suggests that these societies operate more 
inefficiently and thus experience a lower average level of income. On a theoretical 
level, Arrow’s widely quoted impossibility theorem implies, in a nutshell, that 
elections where voters must choose between three or more options result in Pareto 
inefficient results. Sen (1999: 251) argues that Arrow’s theorem is frequently 
misinterpreted to produce overly pessimistic conclusions around the efficiency of 
democracy. He argues that if a democratic system is characterised by sufficient 
information, in the form of, for instance, informed public debates, the contradictions 
implied by Arrow’s theorem do not pose an insurmountable problem.   
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Topics (a) to (i) above all carry the implicit or explicit assumption that one should 
strive towards having more nuanced monetary measures of welfare, where the 
nuancing is to a large extent a matter of measuring what people consume, including 
leisure ‘consumed’. Moreover, the assumption is that more consumption equals 
greater welfare. The next two topics move beyond this framework, yet remain narrow 
in the sense that they exclude the ecology and ecological sustainability (how ecology 
is brought into the equation is the subject of section 3.5 below). The two topics 
discussed here can be labelled (j) subjective wellness and (k) capabilities enjoyed due 
to one’s objective circumstances.  
(j) Subjective wellness. Many items that are important for human welfare are not 
traded and hence carry no explicit monetary value. An example would be additional 
life years. Before discussing non-monetary valuations of welfare, it is pertinent to 
consider how non-traded items such as life years have been assigned monetary value 
in economics. SSF (2009: 154) see as seminal in this regard the work of Gary Becker, 
often considered the founder of human capital theory and 1992 Nobel laureate for his 
application of microeconomic theory to non-market behaviour. Using welfare 
economics tools such as consumer theory and indifference sets, tools designed to 
assign monetary values to non-traded items, Becker and others have attached 
monetary value to years of human life and found that if a person’s total consumption 
over his life (including ‘consumption’ of life itself) is one’s key measure of welfare, 
then standard measures of income improvements in GDP per capita for the period 
1960 to 2000 under-state improvements by about a third. In other words, standard 
measures have failed to take into account substantial human welfare improvements 
associated with greater life expectancy (Becker, Philipson and Soares, 2005: 279).  
However, SSF (2009: 154) conclude that tools for attaching monetary values to non-
traded items that are significant for welfare are too fraught with inaccuracies and 
unnecessary complications to be useful for policymakers. Rather, the use of non-
monetary measures for these items has proven to offer better opportunities for valuing 
welfare. Specifically, subjective valuations of happiness have increasingly been used 
in economics. Whilst these subjective variables are not based on people’s willingness 
to pay, a key criterion in consumer theory, they have been found to perform well in 
several economic models. Often three basic measures of subjective well-being are 
distinguished from each other. Firstly, life satisfaction is a person’s valuation of 
whether his aims in life have been fulfilled up to that point in life. Secondly, positive 
affect is the presence of positive emotions such as enjoyment. Thirdly, negative affect 
is the absence of negative emotions such as anxiety or the experience of physical pain. 
These three subjective variables have been found to be less correlated with each other 
than one may intuitively think, which has led a number of analysts to emphasise 
considering all three variables simultaneously in any analysis of well-being (SSF, 
2009: 146).  
Two international surveys that probe subjective wellness stand out, the World Values 
Survey and the Gallup World Poll. The World Values Survey involves face-to-face 
interviews with a representative sample of all adults in a country. It is run every five 
years and sample sizes vary between 1,000 and 1,500 individuals. Up to 73 countries 
participate per survey wave. South Africa has participated in the last four waves of the 
survey, with the South African sample rising to around 3,000 respondents in the last 
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wave of 200733. The Gallup World Poll has occurred annually in recent years and also 
involves face-to-face interviews. It covers over 130 countries. South Africa has 
participated since 2006, with a different sample of around 1,000 individuals every 
year34. Gallup sells its data, whilst the World Values Survey data are available as free 
downloads.  
Average subjective wellness values per country have increasingly been used for 
international comparisons. These comparisons have been the subject of lively 
conceptual and methodological debate. Much of the debate has centred around the so-
called Easterlin paradox, or the finding that although subjective wellness and income 
are relatively well correlated within countries, between countries they are not. 
Essentially people in rich countries are not systematically happier than people in poor 
countries even though the rich in one country tend to be happier than the poor in the 
same country. This observation has led to the conclusion that people’s happiness is 
largely based on their material welfare relative to others directly observed in the same 
society. An important and recent critique of the Easterlin paradox is provided by 
Sacks, Stevenson and Wolfers (2010), who argue that the apparently poor correlation 
between subjective wellness and income at the cross-country level was largely a 
symptom of inappropriate functional form and errors of measurement. After 
correcting for this, these analysts obtain a correlation coefficient of 0.82 between 
logged income per capita and subjective wellness across 131 countries, using Gallup 
life satisfaction values for the latter variable35. South Africa falls below the regression 
line, meaning South Africans are less satisfied than what income would predict36. This 
is to be expected given the large gap between mean and median income in South 
Africa caused by the country’s exceptionally high income inequality.  
Debate around whether the Easterlin paradox exists has been lively since Richard 
Easterlin first proposed it in 1974. However, insofar as a recent stocktaking of the 
literature by Layard, Clark and Senik (2012: 66) can be trusted to offer a balanced 
verdict, it appears that evidence does not support the existence of the Easterlin 
paradox. Economic growth, it seems, is good for happiness.  
Analyses where subjective wellness variables replace the income variables in growth 
models such as those discussed in section 4 seem not to exist. However, a close proxy 
for this is offered by Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2003: 812), who in an article 
titled ‘The macroeconomics of happiness’ regress life satisfaction on a range of 
explanatory variables, including education variables and income, at the level of 
individuals across several European countries, with dummy variables for countries. 
They find that having continued with education beyond age 19 is positively associated 
with greater life satisfaction after controlling for income. The magnitude of this 
education effect is around a quarter of the effect of not being unemployed and a half 
of being divorced – unemployment and divorce are found to be amongst the largest 
determinants of unhappiness. This analysis suggests that there are reasons beyond the 
often cited income reasons for expanding post-school education.   
                                                     
33
 See http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org. The description of the WVS and the Gallup World Poll 
provided here reflects the situation in 2011.  
34
 See http://www.gallup.com. 
35
 Sacks, Stevenson and Wolfers, 2010: 43 (see Figure 4).  
36
 Sacks, Stevenson and Wolfers, 2010: 42 (see Figure 3). 
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Subjective measures of wellness have largely been a topic of debate amongst 
academics and not policymakers. One notable exception is Bhutan, where the king 
introduced the term ‘gross happiness index’, or GHI, in 1972. This indicator has since 
then become an important element in the national planning process of Bhutan and in 
some respects Bhutan has come to be seen amongst analysts from a wide range of 
countries as a laboratory for the use of this kind of indicator. Bhutan hosts regular 
international conferences on the topic37. Bhutan’s official GHI is in fact not a 
standardised time series of single values, but rather an umbrella term under which a 
number of variables are studied for planning purposes in a relatively flexible manner.  
(k) Capabilities enjoyed due to one’s objective circumstances. The subjective 
measures discussed above are naturally limited by their very subjectivity. One 
criticism that has been made is that people tend to be pessimistic and under-value 
improvements in their circumstances over time (SSF, 2009: 152). One way of 
escaping the limitations of both income and subjective variables is to focus on the 
objective circumstances of people which according to experts or broad consensus are 
important for well-being. A key expert associated with the emergence of this approach 
is Amartya Sen, 1998 Nobel laureate for his contributions to welfare economics. 
Sen’s 1999 book Development as freedom encapsulates many his proposals for 
valuing welfare. Sen’s work focuses largely on what to aim for in development and 
less on the precise mechanisms for attaining the aims though on certain points, such as 
the vital role of a free market, Sen is emphatic. Sen’s (1999: 38) basic thesis is that 
five classes of ‘instrumental freedoms’ enjoyed by people should all be strongly 
promoted in the development process, both because they are a means to greater 
welfare but also because these freedoms are constituents of welfare and hence 
worthwhile ends in themselves. The five types of freedoms are discussed below.  
 Political freedoms. Democratic freedoms are important, Sen argues. India and 
China are contrasted to make the point. A lack of political freedoms in the case of 
China makes this country less able to make the necessary economic policy 
adaptations in times of crisis. The fact that democratic India has not suffered a 
major famine since independence in 1947 is contrasted with China’s major 1958 
to 1961 famine. The other four types of freedom discussed below can be 
considered the outcomes of a successful democracy even if to some extent they 
are realisable in the absence of democracy.  
 Economic freedoms. These freedoms allow people to transact economically in a 
fair and predictable manner through a well functioning market, where the state 
promotes the enforcement of contracts and law and order generally.  
 Social opportunities. Under this heading Sen is referring above all to publicly 
organised education and health services that promote the basic capabilities people 
need, for instance, to participate in democratic processes and the market.    
 Transparency guarantees. This is perhaps the least predictable of Sen’s five 
categories of freedoms and it is interesting that it should be prioritised as it is. 
Transparency guarantees provide people with access to the information that they 
need and counteract incorrect information. The implied policy priorities are 
government mechanisms to protect and promote freedom of expression and to 
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 See http://www.bhutanstudies.org.bt. 
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allow access to needed government information. However, the reach of this 
category is wider than government policies and encompasses sufficient levels of 
honesty and trust within society. This echoes the notion of social capital of 
sociologists such as James Coleman (most known in economics of education 
circles for his groundbreaking 1966 Coleman Report, arguably the first ever fully-
fledged education production function). Transparency guarantees act as a bulwark 
against ‘corruption, financial irresponsibility and under-hand dealings’ (Sen, 
1999: 40). 
 Protective security. Here Sen is referring to government initiated safety nets to 
assist people during temporary crises relating, for instance, to unemployment and 
spikes in food prices.   
Sen’s development framework has been widely embraced by policymakers38. The 
intended comprehensiveness of Sen’s framework inevitably invites criticisms around 
what has been omitted. An omission that seems critical from a South African 
viewpoint is the absence of any explicit treatment of trade unions in Development as 
freedom, despite their important role in many countries. For instance, do trade unions  
cause economic ‘unfreedoms’ insofar as they promote minimum wages above the 
market clearing level? If this is true (as one might suspect following Banerjee, 
Galiani, Levinsohn, McLaren and Woolard (2007) or Kingdon and Knight (2007)), 
would limiting the rights of workers to act collectively not constitute another 
economic unfreedom? In other words, are there not difficult contradictions within 
Sen’s framework that should be acknowledged? Whilst Sen may be silent on trade 
unions, on unemployment he is very clear. In comparing the United States and 
Europe, he argues that an excessive focus on income as a measure of welfare has 
obscured the detrimental effects of long-term unemployment in Europe, which has 
historically been much higher than in the United States. Whilst extensive income 
transfer mechanisms in Europe deal with the problem on the income side, the failure 
of Europe to deal more decisively with the underlying unemployment problem 
represents a serious crisis of under-development, according to Sen (1999: 94). Similar 
arguments could be made in the case of South Africa.  
On one level, Sen disagrees with the need to inform policymakers using the kinds of 
growth models dealt with in this dissertation. The following from Sen (1999: 5) is 
revealing: 
…the opportunity to receive basic education or health care… are among the constituent 
components of development. Their relevance for development does not have to be freshly 
established through their indirect contribution to the growth of GNP or to the promotion of 
industrialization. As it happens, these freedoms and rights are also very effective in 
contributing to economic progress… 
That basic education should be an end in itself and carries benefits that are not related 
to income is something Adam Smith supports when he argues in his Lectures on 
jurisprudence with respect to the uneducated child: ‘When he is grown up he has no 
ideas with which he can amuse himself.’ (Smith, 2010: 460) However, Sen is not 
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 ‘The Guardian Profile: Amartya Sen’ at 
http://www.theguardian.com/books/2001/mar/31/society.politics. The South African Minister of 
Finance, Trevor Manuel, made reference to Sen in his 2003 budget speech 
(http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2003/speech/speech.pdf). 
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impervious to the importance of the causal link between education and income. He in 
fact emphasises that improved income per capita in developing countries is an 
important prerequisite for the realisation of many freedoms (Sen, 1999: 25). 
Moreover, Sen emphasises that human capital development should contribute towards 
human capabilities. The key omission in this regard in Sen (1999) is perhaps how easy 
it is for educational activities not to translate into improved human capabilities, in 
other words how easily paying attention to only educational activities, and not 
educational outcomes, can provide an illusion of progress. This omission in Sen is 
likely to be linked to the fact that much of the work that has emphasised poor 
educational outcomes, for instance Van der Berg (2007) in the case of South Africa, 
post-dates much of Sen’s work.    
Sen has played an important role in the establishment of the UNDP’s Human 
Development Report series, which started in 1990 and has produced a report virtually 
every year since then. A well-known element of these reports is the Human 
Development Index (HDI), an indicator that combines income per capita, the level of 
pre-tertiary enrolments, adult literacy levels and life expectancy. Its aim is largely to 
act as a counterweight to simple income indicators. In particular, the indicator is 
intended to highlight development problems in countries whose performance with 
respect to income is better than their performance with respect to the other HDI 
components. South Africa falls into this group of countries, mainly due to its 
exceptionally low life expectancy, itself an outcome of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. 
Despite widespread acceptance and media coverage, the HDI has been severely 
criticised. It deals only with the second and third categories of freedoms discussed 
above, and even with respect to these categories the coverage is partial. The HDI is 
thus far from being an all-encompassing development indicator. Moreover, the 
weights attached to its various components are largely subjective and not empirically 
informed. Sen was in fact initially opposed to the notion of collapsing several 
development variables into a composite indicator. With respect to the HDI formula, 
SSF (2009: 56) point out that ‘adding the logarithm of per capita GDP to the level of 
life expectancy... implicitly values an additional year of life expectancy in the United 
States as worth 20 times an additional year of life in India’. The precipitous drop in 
life expectancy at birth in countries such as South Africa and Botswana since around 
1995 and the consequent decline in the national HDI values provide a further 
indication of the problem with the HDI methodology. The patterns of mortality 
brought about by HIV/AIDS make the interpretation of the life expectancy at birth 
indicator even more difficult than was previously the case. The problem is illustrated 
in Figure 15 below. Life expectancy at birth in 2008 was 49 in Mali and 54 in South 
Africa. Yet in many ways children in Mali were better off in the sense that from about 
age five, life expectancy was well above that in South Africa. Mortality in Mali was 
concentrated during the first couple of years of life. Above age 45, however, the 
situation for South Africans surpasses that of Malians. Considering life expectancy 
only at birth in isolation from patterns seen at other ages can be deceptive. (The 
curves for Finland and Thailand have been included in the graph to illustrate more or 
less where the best middle and high income country levels lie.) Clearly there is a risk 
that over-interpretation of the HDI will obscure important background distinctions. In 
fact, SSF repeatedly stress the risks inherent in trying to collapse too much 
information within one indicator and prefer a more nuanced approach of considering 
several key indicators simultaneously.  
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Figure 15: Age-specific life expectancy 
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Source: World Health Organization (2011).  
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Some indication has been provided above that changing the dependent variable in a 
growth regression from income or income growth to what some may consider a more 
relevant measure of human welfare, does not change the fundamental finding that 
education is a key variable for human development and the attainment of greater 
levels of welfare. Importantly, this finding holds even when a dependent variable that 
is conceptually very different from income or consumption, namely subjective life 
satisfaction, is used. The relevance of the foregoing discussion for education planners 
relates not so much to whether education contributes towards development, but to 
how to educate the young. Undoubtedly, a strong focus on income, as opposed to 
wellness or people’s objective circumstances, is a feature not just of economic 
models, but also society and governments in general. The discussion suggests strongly 
that some of this focus on income may be misplaced and should instead shift towards, 
for instance, questions around Sen’s enabling freedoms. This has implications for the 
design of school curricula and textbooks, for instance. To a fairly large degree, these 
implications are considered by curriculum designers, though many have argued that 
this has been done too superficially and without sufficient recognition of realities 
within schools. For instance, Harley and Wedekind (2004) argue that in South Africa, 
whilst pro-development values have been promoted in the post-apartheid school 
curriculum, insufficient attention to pedagogical method has resulted in a situation 
where pupils do not develop fundamental skills, without which their future 
capabilities are limited. The next sub-section, which deals with sustainable 
development, will highlight further and very formidable challenges for those shaping 
what gets taught in schools.   
3.5 Growth versus sustainable development 
The term ‘sustainable development’ is usually traced back to the UN’s Brundtland 
Report of 1987, which took stock of environmental degradation across the world and 
discussed the risks that this posed for future welfare. Sustainable development, the 
report explained, is development which will ‘ensure that it meets the needs of the 
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present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs’ (United Nations, 1987: 24). 
The absence of ecological considerations in the models of development presented in 
sections 2 and 4 would seem to be a significant gap. Tim Jackson, an ‘economics 
commissioner’ in the UK’s Blair government, and whose arguments are discussed 
below, has said ‘economists... are schooled in a language that rarely even refers to 
natural resources or ecological limits... Economics – and macro-economics in 
particular – is ecologically illiterate’ (Jackson, 2010: 123). Ecological factors have 
until fairly recently seemed sufficiently minor to allow economics to produce valuable 
policy advice without taking these factors into account. However, the realities of the 
greenhouse effect and the related matter of climate change have made it increasingly 
important to bring ecological factors to bear on economic models, especially models 
dealing with growth.  
When did climate change emerge as a major human development issue? Though 
scientists had speculated about the existence and nature of anthropogenic climate 
change since the late 1800s, the point at which sufficient consensus was reached 
amongst scientists is arguably a 1985 conference held in Villach, Austria, which 
triggered a series of events that led to the establishment of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 (Agrawala, 1998). Thus 1985 can be 
considered the point at which economists were presented with the challenge of 
explaining, in economic terms, an ecological shift that was far greater and more 
imminent than anything that had emerged previously. Importantly, widespread public 
concern about climate change, and hence climate change as an election issue for 
voters, at least in some countries, emerged much later. Media analyses have identified 
a critical surge in public concern in the 2004 to 2006 period, a period during which 
media coverage of the issue quadrupled and after which coverage appeared to remain 
high. These timeframes form an important backdrop to the fairly rapid developments 
that have occurred in economics in response to the climate change question.  
The response within the field of economics has its roots in methodologies developed 
for the sub-field of environmental economics, beginning in the 1950s. An intellectual 
history of this sub-field, by Pearce (2002), describes an important tension between 
environmental economists, economists who attempted to incorporate environmental 
factors such as pollution within an economic framework, and ecological economists, a 
‘broad church’ of largely natural scientists who, dissatisfied with the slow progress 
made by the economists, sought new ways of combining ecological models and 
economic thinking. A number of factors contributed to a state of affairs where 
ecological issues within economics were confined to one sub-field, environmental 
economics, and, even within this sub-field, were dealt with in a rather limited manner. 
One factor was simply insufficient contact across disciplines, which delayed the 
realisation within economics of the magnitude of the ecological effects of modern 
industrial economies that had become clear to the natural scientists. Moreover, what is 
described as marginalism in economics, or a specialisation in how marginal or 
relatively small effects change a system, has made it difficult for economists to take 
into account the large ecological and hence also economic effects implied by the 
climate change literature (DeCanio, 2003: 3). Put differently, economists had not seen 
the need to consider large discontinuities in the ecology within which the economy is 
situated. Nicholas Stern (2006b: 25), an economist whose work is discussed below, 
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describes the climate change discontinuity problem as ‘market failure on the grandest 
scale the world has ever seen’.  
The way environmental economics has traditionally dealt with the problem of 
internalising an externality cost brought about by environmental degradation is to 
specify that the firm responsible for the pollution should be taxed an amount 
corresponding to the marginal cost of the social damage caused by the pollution 
(Hyman, 1999: 102). This will result in both a decline in the demand for the product 
associated with the pollution, and hence less pollution, as well as additional tax 
revenue that can be used to assist those who fall victim to the pollution. This 
framework is limiting in terms of both time and space if one attempts to address 
climate change within it. Firstly, given that the effects of the greenhouse gases 
causing climate change are felt at least a couple of generations after emissions have 
occurred, important inter-generational equity questions must be addressed (Stern, 
2006a: 4). Secondly, given the global nature of the climate change problem, any 
policy solutions must involve all the world’s government and are thus complex and 
include important gaming and free rider dynamics between countries. The original 
theory of environmental economics, which assumed damages occurring within one 
generation and one country, is clearly an insufficient basis for climate change policy 
analysis.  
Initial moves towards accommodating climate change within economics stimulated 
intense debate around, above all, two specific theoretical issues. One was how to 
model welfare trade-offs between several consecutive generations in a way that might 
inform what policy positions to take presently. The other was how to model trade-offs 
between different kinds of capital assets, including the ecology as an asset, over an 
extended period of time. In both of these debates, the question of whether to relax the 
strict welfare economics requirement that all welfare be measured in monetary terms 
has been a central concern. On the matter of inter-generational trade-offs, Pearce 
(2002: 77), in referring to future generations, considers that ‘it is not clear whether 
nonexistent beings can be said to have any rights at all’. He is probably being 
provocative here. Yet intuitive notions of future people are clearly not sufficient for 
policy analysis in a context where policy decisions, or their absence, now can have 
potentially devastating impacts on future generations in ways that would have been 
unimaginable just a few decades ago. For example, if inequities between societies at 
the present time are more or less accepted by policymakers and voters, why should 
inequities over time not be more or less accepted? Technically, various discount rates, 
including ones based on the world real interest rate, have been used in order to 
express the welfare of future people in current terms. The real interest rate has 
generally been discarded as a feasible discount rate as it results in a valuation of future 
people that is far lower than what current ethical systems would regard as proper. At 
the same time, zero discount rates result in scenarios where any economic activity 
today that harms people, say, three thousand years in the future becomes treated as if 
it were causing the same harm today (DeCanio, 2003: 58). On the matter of trade-offs 
between assets expressed in monetary terms, Pearce (2002: 65) argues ‘Probably the 
largest, and most controversial, research effort in environmental economics has in fact 
been devoted to [the] issue of valuing nonmarketed asset change’. The valuing of 
assets is central to the economic approach to considering the welfare of future 
generations, because future welfare is to a large extent based on the total capital assets 
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that are passed on to future people. Stern (2006b: 42) expresses this notion as follows 
and includes a reference to human capital assets: 
…the principle [of sustainable development] need not imply that the whole natural 
environment and endowment of resources should be preserved by this generation for the next 
generation in a form exactly as received from the previous generation. The capital stock 
passed on to the next generation consists of many things, mostly in the form of stocks 
covering, for example, education, health, capital equipment, buildings, natural resources, the 
natural environment, etc. The standard of living available to the next generation depends on 
the whole collection of stocks. A decline in one of them, say copper, might be compensated 
by another stock, say education or infrastructure, which has increased.  
As attractive as this notion may seem, it has limitations. For instance, in a context of 
uncertainty, it is not possible to establish an ‘exchange rate’ between, say, education 
and the burden of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.  
Two widely known and interesting responses to the challenge of adapting growth 
policies to deal with climate change, one by an economist and another by an 
ecological economist, are discussed below, partly with a view to arriving at some 
implications for the education sector. The sources of the two responses, Nicholas 
Stern and Tim Jackson, both produced important reports for the Blair government in 
Britain. The British government has been especially prominent, at least within the 
English-speaking world, as an investor in policy research relating to climate change. 
In fact, it has been argued that Margaret Thatcher, whilst British Prime Minister, was 
prescient in her attempts to push climate change up the global policy agenda 
(Thatcher was trained as a natural scientist). She was unsuccessful in this attempt 
(Flannery, 2005: 247).  
In Stern’s (2006b) The economics of climate change, also known as the Stern Review, 
the question of the degree to which future welfare should be discounted within current 
policy considerations is largely avoided. Instead, limiting average temperature 
increases to around three degrees Celsius is considered something worth devoting 
considerable policy effort towards, whilst at the same time greater restrictions on the 
extent of climate change are considered to be unattainable. These a priori criteria are 
based on assessments by natural scientists of the likely weather irregularities, rainfall 
disruptions and sea level rises associated with different degrees of warming. 
Integrated assessment models, or IAMs, are used for the analysis. These are models 
that emerged in the 1980s and have focussed on combining macroeconomic and 
ecological forecasting. Stern (2006b) makes use of an IAM that takes into 
consideration the uncertainty and probability ranges inherent in climate prediction. 
For this, Monte Carlo simulations are required. This allows the impact of current 
policy decisions to be seen in terms of risk reduction. Stern lets the modelling deal 
with two questions fairly separately. The first question is the likely impact of climate 
change on GDP per capita if no special policy measures are taken, in other words in a 
business as usual (BAU) scenario. Climate change impacts on income occur mainly 
through disruptions in production, particularly within agriculture, and adaptation, 
which could involve migration and the construction of infrastructure such as canals 
and levees. Adaptation could impact negatively or positively on income (the 
contradictory nature of defensive expenditure was discussed in section 3.4). One 
plausible model (Stern, 2006b: 157) finds that there is a 90% probability that a BAU 
scenario would result in a drop in GDP per capita of between 4% and 35% by the year 
2200, relative to a situation in which there was no climate change. Initial losses are 
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relatively low: a 1% loss in global GDP per capita by 2050 and about a 5% loss by 
2100. In the BAU scenario, the average global temperature by 2200 is four degrees 
Celsius above pre-industrial levels. Although Stern (2006b) does not always make this 
point very clear, the base scenario with no climate change has sufficient income 
growth in it to ensure that all the scenarios with climate change retain positive 
economic growth, at least at the global level.   
The second question examined in Stern (2006b) is the impact on GDP per capita of 
likely mitigation policies implemented in the near future to limit temperature 
increases to three degrees above pre-industrial levels. Three types of policy measures 
are considered in the model, relating to carbon pricing, technology innovation and 
behavioural change. Here the cost is found to be a worsening drop in annual GDP 
growth, relative to the BAU scenario with no policy measures, reaching a reduction in 
annual growth of 1 percentage point by 2050. However, the costs of the policy 
measures would be small relative to the economic growth expected to occur during 
the first half of the twenty-first century: overall growth of around 200% in OECD 
countries and 400% in non-OECD countries. Assuming a linear phasing in of the 
GDP costs associated with the mitigation policies, the total loss in GDP by 2050 
would be just 20%. Even with population increases, average GDP per capita in 2050 
would be at least twice what it was in 2000. (Surprisingly, Stern leaves out these final 
calculations relating to total mitigation costs and population trends.) The finding that 
substantially increased income per capita can be combined with reduced ecological 
impacts is something that has attracted criticism, as will be seen below. What is not 
made clear by Stern is why the costs of climate change and the costs of mitigation 
policies are examined within separate models. The IAM used by Stern, the 
PAGE2002 model, is said to be able to model the two simultaneously39. The 
explanation could lie in the different time horizons of the two analyses, which is 
related to the substantial lags between greenhouse gas emissions and the economic 
impact of those emissions. The lag is between 50 and 100 years, meaning for instance 
that climate change experienced in 2010 would largely be an outcome of the 
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere that had been reached in around 
1940. Put differently, if anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions had suddenly 
stopped in 1940, climate change in 2010 would not differ much from what was 
actually experienced in 2010. One problem with Stern’s separation of the analysis into 
two models is that it is not possible to see to what extent the GDP per capita situation 
in 2200 (or before then) is improved, relative to the BAU scenario, if the envisaged 
mitigation policies are carried through.  
Tim Jackson (2009a, 2009b) titles both his book and the government report he 
authored Prosperity without growth. Jackson’s arguments, like those of his several 
intellectual predecessors, question the policy relevance of the models discussed in 
sections 2 and 4 rather fundamentally. Jackson’s basic disagreement with an approach 
such as Stern’s rests on the conclusion that the ratio of greenhouse gas emissions to 
each dollar of GDP cannot be reduced to the degree envisaged by Stern. Put 
differently, an increase of, say, 300% in income is incompatible with a reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions, something that Stern implicitly states is possible (though 
Stern’s logic in this regard is not clearly stated). The argument that GDP per capita 
                                                     
39
 See 
http://unfccc.int/adaptation/nairobi_work_programme/knowledge_resources_and_publications/items/54
47.php. PAGE stands for Policy Analysis for the Greenhouse Effect. 
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can increase whilst emissions per capita decrease is referred to as the ‘decoupling’ 
argument or, more pejoratively, as the ‘angelising’ of GDP. Essentially GDP becomes 
to a large degree decoupled from physical production as we currently understand it 
and becomes more non-physical, depending increasingly on services and information. 
Though Jackson does not provide a comprehensive case against decoupling, he does 
make the important point that what may appear as decoupling in the last few decades 
in the form of a decreasing ratio of tons of greenhouse gas emissions to each dollar of 
GDP in rich countries is in fact deceptive due to the exclusion of international trade 
from the calculations. Reports produced by countries within the emissions reporting 
systems of the UN focus on emissions associated with production and not 
consumption occurring within national borders. As a result, these reports have 
reflected declining emissions for countries such as the UK, though if one takes into 
account the emissions associated with consumption in the UK, total emissions and 
emissions per capita have risen (Jackson, 2009a: 73). Essentially, the British have 
increasingly imported those products associated with high levels of emissions.  
Jackson argues that policy measures beyond those advocated by Stern need to be 
implemented if the desired reductions in emissions are to be brought about. 
Specifically, he places a stronger emphasis on changing the behaviour of consumers 
and emphasises that existing mixed signals of rich country governments (increase 
your production and consumption but be concerned about the environment) are 
problematic. In addition, Jackson sees restrictions to the length of the working week 
as necessary in order to control consumption. In this latter regard, he relies on the 
work of Victor and Rosenbluth (2007), whose analysis of Canadian data suggests that 
a reduction in the working week of just 3%, combined with a number of other policy 
measures, can bring about the desired reduction in emissions associated with lower 
consumption. In effect, consumption is suppressed because income is suppressed. 
Jackson (2009a: 34) points to this work as the beginnings of an ‘ecological macro-
economics’. Part of the importance of this work, according to Jackson, is that it 
indicates that low or zero growth is compatible with political and economic stability, a 
matter that for Jackson represents an area of risk within his larger argument. With 
respect to investments in cleaner sources of energy, Jackson also highlights risks that 
were not considered in Stern (2006b). Here Jackson borrows from D’Alessandro, 
Luzzati and Morroni (2008), who use a theoretical model to demonstrate the existence 
of a ‘sustainability window’ during which sufficient investments in cleaner energy 
must be made. In a nutshell, growth spurred by unrestricted fossil fuel use has created 
a stock of financial capital which must be invested in cleaner energy. However, as the 
switch to cleaner energy occurs, growth will decline and savings will become 
depleted. There is a risk that insufficient savings will remain for the required levels of 
investment. Jackson (2009) thus sees very active stimulation of the savings rate as an 
important part of the policy response to climate change.  
Jackson’s policy recommendations are largely aimed at rich countries. However, they 
have relevance for policymakers in developing countries too for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, they imply that development involves a gradual transition from a focus on 
income growth towards a focus on other development indicators and possibly a state 
of zero growth. This changes the textbook approach to development economics rather 
fundamentally. Secondly, a shift away from promoting consumption growth in rich 
countries would impact on export-oriented industries within developing countries.  
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Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi (2009: 70) lean towards the Jackson argument when they 
advocate switching some of the development attention away from GDP growth and 
towards indicators that reflect the economy’s ecological sustainability. Of the many 
existing indicators available for the latter, two are preferred. They are the ecological 
footprint of the Global Footprint Network40 and the WWF (2010) as well as the World 
Bank’s adjusted net savings (ANS) indicator, for which annual values for 170 
countries are available for the period since 1970 (Bolt, Matete and Clemens, 2002). 
This last indicator accounts for not only the capital stock of produced physical capital, 
but also the stock of human capital and the stock of natural subsoil assets (however it 
does not take into account atmospheric factors associated with climate change).  
If, as Jackson argues, macroeconomics is ecologically illiterate, then both 
macroeconomics and ecological economics can be considered demographically 
illiterate. It is indeed surprising that in a context of a large increase in the world’s 
population, from around three billion in 1950, to seven billion in 2010, to a projected 
figure of around nine billion in 2050, the matter of population policies receives very 
little attention in the climate change literature. For instance, there is little emphasis on 
ways in which population increase, given what we now know about climate change, 
may compromise growth. The silence with respect to population policies is partly 
attributable to the stigma associated with policy initiatives in recent times, from the 
eugenics movement in the early twentieth century to the coercive one child policy in 
China. However, other factors such as religion have also played an important role. 
The absence of analysis and policy debate in the area of demographics seems 
unfortunate. In the literature that has argued for a more proactive treatment of the 
subject, the documents arising out of the critical 1994 Cairo conference on population 
and development have been strongly criticised for their lack of focus on the numbers, 
policies and ecological impacts of population growth. The costs of this lack of policy 
attention may be high. Some analysis suggests that if unmet demand for contraception 
were eliminated, world population by 2100 would be two billion lower than expected. 
Some analysis has pointed to policies aimed at encouraging lower fertility on a 
voluntary basis as being cost-effective ways of tackling emissions (O’Neill, 
MacKellar and Lutz, 2005; Hodgson and Watkins, 1997).  
Bangay and Blum (2010) provide a rare example of a discussion of the implications of 
climate change for education planning in developing countries. Clearly policy 
responses will be necessary to deal with the disruptions caused to the education 
system itself, in particular its physical infrastructure, and to the socio-economic 
conditions of pupils. These measures will be most necessary in developing countries, 
where the impacts of climate change are expected to be more damaging. Bangay and 
Blum (2010) use impacts of recent natural disasters on schooling systems in Asia, and 
the subsequent policy responses, to provide an indication of what responses should be 
planned for in future. What teachers teach in schools can improve both mitigation and 
adaptation efforts of societies. The general quality of schooling, as measured by 
indicators that received attention in section 3.3, will be an important determinant of 
any society’s ability to adapt. Moreover, more education focussing on appropriate 
behavioural responses to climate change, such as more socially responsible 
consumption, will be needed, not just within a separate environmental education 
subject, but across all the subjects of the curriculum. Pupils also need to be equipped 
to engage in the complex ethical, economic and social debates surrounding climate 
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change. Analysis of PISA data have pointed to a strong correlation between scientific 
knowledge and an understanding of environmental dynamics. This underscores the 
inter-connectedness of different education goals. A careful balance will need to be 
maintained to avoid a situation in which the promotion of appropriate behaviour 
becomes indoctrination, something that studies suggest has serious unintended 
consequences such as a culture of pretending to comply with prescribed norms whilst 
in fact compliance is minimal. What this means is that pupils need to be convinced 
certain behaviour is necessary because they understand the science behind the 
consequences of inappropriate behaviour.  
The instilling of useful and desirable values in the schooling process is partly a 
question of what and how to teach across the whole curriculum and partly a question 
of how to design one specific subject, referred to as civic education (or civics) in the 
United States, citizenship education in the United Kingdom and life orientation in 
South Africa. The civic education curriculum tends to encapsulate the values that the 
school curriculum as a whole attempts to transmit. The United Kingdom and South 
Africa cases serve as fairly typical examples from democratic nations. In both 
countries, the civics curriculum emphasises social tolerance (or the avoidance of 
destructive values such as racial prejudice), understanding national and global 
political systems and involvement in community and political life. In South Africa 
(Department of Education, 2002), the emphasis on the latter skill, namely the skill of 
political involvement, is arguably under-developed relative to what is found in the UK 
curriculum. The UK curriculum emphasises an understanding of trade-offs and 
constraints in a way that would be familiar to economists. Specifically, ‘Investigating 
ways in which rights can compete and conflict, and understanding that hard decisions 
have to be made to try to balance these’ receives attention and pupils should study 
‘how economic decisions are made, including where public money comes from and 
who decides how it is spent’ (United Kingdom, 2007: 29, 32).  
Before some discussion of what this section suggests may be missing from civic 
education, it is instructive to consider whether civic education has been found to 
influence pupils in the intended manner. Galston (2001), with a focus on the United 
States, concludes that a long-reigning consensus that civic education has virtually no 
impact on behaviour has been successfully overturned by more recent empirical 
evidence pointing to specific impacts of this element in the school curriculum. Finkel 
and Ernst (2005), using data from South Africa in a multivariate regression analysis, 
find that the existence of civic education but also effective techniques in delivering 
this education do play a role in building political knowledge and instilling democratic 
values in pupils. Torney-Purta (2002), using a landmark International Association for 
the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) data collection of 1999 focussing 
on civic education in mainly OECD countries, also finds a positive impact. For the 
policymaker, these findings are encouraging insofar as they present clear possibilities 
for change through policy.  
If there is a key ingredient missing in the typical civics curriculum, it is perhaps 
consumer education. How government failure, for instance in the form of inadequate 
public transport, leads to defensive spending and how the consumption inherent in this 
is inefficient and reduces welfare should form an important element of voter 
education, especially in countries where defensive spending is higher than it should 
be. One can extend the more typical concept of defensive spending explained in 
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section 3.4 to encompass the ‘conspicuous consumption’ discussed by Jackson (2009: 
99) whereby consumption in many ways becomes a signalling of status needed in a 
context of high social inequality. One consumes to avoid being mistaken for an 
uneducated member of society, or one whose capabilities have been curtailed. 
Understanding the sociology and psychology of conspicuous consumption seems to 
be an important prerequisite of the policy drive to reshape consumption in ways that 
promote ecological sustainability. Of course these aspects to civic education are 
relevant largely for the non-poor who are able to make a large range of consumption 
decisions, meaning most people in developed countries and the elites within 
developing countries. Yet they are important, especially if one considers the 
relationship between the consumption of the non-poor and the persistence of poverty, 
especially in a context of a changing climate. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The complexity of the debate around how to define and measure a country’s progress 
is immense. The widely used inflation-adjusted GDP and GDP per capita measures 
enjoy respect, one suspects, partly because they have become institutionalised over 
several decades and their familiarity provides a certain assurance. But these measures 
are flawed, probably to a greater extent than most analysts who use and interpret them 
believe.  
Before one even begins to consider matters of sustainability, two flaws that stand out 
with respect to the commonly used GDP measures of country development are that 
they ignore, firstly, income inequality and, secondly, defensive spending related 
largely to government failure. To illustrate the problem of income inequality, 
comparing South Africa, on the other hand, to Thailand and Ukraine, on the other, is 
instructive. Thailand’s average GDP per capita was, in around 2010, more or less 
equal to that of South Africa in purchasing power terms, and that of Ukraine was 
around 15% lower than South Africa’s. Yet if one considered everyone except for the 
top 20% of the population in terms of per capita income, Thailand and Ukraine 
perform substantially better than South Africa. The remaining 80% of the population 
is around 70% better off in both Thailand and Ukraine, compared to South Africa, in 
terms of average per capita income41.  
The distortions to income figures brought about by defensive spending are less easy to 
quantify. Government spending on actual defence where this has its roots in the 
government’s inability to resolve internal divisions quantifies one part of the overall 
phenomenon of defensive spending. Israel, Algeria and Lebanon are all countries 
where government spending on defence exceeds 4% of GDP, largely because of 
unresolved internal conflicts. Unfortunately, the impact of defensive spending on 
welfare where this spending is more associated with inequality-related crime (South 
Africa), severe levels of bribery and corruption (Nigeria) and the need to comply with 
cumbersome and often illogical government regulations (Argentina) are not as easy to 
quantify. 
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 Online data-querying facility of World Bank (World Bank DataBank), consulted December 2012, 
used for income distribution. Data from the years 2008 to 2011 were used. Heston, Summers and Aten 
(2011) used for income figures.  
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Evidence on the ecological impacts of the last two hundred years or so of 
industrialisation has become increasingly available and believed and represents an 
immense challenge for the field of economics, which needs to develop new models 
explaining the relationships between economic activity, the ecology and sustainability 
for policymakers, including, to some extent, education policymakers. Nicholas Stern, 
the economist responsible for assessing responses to climate change in Britain’s Blair 
government, has likened the consequences of not responding adequately to climate 
change to the world wars of the twentieth century (Stern, 2006: ii). Yet, as discussed 
previously, Stern has implicitly been accused of under-estimating these consequences. 
What seems far more prone to uncertainty than the predictions of the climatologists, 
given a business as usual scenario, are the predicted outcomes of policy decisions 
aimed at mitigating climate change or adapting to it. These uncertainties are an 
inevitable result of the complexity of the modelling that must occur. However, one 
suspects that a more fundamental uncertainty is not a measurement one, but an ethical 
one, around the degree to which a current generation should restrict its welfare in 
order to ensure that future generations can enjoy similar levels of welfare. In 
economic terms, the question is what discount rates should apply to future 
generations. 
Existing GDP per capita measures, with all their flaws, will remain centrepieces in the 
measurement of country progress for a long time to come. However, it appears they 
will to an increasing degree be interpreted with caution and accompanied by a 
narrative that explains the caveats. Unfortunately, there does not appear to be much 
agreement on how to organise the accompanying narrative better. Where there does 
appear to be agreement is that sets of carefully interpreted indicators are better than 
over-emphasising any single indicator. But a good and widely accepted set of 
indicators with a good accompanying narrative, endorsed by bodies such as the World 
Bank and the UNDP, still seems several years from being realised.  
Compared to the difficulties of attaching values to a country’s level of overall 
development, measuring a country’s level of educational development is relatively 
easy. Questions around whether to consider the quantity or quality of education are 
not so much a matter of fundamentally differing understandings as a matter of the 
available data. Human capital is undoubtedly about what people know and the skills 
they have. Around this there seems to be little disagreement. There also seems to be 
agreement now that years of education attained tends to predict the knowledge and 
skills of adults poorly, especially in cross-country comparisons. However, if one 
wants to cover a wide range of countries, the trade-off is currently one between 
having little historical data, if one uses average test scores from schooling systems, 
and having much historical data but of questionable relevance, if one uses attainment 
statistics.  
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4 A SELECTION OF EMPIRICAL GROWTH MODELS 
4.1 Introduction 
Three empirical cross-country growth models are discussed in depth below: (1) 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil’s (1992) augmented Solow model (human capital is the 
augmenter in this neo-classical model); (2) a model using a Bayesian Averaging of 
Classical Estimates (BACE) approach following Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and 
Miller (2004); and (3) Hanushek and Woessman’s (2009) simple but persuasive 
model using a dataset of educational quality derived from a variety of international 
testing programmes. Other empirical work is also discussed, but in less depth, where 
such work is related in some way to the three models that form the main focus of the 
section.  
As will be seen, the three models each represent important advances in the use of 
country-level data to prove or disprove the theoretical positions that have been put 
forward, and which were discussed in section 2. Two of the models can be said to be 
especially widely known, and hence they were selected for closer examination in this 
section. Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) stands out as a pioneering text and is often a 
point of reference (or the target of an antithesis). Hanushek and Woessman have 
succeeded in entering the discourse of education policymakers to an extent that is 
unusual for education economists (not just due to their 2009 text, but also other work 
by both authors). The Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004) text was also 
selected because it seemed interesting from a methodological point of view. In fact, 
the BACE approach described in this text is used in Part II of the dissertation to 
examine whether the education variables typically used in growth models are in fact 
the best ones.  
This section limits itself to a particular and relatively self-contained area of empirical 
analysis focussing on growth. To quote Lucas (1988: 3), the models dealt with in this 
section deal with ‘the problem of accounting for the observed pattern, across countries 
and across time, in levels and rates of growth in per capita income’. Within that focus, 
the emphasis of the dissertation is largely on what the models can tell the policymaker 
about the relationship between education and growth. Cross-country growth models 
are undoubtedly the central empirical focus in textbooks on growth such as that by 
Aghion and Howitt (2009). Yet, as pointed out in the introduction in section 1, it 
would be incorrect to consider this type of empirical work as the only way of 
exploring causal factors behind growth. In fact, Solow (2001), writing almost half a 
century after his original ‘Solow model’ text, expresses some surprise and unease over 
the way in which cross-country growth modelling has come to dominate the empirical 
enquiry into the factors behind growth. So what are the alternatives? In section 1, the 
influence exerted by microeconomic rates of return models was discussed, as well as 
the interpretation problems associated with these models. Reference was also made to 
the limited and tentative contribution made by computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
models focussing on dynamics within one country. Aghion and Howitt (2009: 309-
11), in a departure from their primary focus on cross-country empirical models, 
discuss a within-country analysis when they consider data from the fifty states of the 
United States. Of course this type of within-country analysis is analogous to the cross-
country approach insofar as comparison occurs across geographical units. Fedderke 
and Luiz (2008) provide an original within-country analysis, focussing on South 
Africa, where time series data on human capital, economic and institutional factors 
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are used to explore directions of causation. Data covering the period 1917 to 1997 are 
used. Findings are based on both bivariate and multivariate analysis. For the latter, 
cointegration techniques are used. Amongst other things, it is found that in the 
relationship between human capital variables, on the one hand, and growth, on the 
other, impact flows mostly from the former to the latter. Moreover, variables that 
proxy for the quality of human capital, such as the proportion of graduates in more 
mathematically inclined fields, have a greater impact on growth than more quantity 
focussed variables, such as school enrolment ratios.     
Despite its popularity, cross-country growth modelling has attracted its share of strong 
criticism. Krueger and Lindahl (2001) identify two points of controversy relating to 
the cross-country growth literature. The controversies arise partly because the micro 
and the macro, or cross-country, evidence point in different directions. One 
controversy relates to the relative importance of the different levels of education in the 
growth process. Cross-country analyses have often supported the need to focus on 
strengthening secondary school and post-school education, whilst the microeconomic 
literature points strongly to promoting basic primary schooling. Secondly, the cross-
country evidence has often supported a key element of endogenous growth theory, 
namely that if one knows the level of education in the population at the start of a 
period, then one does not require data on the growth in the level of education in 
subsequent years because any such growth is explained endogenously. The theory is 
not often explained in this manner, but this is perhaps an appropriate way of 
explaining it. The more common way of putting it is that endogenous growth theory 
sees the initial level of education as important for growth and subsequent growth in 
the level of education as unimportant. This view has, understandably, provoked 
frustration around the logic of endogenous growth theory as seen in the following 
extract from Breton (2011: 767): 
Most endogenous theories of growth suffer from an implicit conceptual problem. They 
assume that a nation’s level of human capital affects its rate of growth over a subsequent 
period, but the length of the period is not defined. As the time period becomes longer, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to accept the theories’ implicit assumption that increases in 
human capital during the period are not affecting the rate of growth.  
Krueger and Lindahl (2001: 1130) conclude on the basis of their own data analysis 
that measurement error has been a hidden and important factor that has led 
endogenous growth proponents, such as Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), to believe 
initial level of education is somehow more important than educational growth. Once 
measurement errors are taken into account, cross-country models do attach 
independent explanatory power to growth in human capital. In contrast, the initial 
level of human capital is only important for the growth of those countries starting off 
from an exceptionally low level of economic development.  
At a more fundamental level, Krueger and Lindahl (2001) dismiss the finding reached 
by some, notably Pritchett (2001) in an article titled ‘Where has all the education 
gone?’, that there is no significant association at all between educational attainment 
and growth. Such a finding, they argue, is simply the result of an insufficient 
sensitivity to data quality. Once data problems have been taken into account, an 
association that is economically important is virtually unavoidable.  
Partly as a result of the selection of models for this section, these debates from the 
cross-country literature do not feature strongly in this section. Mankiw, Romer and 
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Weil (1992) subscribe to the neoclassical framework that predates endogenous growth 
theory, whilst the other two texts discussed below are not clearly or strongly aligned 
to endogenous growth theory.  
The econometric questions in this section are partly dealt with by assessing the degree 
to which four frequently mentioned specification errors occur, or are successfully 
avoided. Following Gujarati (2003: 509) the four are:   
 Omission of a relevant variable (or underfitting a model). If an explanatory 
variable that should be present is omitted in the growth regression the intercept 
and possibly the slope coefficients of the incomplete model will be biased. To 
avoid this error, the analyst should consider the underlying theory carefully and 
ensure that all variables that are important in the theoretical model also appear in 
the empirical model.   
 Inclusion of an irrelevant variable (or overfitting a model). Including a variable 
that should be omitted within the growth regression may not influence the 
magnitudes of the intercept or the slope coefficients of the relevant variables. 
However, the likelihood that the intercept and relevant slope coefficients will be 
statistically significant is reduced. Again, the solution is to pay close attention to 
the theoretical model and not to include explanatory variables that do not directly 
explain the dependent variable, or that duplicate other explanatory variables.  
 Adopting the wrong functional form. This error arises when variables are 
entered into the growth regression using an inappropriate form, for instance a 
linear form when the natural logarithm would be more appropriate. The 
recommended remedy here is to try out different forms and to examine results 
such as the R2 statistics and t values. However, the analyst can also go a step 
further and apply standard tests such as the Durbin-Watson test, the Ramsey 
RESET test or Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test.  
 Errors of measurement. Compared to the above three specification errors, the 
problems with one’s equation that arise because there are measurement errors in 
one’s variables, are particularly difficult to resolve. As explained by Gujarati 
(2003: 524), even randomly distributed measurement errors in one’s explanatory 
variables bias the values of the coefficients on these variables, meaning one’s 
equation is strictly not suitable for describing the relationships in one’s model. 
Specifically, the coefficient values will be biased towards zero. This phenomenon 
is sometimes referred to as regression dilution or attenuation bias (Krueger and 
Lindahl, 2001: 1115). The problem is somewhat reduced if one’s measurement 
errors are found only in the dependent variables, as long as the measurement 
errors are random. In this situation, the values of one’s coefficients will not be 
biased, though the standard errors will be. To minimise biases caused by 
measurement error, the analyst should ideally have a thorough understanding of 
how the data were generated, of the likelihood of measurement errors in general, 
and of the probability that the errors are randomly distributed.    
A fifth error mentioned by Gujarati (2003: 529), incorrect specification of the 
stochastic error term, is not dealt with here as it did not appear to be a relevant issue in 
the selected models. This error is said to occur in a situation where the usual form of 
the error term in the regression, as an added term, should in fact be replaced by a 
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multiplicative form where the error term is multiplied by one of the explanatory 
variables.  
4.2 The augmented Solow model of Mankiw, Romer and Weil 
As explained in section 2.3 above, the intention in Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992, 
abbreviated as MRW) was largely to improve the compatibility of Solow’s (1956) 
model with a non-convergence scenario, where countries do not eventually converge 
to the same level of income per capita. As already explained, MRW achieve this 
through the introduction of a human capital variable to Solow’s (1956) original (‘un-
augmented’) model. Closely related to this first intention was a second intention, to 
adapt Solow’s theory so that its implicit magnitudes approximate better the 
magnitudes found in the real world (MRW, 1992: 408). In terms of the model 
specification issues mentioned in the introduction to this section, MRW introduce a 
variable, namely human capital, that had been omitted from the model. They establish 
that the variable is indeed important as its inclusion results in estimates whose 
magnitudes are closer to those of the real world (details in this regard are discussed 
below).  
MRW, arguably to a greater extent than the authors of the other two texts discussed in 
detail in section 4, base their empirical model on a careful consideration of the 
underlying theory. The key mathematical arguments leading to MRW’s empirical 
model are reproduced here, with some simplifications and adaptations, partly to align 
the notation here with what was used in discussing MRW’s theoretical model in 
section 2.  
To begin with, we have the two determinations of physical capital (K) and human 
capital (H) in year t indicated in equations (39) and (40). Both equations follow the 
logic of earlier equation (4). To take human capital as the example, the amount of 
human capital is a positive function of the proportion of total national income during 
the previous period being invested in education, and is a negative function of the 
proportion of human capital that was lost during the previous period, through deaths 
and net emigration.   
111 −−− −+= ttktt KYsKK δ  (39) 
111 −−− −+= tthtt HYsHH δ  (40) 
The above can be simplified by removing what is ultimately our dependent variable, 
total income Y, and making use of the exponents α and β from equation (6), which 
gives us the following:  
( ) 1111 −−−−− −+= tthktt KKssKK δβαββ  (41) 
( ) 1111 −−−−− −+= tthktt HHssHH δβααα  (42) 
The future steady state implied by the original Solow model, in which the amount of 
physical capital does not increase any more and investment in physical capital equals 
depreciation in physical capital, is captured in equation (43), which is based on 
equation (41). There is an equivalent equation for human capital.  
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( ) 111 −−−− = tthk KKss δβαββ  (43) 
( ) 111 −−−− = tthk HHss δβααα  (44) 
Equation (43) can be restated as equation (45), and likewise equation (44), the human 
capital equation, can be restated as equation (46). The time subscripts are excluded 
here in the interests of simplicity.  
βαββ
δ
−−
−






=
1
1
1
hk ssK  (45) 
βααα
δ
−−
−






=
1
1
1
hk ssH  (46) 
Combining equation (46) and the original production function in equation (7) allows 
for the following equation which, as we shall see, lends itself to a log-linear 
regression form. Equation (47) would yield the same value Y as equation (7) if one 
assumes that a steady state of income prevailed and that therefore equations (45) and 
(46) held true.  
( )
( )
( )αβ
αα
αα
δ
−
−
−
×= 11
1
HsY k  (47) 
At this point we can formulate the following equation using natural logarithms where 
the only variables within the three slope coefficients are α and β (and α and β do not 
appear outside the slope coefficients). Equation (48) can clearly be used as a growth 
regression model if we have data on income Y and on the three explanatory variables: 
the physical capital savings rate (sk), the capital depreciation rate (δ) and the amount 
of human capital (H).  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )HsY k ln1ln1ln1ln α
βδ
α
α
α
α
−
+
−
−
−
=  (48) 
But MRW do not assume technology (A) and labour (L) from equation (7) to be 1. In 
fact, they assume that both have growth rates, referred to as g for A and n for L. 
Moreover, MRW aim to solve a growth regression where income per capita, or Y over 
L, is the dependent variable, given that this is the logical measure of a country’s level 
of economic development. Equation  (49) restates the regression model in such a way 
that these requirements are taken into account.    
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )HgnsgtA
L
Y
kt
t
t ln
1
ln
1
ln
1
lnln 0 α
βδ
α
α
α
α
−
+++
−
−
−
++=





=
 (49) 
It can be shown that equation (49) is true if equation (7) and the following expanded 
version of equation (46) are true: 
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Equation (49) can be simplified to the following form:  
( ) iiii uHBgnBsBBY ++++++= lnlnlnln 3210 δ  (51) 
Here si is what has been referred to earlier as sk for country i. The form in equation 
(51) is thus a log-linear version of the classical linear regression model. The first two 
terms on the right-hand side of equation (49) can be collapsed into one term, the 
natural log of A in year t. This is thus what B0 represents. MRW assume that time t in 
equation (49) is a point in time when all countries have reached their steady state of 
per capita income and hence A in year t would carry the same value for all countries. 
They thus assume that technology possessed by one country will very easily be 
possessed by others too.  
In selecting data, MRW use for the dependent variable the natural logarithm of real 
GDP over working age population in 1985. The explanatory variable s is represented 
by the average gross capital formation, both public and private, over GDP, for the 
years 1960 to 1985. For n MRW use average annual growth in the population of 
working age, or aged 15 to 64, for the years 1960 to 1985. For g they simply use the 
value 0.02 for all countries based on trends in the United States (MRW are treating A 
as a resource freely available to all countries). Similarly, they use a uniform value for 
capital depreciation δ of 0.03 for all countries, again based on US data. It is argued 
that these two variables are unlikely to vary substantially across countries. Finally, H 
is represented by the number of secondary school pupils divided by the population of 
working age. For this, the average across the entire growth period, 1960 to 1985, is 
used. MRW admit that this is an imperfect measure of human capital, but argue that it 
might be the best that is available. Finally, u is the error term. What all this means is 
that only s, H and n are left as country-specific predictors of aggregate income.  
Below, the function in equation (51) is tested using more recent data than that used by 
MRW for Y, s, H and n. For g and δ the original MRW values are used. Data from the 
years 1980 to 2005 are used, in other words from a period that is 20 years later than 
that of MRW. Whether the function has a general applicability beyond the historical 
period considered by MRW is thus tested. Moreover, the effects of a few simple 
adjustments to the data are tested. Further on the effect of using a completely different 
measure of human capital is tested. The following table describes the data used. The 
original variables used by MRW are marked with **. The remaining rows indicate 
variations on the original variables.  
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Table 5: Variables for MRW model 
Variable Source N Mean Min. Max. 
GDP (in real PPP USD of 2006) 
over population aged 15 to 64, 
average 2002-2004** 
Heston, Summers and Aten, 
2006. 
172 14754 811 73796 
GDP per capita (in real PPP 
USD of 2006), average 2002-
2004 
As above.  183 9688 399 49536 
Gross fixed capital formation 
(public and private) over GDP, 
average 1980-2005** 
Online data-querying facility 
of United Nations Statistics 
Division (National accounts 
estimates of main 
aggregate), consulted 2009. 
200 23.0 8.7 87.6 
Annual increase in working age 
population (age 15 to 64), 
average 1980-200542** 
UN Population Division, 
2009. 
174 2.15 -0.30 7.53 
Percentage of working age 
population in secondary 
schooling, average 1980-2005** 
Online data-querying facility 
of UNESCO: UIS, consulted 
2009.  
172 8.98 0.88 21.70 
Percentage of working age 
population in secondary 
schooling, average 1980-1990 
As above 161 8.34 0.65 21.70 
Gross enrolment ratio in 
secondary schooling, average 
1980-1990 
As above 174 54.7 3.6 159.0 
Note: All population values are online data-querying facility of United Nations Statistics Division (World 
population prospects: The 2008 revision), consulted 2009. 
 
Altogether 211 countries have values for at least one variable in the above list, 170 
have values for all the variables marked **. MRW excluded eight countries whose 
incomes were derived mainly from oil so that countries with economies that would 
clearly not be explained by equation (51) would not contaminate the results. In the 
analysis that follows, any country with oil exports worth more than a third of total 
exports in 2005 according to UN data was excluded from the analysis. Two further 
exclusions employed by MRW were of countries with fewer than one million 
inhabitants and communist countries. The former were considered likely to display 
abnormal growth patterns, presumably due to factors such as extreme trade openness 
or special relationships with larger metropolitan powers, and the latter presumably 
due to abnormal constraints on the returns to human capital resulting from high levels 
of government control over profit-maximising behaviour by individuals. When 
countries with fewer than one million inhabitants in 2000 were excluded from the 
dataset used here, the 170 countries referred to earlier were reduced to 142. Applying 
the oil exportation criterion further reduced the sample to 129 countries. Finally, 
excluding ex-communist countries (there were no currently communist countries in 
the sample) reduced the sample to 108 observations. The MRW sample size after 
similar exclusions was 98.  
MRW furthermore excluded countries if the authors of the Penn dataset used by 
MRW considered the income data to be unreliable. As the 2006 version of this dataset 
(Heston, Summers and Aton, 2006) used here did not include indicators of poor data 
quality, these exclusions could not be repeated, and depending on improvements in 
the Penn data, they may not be necessary.  
                                                     
42
 Values, which were calculated from population by five year bins, could have been obtained from a 
greater number of countries from this data source. However, values were only calculated when the 
availability of other values for the country suggested that the country would be included.  
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The following table provides results obtained by MRW (1992: 420) and results from a 
model that uses the ** variables from the previous table and thus replicates the MRW 
model as faithfully as possible using later data (see Model A). Using data from a later 
time period seems to make little difference to the original MRW findings. All three 
explanatory variables remain highly statistically significant and carry the same sign as 
in the original model. The overall fit of the model as measured by the adjusted R2 
remains high.  
Table 6: Regression outputs – replication of MRW 
Variable Original 
MRW 
Model A Model B Model C 
Constant 6.89*** 
(5.89) 
8.37*** 
(3.73) 
8.01*** 
(8.42) 
4.65*** 
(4.59) 
ln(s) 0.69*** 
(5.31) 
1.02*** 
(3.73) 
1.12*** 
(4.25) 
1.09*** 
(4.17) 
ln(n + g + δ) -1.73*** 
(-4.22) 
-0.77*** 
(-7.74) 
-0.72*** 
(-7.04) 
-0.50*** 
(-4.36) 
ln(H) 0.66*** 
(9.43) 
0.87*** 
(7.40) 
0.77*** 
(7.75) 
0.89*** 
(9.54) 
N 98 108 105 106 
R2  0.712 0.729 0.771 
Adjusted R2 0.78 0.704 0.721 0.764 
Note: Dependent variable is GDP per adult in 2002. *** indicates that the 
estimate is significant at the 1% level of significance. Values in brackets are t 
statistics.  
 
Model B deviates from the MRW approach insofar as H is based on data only for the 
earlier 1980 to 1990 period (in Model A, the average across the entire growth period 
1980 to 2005 was used). One might expect this to result in a better fit of the data to 
the theoretical model given the time lag between higher secondary school enrolments 
and better human capital in the labour market. The results from this model are hardly 
different from those of Model A, though a slightly better fit as measured in the 
adjusted R2 is seen. Taking Model B and alternately re-inserting small, oil-exporting 
and ex-communist countries in three separate models makes no substantial difference 
to the levels of significance (all three variables remain significant at the 1% level), 
though the overall fit of the model declines substantially with adjusted R2 dropping to 
0.56, 0.65 and 0.56 respectively. This suggests the exclusions are indeed necessary, in 
particular with respect to small and ex-communist countries.  
Model C converts two of the MRW variables to a more traditional format. GDP per 
capita, instead of GDP over working population, is used. Moreover, what UNESCO 
would call the gross enrolment ratio (GER) for secondary schooling, which is 
secondary enrolments over the population one would assume is in secondary school if 
everyone attended (and there was no grade repetition), is used instead of secondary 
enrolments divided by working age population. MRW chose their forms on the basis 
of theoretical considerations. As the results for Model C show, the more traditional 
forms substantially improve the overall fit of the model as reflected in the adjusted R2. 
This may be the result of errors of measurement problems in the age-specific 
population statistics required for the two denominators in the MRW model, rather 
than any problems with MRW’s theory.  
The results in Table 6 do not answer the question of what the actual values of α and β 
are in equation (49). Using simple algebra and equation (49) to calculate the two 
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values turns out not to be a satisfactory approach as ambiguous results are obtained. 
MRW resolve the problem through the use of a restricted least squares form that is 
permitted by the fact that B1 and B2 in equation (51) are in theory equal to each other 
as they are based on the same factor in equation (49). The restricted form used by 
MRW (1992: 420) is as follows: 
( )( ) ( )( ) iiii ugnHBgnsBBY +++−+++−+= δδ lnlnlnlnln 210  (52) 
The resultant value for α is 0.31 and for β it is 0.28 in MRW. This, they argue, 
underlines how a relevant variable, H, has been omitted in the textbook Solow model. 
If human capital did not matter, β would be zero. Omitting the human capital variable 
from the textbook Solow model means that this model over-estimates the impact of 
saving s on growth. Without human capital and without β the exponent α in the 
production function becomes 0.60, or twice as large as it should be. When the same 
restricted regression used by MRW was applied to the later data, the importance of 
human capital relative to physical capital represented by s is emphasised even more 
strongly than in the original MRW analysis. Specifically, the model without human 
capital yields α equal to 0.54, or a value similar to the corresponding value in the 
original MRW, whilst inserting human capital reduces α to 0.09, or one-sixth of what 
it was in the textbook Solow model. β, or the human capital exponent in equation (7), 
equals 0.41 in the restricted model using the later data, against 0.28 in the original 
MRW analysis. It thus seems as if a historical rise of human capital as a determinant 
of economic success is borne out by the evidence presented here.  
What about the question of convergence amongst countries to similar ultimate levels 
of income? As has been pointed out in section 2.2, the un-augmented textbook Solow 
model does permit non-convergence, or different steady states of income for different 
countries, if initial capital endowments and the rate of saving are different. MRW use 
the regression in equation (53), which is an adaptation of equation (51), to investigate 
how well their augmented model predicts the magnitude of income growth that 
different countries have experienced. The variable y, or log of income per working 
age person at the start of the period in question (1960 in MRW, 1980 in the new 
analysis presented here), is inserted as an explanatory variable, whilst the dependent 
variable becomes the difference between the log of income at the end and start of the 
period. Critically, if B1 is negative and significant, then this would suggest that those 
starting off with a lower income gain more in absolute terms (and, by implication, 
experience higher annual growth rates).   
( ) ( ) iiiiii uHBgnBsByBByY +++++++=− lnlnlnlnlnln 43210 δ  (53) 
The next table displays the results for the above regression model from the original 
MRW analysis and for adjusted versions of models A to C from Table 6.  
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Table 7: Regression outputs – tests of convergence  
Variable Original 
MRW 
Model A Model B Model C 
Constant 3.04*** 
(3.66) 
-0.44 
(-0.54) 
-0.51 
(-0.62) 
-1.48* 
(-1.91) 
ln(y) -0.29*** -0.11* -0.10* -0.08 
 (-4.66) (-1.75) (-1.68) (-1.17) 
ln(s) 0.52*** 
(6.02) 
0.89*** 
(5.95) 
0.91*** 
(6.09) 
0.92*** 
(5.96) 
ln(n + g + δ) -0.51* 
(-1.75) 
-0.23*** 
(-3.25) 
-0.23*** 
(-3.18) 
-0.14* 
(-1.84) 
ln(H) 0.23*** 
(3.88) 
0.06 
(0.75) 
0.05 
(0.66) 
0.11 
(1.34) 
N 98 101 100 101 
R2  0.371 0.373 0.377 
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.345 0.346 0.351 
Note: Dependent variable is difference in GDP per adult between 2002 and 
1980. *** indicates that the estimate is significant at the 1% level of significance, 
* at the 10% level. Values in brackets are t statistics. 
 
The key finding from MRW of a negative and significant value for B1 is found in two 
of the models using the later data. The most notable difference between the original 
results and those using the recent data is that the human capital variable appears non-
significant in the latter across all three models. This is in contrast to the models 
predicting just level of income in Table 6, where the human capital variable was 
consistently highly significant. As will be seen, this is largely due to errors of 
measurement inherent in the use of school enrolments as a proxy for actual 
development of human capital. In fact, one would expect this problem to have got 
worse in the later period as inequalities with respect to secondary schools enrolments 
diminished whilst gaps in the quality of education remained large.    
What would one find if the measures of what pupils learn in schools discussed in 
section 3.3 are used in the augmented Solow model? Results appear in Table 8. The 
two models described are variations of Model C from Table 6. The difference is that 
measures of the quality of human capital are used here. Model C1 uses values 
calculated by Hanushek and Woessman (2009), specifically their values for the 
quality of schooling at the lower secondary level (these yielded the best fit of the 
different educational quality variables calculated by these authors). Model C2 uses the 
newly calculated values for H described in section 3.3 (they are divided by 100 to 
give a similar metric to that used in Model C1). Model C (and not A or B) was 
selected for Table 8 as this model yielded the best fit in terms of adjusted R2. Both 
models in Table 8 represent a worse fit, in terms of adjusted R2, than any of the 
models in Table 6. This pattern persists even if one runs Model C from Table 6 using 
only the countries used in the models in Table 8. Most striking, however, is the low 
level of significance of s in Table 8. This is largely due to multicollinearity between 
the new human capital variables and investment in physical capital s, a problem which 
did not occur when secondary enrolment was used for H. To illustrate, the correlation 
coefficient between the Hanushek and Woessman (2009) lower secondary quality 
variable and s is 0.31, against a correlation between s and secondary enrolments (H in 
Model A of Table 6) of just 0.01. These two correlation coefficients were calculated 
using the same set of countries, as many as the data permitted. This seems telling. A 
plausible explanation is perhaps that a more learned population is more likely to see 
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the advantages of investment in physical capital and hence saves more towards this 
end.  
Table 8: Regression outputs – MRW with quality of human capital 
Variable Model C1 Model C2 
Constant 5.31*** 
(3.48) 
4.52*** 
(2.91) 
ln(s) 0.67 
(1.48) 
0.69* 
(1.78) 
ln(n + g + δ) -0.40*** 
(-2.91) 
-0.41*** 
(-3.13) 
ln(H) 2.67*** 
(3.96) 
3.13*** 
(5.63) 
N 52 68 
R2 0.604 0.619 
Adjusted R2 0.579 0.601 
Note: Dependent variable is difference in GDP per adult 
between 2002 and 1980. *** indicates that the estimate is 
significant at the 1% level of significance, * at the 10% level. 
Values in brackets are t statistics. 
 
Where using a measure of the quality of human capital makes a large difference is in 
predicting actual economic growth within individual countries, using the tests of 
convergence models put forward in Table 7. Table 9 provides variations of Model A 
from Table 7 using the two human capital variables used for Table 8. Model fit as 
seen in the adjusted R2 is better than that of the original MRW model (0.53 compared 
to 0.46). Instead of the non-significant human capital variables using recent data seen 
in Table 7, here a highly significant human capital effect is seen. Moreover, the 
explanatory variable y appears highly significant here, confirming that conditional 
convergence between countries is a reality, as indicated by the original MRW model 
of Table 7. 
Table 9: Regression outputs – tests of convergence with educational quality data  
Variable Model A1 
(H&W HC) 
Model A2 
(new HC) 
Constant -0.99 
(-1.23) 
-1.03 
(-1.41) 
ln(y) -0.20*** -0.16*** 
 (3.53) (-3.40) 
ln(s) 0.83*** 
(4.40) 
0.64*** 
(4.33) 
ln(n + g + δ) -0.12** 
(-2.09) 
-0.10* 
(-1.81) 
ln(H) 0.84*** 
(2.83) 
0.97*** 
(4.21) 
N 49 63 
R2 0.566 0.494 
Adjusted R2 0.526 0.459 
Note: Dependent variable is average annual growth 1960-
2004. *** indicates that the estimate is significant at the 1% 
level of significance, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% 
level. Values in brackets are t statistics. 
 
This section has offered a few permutations of a famous and pioneering growth 
regression. It was seen that the findings of the original 1992 implementation of the 
model by MRW are replicated if later data are used. More interestingly, the basic 
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findings are replicated if a measure of school test results, reflecting the situation 
across the world in the mid-1990s (see section 3.3), is used to represent human 
capital. The correlation between investment in physical capital and the test score 
measure is considerably higher than the correlation between investment in physical 
capital and MRW’s original human capital variable, which reflected the level of 
enrolment at the secondary level. It was speculated that this could be because actual 
human capital in the form of knowledge, as opposed to just years of schooling, is a 
better predictor of people’s understanding of the importance of saving. Though there 
are likely problems with the use of a measure of human capital that is from such a 
recent period (this is discussed further in section 4.4 below), the findings presented 
above add to the evidence that statistics from testing programmes are valuable if one 
wants to model growth and that within the growth process, what people actually know 
is a vital element of human capital.  
4.3 The BACE model with iterative variable selection 
The analysis that principally guides this sub-section is that of Sala-i-Martin, 
Doppelhofer and Miller (2004), titled ‘Determinants of long-term growth: A Bayesian 
averaging of classical estimates (BACE) approach’. This text is henceforth referred to 
as SDM. What also informs this section is two files accompanying SDM, one with 
code in GAUSS, a matrix programming language, and the second a cross-country 
dataset covering 139 countries43.  
Of all the empirical models considered in section 4, that of SDM is arguably least 
rooted in the economic theory presented in section 2. In a sense this is a natural 
outcome of their intention to let the data speak for themselves (SDM, 2004: 813).  
SDM concentrate on two of the four specification errors referred to at the start of 
section 4, namely the omission of a relevant variable and the inclusion of an irrelevant 
one. Informing their approach is their criticism that cross-country growth analysts 
tend to select a very limited set of explanatory variables from the larger set of all 
possible variables in a manner that is ‘artistic’ (SDM, 2004: 813) rather than 
scientific. SDM’s approach is to study jointly 67 variables suspected of playing a role 
in economic growth within a rational methodology. A problem inherent within cross-
country regression analysis is that relative to the number of possible explanatory 
variables, the number of observations, or countries, is too low to allow for meaningful 
inclusion of all variables simultaneously within one regression model. SDM’s solution 
is essentially to run many regressions (in fact, tens of millions) using different 
combinations of explanatory variables, with growth as the dependent variable, and 
then drawing conclusions about the optimal model and optimal variables based on the 
entire exercise. SDM thus address an important econometric problem related to small 
samples and not really addressed by the other empirical analyses discussed in this 
section.  
SDM’s approach involves departing from pure classical statistics and using a method 
that involves some classical statistics and some Bayesian statistics (these two being 
the principal branches of statistics). Some discussion of what Bayesian statistics 
entails is provided as an introduction to SDM’s method. Whilst classical statistics 
focuses on testing hypotheses, such as whether a parameter equals zero, Bayesian 
                                                     
43
 Available at http://www.nhh.no/Default.aspx?ID=3075. 
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statistics focuses on producing the likely distribution of the unknown parameter, 
called the posterior distribution. Bayesian statistics uses a combination of the data and 
the assumptions or judgements of the analyst, where the latter is known as the prior 
distribution, to determine the posterior distribution. An advantage of Bayesian 
statistics over the classical approach is said to be that it makes assumptions more 
explicit. The counter-argument against Bayesian statistics is often that this approach is 
unscientific in over-emphasising expert opinion, relative to the data. Kennedy (2008: 
213) refers to the ‘violent controversy’ surrounding which of the two branches of 
statistics is more justified. Kennedy (2008) moreover argues that it is not so much 
questions of correctness that have allowed classical statistics to remain dominant, but 
rather questions relating to the computational complexity of Bayesian statistics and 
the difficulty of explaining the approach to, for instance, policymakers.    
Somewhat more formally, Bayesian statistics uses as its point of departure the Bayes 
theorem captured in equation (54) below. The left-hand side refers to the posterior 
distribution, or the distribution of the parameter β conditional on the data y, or after 
having taken account of the data. This is calculated by multiplying the prior 
distribution g(β), or the distribution of β before seeing the data, by what we can 
understand as the actual data or what Kennedy (2008: 214, 226) refers to as the 
likelihood function or ‘the “conditional” density of the data, conditional on the 
unknown parameters’. The denominator on the right-hand side is a ‘normalization 
factor’.    
( ) ( ) ( )( )yf
gyfyg βββ || =  (54) 
Following Kennedy (2008: 215) it is possible to demonstrate, for instance in Excel,  
the basic manner in which a prior distribution multiplied by a likelihood function 
divided by a constant results in the posterior distribution, which we can understand as 
the average between the other two distributions. The result of such a demonstration 
appears below.   
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Figure 16: The derivation of the Bayesian posterior distribution 
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Note: The horizontal axis refers to percentiles. The vertical axis refers to the Y 
of the equation for a normal distribution ( )( ) ( )22 2/
2
1 sXXe
s
Y −−=
pi
(Blalock, 
1979: 93). For the prior distribution a mean of 40 and standard deviation (s) of 
8 was used and for the likelihood function the values were 60 and 6. The 
normalization factor was set to ensure that the sum of Y over the percentiles 
for the posterior distribution equalled that found in the prior or likelihood 
curves.  
 
A problem that SDM have with using just the Bayesian approach in solving their 
problem is that this approach allows for too much arbitrariness. They thus resort to a 
combination of classical and Bayesian statistics where just one ‘prior hyper-
estimation’ (SDM, 2004: 815) is used, this being an initial expert assumption on the 
likely size, in terms of number of explanatory variables, of the optimal regression 
model. This variable will be called k in the discussion that follows. SDM call their 
method Bayesian averaging of classical estimates, or BACE.  
The 67 possible explanatory variables in SDM’s dataset cover factors relating to the 
economy (such as trade openness), politics (such as degree of political liberties), 
geography (such as closeness to the equator) and culture (such as predominant 
religions). With respect to education, there are two variables, one being the primary 
enrolment ratio in 1960 and the other the tertiary education enrolment ratio in 1960. 
There are 13 0-1 dummy variables. The dependent variable is average real GDP per 
capita growth between 1960 to 1996. When observations with missing values are 
removed, the original 139 observations are reduced to 88 observations. All of SDM’s 
analysis deals only with these 88 observations, 24 of which refer to high income 
countries.  
The end result of SDM’s method is a ranking of all 67 explanatory variable according 
to their ability to explain growth. A cut-off is drawn after the first 18 variables, these 
being considered the only ones with a significant relationship to growth, but where 
‘significant’ is understood in a more general and non-classical manner (SDM, 2004: 
823). Table 10 at the end of this section lists the 18 variables (see the first panel). The 
abbreviated variable names are explained in Table 12. The three top ranked 
explanatory variables are the East Asian dummy variable, primary enrolments in 1960 
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and investment price levels in 1960. The tertiary education variable mentioned earlier 
is not amongst the 18 significant variables. The values used to sort the 67 variables 
are the posterior inclusion probability values, which range from 0.823, in the case of 
the East Asian dummy, to 0.015.  
Much of the discussion in this sub-section relates to how the posterior inclusion 
probability is calculated. This is done mainly in terms of the mechanics of the 
approach expressed in the GAUSS code accompanying SDM and less in terms of 
Bayesian theory (most of SDM’s explanation of the approach is in terms of the latter). 
The GAUSS code was translated to Mata, a matrix programming language embedded 
in Stata, partly to examine whether SDM’s implementation of BACE was in any way 
sensitive to the programming language used (this was not found to be the case to any 
noteworthy degree). The Mata code appears in Appendix B. Apart from the posterior 
inclusion probability, six other statistics are reported by SDM in their final results 
(SDM, 2004: 824). Of these, just two key ones are dealt with in this discussion and 
the Mata code, namely the posterior mean conditional on inclusion and the posterior 
standard deviation conditional on inclusion.    
BACE involves the iterative running of many regression analyses of the data. Around 
50 million such analyses must be run in the case of the SDM dataset. Every analysis is 
a simple OLS regression, but with a different combination of explanatory variables 
used each time. It is possible for the same combination of variables to be repeated, 
though the probability of this is extremely small, given the number of possible 
combinations (discussed below). The choice of variables is at first completely 
random, meaning each variable has an equal probability of entering the model, but as 
the process proceeds more non-random selection elements come to play. How this 
occurs is a key aspect of SDM’s method. A model could contain between 1 and all 67 
explanatory variables, meaning the total possible combinations is 267 or around 1.5 by 
1020. So even 50 million combinations cover only a very small fraction of all possible 
combinations. Initially the number of explanatory variables clusters around k, with k 
being both the mode and median model size. The value SDM use for k, or the ‘prior 
hyper-estimation’, is 7. This is based on the analysts’ experience of cross-country 
growth modelling. How a departure from the initial clustering around k equals 7 
occurs, is a further key element of the BACE method. A replication of the entire SDM 
analysis took around seven hours on a fast laptop in 2011 using Mata within Stata 9.  
The final posterior inclusion probability statistic (see vector postprob in Mata) 
attached to each explanatory variable at the end of the BACE process is calculated as 
follows, where v is the variable in question.  
∑
∑
=
e
e
pv
*
 (55) 
Each value e is specific to one regression analysis and is referred to in SDM’s 
programming code as the ‘sum of squared errors’. Normally the sum of squared errors 
would be synonymous with what is probably most commonly referred to as the 
residual sum of squares (RSS) in an OLS regression. The higher the RSS relative to 
the total sum of squares (TSS) in a regression, the lower the R2 value and the 
explanatory power of the model. As we shall see, SDM’s sum of squared errors is 
closely related to the common RSS, but there are some key differences. The 
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denominator in equation (55) is the sum of the various values e obtained across the 50 
million or so regressions. The numerator Σe* is the sum of the e values of just those 
models where variable v was included (in Mata e* is sumess whilst e is sess). The 
implication is thus that pv increases in value when either of the following happens: (a) 
variable v is included in a greater proportion of the regression models (if variable v 
were included every time, then pv would equal 1.0); (b) The value e in the models 
where variable v is present is larger relative to the value e in the models where v is not 
present. How these effects come about is explained below.  
To begin with, effect (b) is explained, as initially when the code is run it is just this 
effect, and not effect (a), that plays a role. The situation changes after the first 100,000 
loops (or regressions). Importantly, SDM’s sum of squared errors is negatively 
correlated to RSS. The following graph illustrates the relationship between RSS and 
SDM’s sum of squared errors during the initial 100 loops. Each point represents a 
regression analysis. As explained above, the most common model size is 7 
explanatory variables (model size is indicated by the curves in the graph).   
Figure 17: The BACE sum of squared errors 
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Apart from the negative correlation between the variables on the two axes, what 
stands out is the very high values of the BACE sum of squared errors. They are in the 
range of around 1068 to 1084. Returning to equation (55), the implication is that 
variables appearing in models with relatively low RSS values would be those 
variables with the best, or highest, posterior inclusion probability values. This makes 
intuitive sense as models with higher R2 values are considered to carry greater 
explanatory power. The next two equations explain how RSS (denoted by r below) 
and e are related.  
( )∑
=
=
n
i
iur
1
2
 (56) 
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=  (57) 
Equation (56) is simply a reminder of how r is obtained. It is the sum of the squared 
errors across the n observations following the regression analysis. Equation (57) 
represents a calculation referred to in the notes in the code as ‘ESS corrected by DFs a 
la Ron’ (Ron being almost certainly a reference to one of the three authors, Ronald 
Miller). SDM’s sum of squared errors is referred to as ‘ESS’ in the GAUSS code but 
as ‘SSE’ in the journal article. From the negative exponent in the numerator in 
equation (57) it is clear that the BACE sum of squared errors increases when r 
decreases. The denominator on the right-hand side of equation (57) varies only 
according to m, the number of explanatory variables selected for the current model.  
The number of observations n, which is 88 countries in SDM’s dataset, and k, which 
SDM have set at 7, are constant. The variation in m results in the denominator taking 
on very small positive numbers for a small number of explanatory variables, for 
instance 0.0012 in the case of four variables, 1.0 for seven variables, and very large 
positive numbers in the case of a high number of explanatory variables, for instance 
826 in the case of ten variables. The result is that for any given value of r, having 
fewer explanatory variables increases e. This is clearly visible in Figure 17. It is also 
intuitive. One would expect a model with two explanatory variables which has the 
same RSS as a model with four explanatory variables to be a better model given that 
generally RSS decreases the more variables you have (see SDM, 2004: 817). This is 
the one important dynamic within the relationship between r and e. The other is that 
the power function with a negative exponent results in a situation where there is an 
increasing marginal gain in the size of e as RSS decreases.  
The focus now shifts to what occurs beyond the first 100,000 loops. Up to loop 
100,000 the probability of being selected for the regression is the same for all 
variables. This probability is 0.104, or 7 over 67, giving on average of 7 selected 
variables per regression analysis. In loop 100,000, and thereafter after every 100,000 
loops, something referred to in the code as the ‘adjustment of sampling probability’ 
occurs. What this means is that the probability of being selected (captured in the Mata 
vector iprob) is adjusted. The more a variable is associated with more predictive 
models, the higher its probability of being selected. However, no variable’s 
probability of being selected is allowed to fall below a minimum of 0.100. By the end 
of the process most variables in fact carry a probability of 0.100 and a few carry high 
probabilities, the highest being around 0.8. This explains how effect (a), referred to 
above, becomes possible. The modal (most common) model size is 7 during the first 
100,000 loops, 9 over loops 100,001 to 500,000, 10 for loops 500,001 to 1,000,000 
and then 10 again for 49,500,001 to 50,000,000. There is thus a systematic increase in 
the size of the models. However, as explained below, when one calculates a weighted 
mean of the model size a somewhat different picture emerges.  
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Figure 18: The progression of model size and the BACE SSE 
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Figure 18 illustrates another trend across the four points in the process. Though the 
trend is towards more models with more than 7 explanatory variables, there is also a 
trend towards a maximum value of e associated with a model of size 3. This is to be 
expected given partly the fact that the selection probabilities for more predictive 
variables are rising and that equation (57) is designed to assign especially high values 
of e to smaller models. 
Equation (58) below explains a weighting of e that takes effect in every loop after 
loop 100,000. Here e from equation (57) is replaced by ε to reflect the fact that after 
the first 100,000 loops, but not before then, there is a difference between what appears 
as e and ε below.        
s
q
k
q
k
e
mqm











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
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−×





×=
−
1ε  (58) 
The numerator of the weight in equation (58) includes q, the total possible number of 
explanatory variables (always 67), the prior assumed model size k (always 7) and the 
actual number of variables selected for the current model, m. The natural log of the 
numerator is in effect a negative linear function of m, so the greater the number of 
explanatory variables, the smaller the weight. The denominator s is calculated as 
follows: 
∏
=
=
m
v
vps
1
 (59) 
In other words, s is the product over all variables in the selected model of pv, where pv 
is the probability that this variable would be chosen. Models with ‘weaker’ variables 
thus have a lower value of s and hence a greater weight. During the first 100,000 
loops, the weight is 1.0 because the numerator and denominator are equal. The 
following graph illustrates the effect of the weight later in the process. Specifically, a 
random selection of regression analyses from the 1,000 loops preceding the 3,000,000 
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mark is illustrated. The general effect of the weight is to reduce the value of ε, in 
particular for higher values of ε and where the number of selected variables m is 
higher.       
Figure 19: The weighting of the BACE SSE 
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The next two graphs sum up the effects of the two transformations on the original r 
represented by equations (57) and (58). The graph reflects points for every 100,000 
loops during the first 10 million loops, with each point reflecting the average over the 
preceding 100,000 loops. The average is the weighted average number of explanatory 
variables. The exercise involved creating two approaches, not used by SDM, the ‘No 
weights’ and ‘1st wgt’ scenarios, for demonstration purposes. For the ‘No weights’ 
curve, the inverse of r was used as the weight, in keeping with the idea that holding 
the number of explanatory variables constant, a greater r represents a less predictive 
model. Introducing just the weight implied by equation (57) produces, like the ‘No 
weights’ scenario, average model sizes that are well above the prior assumption of 7. 
It is only with the introduction of the additional weight from equation (58), in other 
words by following the full weighting used in BACE, that an average model size close 
to 7 is maintained for most loops. Figure 20 thus illustrates the justification for the 
calculation of e in BACE.   
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Figure 20: Effect of weights on mean model size  
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The three scenarios can be illustrated with respect to the performance of the posterior 
inclusion probability of variable v, or pv. In the following graph the progression of the 
pv values for the two education variables, the primary and tertiary education enrolment 
ratios, is illustrated. It is only when both weights are applied that pv values reflecting 
realistic differences between the inclusion probabilities of the two variables emerge.   
Figure 21: Effect of weights on posterior inclusion probability 
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The estimated size of the slope coefficient for each explanatory variable calculated in 
BACE is referred to as the ‘posterior mean conditional on inclusion’. The method for 
obtaining this is relatively straightforward. The mean across the coefficients in the 
various models where variable v was present is used, with the mean being weighted 
by e from equation (58). It is in fact an analysis of the slope coefficients which is used 
to determine when the BACE processing should end. Basically, when the standardised 
beta versions of the slope coefficients have become sufficiently stable across loops, 
convergence is said to have been reached and the processing stops.  
The ‘posterior standard deviation conditional on inclusion’ is calculated in a similar 
manner. Again, for each variable the mean, weighted by e, of the standard deviations 
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of slope coefficients found across the regression analyses is used.  The BACE slope 
coefficients and standard deviations are close to what would be obtained if one ran a 
once-off OLS regression analysis of the seven variables with the highest posterior 
inclusion probabilities.  
The above has been a discussion of the key mechanics of the BACE method. 
Returning to the explanations by SDM in terms of Bayesian theory (or departures 
from this), a key matter is why e should be an appropriate measure of the ‘strength’ of 
a particular model. Put differently, what is the justification for equations (57) and 
(58)? Equation (57) is said to approximate a ‘degrees of freedom correction’ 
employed by Gideon Schwarz to avoid a situation where otherwise the ‘posterior 
mean model size ... will always be bigger than the prior model size, irrespective of the 
data’ (SDM, 2004: 817). This is something that was seen in Figure 20. Equation (58), 
on the other hand, has a ‘stratified sampling’ effect insofar as it adjusts the selection 
probabilities of the variables based on their performance. The benefit of this is partly 
that it ‘accelerates convergence’ (SDM, 2004: 819). 
SDM use nine equations, including the one replicated above as equation (54), to 
explain their approach. Their equation (6), reproduced below, is a key one in terms of 
the mechanics described above. 
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=  (60) 
In contrast to the earlier equation (54), which referred to the prior and posterior 
distribution of parameter values, the above equation refers to the prior and posterior 
probability that the models M0 and M1 are the truest models explaining, in our case, 
the growth phenomenon. This extension of Bayesian statistics is a common one 
(Kennedy, 2008: 228). The left-hand side of equation (60) is the odds ratio, or the 
ratio of the first model’s probability of being true to that of the second model. Here k 
refers to the actual number of explanatory variables, in other words what has been 
referred to as m in the previous discussion. SSE is r and T is n from equation (57). If 
equation (57) is used to calculate the odds ratio between two models, the result is 
identical to what one would obtain using equation (60).  
How widely used is BACE? A few analysts have made use of the method. Jones and 
Schneider (2006), for instance, use results from intelligence or IQ tests as one of 
several explanatory variables and find that intelligence is associated with faster 
economic growth. This is less controversial than may at first seem to be the case if 
one considers that the intelligence data they use is essentially a measure of the quality 
of education. Nevertheless, the intelligence dataset used has been criticised by 
economists such as Ervik (2003) for, amongst other things, its lack of standardisation. 
Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2008) use BACE in an attempt to understand what lies 
behind the African dummy which SDM find important (it carries a posterior inclusion 
probability of 0.154 and is therefore amongst the top 18 variables discussed earlier). 
The analysis involves extensive use of interaction terms based on the SDM dataset 
and arrives at the conclusion that the negative impact of the African dummy is large 
due to an especially negative impact of a reliance on primary (as opposed to non-
primary) exports in the case of Africa. However, they also find that in the case of 
Africa the level of primary enrolments and the fraction of GDP linked to mining had 
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exceptionally positive effects in the case of Africa. Burger and Du Plessis (2006) also 
explore the dynamics behind the African dummy using BACE, but with some new 
data added to the SDM dataset, and find that certain omitted variables explain the 
African dummy, for instance changes to the dependency ratio. 
Here the focus is on the impact of inserting an educational quality variable into 
SDM’s original BACE analysis. To ensure that the Mata code used for the present 
analysis did not produce notably different results from the original GAUSS code, the 
original SDM analysis was re-run twice using the Mata code. Table 10 reports the 
results. The value ‘differ’ in the last row of the table is a measure of the degree to 
which the rankings of variables differ from those in the original SDM analysis. Zero 
would mean the exact same ranking was reproduced44. Any variable where the 
posterior inclusion probability was at least 0.104 (7 over 67) is listed. ‘PIP’ is 
posterior inclusion probability and ‘Coeff’ is the posterior mean conditional on 
inclusion, or the slope coefficient. The latter is given in scientific notation given the 
large range of coefficient values, which reflects the large range of standard deviations 
(see Table 12). The ‘differ’ values in Table 10 are low. Using the Mata code does not 
change the ranking or statistics to any notable extent. The differences between the two 
Mata results confirm what one should expect, given the random selection elements 
within the BACE process, namely that no two runs would produce identical results. 
Yet the results for at least the top seven variables can be considered highly stable.  
Table 11 allows for an exploration of the impact of introducing a measure of 
educational quality. In this table, the first two panels report on the results of two 
analyses using only the 46 countries with data in the SDM dataset and the Hanushek 
and Woessman (2009) set of normalised country scores (see section 3.3 above). For 
the first panel, the country score (‘cognitive’) was included, in the second panel it was 
not. The second panel reveals that just the reduction in the number of countries, and 
fewer lower and middle income countries, alters the results in substantial ways 
(specifically, the percentage of lower and middle income countries drops from 72% to 
48%). The number of explanatory variables with posterior inclusion probabilities not 
below the critical threshold of 0.104 increases, from 18 in the original SDM to 35 (see 
the second panel of Table 11). It has become less possible to distinguish between the 
importance of the variables. From an education policy perspective, a key finding is 
that the educational quality variable replaces the primary enrolments variable (‘p60’), 
which no longer surpasses the critical threshold (see the first panel of Table 11). The 
BACE analysis thus arrives at similar conclusions to those of Hanushek and 
Woessman (2009), namely that to improve economic growth, policymakers should 
primarily focus on educational quality. High enrolments are a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for the realisation of tertiary educational quality. A similar 
outcome is seen in the third and fourth panels of Table 11, where for the analysis the 
new measure of educational quality described in section  3.3 (‘newscore’) was used 
(60% of the 60 countries in question are lower and middle income countries).  
                                                     
44
 Each value for ‘differ’, for instance 0.6 in the panel ‘Replication of SDM 1’, is the mean over a 
number of positive values. There is a positive value for every row where there is some content in the 
panel in question and the first panel ‘Original SDM’. Each positive value is the absolute difference 
between the ranking of a variable in the first panel and in the panel in question. Thus for the first seven 
rows between the first two panels, the value is zero because the ranking of variables remains the same. 
For the eighth row, the value is 1 because ‘life060’ has ranking 8 in the first panel and ranking 9 in the 
second panel. For the last four rows, ‘spain’ to ‘buddha’, the value is 2 in each row.   
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One thing that is noteworthy is that whilst the primary enrolments variable takes 
position two in the Table 10 results, the educational quality variables in Table 11 take 
positions seven and five. An obvious explanation for this is that whilst the primary 
enrolments values are from 1960, in other words the start of the growth period 
considered in the dependent variable, the educational quality variables relate to what 
is essentially the end of the growth period: the average data source year in the case of 
Hanushek and Woessman (2009) is 1994 and for the new values data points from 
2000 to 2010 were used. Had an educational quality variable for 1960 existed, this 
would perhaps have been allocated a ranking similar to the primary enrolments 
variable, given that learning outcomes in schools in 1960 would clearly be a better 
proxy for adult human capital in the 1960 to 1996 growth period, than a learning 
outcomes variable referring to the end of period.  
What is also noteworthy is that some other variables considered highly important in 
Table 10 do not appear in Table 11. This can be said of the variables referring to the 
percentage of the country within the tropics (‘tropicar’) and the extent of malaria 
(‘malfal66’). A possible explanation is the greater degree of multicollinearity between 
educational quality and these two variables, relative to that between primary 
enrolments and the two variables. Less easy to explain would be the presence of real 
exchange rate distortions (‘rerd’) in first or second position in Table 11, though it is 
absent in Table 10. The real exchange rate distortions variable, together with another 
two, do surpass a less stringent threshold in SDM (2004: 829), however. The fact that 
the variable is highly ranked in all the Table 11 panels is an indication that this is a 
question of the countries selected, not a question of the use of an educational quality 
variable.  
The magnitude of the coefficients associated with the two educational quality 
variables in Table 11 is somewhat lower than what Hanushek and Woessman (2009: 
Table 1 in appendix) predict following their analysis (discussed below). This should 
be expected, given the larger number of variables considered in the BACE analysis. 
Specifically, an increase in the growth rate of 0.8 percentage points associated with an 
improvement of one standard deviation in the test scores is suggested by Table 11, 
against the comparable improvement of 2.0 percentage points suggested by Table 14 
in the following section, which reproduces the original Hanushek and Woessman 
growth regression results (note that as the dependent variable used for Table 11 is 
expressed as a proportion, so a growth rate of 1 per cent is expressed as 0.01, 
coefficients from Table 11 must be multiplied by 100 to make them comparable to 
those in Table 14). Once-off regression analyses of the top seven variables in Table 11 
result in coefficients which are consistent with the BACE values. The BACE 
approach thus assists in placing models such as those of Mankiw, Romer and Weil 
(1992) and Hanushek and Woessman (2009) within a wider development framework 
and in reducing the problem of over-estimation of the magnitudes of associations 
brought about by a narrow selection of explanatory variables.    
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Table 10: BACE regression outputs – without educational quality variables 
Original SDM Replication of SDM 1 Replication of SDM 2 
Var. PIP Coeff. Var. PIP Coeff. Var. PIP Coeff. 
east 0.823 2.E-02 east 0.807 2.E-02 east 0.832 2.E-02 
p60 0.796 3.E-02 p60 0.795 3.E-02 p60 0.798 3.E-02 
iprice1 0.774 -8.E-05 iprice1 0.769 -8.E-05 iprice1 0.771 -8.E-05 
gdpch60l 0.685 -9.E-03 gdpch60l 0.700 -9.E-03 gdpch60l 0.686 -9.E-03 
tropicar 0.563 -2.E-02 tropicar 0.552 -1.E-02 tropicar 0.572 -1.E-02 
dens65c 0.428 9.E-05 dens65c 0.424 9.E-06 dens65c 0.439 9.E-06 
malfal66 0.252 -2.E-02 malfal66 0.246 -2.E-02 malfal66 0.255 -2.E-02 
life060 0.209 8.E-04 confuc 0.222 5.E-02 life060 0.207 8.E-04 
confuc 0.206 5.E-02 life060 0.211 8.E-04 confuc 0.194 5.E-02 
safrica 0.154 -2.E-02 safrica 0.178 -1.E-02 safrica 0.155 -1.E-02 
laam 0.149 -1.E-02 laam 0.172 -1.E-02 laam 0.150 -1.E-02 
mining 0.124 4.E-02 mining 0.151 4.E-02 spain 0.124 -1.E-02 
spain 0.123 -1.E-02 muslim00 0.127 1.E-02 mining 0.114 4.E-02 
yrsopen 0.119 1.E-02 buddha 0.124 2.E-02 muslim00 0.110 1.E-02 
muslim00 0.114 1.E-02 spain 0.120 -1.E-02 avelf 0.108 -1.E-02 
buddha 0.108 2.E-02 yrsopen 0.108 1.E-02 yrsopen 0.107 1.E-02 
avelf 0.105 -1.E-02 buddha 0.104 2.E-02 
gvr61 0.104 -4.E-02 
n 88 n 88 n 88 
iterations iterations 54.6m iterations 52.8m 
differ. differ. 0.6 differ. 0.5 
Note: Dependent variable here and in the regressions of the following table is average 
real GDP per capita growth between 1960 to 1996. 
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Table 11: BACE regression outputs – effect of educational quality variables 
H&W measure Same observations New measure Same observations 
Var. PIP Coeff. Var. PIP Coeff. Var. PIP Coeff. Var. PIP Coeff. 
rerd 1.000 -2.E-04 rerd 1.000 -2.E-04 gdpch60l 0.968 -2.E-02 gdpch60l 0.963 -2.E-02 
yrsopen 1.000 2.E-02 avelf 0.988 -4.E-02 rerd 0.944 -2.E-04 rerd 0.940 -1.E-04 
avelf 0.999 -3.E-02 yrsopen 0.987 2.E-02 mining 0.788 5.E-02 life060 0.900 1.E-03 
gdpch60l 0.990 -1.E-02 govnom1 0.983 -1.E-01 life060 0.782 1.E-03 confuc 0.801 5.E-02 
govnom1 0.985 -1.E-01 gdpch60l 0.925 -1.E-02 newscore 0.755 8.E-03 mining 0.714 5.E-02 
mining 0.952 4.E-02 mining 0.881 4.E-02 buddha 0.543 2.E-02 spain 0.686 -1.E-02 
cognitive 0.866 8.E-03 spain 0.878 -2.E-02 confuc 0.515 4.E-02 safrica 0.665 -2.E-02 
spain 0.782 -2.E-02 lhcpc 0.818 -7.E-04 spain 0.457 -1.E-02 buddha 0.639 2.E-02 
pi6090 0.739 2.E-04 brit 0.732 8.E-03 dens65c 0.342 6.E-06 govnom1 0.326 -6.E-02 
lhcpc 0.728 -6.E-04 newstate 0.602 4.E-03 avelf 0.330 -2.E-02 ggcfd3 0.309 -7.E-02 
opendec1 0.571 6.E-03 europe 0.569 -1.E-02 safrica 0.318 -1.E-02 dens60 0.242 2.E-05 
europe 0.520 -9.E-03 pop6560 0.432 2.E-01 tot1dec1 0.313 1.E-01 avelf 0.231 -2.E-02 
colony 0.363 6.E-03 opendec1 0.417 9.E-03 govnom1 0.231 -7.E-02 priexp70 0.229 -2.E-02 
geerec1 0.348 2.E-01 pi6090 0.415 2.E-04 east 0.188 1.E-02 dens65c 0.227 5.E-06 
cath00 0.311 -6.E-03 cath00 0.403 -9.E-03 yrsopen 0.158 1.E-02 muslim00 0.208 1.E-02 
brit 0.253 6.E-03 sqpi6090 0.402 2.E-06 priexp70 0.114 -1.E-02 opendec1 0.155 9.E-03 
sqpi6090 0.253 3.E-06 confuc 0.284 2.E-02 ggcfd3 0.110 -6.E-02 ztropics 0.153 1.E-02 
laam 0.247 -2.E-02 life060 0.266 5.E-04 dens60 0.108 2.E-05 europe 0.145 6.E-03 
revcoup 0.245 -2.E-02 size60 0.206 3.E-03 dpop6090 0.108 -4.E-01 pop60 0.144 1.E-07 
pop6560 0.234 1.E-01 geerec1 0.197 2.E-01 yrsopen 0.141 1.E-02 
priexp70 0.211 -8.E-03 fertldc1 0.169 -1.E-02 east 0.134 1.E-02 
confuc 0.190 2.E-02 scout 0.159 4.E-03 h60 0.134 -8.E-02 
iprice1 0.162 5.E-05 prot00 0.156 -7.E-03 dpop6090 0.114 -5.E-01 
newstate 0.161 3.E-03 dpop6090 0.150 8.E-01 
prot00 0.122 -2.E-03 govsh61 0.149 9.E-03 
dens65i 0.121 -1.E-05 ztropics 0.140 8.E-03 
pop1560 0.121 -4.E-02 east 0.140 7.E-03 
size60 0.110 1.E-03 oil 0.139 8.E-03 
dens65i 0.130 -1.E-05 
dens65c 0.127 -3.E-06 
landlock 0.126 -7.E-03 
revcoup 0.123 -1.E-02 
laam 0.121 -1.E-02 
tot1dec1 0.108 5.E-02 
priexp70 0.106 -9.E-03 
n 46 n 46 n 60 n 60 
iterations 52.4m iterations 58.0m iterations 84.4m iterations 72.7m 
differ. 20.8 differ. 21.7 differ. 9.1 differ. 11.3 
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Table 12: Variables reported on in BACE tables 
Non-
missing Mean Std. dev. 
East Asian dummy east 139 0.115 0.320 
Primary schooling in 1960 p60 121 0.692 0.321 
Investment price iprice1 119 94.354 53.074 
GDP in 1960 (log) gdpch60l 120 7.319 0.887 
Fraction of tropical area tropicar 119 0.570 0.467 
Population density coastal in 1960s dens65c 114 125.739 452.237 
Malaria prevalence in 1960s malfal66 115 0.379 0.438 
Life expectancy in 1960 life060 127 53.129 12.277 
Fraction Confucian confuc 136 0.012 0.069 
African dummy safrica 139 0.317 0.467 
Latin American dummy laam 139 0.209 0.408 
Fraction GDP in mining mining 130 0.057 0.090 
Spanish colony spain 139 0.115 0.320 
Years open 1950-94 yrsopen 126 0.334 0.347 
Fraction Muslim muslim00 136 0.203 0.346 
Fraction Buddhist buddha 139 0.038 0.155 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization avelf 127 0.360 0.308 
Gov. consumption share 1960s gvr61 113 0.119 0.077 
Population density 1960 dens60 126 155.285 415.449 
Real exchange rate distortions rerd 116 125.336 40.271 
Fraction speaking foreign language othfrac 133 0.297 0.395 
Openess measure 1965-74 opendec1 125 0.570 0.354 
Political rights prights 134 4.099 2.020 
Government share of GDP in 1960s govsh61 119 0.165 0.072 
Higher education 1960 h60 121 0.031 0.046 
Fraction Population In Tropics troppop 119 0.311 0.369 
Primary exports 1970 priexp70 129 0.753 0.278 
Public investment share ggcfd3 111 0.055 0.045 
Fraction Protestants prot00 136 0.144 0.288 
Fraction Hindus hindu00 137 0.029 0.117 
Fraction population less than 15 pop1560 119 0.396 0.072 
Air distance to big cities airdist 118 4401.263 2504.810 
Nominal government GDP share 1960s govnom1 119 0.148 0.060 
Absolute latitude abslatit 137 22.557 15.775 
Fraction Catholic cath00 136 0.298 0.399 
Note: Variables are listed in descending order according to PIP in SDM. Statistics are based 
on the full 139 observation dataset of SDM. 
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4.4 Hanushek and Woessman’s model 
Hanushek and Woessman (2007, 2008, 2009)45  have been particularly influential in 
policy circles, both in the education sector and in national planning generally. Not 
only have the authors presented findings that appear to provide a basis for greater 
certainty and specificity in policymaking, they also do so in a style that addresses 
policymakers directly, translating empirical findings to simple (though rudimentary) 
simulations of national trends that can guide actual planning. 
The empirical analysis of Hanushek and Woessman (2009 – it is mostly this text that 
is considered in this section) is not strongly rooted in any single theoretical model. If 
one attempts to situate their work amongst the models from section 2, it becomes 
apparent that the role of physical capital K is not taken into account. Convergence, as 
we shall see, is predicted by Hanushek and Woessman’s analysis. They attempt to 
analyse the separate effects of human capital of a basic and of an advanced quality. 
By introducing this focus, Hanushek and Woessman (2009) express concerns that are 
close to those of the Schumpeterian models, specifically that of Nelson and Phelps 
(section 2.7) and the Schumpeterian model with two levels of human capital (section 
2.9). The absence in Hanushek and Woessman’s work of a theoretical framework 
more explicitly rooted in the literature described in section 2 is cause for one of 
several criticisms made by Breton (2011), whose more salient criticisms will be 
discussed within this section. In a report produced for the OECD (2010a) by 
Hanushek and Woessman, one finds what is perhaps the clearest statement of the 
authors’ theoretical underpinnings: they subscribe to endogenous growth theory, 
specifically the notion that a more educated country is better at innovating and 
therefore attaining a higher growth rate. 
An important part of Hanushek and Woessman (2009) is the presentation of a novel 
way of combining country-level test score averages from different testing 
programmes. This was discussed in some detail in section 3.3. What is discussed 
below is how their new set of normalised ‘country scores’ was used within various 
growth models. The following table provides details on the data sources used for the 
replication of Hanushek and Woessman’s (2009) work in this section. Maximum N is 
in all cases the 113 countries for which new learning outcomes values were calculated 
using the nonlinear programming approach explained in section 3.3.  
                                                     
45
 See also Hanushek and Wößmann (2007).  
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Table 13: Data sources used for replicating H&W growth regressions 
Variable Source N Mean Min. Max. 
Real annual growth in GDP per 
capita (in PPP USD of 2006), 
average 1960-2004 
Heston, Summers and Aten, 
2006. 
107 2.49 -2.00 8.36 
GDP per capita (in real PPP 
USD of 2006), 1960 
As above.  67 4753 412 15253 
Gross enrolment ratio in 
secondary schooling, average 
1980-2005 
Online data-querying facility 
of UNESCO: UIS, consulted 
2009. 
101 67 4 118 
Average country score  See discussion above. 113 427 260 578 
Economy openness in 2000, 
following methodology of Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (2003: 529).  
Heston, Summers and Aten, 
2006; Online data-querying 
facility of United Nations 
Statistics Division (National 
accounts estimates of main 
aggregate), consulted 2009. 
110 5.7 -68.3 244.9 
Rule of law indicator for 2000 World Bank, 2010.  107 0.30 -1.25 1.92 
Total fertility rate, 1960 Online data-querying facility 
of United Nations Statistics 
Division (World population 
prospects: The 2008 
revision), consulted 2009. 
108 4.88 1.82 8.40 
 
In the next table three basic models from Hanushek and Woessman (2009, Table 1, 
models (1) to (3)) are reproduced. The form of the most complete model (3) can be 
described as follows: 
uYBEBTBBg tY ++++= =03210  (61) 
Average annual growth in GDP per capita, gY, is a function of three variables: human 
capital T as seen in literacy and mathematics testing programmes, human capital E 
with respect to the degree to which the population has been enrolled in school, and 
initial income per capita Y at the start of the period. The form is completely linear. 
Moreover, growth is strongly predicted insofar as the growth rate, and not income 
itself, is the dependent variable. Thus once growth exists, it is not necessary for either 
of the two human capital variables to experience increases over time for further 
growth to occur.  
The first three data columns of Table 14 display values copied from Hanushek and 
Woessman (2009). The basic conclusion that they draw from these values is that a 
growth model in which historical enrolments appear to be a statistically significant 
predictor of growth (this is the case in model (1)) is deceptive, as without a more 
qualitative measure of how educated the population is, the model suffers the 
specification error of an omitted yet relevant variable. Once the qualitative measure is 
introduced, historical enrolments become insignificant (see model (3)) and learning 
outcomes becomes a highly significant predictor. On its own, the learning outcomes 
variable is far more significant than historical enrolments on its own (compare models 
(1) and (2), including the very different adjusted R2 values). The policy implications 
of this are profound. Policies in developing countries that focus exclusively on 
enrolling more pupils run the risk of devoting scarce national resources to a project 
which does not contribute to growth. Rather, governments should focus on what 
pupils learn. More years of schooling do not automatically translate into better 
learning outcomes as demonstrated, for instance, by the fairly low correlation between 
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the two human capital variables T and E of 0.63 (using the data used for the right-
hand panel of Table 14).  
Table 14: Regression outputs – replication of H&W  
 From H&W Replication with H&W 
values for T 
Variable 1 2 3 1A 2A 3A 
Constant    2.02*** 
(3.52) 
-3.94*** 
(-4.41) 
-3.88*** 
(-4.30) 
T [Learning 
outcomes] 
 2.02*** 
(10.68) 
1.98*** 
(9.12) 
 1.82*** 
(8.67) 
1.73*** 
(7.26) 
E [Enrolment] 
 0.37*** 
(3.23) 
 
 
0.03 
(0.34) 
0.03*** 
(3.23) 
 0.01 
(0.81) 
Y [Income] -0.38*** 
(-4.24) 
-0.29*** 
(-9.15) 
-0.30*** 
(-5.54) 
-0.28*** 
(-4.54) 
-0.27*** 
(-8.18) 
-0.29*** 
(-6.85) 
N 50 50 50 48 48 48 
R2    0.314 0.684 0.688 
Adjusted R2 0.252 0.733 0.728 0.284 0.670 0.667 
Note: Dependent variable is average annual growth 1960-2004. *** 
indicates that the estimate is significant at the 1% level of significance. 
Values in brackets are t statistics. 
 
Hanushek and Woessman use the term ‘cognitive skills’ to refer to abilities displayed 
through standardised tests. The term ‘learning outcomes’ used above is a term that 
might be more familiar to education planners. Here the two essentially mean the same 
thing. However, there is an important caveat in this regard that Hanushek and 
Woessman (2008: 612; 2009: 6) do acknowledge. Apart from the language and 
mathematical skills displayed in pupil tests, young people also acquire, partly through 
formal education, skills relating to social cohesion, for instance the skill to 
communicate well, or to suppress more selfish urges in the interests of the greater 
social good. Such skills are likely to be important for economic growth, yet they are 
not directly captured in test scores, though test scores and these other skills, called 
‘noncognitive skills’ by Hanushek and Woessman, are likely to be correlated.  
For the variable E Hanushek and Woessman (2009) use 1960 values from a dataset of 
average years of education produced by Cohen and Soto (2007b). These values are 
based on the total years of education of adults, including years of post-secondary 
education. They therefore deal not just with basic school education, which is the focus 
of the learning outcomes variable T. The problem is that overall years of education is 
in many ways a poor indicator of the level of participation in basic education. To 
illustrate, within the Cohen and Soto (2007b) dataset, Costa Rica and Malaysia have 
very different values for the percentage of adults with at least some primary schooling 
in 1960 (75% against 50%), yet the overall average years of education values for the 
two countries are almost identical (3.3 against 3.2 years). This is due to a stronger 
post-primary emphasis in the case of Malaysia. It would have been interesting to use a 
variable on the average years of pre-tertiary schooling of adults in the growth model, 
but such a variable is not available in Cohen and Soto (2007b) (nor does not it seem 
available anywhere else).  
Clearly any enrolment variable will have its advantages and disadvantages. In models 
(1A) and (3A) of Table 14 the secondary level gross enrolment ratio (GER) in 1980 is 
used for variable E. This approach is thus similar to what was employed for the 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1991) simulations in section 4.2. The aim of the last three 
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columns in Table 14 is to examine to what degree the Hanushek and Woessman 
(2009) conclusions are sensitive to the measure of historical enrolments used. It 
appears as if a different measure makes no substantial difference to the conclusions. 
Above all, E remains insignificant in model (3). The original Hanushek and 
Woessman (2009) learning outcomes values are used and for initial income in 1960 
Penn version 6.2 data (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2006) are used (Hanushek and 
Woessman used Penn version 6.1 data, which is the reason why the number of 
countries drops from 50 to 48 in Table 14).  
What is the effect of using the new learning outcomes values discussed in section 3.3? 
Simply rerunning the second model (2) in Table 14 using the new learning outcomes 
values results in a relatively low level of explanation reflected in an adjusted R2 value 
of 0.519. The data allowed for 66 countries to be included in the model. If the 46 
countries for which both new and old (or Table 14) learning outcomes values are 
available, then the adjusted R2 value in model (2) of Table 14 is almost the same, 
regardless of which learning outcomes values are used (adjusted R2 is 0.655 and 0.649 
with the new and old values respectively).  
Transforming the explanatory variables and excluding one outlier results in adjusted 
R2 values that are comparable with those in the original Hanushek and Woessman 
(2009) models. The results appearing in Table 15 use the natural logarithm of both the 
enrolment values (secondary level GER) and the 1960 income values. A quadratic 
form for T was tested, but this brought virtually no benefits in terms of the value of 
adjusted R2. The outlier that was excluded was Kenya. Potential outliers were 
identified using the DFITS post-estimation statistic (Baum, 2006: 128). In the case of 
Kenya, essentially the country’s economic growth was much lower than what the 
model (and the level of their learning outcomes) would predict. China was excluded 
from all models as cognitive tests were only implemented in the city of Shanghai.  
Table 15: Regression outputs – with transformed explanatory variables 
Variable 1 2 3 
Constant 4.21*** (3.60) 3.28*** (3.56) 3.87*** (4.65) 
T 
 1.88*** (9.18) 1.54*** (7.74) 
ln(E) 1.53*** (5.66)  0.87*** (4.11) 
ln(Y) -0.96*** (-4.59) -1.08*** (-6.90) -1.40*** (-8.78) 
N 63 63 63 
R2 0.350 0.585 0.678 
Adjusted R2 0.329 0.572 0.661 
Note: Dependent variable is average annual growth 1960-2004. *** 
indicates that the estimate is significant at the 1% level of significance. 
Values in brackets are t statistics. For this analysis and those that follow the 
new learning outcomes values are divided by 100 to provide slope 
coefficients more or less comparable to those of Hanushek and Woessman 
(2009). 
 
The Table 15 results permit similar conclusions about education and growth to those 
drawn by Hanushek and Woessman (2009), though there is a noteworthy difference. 
Models (1) and (2) confirm how much more valuable educational quality, as opposed 
to education enrolment, is if we want to explain why certain countries experience 
higher economic growth than others. In model (3) both educational quality and 
enrolment are highly statistically significant, whilst in the comparable Hanushek and 
Woessman (2009: Table 1, Model 3) model only educational quality was found to be 
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significant. This is mainly due to the fact that more developing countries have been 
included. If model (3) above is run excluding all countries excluded by the original 
Hanushek and Woessman analysis, the enrolment variable becomes statistically 
insignificant. The fact that the enrolment variable has been logged in model (3) is of 
little importance. If the unlogged form is used, the variable remains statistically 
significant (above the 10% level of significance). The coefficients associated with 
initial income remain negative and statistically significant across all models, 
something that Hanushek and Woessman (2009: 9) remind us points towards 
conditional convergence between countries.  
In a model with a wider range of explanatory variables, roughly following Hanushek 
and Woessman (2009: Table 1, Model 8), educational quality as reflected by the new 
country scores remains statistically significant. The adjusted R2 value in Table 16 of 
0.79, in a model that includes 62 countries, compares to an adjusted R2 value of 0.80 
in the corresponding Hanushek and Woessman model with 45 countries. The most 
significant regional dummies were those of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA), both of which produced strongly negative 
coefficients. Below, the two are combined into one dummy variable. Following 
Burger and Du Plessis (2006), it is likely that this dummy variable masks omitted 
variables relating to, for instance, changes in the dependency ratio. With respect to the 
dependency ratio, these authors found that poor economic performance in African 
countries can be explained by an absence of the demographic trends, such as a lower 
fertility rate, needed to increase the labour force as a proportion of the total 
population. What is also confirmed by Table 16 is the finding, evident in Hanushek 
and Woessman (2009) though not emphasised by them, that a more comprehensive 
model reduces the magnitude of the impact of educational quality on growth by about 
half: a coefficient of 1.54 in Table 15 compares to 0.70 in Table 16.   
Table 16: Regression outputs – large range of explanatory variables 
Variable  
Constant 9.92*** (6.53) 
T [Learning outcomes] 0.70*** (3.02) 
ln(E) [Enrolment] 0.85*** (4.65) 
Openness 0.01*** (3.31) 
Rule of law 0.43** (2.34) 
Total fertility rate -0.13 (-1.49) 
SSA/MENA dummy -0.53** (-2.15) 
ln(I) [Income] -1.62*** (-10.36) 
N 62 
R2 0.794 
Adjusted R2 0.768 
Note: Dependent variable is average annual growth 1960-
2004. *** indicates that the estimate is significant at the 1% 
level of significance, ** at the 5% level. Values in brackets 
are t statistics.  
 
To conclude the preceding discussion, there appear to be two findings of note arising 
out of the use of a somewhat enlarged set of countries with respect to learning 
outcomes, where this enlargement is made possible through the incorporation of a 
couple of additional international testing programmes. Firstly, the essential findings 
around the importance of learning outcomes by Hanushek and Woessman (2009) still 
stand. Secondly, the importance of enrolments when viewed beside learning outcomes 
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cannot be discarded completely, especially if a larger number of developing countries 
are included in the model.  
Hanushek and Woessman (2009: 22) attempt to examine the separate growth effects 
of two different variables: the proportion of the population achieving a basic level of 
learning outcomes, and the proportion achieving exceptional results. They create two 
variables on the percentage of pupils achieving above a specific standard. 86% of 
pupils internationally achieve at or above their lower standard, whilst 5% achieve at 
or above their higher standard. The two variables are found to be simultaneously 
significant when run in the same growth regression. The analysts conclude that 
policymakers should consider both widespread basic achievement and a critical level 
of exceptional performance as policy aims at the same time. It is not a matter of 
choosing between the two, in particular considering the two appear to reinforce each 
other.  
A central concern in Hanushek and Woessman (2009: 13) is the possibility that the 
stylised facts seen in the kinds of cross-country regressions discussed above may be 
deceptive because of endogeneity biases within the models. This possibility, they 
admit, was compellingly argued by in particular Bils and Klenow (2000), whose 
analysis suggested that less than a third of the correlation between initial levels of 
educational enrolment and subsequent economic growth can be attributed to a causal 
impact of education on growth. Instead, Bils and Klenow (2000) find evidence that 
anticipation of growth prompts households to invest in more schooling in order to 
reap future benefits. A strong reverse causality is thus suggested. Hanushek and 
Woessman (2009) argue that through their own analysis they sufficiently lay to rest 
any doubts about the strength of the education effect on growth through a verification 
process involving the use of instrumental variables. Metaphorically, they stress test 
their regression results using instrumental variables (IVs).  
Formally, endogeneity is said to exist when an independent variable, such as H in 
equation (61), is correlated with the error term, such as u in equation (61). This means 
that what Gujarati (2003: 71) identifies as assumption 6 of his 10 assumptions 
underlying the unbiased classical linear regression model is violated. According to 
this assumption, there should be zero covariance between the error term and each 
independent variable. Endogeneity points to a bias in the slope coefficient of the 
independent variable in question, such as B1 in equation (61). Endogeneity often 
arises due to one or a combination of the following three problems: an omitted 
variable, measurement error, and simultaneity (Kennedy, 2008: 138). The first two 
problems are of course in the list of specification errors introduced in section 4.1. 
Hanushek and Woessman (2009:13), in their discussion of endogeneity, are largely 
concerned with two of the three problems, namely omitted variable bias and 
simultaneity.  
With respect to the omitted variable problem, it is possible that some variable not 
included in Table 16 might change the existing coefficients if added. An obvious 
example of an omitted variable in this instance is one referring to a cultural trait 
within the country. Hanushek and Woessman (2009: 13) suggest that ‘cultural factors’ 
might cause certain countries to produce both better school results and better 
economic growth. If this were true, it could be deceptive to regard the models 
discussed above as a basis for advising governments to gear education policies more 
towards achieving learning outcomes. Governments of countries with the ‘wrong’ 
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cultural traits may not see growth improvements flowing from education policy 
changes. Instead, the appropriate advice might rather be to change the national culture 
somehow.  
Simultaneity means there is codetermination between the dependent variable and an 
explanatory variable. For instance, better learning outcomes may be contributing to 
economic growth whilst simultaneously better economic growth results in greater 
spending on education and hence better learning outcomes. The following two 
equations illustrate the existence of simultaneity. 
iiii uZBXBBY +++= 210  (62) 
iiii vYAXAAZ +++= 210  (63) 
The above situation, where Y (for instance economic growth) is a function of Z (for 
instance learning outcomes) whilst Z is also a function of Y necessarily results in Z 
being correlated to the error term u, or endogeneity. This can be demonstrated 
mathematically.  
An instrumental variable is formally a new variable that is correlated with the existing 
independent variable suspected of being endogenous – for example T in equation (61) 
or Z in equation (62), but also not correlated with the error term (Gujarati, 2003: 527). 
More intuitively, an instrumental variable captures the part of the endogenous variable 
that represents the effect one is interested in from a theoretical or economic 
perspective. For instance, if one is interested in the impact of smoking on lung cancer, 
then having cigarette prices as an instrumental variable can help one to isolate the 
impact one is interested in, and ignore other dynamics, such as the possibility that 
people get lung cancer from living in polluted cities, whose cultural characteristics 
also make people smoke more. If the incidence of lung cancer diminishes when the 
price of cigarettes rises, one can probably be very certain that cigarettes cause lung 
cancer. Hanushek and Woessman (2009) select several instrumental variables 
reflecting the structural properties of the education system, such as the percentage of 
pupils in the schooling system who take standardised examinations. Such variables 
are likely to influence test results, but not economic growth in any direct way. By 
using these instrumental variables, they are able to isolate the part of the relationship 
between test scores and economic growth that is attributable to an education effect, in 
much the same way as using cigarette prices allows one to isolate the causal link 
between smoking and lung cancer.  
The instrumental variable approach, implemented using the ivregress command in 
Stata, involves two stages of analysis. In the first stage, all non-endogenous (or 
exogenous) explanatory variables plus the instrumental variable or variables are 
regressed against the variable suspected of being endogenous. This analysis involves a 
straightforward OLS regression. In the second stage, all exogenous and endogenous 
variables, but not the instrumental variables, are regressed against the original 
dependent variable (for instance average annual GDP growth). These two stages are 
discussed below.  
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The Stata command ivregress has three estimation techniques, the most commonly 
referred to one being two-stage least squares, or 2SLS, indicated by ivregress 2sls in 
Stata. It is this technique which was used for the analysis discussed below.   
An instrumental variables analysis can be explained by comparing it to a regular OLS 
regression in terms of matrix algebra. An OLS regression is represented as follows 
(Gujarati, 2003: 933):  
( ) yXXXβ ''ˆ 1−=  (64) 
In contrast, the second stage of the 2SLS analysis is represented by the next two 
equations (Baum, 2006: 188): 
( ) yMXMβ ''ˆ 1−=  (65) 
In two of three places the matrix of explanatory variables X is replaced by the matrix 
M, which is obtained as follows: 
( ) XZZZZM '' 1−=  (66) 
We can think of X as having the dimensions n×(k1+k2), where k1 is the number of 
explanatory variables that are regarded as exogenous and not suspected of being 
endogenous whilst there are k2 variables which we suspect could be endogenous. The 
matrix Z has the dimension n×(k1+z), where z is the number of instrumental variables. 
The number of instrumental variables, or z, must be greater than or equal to the 
number of endogenous variables, or k2. Importantly, equation (65) and equation (66) 
do not represent the two stages of the 2SLS analysis. Both equations together provide 
the second-stage results and clearly do not represent a typical one-stage OLS 
regression analysis. The first-stage estimated coefficients are provided by the 
following equation (which does represent an OLS regression): 
( ) wZZZα ''ˆ 1−=  (67) 
Here w is the n×1 column vector representing the one endogenous variable being 
tested. Only one such variable can be tested at a time. The outputs of the first stage of 
the analysis are useful as background information but are not essential to understand 
what the instrumental variables analysis finds with respect to the endogenous variable 
in question. In fact, the display of the first-stage OLS results is only an option in the 
ivregress command.  
Hanushek and Woessman (2009), in each of four different instrumental variables 
analyses, use one or two instrumental variables out of a set of four instrumental 
variables they identify as possibly useful. Their four instrumental variables are: 
percentage of pupils subject to standardised examinations, extent of private schooling, 
degree of autonomy enjoyed by schools, and extent of school enrolment. The last 
variable is the same as one of their original explanatory variables. Hanushek and 
Woessman (2009) argue that not only are their instrumental variables likely to be 
correlated with their country test scores variable, they are moreover likely to be 
embedded in historical and legal traditions and thus not likely to be correlated to 
growth or the error term. In the second-stage outputs of the instrumental variables 
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analysis, the slope coefficient for the learning outcomes variable remains more or less 
what it was in the original OLS regression and the coefficient remains significant at 
the 1% level (though the t values are lower than what they were in the corresponding 
OLS regressions). On the basis of these results, combined with the results of a 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test examining the validity of the IV results, they conclude that 
policy-induced improvements in learning outcomes are indeed causing better growth. 
Whilst improvements in learning outcomes originating in the growth itself or cultural 
factors may exist, those dynamics do not explain the whole situation. The data support 
the hypothesis that governments can improve economic growth by ensuring that the 
right education policies are implemented.  
One can use an IV analysis to test the hypothesis that cultural factors play a role in 
promoting growth through better education. This one can do by using a variable 
describing cultural factors, as opposed to variables describing factors induced by 
educational policies, as the instrumental variable. One apparently relevant cultural 
variable is the indicator of cultural secularity calculated by Inglehart and Welzel 
(2005) using World Values Survey data. One might expect a more secular and less 
traditional culture to stimulate more intellectual enquiry and hence cognitive skills in 
the schooling system. Table 17 provides the results of an instrumental variables 
regression where the learning outcomes variable is instrumented by the secularity 
variable. The results of the first-stage regression indicate that there is indeed a 
statistically significant and positive correlation between learning outcomes (the 
dependent variable in the regression) and secularity, even when enrolment and initial 
income are entered as conditioning variables. The second-stage instrumental variables 
regression demonstrates that even when only learning outcomes differences explained 
by secularity and the other variables in the first-stage regression are taken into 
account, learning outcomes displays a significant association with growth. The 
analysis presented here thus indicates that even if educational policy factors influence 
growth through better education, at the same time some of the growth-inducing effects 
of educational performance stem not from educational policy directions, but deeply-
rooted values held in the society. To compare, if the second-stage part of the IV 
regression of Table 17 had been run as a single-stage OLS regression, learning 
outcomes would have carried a t-value of 7.75 (see Table 18), instead of 4.76 (see 
Table 17). This points to the ‘stress test’ aspect of the IV regression. Essentially it is 
‘more difficult’ for the variable in question to remain a significant predictor within the 
IV regression. However, it is not always true that the t statistic of the variable in 
question will be higher in the OLS regression than in the IV regression. Some 
experimentation with a variety of plausible variables will quickly reveal that this 
pattern does not always hold.  
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Table 17: Regression outputs – culture as an instrumental variable46  
Variable  
First-stage regression  
(dependent variable: Learning outcomes) 
Constant 2.32*** (3.40) 
ln(E) [Enrolment] 0.25* (1.79) 
ln(I) [Income] 0.14 (1.45) 
Secularity 0.31*** (4.35) 
N 53 
R2 0.633 
Adjusted R2 0.611 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression  
(dependent variable: Average annual growth) 
Constant 3.30*** (3.63) 
Learning outcomes 1.78*** (4.76) 
ln(E) [Enrolment] 0.87*** (3.17) 
ln(I) [Income] -1.46*** (-8.27) 
R2 0.708 
Note: Other than the secularity variable, variables are those 
used in the models displayed in Table 14 (learning 
outcomes is entered in the linear form here however). *** 
indicates that the estimate is significant at the 1% level of 
significance * at the 10% level. Values in brackets are t 
statistics. 
 
Table 18: Regression outputs – 2nd stage with simple OLS 
Variable  
Constant 3.41*** (3.71) 
Learning outcomes 1.58*** (7.75) 
ln(E) [Enrolment] 0.97*** (4.05) 
ln(I) [Income] -1.41*** (-8.58) 
N 53 
R2 0.714 
Adjusted R2 0.697 
Note: Dependent variable is average annual growth 1960-
2004. *** indicates that the estimate is significant at the 1% 
level of significance. Values in brackets are t statistics. 
  
It should be added that if the secularity variable were to be added as an explanatory 
variable within the Table 18 regression, the learning outcomes variable remains 
significant at the 1% level, whilst the secularity variable is not significant even at the 
10% level (t equals 0.62). Again, the robustness of learning outcomes as a predictor of 
growth seems to be confirmed.  
There are, however, noteworthy caveats regarding the above instrumental variable 
analysis that emerge if one applies a few of the available post-estimation tests 
applicable to this type of analysis. As mentioned above, Hanushek and Woessman 
(2009: 15) apply the Durbin-Hausman-Wu test and use the results to conclude that 
their variable for educational quality can be considered exogenous and not 
endogenous. In other words, educational quality is indeed a causal factor behind faster 
                                                     
46
 Strictly speaking, the ‘t statistics’ (the statistics in brackets) in the instrumental variables regression 
panel in Table 17 are z-values, but for the purposes of this discussion they can be considered t-
statistics. In fact, Stata has been somewhat ambiguous here. Whilst in Stata 9 the significance statistics 
in the IV regression results were referred to as t-statistics, in Stata 12 statistics of a similar magnitude 
were referred to as z-values. Stata 12 was used for the Table 17 results.  
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economic growth. The manuals for Stata 12 recommend the use of the Durbin and 
Wu-Hausman tests (described as two separate tests) to establish whether the variable 
being considered possibly endogenous in the instrumental variable analysis is in fact 
exogenous. The manuals moreover suggest using a criterion put forward by Stock, 
Wright and Yogo to establish whether an instrumental variable is sufficiently 
correlated with the possibly endogenous variable (StatCorp, 2011: 830-3). The 
secularity instrumental variable does in fact appear sufficiently correlated to 
educational quality according to the Stock-Wright-Yogo criterion. Specifically, the F 
statistic and eigenvalue for secularity in the first stage regression shown in Table 17 
found after the estat firststage post-estimation test exceeds 10 (the value in the case 
of both statistics is 18.9). Moreover, the p statistics in both the Durbin and Wu-
Hausman tests, of 0.52 and 0.53 respectively, indicate that the null hypothesis that the 
educational quality variable is exogenous cannot be rejected. This is broadly in line 
with the finding of Hanushek and Woessman (2009).    
Returning to what by 2011 was probably the most cogent critique of Hanushek and 
Woessman’s work, a key argument made by Breton (2011) is that Hanushek and 
Woessman make inappropriate use of test score data in their growth regressions .  
Breton (2011: 768) implicitly criticises Hanushek and Woessman for not being more 
transparent about the years from which the test score data are obtained47. For this 
dissertation, the mean year of all the test score data points was calculated, as 
discussed in section 3.3, and was found to be 1994. There was thus a concentration of 
data points in the latter part of the 1964 to 2003 period considered by Hanushek and 
Woessman. This important point was not discussed in Hanushek and Woessman 
(2009), though most of the information needed was available in a table. The point is 
important because, as Breton (2011) argues, test score data from the schooling system 
are likely to reflect the quality of human capital in the labour market as it will be 
around 20 years after the data were collected. This implies that the data used for T in 
equation (61) in the preceding analysis are not able to predict the growth rate for the 
period of 1960 to 2000 (as is implied by Hanushek and Woessman (2009)). Breton 
also criticises Hanushek and Woessman’s measurement of educational quantity and 
the functional form of the growth regressions, but his argument relating to the test 
score data is particularly compelling. It is even more applicable to the regressions 
reflected in Table 15 as these make use of even more recent test score data than those 
of Hanushek and Woessman.  
To what extent does Breton’s (2011) argument explained here invalidate the 
Hanushek and Woessman approach to understanding the relationship between 
education and economic growth? Importantly, in one variation of model (3) from 
Table 14 run by Hanushek and Woessman (2009, Table 2, model 9) for just 22 high 
income countries, almost certainly nearly all high income countries, where country 
test score averages are all from 1984 or an earlier year and the growth period is 1980 
to 2000, the slope coefficient for the learning outcomes variable was found to be 
almost twice what was seen in the left-hand panel of Table 14. This is important and 
to a large extent deals with Breton’s (2011) complaint. It is particularly important as 
one might expect a model with only high income countries to yield a lower slope 
                                                     
47
 The foregoing discussion on Hanushek and Woessman’s work draws mainly from Hanushek and 
Woessman (2009). Breton’s critique is directed at Hanushek and Woessman (2008). However, the two 
Hanushek and Woessman sources mentioned here are very similar so Breton’s critique can be 
considered a critique of the modelling discussed previously in this section.  
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coefficient for educational quality, if one assumes diminishing marginal returns for 
this input in the growth process. The time periods for the 22-country model mentioned 
here almost satisfy Breton’s (2011) requirement in the sense that 2000, the end of the 
growth period, is 16 years after 1984, the last test. However, Hanushek and 
Woessman (2008 and 2009) do not seem to address Breton’s (2011) valid concern 
around historical periods and causality explicitly and are not sufficiently clear about 
the importance of the 22-country model, so Breton’s (2011) critique remains valid. 
The clearest acknowledgement by Hanushek and Woessman that could be found (in 
2012) of the historical periods and causality problem was in their report for the OECD 
(2010a: 15), but even here the extent of the problem and what could be done to 
overcome it could have been explained in more depth. Even if the 22-country model is 
a theoretically more defensible model, the question still remains whether one would 
obtain similar results if one also had the required data for developing countries and 
thus could run a model that was more representative of the world. One key thing that 
Hanushek and Woessman do point out in OECD (2010a: 15) and that Breton (2011) 
could have been expected to acknowledge, is that the data problems discussed here 
are likely to result in under-estimates of the impact of educational quality on growth 
so estimates can in some ways be considered minimum values. Moreover, the extent 
to which test score averages change over the course of some decades within a country 
ought be dealt with explicitly. The less change there is, the more defensible it is to use 
lagged measures of educational quality. One can conclude that despite these caveats, 
Hanushek and Woessman (2009) remains a milestone analysis on the relationship 
between education and growth insofar as it represented by far the most ambitious and 
clearly explained attempt to date to include educational quality within a growth 
regression, and the coefficients on educational quality were found to be large and 
significant.  
4.5 Conclusion 
Section 4 has dealt with econometric issues and policy issues. Apart from the latter, 
education policymakers must deal with the former to some extent, partly because they 
sometimes commission econometric work and partly because some familiarity with 
the available techniques is required for the conversation that must happen between 
economists and policymakers.  
The work by Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004) discussed in section 4.3 
underlines an important point regarding data, namely that the available data include a 
wide variety of country-level variables that can used for understanding the social, 
cultural, institutional and geographical aspects of development. This point may be 
missed, given that the methods used by most econometricians preclude a 
consideration of a wide variety of variables. Overlooking the richness of the data that 
have become available limits both the discussion around the modelling alternatives 
and the depth of the policy conversation. 
Theory should probably inform econometrics to a greater degree. Mankiw, Romer and 
Weil (1992) seem to offer a good example of how to proceed in this regard. Not only 
should theory inform the structure of the empirical equations, it should also inform 
what countries one excludes from one’s growth regressions. Acknowledging, for 
instance, that economies based largely on oil are likely to display atypical growth 
patterns is important for the econometrician, but also for some more general debates, 
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for instance those around whether Venezuela offers a model for countries such as 
South Africa when it comes to poverty reduction.  
The Hanushek and Woessman (2009) finding that a test-based educational quality 
variable so easily eliminates the significance of years of educational attainment, and 
thus raises doubts around earlier growth modelling, has understandably been 
embraced by policymakers and institutions such as the World Bank (Hanushek and 
Wößmann, 2007). The finding, not really possible previously due to data limitations, 
has lent additional power to the argument, which many educationists have made for 
decades, that simply going through the motions of providing a school building, 
teachers, books and so, is often not enough. Such measures on their own are no 
guarantee that education and national development will happen. They need to be 
accompanied by monitoring and remediation that deal with the substantial risk that 
there might be little actual learning happening in schools. As has been demonstrated 
above, the Hanushek and Woessman (2009) finding is easily replicated when the 
educational quality variable is inserted into the models of other analysts. 
The excitement arising from Hanushek and Woessman’s (2009) work, however, has 
detracted from the serious specification errors of their empirical model discussed 
above. Above all, there is an obvious problem inherent in the use of data on the 
quality of secondary schooling which are largely from the 1990s as a proxy for the 
human capital of adults in the 1960 to 2000 period. That this anomaly has been so 
easily overlooked seems indicative of how necessary a sufficient degree of research 
vigilance is. The inconvenient reality is that we will probably need to wait for many 
more years of testing to occur before more rigorous cross-country analysis of the 
linkages between educational quality and growth is possible. In the meantime, 
findings such as those by Hanushek and Woessman (2009) need to be considered 
tentative, no matter how intuitively appealing they are, whilst they remain important, 
arguably far more important than growth models which have used participation in 
schooling as a proxy for the learning outcomes of schooling. 
One important matter that Hanushek and Woessman (2009) do acknowledge and that 
policymakers need to pay attention to is that the size of the association between 
education and growth depends on how many explanatory variables are entered in the 
model. This was confirmed when the BACE findings of Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer 
and Miller (2004) were discussed. It seems advisable for policymakers to consider as 
more realistic the lower magnitudes of association found in the more inclusive 
models. Put differently, education policymakers need to acknowledge that 
development is a complex process that is also dependent on what their policymaker 
colleagues do, or do not do, in other areas such as health and justice.  
The intuition of most education policymakers is unlikely to sit well with the 
apparently well argued texts of sceptics who have insisted, as in the case of Pritchet 
(2001), that there is no association between education and economic growth or, as in 
the case of Bils and Klenow (2000), that though there is an association, causality runs 
largely from growth to education, and not vice versa. Yet education policymakers are 
likely to run into these arguments from time to time and can benefit from some of the 
research, much of it compelling, that the intuition of the policymaker that improving 
education contributes to economic development is right. Key here is Krueger and 
Lindahl’s (2001) point that insufficient attention to measurement error lies behind 
many of the findings of the sceptics. Hanushek and Woessman (2009), despite the 
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shortcomings mentioned above, offer sound advice on how the direction of causality 
between education and growth can be tested. Despite the historical misalignments in 
their data, their finding that causality runs mostly from education to growth seems 
believable.  
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5 AUGMENTATIONS TO INFORM EDUCATION POLICYMAKERS 
5.1 Introduction 
As explained in section 5.2 below, the conversation that should happen between 
researchers, such as academic economists, and policymakers is much weaker than it 
ought to be. As discussed below, there is reason to believe that this problem is 
especially pronounced in the area of education policy. Part of the problem is that not 
enough attention goes towards synthesising research findings, in the form of meta-
analyses, and presenting data and findings in ways that would ‘talk to’ policymakers, 
in other words in a way that acknowledges that policymakers tend to draw from many 
disciplines and can find the language and representational intricacies of single 
disciplines, such as economics, difficult to follow. Section 5 takes the data and models 
discussed in previous sections and considers how they can be presented and 
augmented to maximise their utility for policymakers. The education policy issues 
that receive attention are inevitably just a small sub-set of the larger set of all 
education policy issues. Yet, whilst the policy issues may be limited, the points made 
below about how economic research can be presented to policymakers are fairly 
broadly applicable.  
The generally poor state of the conversation between researchers and policymakers, 
and more specifically economists and education policymakers, is examined in section 
5.2. Section 5.3 turns to an important and under-explored area, namely the speed at 
which educational quality improvements can realistically be expected to occur. In a 
context where policymakers are increasingly expected to set targets, this is a crucial 
area of empirical analysis. In section 5.4 the focus is on how country-level 
development indicators, such as the variables used by the three empirical models 
discussed in section 4, can be examined to provide policymakers with a picture of 
how large the education challenge is, relative to other development challenges. 
Section 5.5 draws from the empirical findings discussed in section 4 and looks at 
ways of representing the economic growth impact of educational improvement 
relative to the impact of other policy interventions. Finally, section 5.6 explores ways 
in which policymakers can use available empirical findings to reinforce long-term 
understandings between the state and teacher unions in relation to matters such as 
teacher pay and educational improvement.  
Sections 5.3 to 5.5 draw from an Excel-based tool, called the growth simulation tool 
here, which was developed to accompany this dissertation48. It is important to realise 
that the main aim of the tool is not to analyse, in the sense of finding new and relevant 
trends, but to synthesise and represent findings already established in the literature in 
a form that is accessible to a wider audience that includes policymakers. Excel is 
particularly suited for the latter aim.  
Where applicable, the following sub-sections acknowledge work that has already 
occurred to make the education-growth linkages clearer to policymakers. Two fairly 
similar texts, both produced by Hanushek and Woessman, one for the World Bank 
and another for the OECD49, stand out (Hanushek and Wößmann, 2007; OECD, 
                                                     
48
 File name is Growth simulator.xls. 
49
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
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2010a). To some extent, the focus is on demonstrating how such work can be 
expanded upon.  
5.2 A problematic research-policy nexus 
The impact of research on policymaking is widely believed to be sub-optimal. Much 
of the considerable literature that has emerged to deal specifically with this topic takes 
the position that this impact is in some respects close to negligible and that this 
represents a huge cost to society, largely because the result is sub-optimal policies. A 
prominent early researcher dealing with the topic of the ‘research-policy nexus’, a 
term used by Bailey (2010), is Weiss (1979), who describes a number of models, 
some idealisations and others rather cynical, of how research relates to policymaking. 
For example, the ‘knowledge-driven model’ describes what is widely considered the 
ideal. Researchers focus to a large degree on matters that have indirect or direct 
relevance for human development. Policymakers understand the work of the 
researchers and take it into account when designing policies. In contrast, within the 
‘political model’, ideology shapes policymaking to a large degree and research is used 
to legitimise policy decisions, if research can be found that is compatible with pre-
determined policy positions. Amongst the more compelling explanations for the poor 
impact of research on policy is the ‘two communities theory’ put forward by, for 
instance, Ginsburg and Gorostiaga (2001). According to this theory, researchers and 
policymakers are so absorbed by their concerns within their own institutions, and are 
institutionally so divorced from each other, that they find little time to learn about 
each other’s capabilities, needs and work. Researchers of the research-policy nexus 
problem have tended to contradict common wisdom and have called for changes in 
the way researchers work, in the manner of Weiss (1979: 431): 
There has been much glib rhetoric about the vast benefits that social science can offer if only 
policy makers paid attention. Perhaps it is time for social scientists to pay attention to the 
imperatives of policy-making systems and to consider soberly what they can do, not 
necessarily to increase the use of research, but to improve the contribution that research 
makes to the wisdom of social policy. 
There is some literature on the relationship between economic research with an 
education focus, on the one hand, and education policymaking, on the other, and it 
tends to portray a relatively dysfunctional relationship. Psacharopoulos (1996: 353), 
an economist, has lamented that ‘[i]n the field of education, perhaps more than in any 
other sector of the economy, politics are substituted for analysis’. In a sense, the 
political model prevails. On the education side, there has been suspicion amongst 
education researchers, some of which would be shared by education policymakers, 
towards the true motives of economists dealing with education issues. The following 
extract from Resnik (2006: 176), appearing in the Comparative Education Review, 
expresses an extreme version of this suspicion: 
… the success of the education-economic growth approach has to be understood not in terms 
of its inherent validity but, rather, as a consequence of the ability of the actors identified with 
it to build a large and influential network. Both econometric economists of education and 
functionaries of UNESCO and the OECD participated in the construction of the black box. 
The ‘education-economic growth black box’ is, according to Resnik, a fallacious 
theory claiming that an important function of education is to contribute towards 
economic growth. She is thus referring to the theory that this dissertation is largely 
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concerned about. Reservations amongst educationists towards the human capital 
model were discussed in 2.1. 
McCloskey (1994: 30), along the lines of Weiss, suggests that economists should pay 
closer attention to communicating in ways that make sense to policymakers:  
...why doesn’t social policy work? Sure, sure: the politicians and bureaucrats don’t carry it 
out. But there’s something wrong, too, with our conversation as economists if we can’t 
advise them, and teach each other, in more persuasive ways. 
As part of an effort to communicate the importance of communication, McCloskey 
(2008) offers a rough estimate of the proportion of the GDP of the United States that 
is attributable to persuasion. This proportion is said to be as high as 25%.  
If one wants evidence that persuasion around the importance of improving educational 
quality was not a completed task by around 2010, the UNDP’s 2010 Human 
Development Report, focussing specifically on human capital, is an interesting case. 
Surprisingly, in discussing education policy this report limits itself largely to issues 
such as education attainment, with scant acknowledgement of important work that had 
occurred during the previous decade or so in relation to standardised assessment 
systems and the contribution of educational quality to growth.  
The analysis and discussion presented in the remainder of section 5 are aimed at 
taking the empirical and theoretical work covered in previous sections and 
constructing persuasive arguments that might influence education policymakers, or 
make it easier for them to influence others, for instance people in the Ministry of 
Finance or teacher union members.  
5.3 Feasible education improvement targets 
The spread of standardised testing across schooling systems has understandably led to 
a tendency amongst policymakers to set future targets for the level of learning 
outcomes. As will be seen below, targets that have been set are often not realistic. The 
empirical basis on which targets can be set is not clear in the literature. Exploring a 
better empirical basis is the principal concern of what follows. The discussion here is 
partly reflected in Gustafsson (2012a). 
In the United States, as part of the No Child Left Behind policy, every state was 
expected to achieve certain targets. Hawaii, for example, produced a set of targets for 
the percentage of pupils attaining proficiency in mathematics which essentially 
envisaged a movement from a baseline of 10% in 2001 to 100% in 2014 (Hawaii: 
Department of Education, 2003). In other words, Hawaii’s targets focussed on a 
percentage of pupils, not an overall average score. Brazil serves as an example of a 
country that has set targets based on average scores. In Brazil such targets at the 
federal, state, municipality and school level have been set using a central database of 
baseline scores and a formula that assigns higher targets where the baseline scores are 
higher50. Brazil’s targets are based more or less but not exactly on average scores. The 
targets are in fact index values that include the average score and a grade promotion 
ratio. Combining these two variables within the index is intended to minimise the risk 
that schools will game the system by forcing weaker pupils to repeat their grades and 
                                                     
50
 See http://sistemasideb.inep.gov.br/resultado/.  
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hence delay (or even prevent, through dropping out) their participation in the test 
(Fernandes, 2007). South Africa aims to increase the percentage of primary school 
pupils performing at a basically acceptable level in languages and mathematics from a 
range of between 20% and 50% (depending on grade and subject) in 2010 to 60% in 
2014, with monitoring occurring through the country’s new Annual National 
Assessments programme (South Africa: Department of Basic Education, 2010a). 
Some guidance regarding the possible speed of improvement in standardised test 
scores exists, but the basis for this important guidance is not sufficiently clear and 
some of the available guidance is contradictory. Hanushek and Woessman (2007: 44) 
indicate that in a programme such as TIMSS, an improvement of half a standard 
deviation (meaning 50 points in TIMSS) is possible within a period of 10 to 30 years. 
It is indeed practical to express possible improvements in terms of standard deviations 
in order to facilitate comparison across different testing systems testing using different 
scoring procedures. However, it is important to differentiate between a standard 
deviation across the test-takers of many countries in a programme and a standard 
deviation within one country. With regard to the former, both TIMSS and PIRLS 
establish by design a standard deviation equal to 100 points. Within-country standard 
deviations tend to be lower than this, for instance the median within-country standard 
deviation for grade 8 mathematics in TIMSS 2007 is 85 (Mullis, Martin and Foy, 
2008: 457). One would expect within-country standard deviations to be smaller than 
the standard deviation derived from pupil observations across a large range of 
countries. However, a few countries do have an internal standard deviation that is 
greater than 100 in TIMSS. The Hanushek and Woessman guidance referred to above 
translates into between 0.02 and 0.05 standard deviations a year, assuming a linear 
trend over the years in question. If one were expressing the improvement in terms of a 
national standard deviation, something one may wish to do if one is comparing, say, 
TIMSS results to the results from a national testing system, the 0.02 to 0.05 
parameters would probably need to be raised slightly, depending on the country. The 
parameters put forward by Hanushek and Woessman (2007) are slightly more 
conservative than what the analysis that follows suggests should be possible.  
Mourshed, Chijioke and Barber (2010: 16) offer an even more conservative trend than 
Hanushek and Woessman. On the basis of trends observed in 12 education system a 
good and attainable trend is said to be 11.5 PISA51 points in ten years, or 0.01 PISA 
standard deviations per year. The reason why this improvement level is so low is that 
ten of the twelve countries are developed countries. In the analysis that follows both 
developed and developing countries are analysed within an integrated model and one 
finding, as one might expect, is that there are diminishing improvements as countries 
reach higher levels of educational quality.  
Educational quality targets, like other policy targets, are susceptible to what Inbar 
(1996) refers to as ritualistic planning, or planning where idealistic intention, rather 
than feasibility, becomes the overriding consideration when targets are set. A better 
empirical basis for educational quality targets can have the effect of reducing 
ritualistic target-setting, or at least clarifying that ritualistic targets are extremely 
unlikely to be attained. Yet, as Inbar (1996) would argue, making the target-setting 
process entirely scientific is often not possible as political considerations do weigh 
strongly.  
                                                     
51
 Programme for International Student Assessment. 
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How should targets involving a percentage of pupils be understood? Is there a simple 
way of translating such targets to improvements in standard deviations? Standard 
statistical methods do in fact allow for an approximate translation. To illustrate, one 
could consider a baseline of 20% of pupils attaining a minimum level of performance 
and the target that 60% of pupils should be able to attain the minimum standard. If 
one uses the Excel formula appearing as equation (68) below, a becomes 20% and b 
becomes 60%. The result is 1.09 standard deviations, or 0.27 standard deviations per 
year if one considers the four years for the South African target mentioned above. 
Clearly moving from 10% to 60% in four years is extremely ambitious. Moving from 
50% to 60% in four years on the other hand translates to 0.06 standard devations per 
year and is, as will be confirmed below, feasible though ambitious. The Hawaii 
intention mentioned above to move from 10% to 100% in 13 years implies an 
improvement of 0.28 standard deviations a year, a virtually impossible target. The 
Excel NORMSINV function seen in equation (68) provides the Z score, or number of 
standard deviations, associated with a particular area under the normal curve. In the 
absence of Excel, the solution is best found using a standard table of areas under the 
normal curve (Blalock, 1979: 602).  
( ) ( )baZ −−−= 1NORMSINV1NORMSINV  (68) 
The analysis that follows will extract the best actual improvements over time to 
provide an indication of improvements that optimistic yet realistic planners could 
consider. However, before best trends are examined, it is instructive to examine the 
average trends seen in recent years. Table 3 in an earlier section summarised country-
level mean test scores from recent years that were used for the analysis. That table 
indicated that for the period 2000 to 2009, 230 country-specific time series were 
available, where these consisted of two, three or four points not shared with any other 
time series. Of the 230 time series, 90 had two points, 21 had three points and 69 had 
four points. The mean annual improvement across all 230 series, with least squared 
trendlines used for the three- and four-point series, was 0.8 PISA points per year, or 
around 0.01 of a PISA-wide standard deviation. All country average values were 
converted to the PISA scale for this analysis using the method described in section 
3.3. The average improvement was thus small, though positive. The figure becomes 
minus 0.002 points if only OECD countries are considered and 0.03 for non-OECD 
countries, suggesting that there is educational quality convergence between 
developing and developed countries. However, if the diminishing marginal rate of 
improvement is taken into account a simulation would indicate that it would take 
exceedingly long for developing countries to catch up. South Africa, for instance, 
would require 160 years to reach the levels found in non-Asian OECD countries. For 
Brazil the duration would be around 130 years. Clearly the mean rates of 
improvement seen in the data are discouragingly low. 
An analysis of the 90 series with more than two points suggests that there is 
considerable measurement error in the country scores. Of the 90 series, 15 display 
movements that are consistently upward, 15 display movements that are consistently 
downward and 60 display inconsistent trends consisting of both upward and 
downward movements. One might expect that of the 60, many would display small 
inconsistencies reflecting a situation of virtually no change. To test this, a margin of 
tolerance of 0.05 of the standard deviation of country scores per programme was used 
to determine when there was no change. If the change between two data points was 
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within the margin of tolerance, the trend was considered a flat one with zero change. 
Using this margin still resulted in 47 series that displayed inconsistent trends moving 
both up and down. It seems unlikely that the quality of human capital would in reality 
display trends as erratic as what these figures suggest and reasonable to assume that 
the patterns seen in the data indicate measurement error. This measurement error 
should caution us above all against reading too much into the two-point series of 
individual countries. In fact, although these two-point series are used in the analysis 
that follows, the analysis was also done without these series. The exclusion of the 
two-point series did not make a difference that would substantially change the 
conclusions presented below.  
The 15 consistently upward trends referred to above are found in 11 countries. None 
of the 11 countries had any series, from the set of 90 series, with a consistently 
downward trend. Examining the education policies of these 11 countries should be of 
particular interest. The 11 countries are, in descending order of size of their annual 
improvement: Brazil, Chile, Turkey, Indonesia, Tunisia, Poland, Germany, Israel, 
Hungary, Uruguay and Switzerland. The countries Chile, Tunisia, Turkey and 
Germany each had two series of more than two points with a consistently upward 
trend (for these four countries the average improvement across the two series was 
used for the ranking provided here). 
The following graph displays the point increases of each of the 230 series referred to 
earlier. What immediately stands out is the greater degree of vertical dispersion 
amongst countries with lower country scores. This pattern remains if two-point series 
are removed. Part of the explanation for the greater vertical dispersion on the left-
hand side of graph is that in the case of the 78 countries with more than one series (for 
instance because they have different series for different subjects in the same 
programme), within a single country trends are more likely to vary from series to 
series if the country performs poorly. Specifically, the within-country gap between the 
worst improvement and the best improvement amongst the 78 countries in question 
was on average 4.2 PISA points if the lowest half of performers were considered and 
2.6 PISA points if the top half of performers were considered. Possible explanations 
are a greater degree of measurement error amongst developing countries and that 
developing countries, though they may on average display greater annual 
improvements, improve inconsistently and in spurts, perhaps due to policy or 
leadership instability.  
The quadratic trendline in the graph confirms the pattern, albeit weak (R2 is only 
0.07), of greater increases amongst developing countries.  
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Figure 22: Annual country score increases by level 
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 a
n
n
u
a
l 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 i
n
 P
IS
A
 p
o
in
ts
Country score (PISA scale) 
PISA mathematics PISA reading PIRLS reading
TIMSS Gr 4 math TIMSS Gr 8 math SACMEQ math
SACMEQ reading
NAM
SRB
LSO
KGZ
QAT
QAT
NAM
 
Sources: See Table 3.  
Note: In order to position each point, which represents a time series, along the 
horizontal axis, original country scores had to be converted to the PISA scale. 
This was done by using the five sets of coefficients obtained through the 
process described in section 3.3. For each series, the mean of the converted 
country score values was used to plot the point on the horizontal.    
 
 
Figure 22 is able to provide policymakers with a rough idea of the maximum possible 
improvements that should inform system-wide targets. Clearly annual improvements 
of as high as 0.2 standard deviations (or 20 PISA points) per year appear to be 
possible, though rare. At the same time it is important to acknowledge that of the 11 
consistent improvers referred to earlier, the best average annual improvements within 
a single series were only 5.9 PISA points, in the case of Brazil, followed by 4.5 PISA 
points, in the case of Chile (these figures translate to 0.06 and 0.05 standard 
deviations). 
Stochastic frontier analysis is conceivably an appropriate technique for identifying a 
systematic efficiency frontier, or a feasible outer limit for expected improvements in 
the data. However, the dataset being considered here is too limited in terms of the 
number of efficient units, or countries, for this technique. Instead a quantile regression 
approach was employed to find annual improvement levels that were amongst the best 
at various points along the horizontal axis of Figure 22. The three equations appearing 
below describe the method. These equations, or permutations of them, were used not 
just to identify the best educational quality trends but also the best trends with respect 
to other variables, for instance the best increases in life expectancy, in designing the 
growth simulation tool described below. Equation (69) refers to the OLS estimation of 
annual improvements β in the case of each three- and four-point series i discussed 
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above. Y is the year of the test and X is the country test score at each point in time t 
within the series. A separate regression is run for each series. Next, equation (70) is 
used for a single quantile regression where the best expected annual rates of change in 
X across the various country-specific series i (the left-hand side of the equation) is 
predicted by the level of X, specifically the mean of X within each country-specific 
series, and the parameters k, m and n. In the case of educational quality, the quantile 
regression was run at the 90th percentile. Finally, equation (71) describes the 
derivation of what we can call the ‘improvement curve’. The horizontal axis for this 
curve, when graphed, is time t, measured in years, and starting with year 0. The left-
hand origin of the curve would reflect, along the vertical axis, the worst value X seen 
in the data, for instance the worst average country score. Subsequent points along the 
curve would be plotted using equation (71), up to the point representing what one 
would consider the best attainable value of X. Equation (70) allows for diminishing 
improvements over time, which is what one would expect. For most of the other 
explanatory variables used in the growth simulation the application of the three 
equations is simpler than in the case of educational quality, because one is dealing 
with just one time series per country, so i is simply a country observation. What 
makes the educational quality data unusual is that we have data for only a short 
historical period and that the data are derived from several different testing 
programmes.  
itiiit YX βα +=  (69) 
( )2ii
i
XnXmk
X
++=




 β
 (70) 
( )( )2111 −−− ++×= tttt XnmXkXX  (71) 
The curve in the following graph is obtained using equation (71). Pseudo R2 in the 
quantile regression was 0.23. The graph illustrates, for instance, that even if it 
improved at more or less the best possible rates seen around the world, South Africa 
would take 34 years to attain the level of performance of non-Asian OECD countries 
(average of 491 on the PISA scale). It would take Brazil about 25 years to achieve the 
same. These are clearly optimistic scenarios, but not impossible ones. One could 
translate the scores reflected on the vertical axis to the metric of another testing 
programme using the coefficients from equation (33). 
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Figure 23: Minimum years needed to improve 
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The following graph expands on the previous one by superimposing actual 
improvements from key improver countries. Here South Africa is included, on the 
basis of trends revealed after the release of TIMSS 2011 grade 9 results, in 2012. 
TIMSS 2011 values were not included in the calculations described in section 3.3. A 
graph such as this one brings together a number of issues policymakers would be 
concerned about: level of performance, speed of past improvements and feasible 
future improvements.    
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Figure 24: Minimum years needed to improve with actual examples 
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Sources: See Table 3, also Mullis, Martin, Foy and Arora (2012). 
Note: Numbers in brackets refer to the number of data points available, where more this is more 
than one point.  
 
 
5.4 Magnitude of educational and non-education under-performance 
There is much emphasis in the development literature aimed at policymakers on 
comparing key development indicators across countries. For instance, the World 
Development Report of the World Bank (for instance 2011b) presents a selection of 
World Development Indicators where countries can be compared across the same 
indicator. UNESCO’s (for instance 2011a) annual Global Monitoring Report does 
something similar for just education, though it is noteworthy that no learning 
outcomes values have been presented as indicators along the lines of what is seen in 
Table 21 in the appendices. The World Economic Forum (for instance 2012), in its 
Global Competitiveness Report, presents country indicators in a somewhat different 
fashion, using country as a principal category and within that providing rankings for 
the country in question. Given the degree to which these kinds of reports seem to 
stimulate public debate, as seen in Matola (2012) with respect to the 2012/13 Global 
Competitiveness Report, it seems they succeed in providing one bridge between more 
academic analysis and the general policy discourse. Yet these reports have their 
drawbacks. Above all, in the attempt to compile large amounts of comparable 
statistics, scrutiny of data quality is compromised, resulting in a situation where very 
often statistics are not really comparable across countries. To illustrate, UNESCO 
indicators that draw from enrolment and population data to produce gross enrolment 
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ratios have been criticised because they do not sufficiently adjust for or even 
acknowledge problems of comparability between the two data sources. This is argued 
in Gustafsson (2012b). A further problem is that statistics may be poorly explained. 
The World Education Forum (WEF) educational quality indicators are widely 
understood to represent scientific measures of what pupils actually learn. Such an 
interpretation is evident in Matola (2012). However, closer examination of the WEF’s 
methodology notes reveals that educational quality values are drawn from a few 
country-based experts who evaluate the education system on a seven-point scale. An 
expert opinion approach is thus employed, but in a manner which in no way is 
oriented towards cross-country comparison. It is therefore not surprising that, for 
instance, South Africa’s primary schooling should emerge as of a poorer quality than 
that of Lesotho, when figures such as those in Table 21 suggest that the opposite is 
true. Moreover, South Africa emerges as worse than several countries, around 40, 
which have never participated in any international testing programme.  
It is not easy to prescribe solutions for these problems in the international indicators. 
The demand for these indicators is high, yet because policy decisions based on them 
are fluid rather than hard in the sense that they do not, for instance, influence the 
distribution of global resources in any precise manner, users are often prepared to 
overlook errors, sometimes serious ones. It would be difficult, even for organisations 
such as UNESCO and the World Bank, to invest sufficiently to achieve reliable 
statistics. This could require running new surveys in countries where data are known 
to be unreliable. However, what would be feasible is better documentation relating to 
what countries and what indicators are most problematic, based on internal, including 
historical, consistency checks. Such documentation is currently almost non-existent.   
Section 5 includes some illustration of the relative performance of single countries 
with respect to key development indicators. Specifically, apart from educational 
quality, seven non-education indicators are examined, partly so that the magnitude of 
the educational quality challenge can be viewed in the context of other development 
challenges. But before explanatory variables are examined, it is worth looking at 
trends with respect to the dependent variable, economic growth. The four countries 
represented in Figure 25 demonstrate how precarious growth can be and specifically 
how political circumstances can compromise growth and average income. In 
discussing growth, it is always worth considering how costly the risks are associated 
with political instability and ideology that is divorced from basic notions of well-
being. South Africa’s unfortunate political history, in which the human capital of 
black citizens was curtailed in various ways, has resulted in relatively weak growth 
since at least 1960. South Africa’s average income figure in 2009 was around 57% of 
what was seen in other countries that started off at more or less the same income level 
as South Africa in 1960. The graph is taken from the Excel growth simulation tool 
and the 23 comparator countries are countries in the decile immediately above and 
below South Africa, meaning more or less a quintile of countries with South Africa as 
the median, using the per capita income in the starting year, 1960 in this case, as the 
ranking variable. Iran saw a calamitous drop in average income that coincided with 
the Iranian Revolution, after an initial couple of decades where growth exceeded that 
in the comparator countries. In 2009, Iranians, like South Africans, were experiencing 
a level of income well below what they presumably would have enjoyed had their 
political history been different. Argentina and Brazil, in many respects similar but 
politically rather different, offer an interesting comparison. In 1960 Argentina’s per 
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capita income was over double that of Brazil, but political instability, populist 
governments and economic mismanagement took a heavy toll and by 2009 
Argentina’s income was only 25% greater than Brazil’s. In fact, many of Argentina’s 
initial comparator countries, such as Spain, had become classified as high income 
countries by 2009. Brazil, despite experiencing political instability similar to that of 
Argentina, succeeded in maintaining a relatively stable economic climate that 
promoted investment in appropriate human and physical capital.   
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Figure 25: Growth trajectories in four countries 
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For the growth simulator tool, variables were selected which, according to the 
literature, were significant predictors of growth and which were amenable to policy 
interventions. Educational quality is clearly one such variable. An example of a 
variable that predicts growth relatively well but is not subject to policy interventions 
would be the proportion of the country situated within the tropics. Even the proportion 
of the population that is Confucian, a variable found to be significant in Sala-i-Martin, 
Doppelhofer and Miller (2004) (or SDM), can be considered beyond the scope of 
normal policy interventions. Moreover, it had to be possible to obtain data on the 
variable from a recent year that could serve as a baseline, given that the aim was to 
use analysis already conducted of past trends to forecast trends into the future. In the 
tool, any year beyond 2009 was considered a future year. Measurement difficulties, 
though present, were never large enough to exclude any variable, meaning that 
ultimately significance and amenability to policy-induced shifts were the determining 
criteria in the selection of the eight variables, one of which was educational quality.   
Of the seven explanatory variables other than educational quality, three are variables 
that were found to be prominent predictors of growth in SDM and that were re-used in 
the growth simulator tool with no adaptations. The three variables are: investment 
price, life expectancy, and government consumption as a proportion of GDP (see 
Table 10). Three explanatory variables, malaria prevalence, trade openness and 
ethnolinguistic fractionalisation, are also amongst the most prominent SDM variables, 
but because it was not possible to replicate measurement in the way SDM did, 
different ways of measuring the baseline values in the growth simulator tool had to be 
found (the details of this are explained below). For these three variables, adjustments 
also had to be made to the slope coefficients in the SDM growth regression. Finally, 
one variable that draws from the growth modelling of Hanushek and Woessman 
(2009) is property rights, which is referred to as rule of law for the purposes of the 
tool (see for instance Table 16).  
The next table summarises the baseline values from a recent year with respect to all 
eight explanatory variables. The year for the baseline values was 2009, or a year as 
close as possible to 2009. For certain variables, the baseline year was different for 
different countries. The tool explains what year applies for each variable with respect 
to the country that is selected. The maximum possible number of countries is 152, 
which is the number of countries for which per capita income values existed in 
Heston, Summers and Aten (2011). In keeping with analysis found in the literature, 
very small countries, in the case of the tool countries with a population of less than 
one million, were excluded (see justification in section 4.2).     
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Table 19: Details on explanatory variables for growth 
Variable Source N Mean Std. 
dev. 
Min. Max. 
Educational quality See section 3.3. 100 425 66 260 578 
Investment price Heston, Summers and Aten, 2011. 150 67.3 28.7 0.0 180.0 
Malaria prevalence Online data-querying facility of 
World Bank (World Bank 
DataBank), consulted 2012. 
152 0.0282 0.0652 0.0000 0.3477 
Life expectancy Online data-querying facility of 
United Nations Statistics Division 
(World population prospects: The 
2008 revision), consulted 2009. 
151 69 10 45 85 
Trade openness Heston, Summers and Aten, 2011. 149 83 50 2 382 
Ethnolinguistic 
fractionalisation 
Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly 
and Kurlat, 2003. 
147 0.406 0.288 0.002 0.923 
Government 
consumption share 
Heston, Summers and Aten, 2011. 149 11.1 6.9 3.0 62.0 
Rule of law World Bank, 2010.  152 -0.16 1.01 -2.43 1.97 
 
What follows is some discussion of the values used for each of the eight variables and 
the relevance the variables may have for education planning. How feasible 
improvement trends were identified for the last seven variables, along the lines of the 
analysis of educational quality in section 5.3, is discussed in section 5.5 
Educational quality. This variable was discussed extensively in section 3.3. Of the 
113 countries for which values are found in Table 21, 100 were found in the set of 
152 countries with the required income data and thus included in the tool.  
Investment price. As in SDM, for the tool the Penn World Table (Heston, Summers 
and Aten, 2011) is the data source, though for the tool a later version of this source is 
used. Values reflect, in terms of USD PPP, the prices of inputs needed in construction 
as well as machinery and equipment needed in industrial processes. A large range of 
inputs, from vehicles to computer software, are considered. Because values are 
expressed in PPP terms, they would not reflect the attractiveness of investment for 
foreign investors, but rather for local investors. A country’s tax system is one factor 
that might change its PPP investment price. The same PPP indices used for GDP in 
general are used to obtain PPP prices for just investment inputs. To illustrate, 
particularly highest investment price values are found in Cuba, Norway and the 
Republic of Congo. Countries with low values include Botswana, Saudi Arabia and 
Vietnam. Prices in developed countries tend to be higher. Of interest to the education 
planner would be the fact that if skills needed for investment activities, such as 
engineering skills, are in particularly short supply, the PPP investment price would 
rise and in general growth can be expected to be slower.  
Malaria prevalence. It was not clear how the SDM values for malaria prevalence 
were obtained. The source that is referred to in SDM (2004: 820), Gallup, Mellinger 
and Sachs (2001), contains values that are substantially different to those of the 
dataset that accompanies SDM and no way could be found of deducing what type of 
adjustment occurred when the values used by SDM were prepared. For the tool, 
malaria prevalence values from the World Bank’s DataBank were used. These data 
have their own problems, specifically erratic trends for certain countries. For instance, 
Tanzania moves from one million to 30 million to half a million malaria sufferers 
between 1997 and 1999, a trend which must be an error. According to Barat (2006: 
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15), in countries that have succeeded in reducing malaria prevalence, the education 
authorities have played an important role.    
Life expectancy. The UN data on life expectancy display a high degree of internal 
consistency. The education system influences life expectancy, and vice versa, in a 
number of ways. For instance, education may promote behaviour that reduces HIV 
infections, which in turn increases life expectancy. On the other hand, higher average 
life expectancy means that human capital, once developed, is available for a longer 
period of time, which can be beneficial for the inter-generational transfer of 
knowledge and skills. 
Trade openness. The data used by SDM, which referred to years during which the 
economy had been open, could not be found. As a substitute, Penn World Table 
values referring to imports plus experts as a percentage of GDP were used. This 
indicator is used by, amongst others, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003: 529) for trade 
openness.      
Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation. This is a variable with an interesting history which 
is of special relevance for education planners, given the importance of education 
systems in promoting international and within-country communication through the 
teaching of common languages. In Sub-Saharan African countries such as South 
Africa, linguistic diversity produces special challenges in the development process. 
The same can be said of Asian countries such as India. This seems to justify paying 
special attention to this variable. In section 5.5, a new approach for an ethnolinguistic 
fractionalisation index is proposed, which is arguably more sound conceptually than 
approaches that are widely used, though the proposed approach may be difficult to 
implement across a sufficiently broad range of countries due to data limitations. The 
proposal draws from an unusual South African data source.  
SDM employ a commonly used set of values that originates in an atlas published in 
the Soviet Union in 1964. Each value reflects the ‘probability that two randomly 
selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic 
group’ (Easterly and Levine, 1997: 1243). Values are based mainly on the languages 
people speak, though to a limited extent other ethnic factors influence the index too 
(Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly and Kurlat, 2003: 156). As pointed out by Fearon 
(2003), how one defines language and ethnicity has a large impact on the relative 
degree of fractionalisation found in specific countries. An advantage with the Alesina 
et al (2003) values over values drawn from the Soviet atlas is that the former source is 
more explicit with respect to definitions. In fact, Alesina et al (2003) base their 
composite index on three separate indices dealing with language, religion and a ‘broad 
measure of ethnicity’ (Alesina et al, 2003: 156). Moreover, this source uses relatively 
recent data, for instance language data from 2001. In both sources, the index for one 
country is calculated as one minus the Herfindahl index, an index traditionally used to 
gauge the degree to which an industry is concentrated in just a few firms.  
∑
=
−=
n
m
mpF
1
21  (72) 
The fractionalisation index value for country j is thus calculated using n values of p, 
where p is the proportion of the population within each of the n groups according to, 
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for instance, home language. The index value can range from 0.0, where everyone 
belongs to the same group, to 1.0, in the theoretical instance of a society where each 
individual belongs to his own group. To illustrate, the index values in Alesina et al 
(2003) for language are (with the Easterly and Levine values, which were based on 
the original Soviet atlas, in brackets): Japan 0.02 (0.01); United States 0.25 (0.50); 
India 0.81 (0.89); and South Africa 0.87 (0.88). The language-based index values 
from Alesina et al (2003) were used in the simulation tool as they were 
methodologically the closest to the original SDM values (both focussed strongly on 
language), they follow a scale which seems very close to the original SDM scale, and 
as they are relatively recent values (as mentioned earlier, all from 2001).  
Government consumption share. This is government consumption as a percentage 
of GDP. The data source used for the tool is the Penn World Table. Though SDM use 
a different source, the 2009 mean from Penn of 11.1 is close to SDM’s mean of 11.6.       
Rule of law. As in the previous section 4.4, the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicator is used, though for the tool a 2011 update of the data were 
chosen, which included values for years in the range 1996 to 2010. For the tool, 2010 
values were used for the baseline.  
The next two graphs offer an illustration of the relative under-performance of 
individual countries with respect to the eight explanatory variables described above. 
In the case of four variables, a lower value is considered better for growth: investment 
price, malaria prevalence, ethnolinguistic fractionalisation, government consumption 
share. The graphs for South Africa and Botswana, both produced within the tool, are 
instructive. Again, similar countries are the countries in the decile above and the 
decile below the country in question, using present income per capita as the sorting 
variable. South Africa’s values are better than the average across similar countries for 
just two variables, investment price and government consumption share, and the 
difference is small, less than 0.5 of the standard deviation across all 152 countries. In 
the case of three explanatory variables, educational quality, ethnolinguistic 
fractionalisation and rule of law, South Africa performs substantially worse than 
countries with similar incomes. The situation in neighbouring Botswana is very 
different. Botswana does not under-perform to a large degree with respect to any of 
the eight explanatory variables. One should keep in mind that these eight variables are 
variables that have been found to be particularly important for growth. Botswana 
performs exceptionally well in terms of one variable, rule of law. The graphs serve to 
alert the South African planner that certain development areas require more urgent 
attention than others, but also that ideas for the needed policy solutions might be 
found in countries such as Botswana.  
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Figure 26: Relative sizes of development challenges 
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One thing the growth simulation tool does not consider explicitly is the impact of 
educational quantity, in the sense of the proportion of the young population enrolled 
in schools or average years of schooling amongst adults, on growth. The work by 
Hanushek and Woessmen (2009) has suggested that educational quality is a far better 
predictor of growth than educational quantity and this seems to justify having a 
simulation that excludes an explicit treatment of quantity. A further justification for 
this approach is that there does not appear to be a trade-off between quality and 
quantity in education of the kind one may intuitively expect. Put differently, 
increasing the proportion of children enrolled, which generally means improving the 
coverage of children from the poorest households, seems not to be associated with a 
decline in the average test scores of pupils. Improving quality versus increasing 
enrolments would therefore not appear to be a choice that policymakers have to make. 
Both indicators can improve simultaneously. This is demonstrated in Taylor and 
Spaull (2013) using SACMEQ52 data. The absence of a clear quality-quantity trade-
                                                     
52
 Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality. 
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off, coupled to evidence that quality predicts growth to a far greater degree than 
quantity, seems to justify the exclusion of enrolment from the growth simulation tool.  
5.5 The relative magnitude of education’s growth effect 
In various texts Hanushek and Woessman have taken the outputs from their growth 
regressions and used them to project likely changes to future growth and national 
income if certain increases to average test scores are realised (Hanushek and 
Woessman, 2007; Hanushek and Wößmann, 2007; OECD, 2010a). Their most 
comprehensively explained forecast is arguably that of OECD (2010a), titled The high 
cost of low educational performance. In this text the focus is on OECD countries 
only. The authors argue that policymakers and governments do not pay enough 
attention to educational quality improvements, partly because they are not aware of 
how large the future welfare benefits of such improvements are, but also because of a 
general absence of long-term planning and an over-reliance on more short-term 
growth stimulation, in particular demand-focussed short-run business cycle 
management. Put differently, there is an under-emphasis of supply side interventions 
such as growing human capital. In OECD (2010a) Hanushek and Woessman draw 
from Lucas’s (2003: 1) presidential address to the American Economic Association, 
which though not dealing specifically with education or human capital, emphasises 
the importance of a better focus on long-range growth dynamics: 
Taking performance in the United States over the past 50 years as a benchmark, the potential 
for welfare gains from better long run, supply-side policies exceeds by far the potential from 
further improvements in short-run demand management.  
In OECD (2010a) three future scenarios are presented. In the first, OECD countries 
each improve their average PISA score between 2010 and 2030 by 25 PISA points, or 
a quarter of a standard deviation in PISA (see the definitions in section 3.3). In the 
second scenario, all countries move to the level of the highest baseline performer, 
Finland. In the third scenario, the within-country distribution of scores is adjusted so 
that eventually no pupil has a score under 400 PISA points. The first two scenarios, 
and perhaps the third scenario, though this is not completely clear, involve 
improvements in the performance of pupils during the period 2010 to 2030. By 2071, 
the target level of human capital is assumed to exist throughout the labour market, 
across all ages, so starting from this year the difference between the baseline growth 
rate, which is based on recent historical data, and the steady-state growth rate is the 
slope coefficient for the educational quality variable in a growth regression such as 
that of model (3) in Table 14. They refer to the baseline growth rate as the ‘education 
as usual’ rate (OECD, 2010a: 22). The coefficient value used is 1.7, in the sense of a 
1.7 percentage point increase in the growth rate for every 100 additional PISA points. 
The value is obtained from a model based on the data for just 23 OECD countries, 
where the model includes initial average years of schooling amongst adults and initial 
per capita income. Years of schooling carries a statistically insignificant coefficient in 
the model. Equation (73) expresses the steady-state calculation: the difference in the 
annual growth rate g is the slope coefficient B multiplied by the improvement in 
educational performance T. Before 2071, additional growth is smaller than in equation 
(73) for two reasons. Firstly, it takes 20 years for the PISA improvement to be brought 
about in schools and even then, by 2030, it takes a further 40 years before all adults in 
the labour force have the new level of human capital.  
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TBgY ∆×=∆  (73) 
In the third scenario, the underlying growth regression is more complex, with two 
explanatory variables drawn from the performance data, namely the proportion of 
pupils achieving less than 400 (this would carry a negative coefficient) and the 
proportion achieving more than 600 (a positive coefficient). 
Results of the forecasting are expressed per country in three ways: future GDP as a 
percentage of baseline GDP; the total of the 2010 to 2090 stream of additional GDP 
expressed as a present value, using a discount rate of 3.0%; and the long-run 
additional percentage points to annual GDP growth, relative to the baseline. The third 
statistic might appeal to policymakers concerned with politically set growth targets, 
such as South Africa’s target of 5% (set in 2012) or China’s target for the 2011 to 
2015 five-year period of 7% (South Africa: National Planning Commission, 2012: 39; 
KPMG, 2011). The first statistic, future income as a percentage of baseline income, 
has the advantage that it reflects the gains obtained through the compounding of many 
years of growth, a gain that often appears counter-intuitively high, meaning intuition 
tends to under-value this gain. The present value of future income streams is a 
convenient basis for comparing education interventions to other interventions and of 
dealing with the complexity brought about by the lags in the gains associated with 
better education.  
OECD (2010a) includes margins of error for forecasted gains in GDP based on a 
confidence interval in the slope coefficient that is based on a 5% level of significance. 
Given the effects of compounding, these margins are large. For instance, for all 23 
OECD countries considered in the first scenario, total GDP in 2110 is expected to be 
33% higher than in the business as usual scenario, though the margin for this 
improvement is 15% to almost 60%. The authors present a number of fairly obvious 
caveats relating to the forecast. One is that the growth regression informing the 
coefficients used for the forecast could be inaccurate. In this regard, it is worth re-
stating the point made in section 4 that the size of the education quality coefficient is 
highly sensitive to the overall number of variables in the regression. Due to 
multicollinearity, the greater the number of variables, the smaller the coefficient. This 
was seen in Hanushek and Woessman (2009) and was also evident in Table 14 and 
Table 16 above, which indicated that a more inclusive model reduces the size of the 
educational quality coefficient by two-thirds. It could be argued that the coefficient 
used in OECD (2010a) by Hanushek and Woessman is three times as large as it 
should be. A further caveat acknowledged more explicitly in OECD (2010a) is that 
there is a risk in assuming that growth over the next 100 or so years will occur within 
the same structural parameters as that over the last 50 or so years. As discussed in 
sections 3.4 and 3.5 above, there is considerable debate over defining and measuring 
growth, partly because economic growth acquires different meanings in different 
historical settings. One parameter that is certain to change is the predictability of 
climate. As argued in the Stern Review, climate change can be expected to reduce 
growth by one percentage point by 2050 relative to a situation with no climate change 
(see section 3.5). Hanushek and Woessman do in fact make use of the Stern Review 
when they decide on a discount rate to use (OECD, 2010a: 22).  
A forecasting exercise with a similar policy focus but a rather different method to that 
of Hanushek and Woessman in OECD (2010a) is that of Patrinos and Psacharopoulos 
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(2011). Comparing the two texts is instructive. The latter text, like the first one, 
presents estimates of forfeited income growth associated with a failure by 
governments to invest sufficiently in education. The difference is that Patrinos and 
Psacharopoulos focus not on educational quality but quantity, in particular the average 
years of education attained amongst adults in a country. Why they chose to focus on 
quantity, rather than quality, is not made explicit but it appears they were interested in 
obtaining as many data points as possible, in terms of countries and historical time 
periods, and this would preclude an analysis based on average test scores. Their 
historical period of interest is long, from 1900 to the present.  They do acknowledge 
the possible tenuousness of years of schooling as an indicator of actual human capital, 
or of the knowledge and skills people possess. Much of the modelling makes use of a 
‘macro-Mincerian function’ with just two variables: the log of average country 
income on the left and the average years of schooling on the right (Patrinos and 
Psacharopoulos, 2011: 20). A total of 1,596 observations are used, each being specific 
to a country and a year in the data. They include no explanatory variables other than 
years of schooling, a decision that is likely to inflate the years of schooling coefficient 
as the effect of institutional factors such as promoting the rule of law would have been 
excluded. Like Hanushek and Woessman, Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (2011: 19) 
find that that forfeited income is large: for instance, if during the period 1900 to 2050 
Pakistan had an additional year of schooling across all years, income would have been 
around 20% to 40% higher in all years. Both texts appear convincing for 
policymakers. Clearly, policy conversations based on the relationship between years 
of schooling and growth cannot be regarded as redundant. The conversation is 
inevitably constrained by the data that are available at any point in time.  
In attempting to forecast income gains associated with particular education quality 
improvements, the growth simulation tool expands on the work found in OECD 
(2010a) in three key respects. Firstly, a lower slope coefficient for educational quality 
is used, in recognition of the finding that this coefficient is lower than what is seen in 
OECD (2010a) if a larger range of variables is included in the growth regression. This 
seems appropriate as one can assume that to some degree policy interventions 
focussing on other variables are implementable independently of educational quality 
interventions. Other interventions of note would include health advocacy campaigns, 
language policies aimed at promoting social cohesion and initiatives aimed at 
instilling respect for the law.  
Secondly, the forecasting in the tool includes explicit details on the assumed impact of 
variables other than educational quality as, notwithstanding the above point about the 
separateness of policy interventions, to some extent education policymakers regard 
themselves as exerting an influence on aspects of society beyond schooling. Thirdly, 
the tool, in drawing from the analysis of section 5.3, uses more empirically informed 
assumptions around the speed with with educational quality can be improved. But in 
the design of the tool, feasible speeds of improvement were also sought for the non-
education variables. It was necessary to produce a curve for the non-education 
variables similar to the education improvement curve of Figure 23. The following 
paragraphs discuss how this was achieved for the seven explanatory variables in the 
tool other than educational quality. The seven resultant graphs are not reproduced here 
but can be found in the tool.  
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Investment price. For this variable, where a decline represents an improvement, 
equations (69) to (71) were used without any adjustments. Actual historical declines 
in the Penn World Table data were considered sufficient to permit an empirically 
informed improvement trend. A floor was set at 45 USD, or the 25th percentile, as it 
was assumed that moving to an even lower investment price would involve 
interventions that are not easy to replicate across countries, for instance highly 
generous public subsidies or lowering the unit cost of labour.  
Malaria prevalence. Here an account by Barat (2006: 12) of eleven countries with 
exceptional improvements was used as a point of departure. Nine of the eleven 
countries displayed clear improvement trends in the World Bank data. The trends for 
the nine countries are displayed in the next two graphs, the second of which is a 
magnification of the first. The three equations referred to above were used with the 
data from the nine countries.   
Figure 27: Malaria prevalence reduction I 
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Source: Online data-querying facility of World Bank (World Bank DataBank), 
consulted 2012.  
 
Figure 28: Malaria prevalence reduction II 
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Source: Online data-querying facility of World Bank (World Bank DataBank), 
consulted 2012. 
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Life expectancy. The three equations were used with an assumed maximum life 
expectancy of 79 as the data suggested extremely slow improvements beyond this 
point.  
Trade openness. Here improvements (increases) were only implemented if the value 
was below 100. The intention was to focus on improving trade openness up to a level 
just above the baseline mean in the case of more closed countries. The focus was thus 
not on seeing already fairly open countries become more open, something that is 
difficult to model without an explicit consideration of circumstance, such as 
individual country size.  
Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation. Here it was not possible to use the three formulas 
as there was no trend data for the variable. As explained earlier, all values were from 
around 1964. As Fearon (2003) argues, it is unrealistic to assume that ethnolinguistic 
fractionalisation does not change over time. Roeder (2001) puts forward country 
values for 1961 and 1985 but it is not clear whether there is sufficient comparability 
across the two years as it seems possible that rather different methods were used.  
Clearly the utilisation of languages evolves and this may lead to less fractionalisation. 
One just needs to the think of the rise of English as a world language in the last half a 
century. In an attempt to obtain some sense of the magnitude of the changes possible 
within one country, but also to explore an under-explored issue in South Africa, a 
rather unusual South African household dataset was used where not only the home 
language of respondents was collected (this is common) but also all the national 
languages other than the home language spoken by respondents (this is seldom 
collected). Arguably one needs data on all the languages spoken by individuals in 
order to model properly the degree to which people are divided from each other by 
language.  Moreover, a picture of languages spoken other than home language is of 
particular importance to education policymakers as this picture can be changed 
relatively easily through education (the distribution of home languages is less 
alterable).    
The South African dataset in question covers a nationally representative sample of 
around 5,700 households in 2004 (South Africa: HSRC, 2005) . Two key language 
questions were asked: ‘Which language does (the person) speak most often at home?’ 
and ‘What other languages can the person speak?’. Possible responses were limited to 
the eleven official languages and ‘Other’. ‘Other’ was selected by just 0.6% of 
respondents in the case of the first question. The following table illustrates the 
distribution of home and non-home language abilities.  
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Table 20: Language use in South Africa amongst adults (2004) 
Total 
home 
lang. (m) 
Total speakers where not home language (millions) Total 
speak-
ers AFR ENG NBL XHO ZUL NSO SOT TSN SSW VEN TSO 
Afrikaans (AFR) 4.1 3.5 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.4 
English (ENG) 2.7 1.7 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.2 
isiNdebele (NBL) 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 
isiXhosa (XHO) 4.7 0.5 3.5 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.1 
isiZulu (ZUL) 7.4 0.4 4.4 0.2 0.6 0.2 1.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 11.3 
Sepedi (NSO) 2.8 0.7 1.8 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.3 4.0 
Sesotho (SOT) 1.9 0.6 0.9 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.5 
Setswana (TSN) 2.4 0.9 1.5 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2 4.0 
siSwati (SSW) 0.9 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 1.4 
Tshivenda (VEN) 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 
Xitsonga (TSO) 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 1.8 
Total 28.9 5.4 17.5 0.6 1.3 3.9 1.2 2.6 1.6 0.5 0.2 1.0 
Source: South Africa: HSRC (2005). 
Note: Figures are in millions (sample weights used). Anyone aged 15 or above is considered an adult. 
Each value in the last column is the sum of two values: the number of home language speakers reflected 
in the first column and the number of speakers who do not use the language as a home language (this is 
reflected in the bottom row of the middle panel). Thus the 20.2 million English speakers comprise 2.7 
million home language speakers plus 17.5 million who speak English as a non-home language. There are 
28.9 million adults in total reflected in the table. Three-letter codes are ISO codes.  
 
An index value using the South Africa data which is comparable to the SDM value 
would be the probability that two randomly selected adults would not have a language 
that they could speak to each other in. Put differently, the index would reflect the 
average percentage of other South Africans that each South African would not be able 
to communicate with. The calculation of the index is illustrated in the following three 
equations.  
T
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The linguistic fractionalisation index e proposed here is one minus a ratio which is the 
total number of two-way conversations possible amongst adults, given the languages 
people command, divided by the total number of two-way conversations which would 
be possible if everyone spoke just one language. The denominator T is a function of 
the total number of adults P according to equation (75). It is assumed that non-adults 
should be excluded from the calculation as they would not have reached their full 
linguistic potential yet. Equation (76)  demonstrates the calculation of the numerator 
C. Here Pi is the number of adults in group i, where each group i is unique with 
respect to the languages spoken. For instance, one group may speak only Afrikaans, 
English, Setswana and Sepedi. There are m groups altogether. The first term on the 
right-hand side of equation (76) gives the total number of possible conversations 
within group i. By definition, everyone in group i should understand everyone else in 
group i. The last term in equation (76) is the number of possible conversations 
between the individuals of group i and all other individuals in all other groups. 
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Clearly, this would depend on the degree to which language ability overlapped. The 
variable d is a 0-1 dummy variable where 1 means that because group i1 and group i2 
share at least one language, they are able to communicate. If d is equal to 1 then the 
number of possible conversations is the product of the values Pi from the two groups. 
It is necessary to add the number of possible conversations across all possible two-
way combinations of the m groups. The determination of d in each instance involves 
looking at the availability of languages in both groups i1 and i2. This lends itself to 
the running of programming code iteratively. Using the data and method discussed 
above, the value of e from equation (74) for South African adults was found to be 
0.34. It was also possible, through considering which languages are spoken as home 
languages, to calculate permutations of e. For instance, if one only considers home 
languages, the value of e becomes 0.86. If one relaxes this restriction somewhat and 
allows for situations where at least one party in the conversation had to be using his 
home language as the language of communication, then the value of e is 0.60. 
For the purposes of the growth simulator, what is important is whether 
enthnolinguistic fractionalisation can be expected to change over time. One way of 
attempting to answer this question is to examine whether the linguistic 
fractionalisation index for South Africa is different for older and younger adults. The 
next graph illustrates index values for five different age groups where, for instance, 
the age 20 value is based on observations with the age value in the range 15 to 24. 
There appears to be a clear improvement over time of around 0.05 every ten years. 
The flat trend between age 20 and 30 is likely to be a reflection of the fact that 
younger adults, specifically those aged 15 to 24, would not have realised their full 
linguistic potential in terms of languages spoken.   
Figure 29: Linguistic fractionalisation in South Africa by age of adults 
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The fact that the average young South African adult was not able to communicate 
with around 30% of fellow South Africans due to language barriers in 2004 (this is the 
meaning of the index value) is a fragmentation problem that is clearly amenable to 
policy interventions, in particular education policy interventions. As suggested by 
Table 20, the specific solution seems to be a stronger emphasis on the most widely 
spoken language, English, with the aim of ensuring that all adults became fluent in 
this language. In 2004, despite being by far the most widely understood language, 
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English was still not understood by 30% of adults. In a situation where all adults 
understood English, the linguistic fractionalisation index value discussed here would 
drop to zero. The trend, suggested above, of a reduction in linguistic fractionalisation 
equal to around 15% of the 2004 level every ten years, can be roughly transposed to 
the scale of the index used by SDM, or Alesina et al (2003), remembering that those 
two sources use scales which are almost identical. This would result in a drop every 
decade of around 0.12 points within a scale where South Africa’s original 
fractionalisation was 0.88. This possible magnitude of change was considered 
possible for the purposes of the growth simulator. Of course this proposed magnitude 
is only slightly better than an educated guess, yet it seemed justifiable to come up 
with this magnitude given, firstly, that some empirical backing has been provided, 
albeit just for one country and, secondly, given that ethnolinguistic fractionalisation 
has been found to be a significant predictor of growth whilst at the same time it is a 
variable that is amenable to the influence of education interventions.  
Government consumption share. Here the three equations (69) to (71) were used. The 
Penn data available went back to 1950 for many countries.  
Rule of law. The three equations were applied to the annual values available for the 
1996 to 2010 period for a large number of countries.  
Total fertility rate. The three equations were applied to values for every five years 
going back to 1950.   
Once plausible best trends for all eight explanatory variables had been established for 
the growth simulation tool, it became necessary to establish each variable’s additive 
contribution to growth, using as the point of departure equation (73) above. The 
variable requiring the most complex calculation was educational quality given the lag 
between changes in the schooling system and changes in the human capital 
composition of the labour force. The following equation describes the approach taken 
to expand on equation (73).  

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ttt
Y T
AZTBg  (77) 
T represents the average quality of human capital in the labour force. The previous 
year’s T is adjusted using Z, being average T amongst adults who had been in the 
labour market for 40 years in the previous year and would no longer be present in the 
current year and using A, being average T amongst young adults who entered the 
labour market between the previous and the current years. The result is T for the 
current year t.  
The slope coefficient B for each of the explanatory variables was needed to obtain 
forecast estimates. Moreover, confidence intervals for each slope coefficient B at a 
5% level of significance were needed in order to estimate the lower and upper bounds 
in the forecast. These statistics were obtained by using the results of existing growth 
regressions. Running a new growth regression using just the set of eight explanatory 
variables used in the growth simulation tool would have been ideal, though, as argued 
below, is not necessary. The new growth regression would have been difficult to run 
for a number of reasons to do with the availability of data for the start of the growth 
period, say around 1960. The problem of a lack of early data on educational quality 
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has already been discussed (see section 4.4), and a new model would inevitably have 
repeated this problem found in Hanushek and Woessman (2009). Moreover, early data 
on the rule of law seems not to be readily available. Hanushek and Woessman (2009: 
9) do include the related variable ‘property rights’, but it is not clear what data source 
they used or how early the values used in the growth regression were. Not running a 
new growth regression was not considered a great loss for the process of arriving at 
scenarios that might inform policymakers, given that those scenarios are aimed at 
providing greater empirical backing for policy priorities that are already more or less 
embraced by policymakers, as opposed to overturning existing intuition or advocating 
a radical re-prioritisation for governments. Had the latter, more radical intention been 
the case, a more rigorous approach that might have included a new growth regression 
would have been justified.  
The slope coefficient B used for educational quality in the simulation tool was 0.007, 
which is taken from Table 16 (the Table 16 coefficient had to be divided by 100 given 
the metric of the educational quality variable in that model). Thus in the tool every 
increase of one point on the PISA quality scale results in a 0.007 addition to economic 
growth, so an increase of 100 PISA points, or one PISA standard deviation, might 
raise annual growth from 3.0 to 3.7 per cent. The size of the conditional correlation 
between educational quality and growth in the tool is thus around a half of what it is 
in the models of OECD (2010a). For rule of law and total fertility rate, again 
coefficients from Table 16 were used. For these two variables, the data sources in the 
tool are the same as those of the Table 16 regression, though in the case of the total 
fertility rate 1960 values were used for Table 16 whilst 2010 values were used in the 
tool. The assumption is thus made that the conditional correlation between the fertility 
rate and growth has not changed over time. In the case of rule of law, values are from 
2000 in both Table 16 and the tool, meaning that criticisms similar to those applicable 
to the educational quality values, which are also recent, would apply. 
Because the simulation tool, unlike the projections in OECD (2010a), includes a large 
range of developing countries, it was especially important to allow for a large range of 
baseline growth rates and diminishing growth as countries developed. In the case of 
OECD (2010a) the approach was to apply a baseline ‘education-as-usual’ growth rate 
of 1.5% across all, mainly developed, countries. For the tool, each country’s actual 
average growth rate for the period 2000 to 2009 was used for the baseline. Moreover, 
it was assumed that the growth rate would decline by one percentage point for every 
increase of 1.0 in the log of income between the years t
-21 and t-20. This means that a 
coefficient of -1.0 was used where the model in Table 16 yielded a value of -1.62 and 
SDM provided a coefficient of 0.9 on the log of previous income (see Table 1053). In 
other words, a point between the two empirical results was chosen. This choice 
seemed to result in plausible forecasts in the tool, though for certain countries 
anomalies arose, as discussed below. 
Projections produced by the tool were broadly similar to those of OECD (2010a), with 
one exception: discounted present income values associated with the education 
intervention. This matter is also discussed below.  
                                                     
53
 The value -9.E-03 under ‘Original SDM’ must be multiplied by 100, producing 0.9, to take into 
account the fact that the model informing Table 10 treats the growth rate as a fraction.  
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Figure 30 below includes two graphs taken from two different runs of the tool, for the 
two countries United States and South Africa. In the case of the United States, 
improvements in educational quality result in, for instance, a growth rate in 2100 that 
is 0.7 percentage points greater than it would be without the improvement. This is 
relatively close to the corresponding 1.01 long-run addition to the growth rate for the 
United States seen in OECD (2010a: 25). In the case of South Africa, the addition to 
the growth rate by 2100 is considerably larger, at 1.7 percentage points. This is to be 
expected, given the larger scope for educational quality improvement in South Africa. 
One problem with the tool is that absolute per capita income figures are often 
implausible. For instance, the growth figures of Figure 30 produce a per capita income 
level of around USD 175,000 in the United States in 2100, and just over one million 
USD in the case of South Africa. Clearly this has little meaning for policymakers. 
What does seem meaningful, however, is the illustration of the kinds of interventions 
that stand out as particularly valuable in South Africa. These interventions are, apart 
from improving educational quality, improving life expectancy, which in South Africa 
would largely involve tackling HIV/AIDS, and dealing with linguistic 
fractionalisation. Tackling HIV/AIDS is clearly part of the national development plan 
of South Africa (South Africa: National Planning Commission, 2012), but the matter 
of a language policy that promotes social cohesion is not. One value of the picture 
provided by the South Africa graph below would thus be to bring to the fore a policy 
issue whose importance has been under-estimated.   
Figure 30: Contributing factors behind higher future growth 
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To calculate the discounted present value of income gains, the tool used a 3% 
discount rate and thus the same rate as the OECD (2010a). Results for the United 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Part I  158 
 
States and South Africa are shown in Figure 31 below. Again, a comparison across 
countries of the absolute values does not seem meaningful but what appears 
important, or at least suggestive, is the relative size of each segment within one 
country.  
There was a notable discrepancy between the tool and OECD (2010a). Present 
discounted values produced by the tool were much lower than those reported in 
OECD (2010a). It appears as if in all three scenarios of OECD (2010a) the present 
discounted values are inconsistent with the model parameters presented in the report. 
The values are two to three times as high as they ought to be. For example, in the first 
scenario the present value of future income for the United States is 267% of the 
baseline GDP54 (the OECD report focuses on total GDP, not GDP per capita). In 
Figure 31, the education segment for the United States equals 247% of initial GDP per 
capita, but here a far more ambitious educational improvement trajectory is envisaged, 
compared to what is found in the first scenario of OECD (2010a). A replication of the 
calculation in OECD (2010a) revealed that the present value of future gains should 
not be greater than 120% of the baseline GDP. The OECD (2010a) present values 
would be correct if a discount rate of around 1.5% and not 3.0% were used. The 
authors do say that they tried various discount rates, and make specific reference to 
Stern’s 1.4%. It is possible that the present values in OECD (2010a) are based on a 
discount rate of around 1.4%, and not the stated 3.0% rate.  
                                                     
54
 Table 2 in OECD (2010b: 25) provides the information needed to gauge the baseline GDP value 
used. 
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Figure 31: Present value of future changes 
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5.6 Educational improvement and teacher pay 
The foregoing discussion has concentrated largely on how the relationship between 
educational quality and economic growth can be conveyed to policymakers in a 
manner that brings to the fore the welfare costs of not taking full advantage of current 
opportunities to improve learning outcomes. But the space that governments have to 
improve education outcomes is often severely constrained by the demands of teacher 
unions. One of several constraints brought about by teacher unions is that they divert 
funding away from non-teacher inputs in the schooling process and towards teacher 
salaries, in a manner that results in allocative inefficiencies, and thus sub-optimal 
outcomes relative to the available budget. This problem is analysed empirically by 
Pritchet and Filmer (1997), who take coefficients from various developing country 
production functions, combine these with the unit costs of the production inputs, and 
examine the marginal gain in test scores associated with various investments. They 
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find that the marginal gains from investing in teacher salaries are particularly poor, 
which points to a skewed and inefficient basket of inputs. In a situation of allocative 
efficiency, the marginal returns to the various investments should be more or less 
equal.  
One way of extending the foregoing work with a view to making salary negotiations 
between the government and teacher unions a more informed and welfare-oriented 
process, would be to model the relationship between educational improvement and 
teacher pay. If teachers could see in fairly explicit terms the relationship between 
what they can influence, namely educational outcomes, and their pay they might focus 
more on outcomes, which would benefit not just teachers but society as a whole. This 
is the idea that informs the following series of graphs. As will be seen, the fact that 
there are particularly long lags between educational change and economic effects, and 
given that teacher union leaders tend to focus on fairly immediate gains, the effect that 
differently presented information can have on political processes is limited. Yet the 
analysis that follows, which appears not to be available in the existing literature, 
seems to be a valuable ingredient in any teacher wage negotiation process.  
One point that must be emphasised is that it is not reasonable to assume that teacher 
pay will increase as fast as GDP per capita. Before the possible impact of educational 
improvement on teacher pay is examined, the relationship between teacher pay and 
GDP per capita must be explained. Mingat and Tan (2003), in an article titled ‘On the 
mechanics of progress in primary education’, provide valuable guidance on the latter 
relationship. For countries such as South Africa, where secondary school teacher 
salaries are very similar to primary school ones, this guidance is applicable to the 
schooling system as a whole. In a nutshell, the ratio of teacher pay to GDP per capita 
for a country declines over time, as the latter variable improves. It does this because 
as society develops and more professional positions outside the teaching profession 
become available, teachers become less of an elite in society and their relative, but not 
absolute, income declines.  
Figure 32 below includes a reproduction of the Mingat and Tan (2003: 457, 466) 
curve relating teacher pay over GDP per capita to GDP per capita55. Equation (78) 
below describes the Mingat/Tan curve in the graph for ratios of teacher pay over GDP 
per capita, or r, down to 1.7. The variable I is income per capita. Mingat and Tan 
(2003) seem to suggest that in the case of developed countries, the ratio does not 
decline beyond around 1.7.  
23.017 −= Ir  (78) 
                                                     
55
 The fact that GDP is used here whilst GNP is used in the original has almost no effect. The two 
variables produce a correlation coefficient of 0.9999 at the country level, using 2009 values from 
World Bank DataBank. The horizontal axis was recalibrated so that Figure 32 would reflect 2009 USD 
PPP values, based on Heston, Summers and Aten (2011). 
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Figure 32: Relationship between relative teacher pay and GDP per capita 
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Source: Mingat and Tan (2003: 461), with adjustment to 2009 price levels, and 
http://www.oecd.org/edu/skills-beyond-school/48631286.pdf. Red points refer 
to countries in the OECD source.  
 
It would have been ideal to redo the Mingat and Tan analysis, but comparable average 
teacher pay values, in particular for developing countries, are not readily available. 
Mingat and Tan had to piece together information from a multitude of sources. What 
is relatively straightforward, however, is to examine teacher pay values for just OECD 
countries, as these are systematically published56. The average ratio at the developed 
country stage is in fact particularly important as one assumes that this is the ratio 
towards which developing countries such as South Africa should move. In Figure 32, 
the red curve and points reflect the situation in OECD countries plus one non-OECD 
country, Indonesia, the only non-OECD country for which the OECD analysts 
succeeded in finding data. Amongst OECD countries there is no negative or positive 
trend, which seems to confirm the existence of a steady state ratio in developed 
countries. What is noteworthy is that the OECD average for the ratio, at 1.16, is 
considerably below what is seen in Mingat and Tan (2003). The explanation for the 
difference appears not to be a downward trend over time in the ratio. According to the 
OECD source, the ratio remained constant, at least for the 2000 to 2009 period. It 
seems more likely that different definitions lie behind the difference. Mingat and Tan 
(2003: 458) use the ‘average teacher salary’ at the primary school level. The OECD 
source uses the average salary paid to teachers at the primary school level who have 
worked for 15 years and have just the minimum qualifications. It is likely that many 
teachers would have more than the minimum qualifications after being in service for 
15 years.  
A graph such as Figure 32 offers important guidance for policymakers and could help 
a government explain to teacher unions why teacher pay must in general increase at a 
lower rate than GDP per capita. But different developing countries, even ones with 
similar GDP per capita values, have vastly different ratios of teacher pay over GDP 
per capita. Overall, the range in the ratio for developing countries according to Mingat 
and Tan is 0.8 to 15.0. It would be useful to construct a graph that indicates the 
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 Information on OECD indicator D3 at http://www.oecd.org/edu/skills-beyond-school/48631286.pdf. 
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trajectory for a specific developing country from its current position to a future point 
at which it becomes a developed country. This is attempted in Figure 33 with respect 
to South Africa. It is assumed that when GDP per capita reaches 20,000 USD PPP (for 
2009) a fixed band of possible ratios apply. That band in Figure 33 lies between 0.93 
and 1.96, which are the 10th and 90th percentile values in the 2009 OECD data. The 
band thus encompasses the Mingat/Tan steady state ratio of 1.7.  
Figure 33: Evolution of the teacher pay ratio in South Africa I 
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In the above graph, 2009 USD PPP are converted to 2011 ZAR (South African rand) 
values. The average pay for a teacher who has been in service for 15 years and has 
just the basic qualification was ZAR 235,510 in 201157. GDP per capita in 2011 was 
ZAR 57,68358. This produces a ratio of 4.08, which lies well above the Mingat/Tan 
curve. If one assumes that a power function such as that expressed in equation (78) 
best describes the trajectory towards a lower ratio, then one could use a series of 
equations such as the following to describe the trajectory for a specific country with a 
specific point of departure. Here the subscripts 1 and 2 refers to the start and end 
points, where the end point is the entry point into developed country status at a GDP 
per capita of 20,000 USD PPP (in 2009) or ZAR 140,730 (in 2011). To illustrate, for 
the calculation of the lower bound, r1 is 4.08, r2 is 0.93, I1 is ZAR 57,683 and I2 is 
ZAR 140,730.    
y
I xIr =  (79) 
( )
( )12
12
ln
ln
II
rry =  (80) 
                                                     
57
 Own analysis of October 2011 Persal payroll data accessed through the Department of Basic 
Education, Pretoria. 
58
 2013 Budget Review available at http://www.treasury.gov.za for GDP and ‘Mid-year population 
estimates’ for 2011 available at http://www.statssa.gov.za. 
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For many, what would be more meaningful than the previous graph, is a picture of the 
evolution of actual teacher pay over time, given certain assumptions. This picture is 
provided in Figure 34 below. A growth rate for income per capita of 3.0% is assumed 
here, which is the average for the 2000 to 2009 period in South Africa. What becomes 
clear when one deals with actual teacher pay, is that the lower bound for the ratio 
illustrated in the previous graph can result in a decline in teacher pay. It is assumed 
that this is not politically possible and hence the lower bound is raised to ensure that 
teacher pay never declines below its initial level. This explains the narrowness of the 
range between the red curves in Figure 34 below. With respect to actual teacher pay, 
what is clear is that with a growth rate of 3.0%, only relatively modest real increases 
of around 0.5% per annum in teacher pay are possible for many years. It is only 
several decades into the future that larger annual increases for teachers become 
possible. This is a sobering picture, and would be counter-intuitive for those who 
adopt the assumption, probably a fairly common one, that teacher pay can rise at the 
speed of GDP per capita.  
Figure 34: Evolution of teacher pay in South Africa II 
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Importantly, an increase of 0.5% a year would not necessarily mean adjustments to 
the teacher pay scales. As pointed out by Gustafsson and Patel (2009) with reference 
to South Africa’s teacher pay, what teachers currently earn is often different to what 
the current pay scales say teachers will earn, say, fifteen years into the future. This is 
because improvements in future earnings prospects built into the pay scales are 
generally not implemented retroactively. This dynamic exerts a potentially large 
impact on pay projections. The analysis by Gustafsson and Patel (2009: 19) suggests 
that simply by letting existing pay scales take effect, the pay of 45 year old teachers 
would increase by around 30% in real terms over a couple of decades.  
A further complexity, analysed by Gustafsson (2012c) using South Africa data, is that 
if for historical reasons the age distribution amongst teachers is skewed either towards 
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the high end or the low end, average teacher pay, across all teachers, may fall or rise 
purely on the basis of demographic trends. Specifically, in South Africa an ageing 
teacher force means that a large inflow of young teachers in the near future is likely, 
which would exert a negative impact on  average teacher pay given that younger 
teachers are paid less as they have not accumulated the income benefits associated 
with years of experience. But if this dynamic is considered in combination with the 
pay scale effect of Gustafsson and Patel (2009), the net negative impact is small. The 
projection tool coming with Gustafsson (2012c) suggests that if one assumes 
recognition of experience increments in the future that are more or less in line with the 
current practice, there would be a period of decline in the average pay, between 2018 
and 2035, but the overall decline would only be around 0.6% in real terms. These 
complexities serve as a reminder that a picture such as that in Figure 34 can be made 
more realistic through the incorporation of the actual teacher scales and demographic 
factors. A further complication that should ideally be taken explicitly into account is 
the fact that thresholds between different levels of development, such as between 
developing and developed country status, change in complex ways that are not simply 
a function of inflation. This would influence the point at which the developed country 
ratio of teacher pay over GDP per capita would take effect. How the relationship 
between income per capita, in constant price terms, and a country’s development 
status changes over time is discussed in Part II of the dissertation.  
As much of section 5 has shown, GDP per capita is not an entirely exogenous variable 
as far as the education planner is concerned. Education planners and teachers, through 
their actions, can exert a positive impact on GDP. The following graph reproduces the 
curves of the previous graph, but adds new and higher upper bounds for GDP per 
capita and teacher pay that might result from improvements in educational outcomes. 
The upper bound for the ratio of teacher pay over GDP per capita would drop, 
however, given the faster move towards the developed country threshold. Using the 
education quality coefficient of 0.007 described in section 5.5, meaning 100 PISA 
points would raise annual growth from, say, 3.0% to 3.7%, results in barely noticeable 
changes to income and hence teacher pay. What seems clear is that education planners 
cannot honestly say to teachers ‘Improve the performance of your students and 
government will be in a position to pay salaries that are substantially higher in the 
near future’. Even if the education quality coefficient is doubled and thus put on a par 
with the coefficient used by Hanushek and Woessman in OECD (2010a), the 
improvements in teacher pay appear fairly unimpressive. In fact, Figure 35 below is 
based on an inflated coefficient of 0.014. In this scenario, it is only after 23 years that 
better educational quality will produce a GDP per capita level that will allow teacher 
pay to be at least 1.0% higher than what it was in the scenario painted in the previous 
graph, Figure 34.     
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Figure 35: Future teacher pay in South Africa with quality improvements 
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The calculations used for the above graph are explained in the equations below. 
Largely, they represent an unpacking of the earlier equation (77), but here the fact that 
growth diminishes as income rises is reflected explicitly. Growth g in year Y is the 
previous year’s growth plus an education effect e and a convergence effect c. The 
education effect e is the educational quality coefficient B multiplied by the change in 
the quality of the labour force T. For the above graph, B was 0.014. The educational 
quality of the labour force in the current year is a function of the previous year’s 
overall value, the value of the oldest age cohort of workers, Z, and the value A for the 
students from the previous year that became the current year’s youngest workers. Z 
for the above graph, and for any scenario involving fewer than 41 future years, will be 
the average level of educational quality in the schooling system in the baseline year. A 
will rise annually, assuming optimal education interventions, according to Figure 23 
above, whose values are reproduced in Table 22 in the appendices. The convergence 
effect c is the coefficient E, whose value is assumed to be -1.00 as discussed in 
section 5.5, multiplied by a value which is the natural logarithm of per capita income 
20 years ago minus the same value from 21 years ago 
YYYY cegg ++= −1  (82) 
( )1−−= YYY TTBe  (83) 
40
40 11 −− +−×
=
YY
Y
AZTT  (84) 
( ) ( )( )2120 lnln −− −= YYY IIEc  (85) 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Part I  166 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
One aim of section 5 was to explore how economic models can be meaningfully 
presented to policymakers. Findings in this regard have been implicit rather than 
explicit in the foregoing discussions. This conclusion attempts to bring these findings 
to the fore. 
What seems clear is that making the academic economics texts more accessible 
requires an investment in what one could refer to as bridging texts and tools. As the 
literature on the relationship between academia and policymakers makes clear, there 
is a shortage of materials that can be used for knowledge brokerage between the two 
spheres.  
So what makes for good bridging materials? Firstly, they need to draw from a variety 
of sources in the academic literature. Put differently, they need to function as meta-
analyses. The growth simulation tool described above drew from two of the sources 
discussed in section 4, as well as a few other texts.  
Secondly, they need to focus rather strongly on identifying key patterns within 
complex systems. Policymakers are inevitably confronted, on a continuous basis, by a 
large amount of new information and appeals from lobbyists. Academics are 
privileged insofar as they have, or should have, considerable space for questioning 
and contemplation. Research ought to assist in cutting through the mass of 
information, in ensuring that one does not miss the wood for the trees. An important 
part of the ‘wood’, is the likely long-run impacts of present actions and policies. Inbar 
(1996: 40), in an important education planning manual of the International Institute 
for Educational Planning (IIEP), says the following about the importance of 
identifying the ‘wood’: 
Vision for educational innovation should yield a description that is useful to the viewer and 
not cluttered by irrelevant information. Vision is built around certain familiar symbols and is 
itself a creator of new symbols.  
Importantly, there are two levels to the problem. First, analysts need to have a firm 
grasp of the ‘wood’ or the key patterns that must be understood if effective policies 
are to be formulated. Secondly, they need to be able to convey this knowledge in ways 
that are intelligible to the policymaker. The economics discipline is well placed to 
offer guidance at both levels for a number of reasons. The economics literature often 
pays very close attention to how one measures and quantifies things. It is thus rather 
rigorous in the way it concludes empirically what current and past realities are. 
Misunderstandings of these realities are frequently a problem in education 
policymaking. The economics literature also pays considerable attention to 
identifying, measuring and understanding correlations, including counter-intuitive 
ones, between different variables. It teases out from an enormously complex and often 
data-rich system what factors seem to matter for the key variables of interest, such as 
learning outcomes. It does this within a conceptual framework with a long tradition 
and whose key concepts, efficiency, equity, welfare, costs and benefits, are of great 
relevance to policymakers.  
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Yet there is a risk that too much is promised, that caveats are not made sufficiently 
clear, in the quest for elegance and simplicity. Inbar (1996: 91) makes the following 
warnings:  
Comprehensive knowledge, organized into a coherent framework, gives the appearance of 
better control, or reduced uncertainty, and a decrease of risks. The development of over-
sophisticated, abstract models and plans of innovation arises from this illusion. Modelling is 
often undertaken to persuade politicians or administrators who demand certainty before 
allowing planned change and who too often search for perfection rather than improvement. ... 
[models] are imbued with almost magical quality of truth and objectivity. Consequently, 
there is pressure to advocate rationality, which may contribute little or nothing to the change 
process, rather than into the development of human contacts, involvement and commitment 
which are true underpinnings of innovation. 
A third priority is thus to avoid merely playing to the ‘baser instincts’ of policymakers 
and, more pertinently, politicians, who, perhaps as a result of exhaustion induced by 
information overload, may want to settle for an analysis that is overly simplistic. In 
section 5, acknowledgement that different analysts have tackled similar policy 
problems differently and the use of confidence intervals in the modelling of scenarios 
are both ways of counteracting the illusion that the future can be perfectly modelled. 
Fourthly, cross-country comparisons should be employed, but in a manner that 
acknowledges the serious pitfalls in this area. These comparisons, which lie at the 
heart of the key models discussed in this dissertation, are useful to policymakers, who 
are in fact often asked to explain the effectiveness of the policies of their own country 
in terms of what is found elsewhere. Advice to policymakers should include reference 
to common international ‘league tables’, such as those of the World Economic Forum 
and the World Bank. However, this advice needs to acknowledge the serious 
measurement problems in the international indicators. Some of these problems were 
discussed in section 5.4. In fact, it is in this regard that economists should display 
some humility, for it is often economists who are responsible for the league tables in 
question. It is important to explain to the policymaker the distinction between more 
academic texts produced by economists, such as peer-reviewed articles, and reports, 
also produced by economists, where, it could be argued, rigour has been compromised 
so that an appearance of comprehensive knowledge could be maintained.  
A fifth point is that when one tries to bridge the existing academic literature with the 
needs of policymakers, one tends to find key gaps in the literature, because that 
literature was often not produced with a clear understanding of what policymakers 
might require. These gaps need to be filled where possible. In section 5, one such gap 
was insufficient analysis into what historical trends tell us about feasible future 
improvement trajectories in the area of average test scores. Another gap was the 
missing answer to the question as to whether linguistic fractionalisation in a society 
such as South Africa’s changes over time and, if so, at what speed. Both these gaps 
relate to target-setting, something that policymakers are increasingly concerned with 
as governance through indicators becomes more common.  
The sixth point is that the bridging texts and tools need to be designed in a manner 
that is sensitive to who the potential users are and, in the case of policymakers in 
government, typical within-government dynamics and dynamics between the 
government and important stakeholder groups, for instance teacher unions. The 
growth simulator tool discussed above expanded on the work of OECD (2010a) 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Part I  168 
 
through the incorporation of various development indicators because at least some 
education policymakers rightly see their role as lying at the heart of the long range 
development of the country. The attention paid to the ethnolinguistic fractionalisation 
indicator was largely justified through reference to its sensitivity to the education 
process. Policy on the overall language situation in a country is typically not well 
accommodated within traditional government structures, despite its apparent 
importance for development, yet if there is a home for this policy area, it is arguably 
within the education ministry. The importance for the budgeting process of teacher 
pay, and the political weight of teacher unions, prompted the extension of the analysis 
to encompass long range teacher pay trends in section 5.6. Admittedly, what is 
presented above in relation to teacher pay is far from a comprehensive model of the 
long-range relationship between teacher pay and economic growth. As was explained 
above, such a model would need to take into account more operational realities 
relating to factors such as the teacher pay scales and the age distribution of teachers. 
The emphasis was on putting forward some broad analytical checks and balances that 
would need to be considered when the evolution of teacher pay is related to growth.  
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6 CONCLUSIONS FOR PART I 
Part I of the dissertation contains a mix of literature reviews, often enhanced by re-
estimations or re-presentations of existing models, as well as what can be considered 
new findings based on new data analysis. What have the key re-estimations, re-
presentations and findings been, and what is their importance in terms of the research 
questions put forward in the introduction in section 1? 
Section 2, which outlined around fifty years of thinking on economic growth, has in a 
sense been put together as a primer for education planners on this important area of 
economics. In attempting to simplify a rich and complex body of literature, the 
various traditions were condensed into standard graphs to facilitate comparison and a 
clearer sense of the evolution of ideas over time. Importantly, the theoretical literature 
in question is not entirely abstract and removed from practical policymaking concerns 
in the education sector. It deals with key concepts such as the trade-off between 
imitation and innovation and the role of time in the education process, concepts that 
good education policymakers would be grappling with. 
In contrast to the non-empirical theory of section 2, section 3 dealt with concrete 
questions around how to measure both educational outcomes and what we want these 
outcomes to enhance, namely human welfare. Again, the focus was strongly on what 
education policymakers need to know. It was assumed that these policymakers do 
need to understand the complexities around measuring welfare, but also that a variety 
of indicators of welfare exist which, if interpreted with care, are useful. If education 
does indeed lie at the heart of advancing welfare, as much of the theory suggests, then 
surely those who design the education system must have a good grasp of the key 
accomplishments relating to the measurement of welfare. The economic literature on 
the likely impacts of climate change on welfare was introduced, as out of this 
literature is emerging some of the most critical policy advice that policymakers have 
ever had to deal with. Education policymakers are only beginning to think about how 
the education system impacts on both climate change mitigation and adaptation. But 
beyond these practical concerns, school curriculum specialists will have to pay 
increasing attention to how to package ethical concerns relating to the environment 
within the school curriculum.  
Section 3.3 includes one of the innovations put forward by Part I of the dissertation. 
Here a method was proposed for constructing a set of country-level education quality 
measures that is wider than the sets of values existing previously. Specifically, the set 
covering 77 countries and put forward by Hanushek and Woessman (2009) was 
expanded on, using different methods and some new data, in order to come up with a 
set covering 113 countries. The new set has a greater presence of developing 
countries. As explained in section 3.3, the new method comes with some costs 
relating to measurement rigour, but it was argued that the new set of values is useful, 
both for cross-country modelling, and as an expanded ‘league table’ that can inform 
policy debates.  
The discussion on theory, in section 2, and measurement, in section 3, can be 
considered necessary preambles to the examination, in section 4, of three prominent 
cross-country growth models (or more precisely, three sets of models). A substantial 
amount of the methodological focus went towards the partially Bayesian methods of 
Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004), referred to as the BACE approach. 
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These methods seem valuable for data where there are relatively few observations and 
many potential explanatory variables. Whilst BACE does not establish cause and 
effect, it does make the discovery of conditional correlations a more scientific 
process. Cross-country growth regression data is clearly one candidate for BACE, but 
it could be applied to other areas of analysis that are of importance to education 
policymakers, such as education production functions. The key policy discussions in 
section 4 relate to the landmark analysis of Hanushek and Woessman (especially 
2009). The work of Hanushek and Woessman is perhaps better known amongst 
education policymakers than any other recent work in economics, partly due to what 
Hanushek and Woessman say and partly due to how they say it. What they say has 
attracted the attention of policymakers because of the very clear correlations between 
country growth and educational quality that have been brought to the fore. But their 
work is also important insofar as they pay close attention to the question of cause and 
effect and use statistical techniques to confirm that it is better education that largely 
brings about higher income. Causality does not run in the opposite direction. But 
section 4 also cautions against a too uncritical treatment of Hanushek and 
Woessman’s work. Legitimate concerns have been raised about how much certainty 
the available data allow. The conclusion was drawn that whilst tentatively the findings 
of Hanushek and Woessman can be considered valid, we shall have to wait for 
another couple of decades of educational quality data to be collected before we can be 
certain about what the magnitude of the impact of educational quality on growth has 
been.  
Much of what is new in Part I of the dissertation is found in section 5, where the 
centra concern is making the available economic analysis on education and growth 
‘talk better’ to education policymakers. Section 5 is accompanied by an Excel tool 
that simulates the impact of educational quality, but also other development 
indicators, on growth and produces a set of graphs applicable to the country selected 
in the tool. The tool on its own is of limited value, but together with the narrative of 
section 5, it is meant to stimulate and inform the policy discourse around education’s 
role in country development. A further aim is to assist cross-country comparisons, 
something that policymakers generally consider important, but is often elusive 
because the texts and tools required for this are limited and, as argued in section 5, 
occasionally misleading. Three rather novel analyses are explained in section 5. The 
first involves the use of the available country-level data to provide a more rigorous 
analysis of what education policymakers can consider feasible education quality 
improvement targets. The second involves the use of an unusual South African dataset 
to improve on the existing definitions of linguistic fractionalisation in a country, a 
factor which is partly dependent on how education is implemented in the country and 
is considered important for growth. The analysis includes an exploration of how 
linguistic fractionalisation changes over time, something that seems not to have been 
covered in the existing literature. The third novelty involves bringing together the 
‘mechanics of progress’ work of Mingat and Tan (2003), Hanushek and Woessman 
(2009) and some practical considerations of how teacher pay works in South Africa, 
in order to represent teacher pay in the national development context in a new manner 
which could inform the teacher wage negotiation process.  
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Appendix A  
 
The following table contains adjusted programme-specific and across-programme 
country scores discussed in section 4.4.  
The Excel tool developed to implement the adjustments is file Cross-country.xls, 
which accompanies this dissertation. For the solving of the nonlinear programming 
problem described in section 4.4 above, the Solver facility in Excel 2003, with default 
settings applicable, was used.   
Table 21: Adjusted country averages of pupil performance 
Country 
ISO 
code PIRLS PISA 
SAC-
MEQ 
SER-
CE 
TIMSS 
Gr4 
TIMSS 
Gr8 Overall 
Albania ALB 373 373 
Algeria DZA 401 395 398 
Argentina ARG 401 391 392 395 
Armenia ARM 459 464 462 
Australia AUS 522 477 472 490 
Austria AUT 485 497 475 486 
Azerbaijan AZE 406 406 
Bahrain BHR 404 404 
Belgium BEL 477 513 502 497 497 
Belize BLZ 336 336 
Bosnia and Herzegovina BIH 442 442 
Botswana BWA 355 380 367 
Brazil BRA 381 392 387 
Bulgaria BGR 492 422 452 455 
Canada CAN 491 529 477 484 495 
Chile CHL 419 407 395 407 
China (Shanghai) CHN 578 578 
Colombia COL 403 387 388 387 390 391 
Costa Rica CRI 426 425 425 
Croatia HRV 470 470 
Cuba CUB 467 467 
Cyprus CYP 454 478 446 459 
Czech Republic CZE 484 495 464 475 479 
Denmark DNK 491 503 486 493 
Dominican Republic DOM 328 328 
Ecuador ECU 352 352 
Egypt EGY 403 403 
El Salvador SLV 370 373 363 369 
England ENG 491 493 476 487 
Estonia EST 507 493 500 
Finland FIN 543 543 
France FRA 474 501 488 
Georgia GEO 437 377 436 411 415 
Germany DEU 488 497 487 491 
Ghana GHA 331 331 
Greece GRC 475 463 469 
Guatemala GTM 353 353 
Hong Kong HKG 490 539 525 526 520 
Hungary HUN 491 487 484 488 487 
Iceland ISL 466 503 485 
Indonesia IDN 391 379 407 392 
Iran IRN 400 411 409 406 
Ireland IRL 506 506 
Israel ISR 465 448 458 457 
Italy ITA 491 473 475 460 475 
Japan JPN 523 511 520 518 
Jordan JOR 394 421 408 
Kazakhstan KAZ 398 501 449 
Kenya KEN 388 388 
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Country 
ISO 
code PIRLS PISA 
SAC-
MEQ 
SER-
CE 
TIMSS 
Gr4 
TIMSS 
Gr8 Overall 
Korea KOR 542 535 539 
Kuwait KWT 361 365 373 366 
Kyrgyzstan KGZ 310 310 
Latvia LVA 488 478 494 478 484 
Lebanon LBN 432 432 
Lesotho LSO 288 288 
Liechtenstein LIE 516 516 
Lithuania LTU 486 475 491 475 482 
Luxembourg LUX 498 474 486 
Macao MAC 509 509 
Macedonia MKD 417 377 428 407 
Malawi MWI 260 260 
Malaysia MYS 409 466 437 
Malta MLT 453 464 458 
Mauritius MUS 414 417 415 
Mexico MEX 407 410 408 
Moldova MDA 455 393 475 445 442 
Montenegro MNE 401 401 
Morocco MAR 342 381 393 372 
Mozambique MOZ 332 332 
Namibia NAM 289 289 
Netherlands NLD 494 527 494 497 503 
New Zealand NZL 479 524 468 468 485 
Nicaragua NIC 361 361 
Norway NOR 457 497 450 448 463 
Oman OMN 385 385 
Palestine PSE 389 389 
Panama PAN 366 358 362 
Paraguay PRY 358 358 
Peru PER 339 373 356 
Philippines PHL 389 389 389 
Poland POL 472 492 482 
Portugal PRT 473 473 
Qatar QAT 354 343 353 341 348 
Romania ROU 458 419 450 443 
Russia RUS 491 462 494 479 481 
Saudi Arabia SAU 357 357 
Scotland SCO 477 468 467 471 
Serbia SRB 430 460 445 
Seychelles SYC 402 402 
Singapore SGP 488 544 529 539 525 
Slovakia SVK 475 483 470 478 476 
Slovenia SVN 466 496 467 470 475 
South Africa ZAF 318 322 311 317 
Spain ESP 467 480 473 
Swaziland SWZ 368 368 
Sweden SWE 497 506 474 469 486 
Switzerland CHE 514 514 
Syria SYR 388 388 
Taiwan TWN 483 521 513 534 513 
Tanzania TZA 385 385 
Thailand THA 422 432 427 
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 412 415 414 
Tunisia TUN 376 374 414 388 
Turkey TUR 422 441 426 430 
Uganda UGA 317 317 
Ukraine UKR 454 446 450 
United Arab Emirates ARE 426 426 
United Kingdom GBR 506 506 
United States USA 487 491 486 476 485 
Uruguay URY 425 427 426 
Yemen YEM 311 311 
Zambia ZMB 261 261 
Zimbabwe ZWE 345 345 
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Appendix B  
What follows is the Mata code that was written to implement the Bayesian averaging 
of classical estimates (BACE) approach put forward by Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer 
and Miller (2004). The Guass code of those authors served as basis for developing the 
Mata code. The Mata code was developed to work in a Stata 9 environment (though it 
should also work in all subsequent versions of Stata). 
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* INTRODUCTION: 
 
* This code implements the Bayesian averaging of classical estimates (BACE) methodology of Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer 
* and Miller (2004). This is essentially a translation of these authors' code in GAUSS to Mata. This code was  
* tested in Mata existing in Stata 9, but it was also found to work in Mata within Stata 12. The approach was to 
* follow the variable naming of the original GAUSS code, unless renaming seemed to make things a lot clearer, and  
* to have key comments from the original code plus new comments I thought were worth introducing.  
* Importantly, this code produces only the three key statistics per variable from  
* the original, namely the posterior inclusion probability (see macro 'postprob') below, the posterior mean conditional  
* on inclusion ('coeff') and the posterior standard deviation conditional on inclusion ('sd'). This should be adequate 
* for most analyses.  
 
* RUNNING THE CODE: 
 
* Select this entire file and then execute. Execution takes many hours, for instance 7.  
 
* STARTING OFF IN STATA: 
 
* If a dataset other than the original one is used, then it will be necessary to change the filename and the  
* references to variable names in the following.  
set more off 
use "C:\BACEdata.dta", clear /* Should obviously change as needed. */ 
local xfirst "abslatit" 
local xlast "ztropics" 
drop obs code country 
 
* The following ensures that there are no observations with any null values in the explanatory variables.  
quietly foreach var of varlist `xfirst'-`xlast' { 
  drop if `var'==. 
} 
 
* BEGIN USE OF MATA IN STATA: 
 
clear mata 
mata 
 
/* LOAD DATASET WITHOUT MISSING VALUES AND POPULATE MATRICES CONTAINING THE DATA */ 
 
st_view(data_c=., ., .) 
n = rows(data_c) 
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m = cols(data_c) 
nvar = m - 1 /* Note that nvar is the number of explanatory variables, with y excluded. */ 
nobs = n 
varnames = st_varname((2..m)) 
varnames = varnames' 
y = data_c[., 1] /* The first variable must be the dependent variable. */ 
sdx = J(nvar, 1, .) 
for (i=2; i<=nvar + 1; i++) { 
  sdx[i-1,1] = sqrt(variance(data_c[.,i], 1)) 
} 
sdy = sqrt(variance(data_c[.,1], 1)) 
 
/* SET MATRICES THAT KEEP THE SAME VALUE THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS */ 
 
/* Key prior assumption. */ 
pmsize = 7 /* Prior model size. */ 
/* Matrices relating to the weighting of ESS */ 
samplen = 100000 /* Frequency in loops of adjustments to the selection probabilities of variables. */ 
sprobb = 0.5 /* Partial adjustment coefficient for the sampling probabilities. 0 gives no adjustment, 1 gives immediate adjustment to the estimated posterior inclusion probability. 
*/ 
lb = 0.1   /* Lower bound on the sampling inclusion probability. */ 
ub = 0.85   /* Upper bound on the sampling inclusion probability. */ 
/* Matrices needed for the monitoring of convergence */ 
checkn = 10000   /* Frequency in terms of number of loops for checking convergence. */ 
criterion = 10e-6   /* A threshold that is used to determine how stable the slope coefficients have become. */ 
numbertimes = 10   /* Another parameter used to assess convergence towards stable coefficient values. */ 
loopnum = 100000000 /* The number of loops that will occur if convergence is not reached. */ 
/* Matrices relating to the reporting of results */ 
semifinaln = 100000 /* Frequency in loops of reports on the values for the three key statistics. */ 
/* Matrix needed for the final calculation of posterior means of coefficient and standard deviation. */ 
tolerance = J(nvar, 1, 1)  
 
/* SET MATRICES THAT CAN CHANGE DURING THE PROCESS */ 
 
/* The three key statitics found, per explanatory variable. */ 
postprob = J(nvar, 1, 0) /* Posterior inclusion probability. */ 
coeff = J(nvar, 1, 0) /* Posterior mean coefficient conditional on inclusion. */ 
sd = J(nvar, 1, .) /* Posterior standard deviation conditional on inclusion. */ 
/* The loop counters */ 
loop0 = 1 /* The counter that continues throughout with no resetting. */ 
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loop1 = 1 /* The counter that checks when the next adjustment of selection probabilities should occur. Gets reset to zero. */ 
loop2 = 1 /* The counter that checks when the next interim report of statistics should be provided. Gets reset to zero. */ 
loop3 = 1 /* The counter that checks when the next convergence check occurs. Gets reset to zero. */ 
/* Matrix relating to the sampling inclusion probability. */ 
sprob = 0 
/* Matrices relating to the value of ESS */ 
ess = 0 /* The ESS for just the current model. */   
sess = 0 /* The cumulative sum of all ESS values. */ 
sumess = J(nvar, 1, 0) /* For each explanatory variable, the sum of the ESS values where the variable was included. */ 
/* Matrices needed for the monitoring of convergence. */ 
good = 0 /* Used in the assesssment of convergence. */ 
sflag = 0 
cbeta = J(nvar, 1, 0)  
maxchng = 1 
avchng = 1 
changer = 1 
maxchngpp = 1 
avchngpp =1 
changepp= 1 
postprobold = J(nvar, 1, 0) 
sessold = 0 
/* Matrices needed for the calculation of the posterior mean coefficients. */ 
coeffsum = J(nvar, 1, 0) 
varw = J(nvar, 1, 0) 
 
/* SET VALUES OF pprob (WHICH NEVER CHANGE) AND INITIAL VALUES OF iprob */ 
 
inclprob = pmsize / nvar 
pprob = J(nvar + 1, 1, 0)    
i = 0                             
for (i=0; i<=nvar; i++) { 
  pprob[i + 1, 1] = inclprob ^ i * (1 - inclprob) ^ (nvar - i) 
} 
iprob = J(nvar, 1, 1) * inclprob /* This is the probability of being included in the model of each explanatory variable. */   
 
/* SET SOME OTHER THINGS */   
tolerance = tolerance * 10e-50 /* These values, rarely if ever used, cater for the possibility of an explanatory variable being virtually valueless in the analysis. */   
   
/* START THE MAIN LOOP */ 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Part I  177 
 
while (sflag==0) { /* Looping ends if the maximum loops is exceeded or convergence is obtained. */ 
 
/* SELECT THE VARIABLES FOR THIS LOOP */ 
 
  coinfliprnd = uniform(nvar, 1) 
  coinflip = J(nvar, 1, 0) 
  for (i = 1; i<=nvar; i++) if (coinfliprnd[i, 1]<iprob[i, 1]) coinflip[i, 1] = 1 
 
  k = sum(coinflip) 
 
  if (k>0) { /* We only enter the loop if at least one explanatory variable has been selected. */ 
 
/* CONSTRUCT THE SUB-DATASET */ 
 
    select = J(k, 1, .) 
    x = J(nobs, k + 1, .) 
    iin = 0 
    for (i=1; i<=nvar; i++) { 
      if (coinflip[i, 1]==1) { 
  iin = iin + 1 
  select[iin, 1] = i   
  x[., iin] = data_c[., i + 1] 
   }   
    } 
    x[., k + 1] = J(nobs, 1, 1) 
 
/* CALCULATE THE PROBABILITY THAT THIS MODEL WOULD BE SELECTED */ 
 
   if (coinflip[1, 1]==1) { 
      sprob[1, 1] = iprob[1, 1] 
    } 
    else { 
      sprob[1, 1] = 1 - iprob[1, 1] 
    } 
    for (i=2; i<=nvar; i++) { 
      if (coinflip[i, 1]==1) { 
        sprob = sprob * iprob[i, 1] 
      } 
   else { 
        sprob = sprob * (1 - iprob[i, 1]) 
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   } 
    } 
 
/* PERFORM THE REGRESSION ANALYSIS */ 
 
    invxx = invsym(x' x)  
    beta = invxx * x' y  
    resid = y - x * beta    
    ess = (resid' resid) ^ (-nobs / 2) / nobs ^ ((k - pmsize)/ 2) /* This is the first BACE-specific adjustment of the residual sum of squares. */ 
    ess = ess * pprob[k + 1, 1] / sprob /* This is the second BACE-specific adjustment. */ 
    sess = sess + ess 
    sumess = sumess + ess * coinflip  
    coeffsum[select, 1] = coeffsum[select, 1] + beta[1::k, 1] * ess 
 invxxdiag = J(k + 1, 1, .) 
 for (i=1; i<=k + 1; i++) invxxdiag[i, 1] = invxx[i, i] 
 varb = (resid' resid) * invxxdiag / (nobs - k - 1) 
 varw[select, 1] = varw[select, 1] + (varb[1::k, 1] + beta[1::k, 1] :* beta[1::k, 1]) * ess  
 
/* ADJUST THE SAMPLING PROBABILITY TO FAVOUR THE BETTER VARIABLES */ 
 
    if (loop1>=samplen) {  
      loop1 = 0 
      postprob = sumess / sess  
      iprob = iprob + sprobb * (postprob - iprob)   
      for (i=1; i<=nvar; i++) { 
        if (iprob[i, 1]<lb) { 
          iprob[i, 1] = lb 
        } 
        else { 
          if (iprob[i, 1]>ub) { 
            iprob[i, 1] = ub 
          } 
        } 
      } 
  
 /* DISPLAY THE NON-FINAL THREE STATISTICS PER EXPLANATORY VARIABLE AS THEY NOW STAND */   
 
      if (loop2>=semifinaln) { 
"Loops done:"  
     loop0 
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     loop2 = 0 
        postprob = sumess / sess 
        for (i=1; i<=nvar; i++) { 
       coeff[i, 1] = coeffsum[i, 1] / max(sumess[i, 1] \ tolerance[i, 1])  
    sd[i, 1] = sqrt(varw[i, 1] / max(sumess[i, 1] \ tolerance[i, 1]) - coeff[i, 1] * coeff[i, 1])  
  } 
"THE THREE STATISTICS:"   
"1: Posterior inclusion probability" 
"2: Posterior mean conditional on inclusion" 
"3: Posterior standard deviation conditional on inclusion" 
        semifinal = (postprob, coeff, sd) 
        varnames         
  semifinal 
      } /* The conditional on whether it is time to report on the interim statistics ends here. */ 
    } /* The conditional on whether to adjust the sampling probability ends here. */ 
 
  
/* CHECK FOR CONVERGENCE */ 
 
    if (loop3>=checkn) {  
      loop3 = 0 
      normcoeff = coeffsum :* sdx / sdy 
      if (loop0>checkn) {  
     chng = abs(normcoeff / sess - cbeta / sessold)  
        maxchng = max(chng)  
        avchng = mean(chng, 1) 
        changer = . 
        i = 1 
        while (changer==.) { 
          if (chng[i, 1] = maxchng) { 
            changer = i 
          } 
          i = i + 1 
        } 
        postprob = sumess / sess 
        chngpp = abs(postprob - postprobold) 
        maxchngpp = max(chngpp) 
        avchngpp = mean(chngpp, 1) 
        changepp = . 
        i = 1 
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        while (changepp==.) { 
          if (chngpp[i, 1] = maxchngpp) { 
            changepp = i 
          } 
          i = i + 1 
        } 
      } 
      cbeta = normcoeff 
      sessold = sess 
      postprobold = postprob 
      if (maxchng<criterion) { 
        good = good + 1 
      } 
      else { 
        good = 0 
      } 
      if (good>numbertimes-1 | loop0>loopnum) sflag = 1 
    } /* The conditional on whether to run the convergence test ends here. */  
  } /* The conditional on whether any explanatory variables have been selected ends here. */ 
 
  loop0 = loop0 + 1 
  loop1 = loop1 + 1 
  loop2 = loop2 + 1 
  loop3 = loop3 + 1 
 
} /* The main loop ends here. */ 
 
/* DISPLAY THE FINAL STATISTICS */ 
 
postprob = sumess / sess 
for (i=1; i<=nvar; i++) { 
  coeff[i, 1] = coeffsum[i, 1] / max(sumess[i, 1] \ tolerance[i, 1]) 
  sd[i, 1] = sqrt(varw[i, 1] / max(sumess[i, 1] \ tolerance[i, 1]) - coeff[i, 1] * coeff[i, 1]) 
}   
"FINAL FOR THE THREE STATISTICS:" 
"1: Posterior inclusion probability" 
"2: Posterior mean conditional on inclusion" 
"3: Posterior standard deviation conditional on inclusion" 
final = (postprob, coeff, sd) 
varnames 
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final 
varnames 
 
end 
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Appendix C  
The following table contains the values reflected in Figure 23. 
Table 22: Feasible long-range improvement trend 
Year Score Year Score Year Score Year Score 
0 260 
1 270 41 492 81 556 121 589 
2 280 42 495 82 557 122 589 
3 289 43 497 83 558 123 590 
4 299 44 499 84 559 124 591 
5 308 45 502 85 560 125 591 
6 317 46 504 86 561 126 592 
7 325 47 506 87 562 127 593 
8 334 48 508 88 563 128 593 
9 342 49 510 89 564 129 594 
10 350 50 512 90 565 130 595 
11 357 51 514 91 566 131 595 
12 364 52 516 92 567 132 596 
13 371 53 518 93 568 133 597 
14 378 54 520 94 568 134 597 
15 385 55 522 95 569 135 598 
16 391 56 523 96 570 136 599 
17 397 57 525 97 571 137 599 
18 403 58 527 98 572 138 600 
19 409 59 528 99 573 
20 414 60 530 100 573 
21 419 61 531 101 574 
22 424 62 533 102 575 
23 429 63 534 103 576 
24 434 64 536 104 577 
25 438 65 537 105 577 
26 443 66 539 106 578 
27 447 67 540 107 579 
28 451 68 541 108 580 
29 455 69 542 109 580 
30 458 70 544 110 581 
31 462 71 545 111 582 
32 465 72 546 112 583 
33 469 73 547 113 583 
34 472 74 549 114 584 
35 475 75 550 115 585 
36 478 76 551 116 585 
37 481 77 552 117 586 
38 484 78 553 118 587 
39 487 79 554 119 587 
40 490 80 555 120 588 
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7 INTRODUCTION FOR PART II 
Part II of the dissertation addresses the following question: What new patterns can be 
found in the historical country-level enrolment and per student spending data to 
inform policymakers on how to prioritise the various levels of the education system? It 
will be argued below that given the importance of this question to policymakers, and 
the data that are available, not enough work in relation to the question has occurred. 
Some related modelling using country-level data has occurred and this will be 
discussed. However, what has been largely absent is rigorous analysis of a rather well-
known data source, the data of the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), gathered 
over several decades from ministries of education around the world. The analysis 
presented below focuses above all on the enrolment and per student spending 
statistics, by education level, from this data source, going back to 1970. It moreover 
explores correlations between the education values and economic growth values.  
Why is the question an important one? The circumstances of each country are 
different and there can clearly be no one-size-fits-all prescription relating to, for 
instance, what average public spending per student should be at the primary, 
secondary and tertiary levels for countries at different levels of development. Yet 
cross-country patterns can be useful insofar as they highlight when country-specific 
patterns are anomalous and might therefore be problematic and in need of an 
adjustment. The patterns can thus be suggestive. Currently the data analysis available 
to inform across-level prioritisation in education is sparse. The same can be said about 
the available theory. Policymakers have considerable decision-making power with 
respect to how public spending is spread across the levels of the education system. It 
is in this area that policymakers are likely to be particularly interested in analysis 
relating to the above question. Even with respect to the spread of enrolments across 
levels of the system, policymakers exert considerable influence, though arguably less 
so than in the case of public spending. Governments can increase or restrict the supply 
of student places at education institutions, though restrictions often result in serious 
public resistance and increasing supply may not result in actual enrolment increases if 
the demand for education is insufficient or there are quality bottlenecks, for instance 
insufficient graduates of the required standard exiting from a lower level.  
Section 8 below proposes a set of factors which are likely to influence decisions 
relating to prioritisation across levels amongst policymakers. This examination 
includes some discussion of how policymaking processes work and how decisions are 
taken when there is little empirical evidence. It also includes discussion of how the 
microeconomic evidence on rates of return to education has to some extent been 
misinterpreted in the context of prioritisation across levels. Section 8 thus provides an 
institutionally-focussed examination of how decisions seem to be taken, which then 
forms a backdrop against which to explore, in the next section, more data-driven 
decision-making frameworks.  
Section 9 looks at what the existing theory and empirical evidence in economics has 
to offer the policymaker faced with level prioritisation decisions. On the theory side, 
human capital theory, rates of return to education and models of country development 
receive attention. Modelling by Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2006) of OECD 
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country data is examined, as is related work by Lutz, Cuaresma and Sanderson (2008) 
focussing on developing countries.  
Section 10 begins by describing the UIS enrolment and expenditure data used for the 
new analysis, including the shortcomings of these data. Key shortcomings worth 
noting at this point already are the absence of reliable and comprehensive values on 
participation in or expenditure on pre-school and vocational training. The analysis 
thus focuses largely on relationships and trade-offs between the three large categories: 
the primary, secondary and tertiary levels. In fact, much of the emphasis in the 
analysis falls on the secondary and tertiary levels, as this is where policymakers have 
most discretion. Universal participation in primary schooling is generally considered 
an a priori policy priority, though expenditure per primary student is a more debatable 
matter. A discussion of the basic line of inquiry and the kinds of data analysis 
techniques employed follows. The analysis itself includes fairly basic descriptive 
analysis as well as some multivariate modelling. As will be seen, the data do not lend 
themselves to the identification of cause and effect. However, they do allow for the 
identification of associations which, it will be argued, are suggestive of actual 
historical dynamics and thus important for policymakers. It should be remembered 
that despite the fact that the UIS data are well-known amongst researchers and 
policymakers, they appear not to have been subjected to the kind of pattern-seeking 
analysis presented in section 10. Key findings include the fact that countries with 
faster growing economies have pursued different enrolment and education spending 
trajectories and, somewhat unexpectedly, a high positive correlation, even when 
controlling for a large range of non-education variables, between higher per student 
secondary school spending in the past and faster growth. In keeping the other two 
parts of the dissertation, the analysis focuses strongly on concerns that policymakers 
in developing countries would have, including policymakers in South Africa. Section 
11 concludes Part II of the dissertation.   
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8 HOW EDUCATION POLICYMAKERS DEAL WITH PRIORITISATION 
ACROSS EDUCATION LEVELS 
Education policymakers, and government policymakers in general, do to some extent 
actively influence how the various levels of the education system are prioritised, 
through funding decisions taken and the design of policies relating to matters such as 
entrance requirements, compulsory school attendance, and exit qualifications. At the 
same time, prioritisation across levels occurs partly through dynamic social and 
economic processes over which the policymaker has little direct influence. Below, six 
factors which are likely to influence how prioritisation occurs are discussed: available 
public funding; public demand for education; demands of employers; teacher union 
demands; international pressure; welfarist considerations. The first five factors are 
powerful external factors over which the policymaker is likely to have limited control, 
though how exactly these factors shape policies is still largely under the control of 
policymakers. The sixth factor is essentially economically-informed rational decision-
making and is thus considered an optimal factor. The greater the degree to which 
prioritisation decisions are based on theories encompassing rational notions of 
efficiency, equity and country development, and the greater degree to which these 
decisions are based on empirical evidence, the better. The discussion of the six factors 
will point to certain complexities, including dynamics between the six factors and the 
fact that what may look like a rational pursuit of welfarist principles, may instead be 
something else.   
(a) Available public funding. Public funding constraints limit the possible size of the 
education system as a whole. However, these constraints tend to be felt most acutely 
at the tertiary and to some extent secondary levels, because per student costs tend to 
be higher the higher the level (as seen in section 10). Moreover, any discussion of 
limiting in the size of the system due to funding constraints is likely to focus on, 
firstly, the tertiary level and, secondly, the secondary level, as limiting expansion at a 
higher level has only a limited effect on lower levels, whilst the reverse does not 
apply. In developed countries, it is the relatively high availability of public funds that 
has been a key factor in the achievement of extremely high enrolment ratios at all 
levels, making universal tertiary education appear as a possibility (Schofer and Meyer, 
2005: 898). 
(b) Public demand for education. Policymakers, in particular within democratic 
societies, are likely to be under pressure to expand access at whichever level universal 
coverage has not been reached to satisfy demands from citizens wishing to maximise 
their future incomes. At the primary level, but even at the secondary level, this 
pressure may take the form a constitutional provision making education a human 
right. However, not all popular pressure is oriented towards social equity. In less 
equal societies, an elite may create pressure for public funds in education to be largely 
directed towards this elite. Verspoor and Bregman (2007: 6), in a report produced for 
the World Bank, argue that this has been the case in Sub-Saharan Africa, insofar as 
elites have lobbied for the maintenance of elitist secondary school systems with high 
per student spending and relatively low coverage. One argument elites may use 
against a rapid expansion of the education system is that this reduces not just the 
average quality of graduates, but even the overall number of graduates achieving at a 
high level, through a dilution effect. The empirical evidence for such an effect is not 
strong, however, as argued in for instance Taylor and Spaull (2013).  
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(c) Demands of employers. Policymakers are influenced by the needs of employers, 
including the government as an employer, in a number of ways when plans are made 
to prioritise certain specialisations or expand particular levels of the education system. 
However, as Bertrand (2004: 71) argues, in a planning manual of the International 
Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) directed at policymakers, labour market 
demands are too frequently ignored, or misinterpreted, in the education planning 
process. This is partly because, following the discrediting of highly detailed 
‘manpower planning’ methods due to problems around the workability of these 
methods, the development of alternative techniques to promote labour market 
responsiveness amongst education planners has been weak. There has been, to some 
extent, a methodological vacuum. Yet there are large differences between the 
approaches of different governments, with some paying very little attention to labour 
market demands and others setting up sophisticated information and knowledge 
systems that at least improve the probability that education planners will understand 
what the labour market demands are. An example of the latter would be the 
Occupational Outlook Handbook (OOH) produced periodically by the Bureau of 
Labor and Statistics in the United States. The OOH includes a database, which can be 
queried online, covering over 1,000 occupations and providing statistics on projected 
growth in each occupation. For instance, ‘high school teachers’ require a Bachelors 
qualification and their demand is expected to increase by 7% between 2010 and 2020, 
the time horizon of the OOH forecasts (http://www.bls.gov/ooh/, accessed July 2013). 
The occupation ‘construction labourers and helpers’ requires no formal qualifications, 
though certain basic skills are needed, and here demand to 2020 is expected to 
increase by 23%. Clearly this information can guide education planners directly, 
though it is also intended to steer public demand for education. The United 
Kingdom’s equivalent of the OOH, the Working futures report, also uses a ten year 
horizon but is more analytical, providing for instance forecasted trends with respect to 
the demand for graduates at different levels of the education system (United 
Kingdom: UK Commission for Employment and Skills, 2011: 120). However, 
Bertrand (2004: 44) suggests that even in the UK, the utilisation of this kind of 
information is limited. In South Africa, the Human Sciences Research Council 
(HSRC) has produced two issues of the Human resources development review, in 
2003 and 2008, partly to provide research to education planners on labour market 
demands (Kraak and Press (eds.), 2008). There is little evidence that the HSRC’s 
reports are used as such reports should be in education policymaking in South Africa. 
The reasons for this could of course be both a lack of responsiveness in the education 
sector and limitations of the reports themselves.   
(d) Teacher union demands. Teacher unions demands for higher salaries at the 
primary and secondary school levels, where unionisation is typically strong and 
market forces weak, are likely to crowd out funding for post-school education, where 
unionisation tends to be relatively weak. In fact, evidence from several developing 
countries presented by Pritchet and Filmer (1997), and discussed in Part I of the 
dissertation, suggests that this kind of crowding out could be the norm as teachers 
mostly succeed in inflating their salaries to a point well above a more market-related 
level.  
(e) International pressure. Part III of the dissertation discusses briefly the way 
foreign and international donors play a large role in the education decision-making of 
a specific set of developing countries. Researchers such as Samoff (1999) have been 
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highly critical of this kind of pressure, including the way in which it has apparently 
led to an over-prioritisation of primary schooling at the expense of the higher levels of 
the system. The basic argument is that donors tend to over-simplify and 
misunderstand the dynamics of the recipient country and hence advocate and 
generally succeed in imposing inappropriate policies. How rates of return analyses 
have been misused, in particular by World Bank analysts advising Sub-Saharan 
African governments on how to prioritise education levels, is a matter that has 
received considerable attention in the literature. This is discussed towards the end of 
this section. As is shown in the data analysis of section 10, however, the movements 
in the key enrolment indicator values since 1970 do not clearly support the hypothesis 
of a perverse over-prioritisation of the primary level in the case of Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
(f) Welfarist considerations. Finally, more skilled policymakers take the five factors 
mentioned above and incorporate them into what can be called a welfare economics 
framework, even if not all policymakers would be happy to use this term. Essentially, 
this involves looking at what kind of prioritisation across the education levels would 
maximise future welfare, whilst recognising that optimal future welfare is to some 
degree subject to differing interpretations of social equity. Educational equity is likely 
to promote income and socio-economic equity, but at the same time using education 
to create a critical mass of talented experts, which inevitably involves allowing some 
inequity, can promote innovation and thus economic growth. Of course the analysis 
can occur in a more or less formal manner. Moreover, the use of empirical evidence is 
in itself not proof that good evidence-driven policymaking is occurring. The evidence 
should be correctly interpreted. It is not impossible that optimum decisions will be 
taken even in the absence of a rational planning approach characterised by sound 
interpretation of empirical evidence. Responding very directly to, for instance, the 
demands of the public may result in an optimal distribution of education funding 
across levels. However, it can be considered preferable to pursue optimum policies on 
the basis of a approach model, as opposed to hoping that optimum policies will be 
achieved by accident.  
In any policymaking process, it is particularly important to avoid what is referred to as 
‘piecemeal welfare economics’ by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956: 11), two economists 
who came up with the first formal definition of ‘second best’ policymaking. In this 
type of policymaking, one explicitly acknowledges that a Pareto-optimal economy 
may be rendered impossible by a constraint, generally a market imperfection, which is 
not removable. For instance, an optimal set of enrolment ratios and per student 
spending values may involve a tertiary enrolment ratio of x and tertiary per student 
funding of y. However, teacher union pressure may result in a crowding out of the 
tertiary level in the budgeting process and policymakers may respond by suppressing 
per student funding at the tertiary level to a point below y, whilst maintaining tertiary 
enrolments at x. Because of the constraint imposed by teacher unions at the primary 
and secondary levels, the optimal policy positions at the tertiary level no longer hold 
true. Either x or y, or both, stipulated in the ‘first best’ solution must be abandoned. 
Haphazardly reducing per student spending could represent ‘piecemeal welfare 
economics’. However, rationally determining how to achieve a sub-optimal deviation 
from both x and y would represent second best policymaking.  
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Turning to the problem of rates of return to education and their implications for 
prioritisation across education levels, in Part I arguments put forward by Glewwe 
(1996) were discussed briefly. His two key complaints around the way rates of return 
have been used are, firstly, that the exclusion of positive externalities within these 
rates results in an under-valuation of tertiary education and, secondly, that the years of 
schooling variable used in the calculation is a poor proxy for what people actually 
learn, meaning there is a serious and confounding measurement error in the 
calculation. Bennell (1996) offers further reasons for rejecting the way rates of return 
have been used to inform policy, in an article titled ‘Using and abusing rates of 
return’. He argues that apart from possible problems with the source data, very basic 
anomalies in the rates of return calculations done by Psacharopoulos (2004) have been 
overlooked. He also argues that adjustments that ought to occur to typical rates of 
return statistics to take into account issues such as innate ability, socio-economic 
status and opportunity costs associated with informal sector work, would tend to 
reduce the primary level rates of return statistics to a larger degree than the tertiary 
level statistics. Gustafsson and Mabogoane (2012: 353) emphasise that rates of return, 
even in the absence of measurement errors, would tend to reflect the dynamics of a 
sub-optimal education system, and implicitly reject an approach where planners do 
not consider what the rates of return might have been in the presence of more efficient 
policies. Specifically, they link the high rates of return associated with attaining grade 
12 in South Africa to the fact that grade 12 is where the schooling system’s only 
national examination exists. The policy priority should perhaps rather be to introduce 
additional examinations lower down in the schooling system, as opposed to simply 
prioritising grade 12 attainment on the basis of existing rates of return. 
There appears to be no published attempt to come up with a theory on how rates of 
return, with all their shortcomings, could be used to inform education policymaking, 
in particular prioritisation across different types and levels of education. Whether such 
a theory is possible and could assist policymakers is not clear. Any theory would need 
to take into consideration the key dynamics discussed above, such as positive 
externalities associated with higher levels of education. It would also need to move 
beyond simply asking which level of education to prioritise. It seems preferable to see 
the problem as one of an equilibrium. Enrolment growth and spending increases must 
probably occur across several levels of the system at once, so questions should focus 
on how to pursue an optimum spread of budgets and efforts across several competing 
priorities. The analysis provided in section 10 can be considered a contribution 
towards a more evidence-based and rational approach to prioritisation across 
education levels, even if it falls several steps short of comprising a neat and 
comprehensive theory.  
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9 THE ECONOMICS OF PRIORITISING ACROSS EDUCATION LEVELS  
9.1 The basic economic theory 
Figure 36 below presents a diagram depicting the theoretical framework for 
investment in education by households and the government. The framework 
represents a fairly standard picture of the human capital model, with some 
differentiation by education level added (Schultz, 1961; Boissiere, 2004). A diagram 
such as this could be of use for education policymakers wanting to organise the 
discussion around the prioritisation of the levels of the education system, where the 
ultimate aim is to advance economic growth, or national development. The diagram 
can also be considered a summary of various strands of theory that are discussed 
across the three parts of the dissertation.  
A useful point of departure is the decisions taken by the household to invest in the 
education of its younger members. Investment decisions here are influenced by a 
number of variables. The household perceives, perhaps inaccurately, what incomes 
are associated with specific years of schooling and qualifications. These perceptions 
can encourage investment in more education, depending on the income gained from 
the additional education relative to the income forfeited from not entering the labour 
market immediately. The latter is often referred to as the indirect or opportunity cost 
of education. High direct costs, in the form of for instance tuition fees, could dissuade 
the household from investing further in education. The decisions of the household 
carry considerable risk, for two key reasons: it is risky to use present information as a 
proxy for what future incomes will be and the household cannot know if its members 
will succeed in reaching achievement levels required for specific qualifications. 
Investment in primary and secondary schooling often occurs due to the option value 
of this level of schooling, or the fact that it makes higher levels of education an option 
at a later point in time1.  
The education system gives household members two key things: learning outcomes, 
in the form of skills and knowledge, and qualifications. Importantly, learning 
outcomes are brought about not just by what happens in the education system, but also 
by what happens in the household. The greater the schooling, or human capital, of the 
previous generation of scholars in the household, or the parents, the greater the 
contribution of the household towards the learning of the next generation. Education 
makes people more productive, which contributes to higher incomes. However, 
success in the labour market also depends to some degree on qualifications, which 
provide signals to employers, and allow employers to screen job seekers. In theory, 
qualifications would reflect the skills and level of productivity of job seekers, though 
in practice the signalling devices would be imperfect. For instance, people with the 
same qualification would possess different innate abilities. It is possible for less 
qualified people to be more productive than more qualified people if, for instance, the 
qualifications system itself is inconsistent or unqualified people have acquired skills 
outside the formal education system.  
                                                     
1
 The term ‘option value’ is typically used to explain why governments invest in or maintain 
environmental or public assets which are not needed currently, but which are likely to be needed in 
future. McMahon (1982) and Burger and Teal (2013) are examples of economists who have used the 
term in the context of education investment choices.  
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Economic growth and social development occur as aggregate income rises, but also as 
positive externalities arising out of a more educated society, for instance greater trust 
and social cohesion, are realised. There is a cycle of improvement as each generation 
uses some of its income and capabilities to ensure that the next generation attains an 
even better level of education. A key question is how governments and policy can 
accelerate this cycle of development, or perhaps undermine it. This is dealt with in the 
grey boxes of the diagram.   
Government can accelerate human capital accumulation by ensuring that the 
redistribution of income, through the tax system, manifests itself in subsidised 
education for the poor. This redistribution plays a particularly large role in promoting 
growth in the lower levels of the education system, specifically primary schooling. 
Virtually everyone, regardless of socio-economic status, is able to participate in 
primary schooling. In contrast, home background disadvantages are a key reason why 
many are not able to fulfil entry requirements for tertiary education institutions. 
Moreover, due to high private returns to tertiary education, private loans for this level 
of education are, at least in theory, relatively easy to obtain, even for the poor who 
have performed well at the secondary level. In reality, however, poorly functioning 
banking sectors in developing countries may make it difficult for these loans to be 
realised. The fact that the cost of educating each primary school child is relatively 
low, is a further motive for a government to subsidise, often fully, primary school 
education for all. In fact, governments will often subsidise even the primary schooling 
of the rich, who could afford to pay for this schooling through private means. There is 
no strong economic rationale for any government to do this, but an ideological 
concern to keep all of society within one public primary system is often the 
determining factor here. Governments will often enforce investment in primary 
schooling through compulsory education laws. The enforcement applies particularly 
in the case of the very poorest households, which might otherwise have benefitted 
economically from having their young children work for an income, or in a family 
business or farm. Again, the overriding influence here may be ideological, rather than 
purely economic. Primary schooling has come to be seen as a non-negotiable basic 
human right or, to use the more economic terminology, a merit good.  
Due to the very public nature of the education system, prices are often not determined 
through market forces, but administratively, which increases the risk of rent-seeking 
(capture of income beyond what can be justified by one’s productivity) and 
inefficiencies. A large policy challenge revolves around the determination of teacher 
salaries in the pre-tertiary schooling sector, whose structure lends itself to high levels 
of unionisation and thus a combination of monopoly (a union will represent all 
teachers) and monopsony (the state is the only buyer of services). The government 
needs to ensure that the monopolistic result of inflated prices (or salaries) or the 
monopsonistic result of deflated prices are avoided. This needs to be achieved to a 
large extent through an analytical process of comparing teacher productivity and the 
wages of teachers relative to those of other similar professionals. These kinds of 
problems are relatively absent at the post-school level, largely because university 
teachers tend to have skills which are in demand in various sectors of the economy, 
thus allowing for roughly a market-like determination of wages.  
Governments typically need to find innovative ways of enhancing productivity in the 
education sector, given the serious information asymmetry problems that are inherent 
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to the education sector. The clients, households, are often unable to understand the 
quality of the specific education they are investing in until it is too late, in other words 
when the scholar enters the labour market. Even the government experiences great 
difficulties in assessing whether learning outcomes could be increased with the given 
budgets and technologies. Accountability systems are needed, but these should be 
designed in such a way that they minimise the possibility of gaming, in particular the 
possibility that teachers will misinform the administration about performance in their 
institutions. Incentives and disincentives can be attached to accountability systems, 
but unless this is done carefully, it can encourage even more misinformation. 
Moreover, poorly designed incentives can create unintended disincentives if, for 
instance, they result in a sense that the administration treats teachers unfairly.  
The government can reduce the information asymmetries experienced by the 
household in two important ways. Firstly, it can ensure that the household receives 
good information about the educational performance of its scholars, through 
standardised assessment systems. Not only does this assist the household in 
determining whether it is worth educating the scholar further, this information also 
allows the household to become an agent in the education process. An informed 
household is able to complain about the quality of the education service, may be in a 
position to consider alternative schools and might, together with other households, 
exert political pressure on the school to perform better. 
Secondly, the government can make it clearer to the household what level of income 
is associated with different types of education, especially at the post-school level, 
where the heterogeneity of educational offerings can be confusing. It can do this by 
collecting data and publishing the average earnings of graduates from different fields 
of study and institutions.  
Just as the government can enforce investment in primary schooling in the interests of 
combating poverty and advancing economic growth, it can also prohibit the household 
from investing in education where this seems like a poor investment. It does this 
through a system of quality hurdles, often in the form of examinations, which prevent 
scholars from advancing further in the education system if they are considered unable 
to succeed at the next level, or within a specific field of study.  
What has been provided here is a high-level summary of key dynamics that should 
influence the education planner’s thinking around the prioritisation of the various 
levels of the education system. Clearly, the amount of education that happens at each 
level, in terms of enrolments and learning outcomes, is not a simple matter of 
spreading budgets across the levels in a manner that is appropriate for the country’s 
level of economic development. Various interventions aimed at improving the 
education system’s internal efficiency, setting standards and making information 
available interact with each other and determine the effectiveness of each level, and of 
the of education system as a whole.  
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Figure 36: The human capital model and the role of education policies 
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9.2 Empirical findings from cross-country models 
As discussed in section 8, the use of the microeconomic rates of return to education 
evidence to inform prioritisation across levels of the education system has been 
flawed. It is not clear whether the existing flaws in this channel between evidence and 
policymaking can be corrected, but this is not the focus of this dissertation. Instead, 
the focus in the dissertation is mainly on the use of cross-country data in answering 
policy questions. Part II pays special attention to how these data can be used to solve 
policy questions relating to the prioritisation of education levels. Here there seems not 
to be much empirical work done beyond the few texts discussed in this section. Two 
of these texts are discussed in some detail as their coverage of the policy questions is 
rather comprehensive: Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2006), who focus just on 
high income countries, and Lutz, Cuaresma and Sanderson (2008), whose focus is 
developing countries. At the end of the section, a few further texts are briefly 
discussed which deal less comprehensively with the question posed at the start of 
section 7, or limit their attention to specific geographical regions.  
Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2006), henceforth referred to as VAM, present a 
series of growth regressions which are unusual insofar as they focus on optimal mixes 
of levels of education in the labour force. Their theoretical framework was discussed 
in Part I of the dissertation. Here their empirical work is discussed. VAM are largely 
motivated by a need to respond to Krueger and Lindahl (2001: 1119, 1130), who 
found that average years of schooling of adults was not correlated with economic 
growth in models covering just high income countries, and hence concluded that 
education was a less important driver of growth in these countries than was commonly 
thought. This explains partly why VAM use only data from high income countries, 
specifically 19 high income OECD countries. Further reasons for this are the limited 
nature of certain data from developing countries, in particular historical public 
expenditure data and average years of schooling attained data, and the fact that VAM 
were interested in examining trade-offs between imitation and innovation, the second 
of these phenomena being a feature largely of developed countries. Despite the 
exclusion of developing countries, the analysis presented by VAM would probably be 
of interest to developing country policymakers, who are often under pressure to 
pursue innovation, often on the basis of ideological considerations.  
A key concept in VAM is distance from or proximity to the global technological 
frontier. If their model is important for education planning, and they suggest it is, then 
so is understanding a country’s proximity to the technological frontier. They 
hypothesise that how close a country is to having internalised all the best available 
technology at any point in time determines what the optimal split in the labour force 
between skilled and unskilled workers is. In their empirical analysis, VAM consider 
workers with post-school education as skilled and those with just school education as 
unskilled. They furthermore assume that the technology of the United States 
represents the technological frontier. Distance from this frontier is measured in terms 
of total factor productivity (TFP), a measure worth discussing in some detail. TFP is 
essentially a measure of how productive workers and the technologies they use are. In 
other words, it can be seen as the A of the Cobb-Douglas model discussed in Part I of 
the dissertation. VAM (2006: 110) define the term as follows: ‘output per adult minus 
capital per adult times the capital share’. This means that TFP is higher when (1) more 
adults are workers, (2) workers are more productive given a particular level of 
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technology, (3) the technology used is more advanced and (4) the capital share is 
higher. The capital share and labour share of an economy together equal one. The 
capital share is generally calculated as the part of national income that is not paid in 
the form of wages but instead takes the form of interest income and economic profit 
(Schneider, 2011: 1). TFP improves when the capital share is higher, if output remains 
the constant, as this would mean that the ratio of outputs to wages increases. VAM 
themselves do not elaborate on issues relating to the measurement of TFP, though a 
discussion in Manuelli and Seshadri (2010) suggests this is not a straightforward 
matter. Saliola and Seker (2011) use firm data to calculate TFP and find within a 
group of 27 developing countries Zambia, South Africa and Colombia to be amongst 
the bottom five countries and Ethiopia, Mexico and Peru to be the top three. 
Intuitively these rankings are difficult to grasp, suggesting that TFP may not have 
become a sufficiently robust measure to inform policymakers.  
Notwithstanding some doubts around measuring proximity to the technological 
frontier, as a whole the VAM model does appear to make intuitive sense. In one key 
growth regression (VAM, 2006: 113, model 5), data from five-year intervals for the 
period 1960 to 2000, covering the 19 OECD countries, are used in a regression 
described by the following equation: 
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On the left-hand side is growth over a five-year period with respect to Y, which in this 
equation is taken to be total factor productivity. On the right-hand side, fixed effects 
are introduced for each of seven groups of countries, determined according to 
institutional and geographical criteria, and indicated by the subscript j, as well as for 
each time period t. The first slope coefficient describes the association for distance to 
the technological frontier, lagged by one period, where * indicates that the TFP of the 
country with the maximum value in period t is used. The variable h is the percentage 
of adults who have attained a tertiary education. This is lagged by one period. Finally, 
the last explanatory variable is the interaction of the previous two. All three 
coefficients B2, B3 and B4 are statistically significant at least at the 5% level. What is 
not indicated above are three instrumental variables: distance to the frontier lagged by 
ten years, an indicator of expenditure on tertiary education lagged by five years, and 
the interaction of these two. The last two of these variables emerge as statistically 
significant in the first stage regression. VAM conclude, on the basis of a rank test, that 
endogeneity, specifically the possibility that improvements in Y cause improvements 
in tertiary attainments, is not a factor that needs to influence the interpretation of the 
results.   
A simulation using the results of the regression indicate that if a country that has 
incorporated 80% of the technology of the frontier (amongst the 19 high income 
countries the mean is 74% and minimum 42%) and has achieved 13% attainment of 
tertiary education amongst adults (mean of 13%, minimum of 1.5%) increases the 
attainment percentage from 13% to 15%, annual growth improves by 0.1 percentage 
points. However, had the country incorporated 85% of the technology of the frontier, 
the same improvement to the attainment percentage would result in an improvement 
to annual growth of a much larger 0.25 percentage points. VAM (2006: 122) believe 
the results have policy relevance: ‘Our empirical estimates in this paper can be used to 
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derive policy prescriptions in developed countries’. How exactly this might occur is 
debatable, but what is clear is that planners stand to gain from improvements to the 
measurement of the distance to the global technology frontier, as this statistic 
influences assessments such as whether too few graduates are being produced by the 
tertiary education sector. The analysis by VAM provides empirical backing for the 
intuition of education planners, specifically the notion that expanding the tertiary 
education sector is likely to impact positively on growth, though, as shown by VAM, 
there is an important conditionality attached to the expected magnitude of the growth 
improvement. The weakness with the Krueger and Lindahl (2001) argument is thus 
that their measure of educational attainment was just one average value encompassing 
all levels of education, and not level-specific values. Disaggregation by level is 
necessary if the relationship between education and economic growth is to be properly 
understood. Of course further analysis along the lines of VAM to explore the 
dynamics in developing countries would be valuable.   
In Part I of the dissertation, the IIASA-VID dataset of internationally comparable 
educational attainment statistics by age, developed jointly by the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and the Vienna Institute of 
Demography (VID) was described. Lutz, Cuaresma and Sanderson (2008) describe a 
growth regression that uses these data and that probably comes closer than any other 
available analysis to answering empirically the question of how growth at the various 
levels of the education system should be prioritised in the interests of country 
development and economic growth2. The analysis has certain drawbacks, which are 
discussed below, yet it stands out as filling a gap in the body of research required by 
education planners. Perhaps because the research is still relatively new, but perhaps 
also due to the unresponsiveness of policymakers, there seems to be little evidence 
that this research by Lutz et al (2008) has been used or critiqued by those engaged in 
policymaking.  
The growth regression by Lutz et al (2008) uses data from 101 countries, 84 of which 
are non-OECD countries, for five-year intervals in the period 1970 to 2000. The 
empirical form of the regression, seen below, is in several respects similar to that of 
VAM.  
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Here Y is GDP in real terms, so the left-hand side of the equation refers to GDP 
growth for country i over a five-year period. On the right-hand side, there is one 
undifferentiated intercept, so no fixed effects are employed. The first log difference 
on the right-hand side is repeated eight times, for two broad age categories j, being 15 
to 39 and 40 to 65, and four educational attainment categories k, being: (1) no formal 
education, (2) from incomplete primary schooling to incomplete lower secondary 
schooling (called ‘Primary’ in Table 23 below and in the original research article), (3) 
from complete lower secondary schooling to incomplete first level tertiary education 
(called ‘Secondary’ in the table), and (4) first level of tertiary complete and above 
                                                     
2
 The details of the growth regression appear in a separate technical appendix. 
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(called ‘Tertiary’ in the table). L is the number of adults in each of the eight 
categories, so the explanatory variables deal with growth in a country’s human capital 
with respect to the two age categories and the four education attainment levels. The 
equation includes a distance to global technological frontier variable, as in equation 
(86), except here the measure is simply the gap between the per capita income, W, of 
country i in period t and the highest per capita income for any country or period found 
in the dataset. Growth in the capital stock K is the next explanatory variable. Finally, a 
series of variables dealing with the interaction between level of L and distance to the 
global frontier is included.  
Of special interest to policymakers would be the simulations, presented by Lutz et al 
(2008: 1048), for four hypothetical countries, the results of which are reproduced in 
Table 23. The expected annual growth associated with four different combinations of 
human capital amongst adults is described.   
Table 23: Simulations from regression using IIASA-VID data 
Country No 
schooling 
Highest level attained Total Annual 
growth Primary Secondary Tertiary 
A 50 40 10 0 100 2.0 
B 0 90 10 0 100 6.5 
C 0 50 50 0 100 13.0 
D 50 30 15 5 100 7.0 
Source: Values read off graph in Lutz, Cuaresma and Sanderson (2008: 1048). 
Note: See preceding discussion for definitions of the education levels.  
 
As argued by Lutz et al (2008), what seems particularly relevant for policymaking is 
country C, which illustrates the especially large returns associated with investments in 
secondary schooling, remembering that this has been defined as ranging from 
attainment of complete lower secondary schooling to incomplete first level tertiary 
education. It is implied that the United Nations, with its strong prioritisation of 
universal primary education (UPE), has probably under-estimated the importance of 
secondary schooling. Specifically, if moving from the country B scenario of universal 
primary education with very little secondary education to the country C scenario of 
50% attainment of secondary schooling should bring with it additional growth returns, 
of 6.5 percentage points, which are considerably larger than the returns associated 
with a movement from the country A scenario, of very low education attainment 
generally, to the UPE of country B, then the general perception amongst many 
education planners and donor agencies has probably been somewhat misguided. 
Country D challenges the common opinion to an even greater degree. It implies that 
not insisting on UPE and maintaining a relatively elitist education system results in a 
level of growth which is at least as good as the UPE with a bit of secondary schooling 
scenario of country B. This could be of interest to planners in countries that by 2010 
were still far from achieving UPE. The IIASA-VID data point to the existence of six 
such countries in 2010, all them in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(http://webarchive.iiasa.ac.at/Research/POP/edu07/, accessed November 2012). Of 
course the notion that basic education is important as a human right, and not just as 
human capital investment, would disqualify the country D option. What seems of 
greatest relevance for policymakers in Lutz et al (2008) seems to be the evidence 
pointing to the need for a strong focus on secondary schooling in developing 
countries. Above all, in the absence of strong policy signals around secondary 
schooling, there is a risk that once developing countries attain universal primary 
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schooling, there will be a sense that ‘the job is done’ and public resources will not be 
directed towards secondary schooling to the degree they should be.  
One drawback with Lutz et al (2008) is that they do not consider the possibility of 
endogeneity in their growth regression, as VAM do. In particular, in drawing 
conclusions around the impact of investment in the various levels of the education 
system, they do not consider the possibility that in the past economic growth has 
driven investments in education, as opposed to the reverse being the case. However, 
the direction of causation in this relationship has been studied extensively by other 
analysts, including VAM (2008) and researchers such as Hanushek and Woessman 
(2009) discussed in Part I of the dissertation. The evidence suggests strongly that the 
direction of causation is largely from education to growth.  
Turning to a few other attempts to answer the levels prioritisation question using 
country-level data, Mingat and Tan (1998) provide a series of essentially bivariate and 
cross-sectional analyses of a number of development and education indicators in an 
attempt to uncover the ‘mechanics of progress in education’. Indicators cover, in 
particular, enrolment, grade repetition, school life expectancy, spending per student, 
spending on non-personnel, teacher pay, test scores, and demographic structure. A key 
concern in Mingat and Tan (1998) is how factors such as a decrease in teacher pay 
relative to GDP per capita allow richer countries to devote more resources to each 
pupil. The prioritisation of levels is a minor concern, though with progress is said to 
come a reduction in inequality between the per student spending levels of the 
secondary and tertiary levels. Yet the authors find considerable randomness in the 
data, which precludes the identification of clear development paths. Essentially, 
‘countries have substantial leeway to set priorities’ (Mingat and Tan, 1998: 7).  
Different ways of prioritising education levels, and types, are said to lie behind the 
slower growth of European countries relative to the United States in recent decades. 
Aghion and Howitt (2009: 287, 312), in reviewing the available literature, argue that 
lower levels of attainment of tertiary education in Europe relative to the US explain 
the higher growth of the latter. Krueger and Kumar (2004), relying almost exclusively 
on a theoretical and mathematical macro model, conclude that Europe has forfeited 
growth in the period since around 1980, relative to the US, because Europe did not 
respond to the acceleration of technological change by shifting priorities away from 
vocational education, which was an appropriate priority up to the 1970s when 
technological change was slower, and towards general education. In a context of rapid 
technological change, it becomes less feasible to train people in the use of specific 
technologies because that training soon becomes redundant. Instead, one needs to 
focus on giving people the fundamental cognitive skills they need to adapt to 
changing circumstances. Such skills are best developed through a more general 
education.  
Teal (2011) uses evidence from a country-level panel dataset to argue that Sub-
Saharan African countries should perhaps place an even greater relative prioritisation 
on tertiary education than other countries. In a regression analysis predicting income 
per capita for 32 African countries for the 1960 to 2004 period, Teal (2011: 58) finds 
that the average years of tertiary education, and to some extent secondary education, 
of adults are a far better predictor of growth than years of primary education. In some 
respects, Teal’s (2011) policy recommendations are diametrically opposed to the 
notion, already discredited by others as seen in section 8 above, that Africa should 
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prioritise primary schooling. Caveats put forward by Teal (2011) include the 
conditions that growth in the number of tertiary education graduates should be 
coupled to a shift towards more private sector employment and a stronger emphasis 
on the export of goods and services produced by graduates.  
10 NEW FINDINGS FROM THE COUNTRY-LEVEL DATA 
10.1 The data 
The key data used for the analysis that follows are, firstly, income per capita from the 
Penn World Table version 7.0 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2011) and, secondly, 
eleven indicators relating to enrolments and expenditure drawn from the UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics (UIS) online query facility (UNESCO: UIS). The eleven 
indicators are listed in Table 25 below.  
Part I of the dissertation described a number of different UNESCO datasets, including 
the online UIS data on education, most of which are derived from questionnaires 
completed by ministries of education around the world. Part I also explained how the 
UIS data have been used, in combination with other data sources, to produce country-
level datasets on educational attainment. Here issues relating to the eleven selected 
indicators are discussed. 
The online UIS database is large and includes over 800 variables. The data used for 
the analysis were downloaded in September 2012. Only portions of the data can be 
downloaded at a time, so only data that appeared useful for the analysis were 
accessed. In fact, the labour-intensity of the process of downloading and then 
normalising the UIS data is likely to be one reason why these data have not often been 
systematically analysed. Another reason could be the limited technical documentation 
explaining the data. Obviously, the UIS database is expanded over time as new 
questionnaires covering new years are received, but retrospective changes to values 
seem to be rare, apart from changes relating to countries that have broken up, as 
discussed below. In the data used for the analysis, values were available for the 1970 
to 2011 period, with at least some data being available every year. There were at least 
some values for 197 different countries. In selecting data, the completeness of the data 
across years and countries was one consideration, as well as relevance to the issue of 
level prioritisation. The UIS data follow the International Standard Classification of 
Education (ISCED), determined by UNESCO, in specifying levels of the education 
system. The following seven ISCED levels, from 0 to 6, exist (UNESCO, 1997).  
Table 24: ISCED classifications 
ISCED 
level 
Description 
0 Pre-primary education 
1 Primary education or first stage of basic education 
2 Lower secondary or second stage of basic education 
3 (Upper) secondary education 
4 Post-secondary non-tertiary education 
5 First stage of tertiary education 
6 Second stage of tertiary education 
 
Levels 2 to 5 have A and B sub-categories, covering more general and more 
vocational education respectively.  
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Five gross enrolment ratios (GERs) are included amongst the eleven indicators, 
corresponding to the primary, lower secondary, upper secondary, secondary, and 
tertiary levels. These GER values are calculated by UIS. Lower and upper secondary 
GERs are disaggregated versions of the secondary level GER. The secondary level 
GER values cover all programmes, so vocational education at this level would be 
included. As seen in Table 25, lower and upper secondary GER values span a shorter 
period, from 1998 to 2011. No already calculated GER for ISCED level 4 is available, 
but a more or less equivalent indicator was derived, as explained below.  
Table 25: Data availability 
Variable Values Countries 
Min. 
Year 
Max. 
year 
GER primary 6,089 193 1970 2011 
GER lower secondary 1,979 190 1998 2011 
GER upper secondary 1,885 189 1998 2011 
GER secondary 5,303 193 1970 2011 
GER tertiary 4,429 190 1970 2011 
Vocational ISCED 2/3 4,605 189 1970 2011 
Post-secondary non-tertiary 804 110 1998 2011 
Tertiary engineering 824 132 1998 2011 
Per student expenditure primary 2,187 165 1971 2011 
Per student expenditure secondary 2,117 169 1971 2011 
Per student expenditure tertiary 2,089 164 1971 2010 
GDP per capita PPP in 2005 USD 6,891 189 1970 2009 
 
The gross enrolment ratio is the enrolment of a particular level of the system, divided 
by the population of the age that would be enrolled at that level if there was no grade 
repetition and everyone in the population completed that level. Clearly, the GER can 
exceed 100 (the ratio is generally multiplied by 100). As already mentioned, the 
documentation accompanying the UIS data is thin, so a number of key criteria are not 
completely clear. For instance, there is some ambiguity around what is considered 
‘tertiary’ in the UIS data. More critically, the age range in the population denominator 
used for the tertiary GER for each country is not made clear. The only specification 
that could be found was one on the World Bank site indicating that for all countries 
the five age cohorts starting from the age cohort immediately after the last secondary 
schooling age cohort, are used3. Given the close collaboration between UNESCO and 
the World Bank when it comes to education data, and the fact that the World Bank has 
no parallel data collection process for national education statistics but relies on 
UNESCO, the specification on the World Bank website is probably accurate.  
Competing, in a sense, with the GER is the net enrolment ratio (NER) and, available 
since 2009, the adjusted NER. The NER is enrolment within an education level over 
population counting only those who are in the correct age range in both the numerator 
and the denominator. The NER should thus never exceed 100. The adjusted NER, 
which should also never exceed 100, is essentially an expanded age-specific 
enrolment ratio (ASER), for instance all 7 to 15 year olds enrolled at any level of the 
system, divided by all 7 to 15 year olds in the population. As pointed out by Lewin 
(2011: 7), the advantage of the NER over the GER is that it is much less likely to be 
distorted by inefficiencies in the form of grade repetition. One can illustrate the 
problem with an extreme example. If in one country only half of all children get to 
attend primary schooling, at the right ages, but all repeat each grade once, the GER 
                                                     
3
 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR. 
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for the primary level would be 100, but the NER would be a more realistic 50. The 
disadvantage with the NER is that it is often distorted by poor data, given its reliance 
on what are often problematic age breakdowns in the enrolment data. Gustafsson 
(2012b) explains how even the GER is subject to a number of measurement problems 
relating to discrepancies between enrolment and population data. The NER would be 
subject to these same problems, but also further problems in the enrolment data. For 
many countries the NER is simply not calculated, whilst the GER is. In the 1970 to 
2011 period, there are twice as many GER values as NER values in the UIS data. In 
the 2000 to 2011 period, 198 countries have GER values, but only 162 have NER 
values. Countries without NER values in this later period include India and Russia. 
Conceptually, the GER has some advantages. It does provide a sense of the capacity 
of the education system. Even if in our hypothetical country only half of all children 
receive primary schooling, if the GER is 100 then the country has enough capacity, in 
terms of physical space and teachers, to provide primary schooling for all, if only 
repeaters were replaced by non-repeaters.  
Apart from the five GERs listed in Table 25, three new enrolment ratios were derived 
from the available UIS data to deal with important pockets of the education system. 
Firstly, technical and vocational education enrolments in ISCED 2 and 3 were divided 
by total ISCED 2 and 3 enrolments. Secondly, enrolments in something the UIS refers 
to as ‘post-secondary non-tertiary’ was expressed as a percentage of itself plus all 
tertiary enrolments. Thirdly, tertiary enrolments in ‘engineering, manufacturing and 
construction’ were divided by all tertiary enrolments, given the importance of these 
specialisations for economic growth and given that this new indicator displayed some 
interesting initial patterns. The Table 25 figures point to the fact that the second and 
third indicators described here could be calculated only for a limited number of years 
and countries.  
Turning to expenditure by level, three indicators already calculated by the UIS were 
used. These were expenditure per student expressed as a ratio of GDP per capita, for 
the primary, secondary and tertiary levels. The available metadata make it clear that 
the numerator in this ratio is public expenditure, excluding private expenditure, and it 
is fairly clear that only current expenditure, and not capital expenditure, is considered 
(see for instance UNESCO, 2003). The questionnaires used by the UIS to collect data 
from ministries of education seem to suggest that respondents should fill in only 
spending directed at education institutions themselves, and not, for instance, the 
education administration outside these institutions. However, this is not altogether 
clear and in many education systems accounting systems are not able to distinguish 
clearly between, say, staff based permanently at schools and staff who move between 
schools providing administrative or educational support.    
Only 197 countries were included in the analysis, and these were all countries listed in 
the World Development Report of 2012 (World Bank, 2011b). Very small countries 
not on the list were thus filtered out. With regard to country breakups and mergers, it 
should be noted that the UIS data include historical values from before the 1990s for 
many states created post-1990 in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. For instance, 
values for the Czech Republic and Slovakia going back as far as 1971 and 1987 
respectively are available, though these countries only came into being in 1993 after 
the breakup of Czechoslovakia. What the UIS has not done is simply use the values 
submitted by Czechoslovakia for pre-1993 data on the two new countries. The pre-
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1993 values are different for the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The methodology 
followed by the UIS is not clear. All 197 countries and details on their data 
availability with respect to the eleven education indicators appear in Appendix A of 
Part II of the dissertation.  
10.2 Methodology 
In proceeding with the data analysis that follows, it was assumed, correctly it seemed 
in the end, that a systematic exploration of patterns within the data summarised in 
Table 25 would produce findings that are relevant for policymakers, could inform 
future research and are interesting from a historical perspective. The analysis 
presented below employs an eclectic mix of techniques, including factor analysis, a 
semi-Bayesian growth regression model discussed in Part I of the dissertation and 
techniques commonly used in econometrics, in particular panel data fixed effects 
modelling. There is a strong emphasis on innovative ways of graphing the data and, 
implicitly, on constructing economical graphs that on the one hand convey as much 
relevant information as possible, whilst minimising the risk of being overly complex. 
The emphasis on graphs should be understood in the context of a key concern of the 
dissertation, which is to convey information to education planners as effectively as 
possible. There is some published literature supporting the efficacy of graphs for 
communicating quantitative findings, such as Kastellec and Leoni (2007). Probably 
the most widely known recent example of innovative graph use to influence a range of 
decision-makers is the work of Hans Rosling, often involving animated graphs. Whilst 
no animated graphs were developed in the analysis that follows, it is to some extent 
inspired by Rosling’s work (Rosling, Rosling Rönnlund and Rosling, 2005). 
The overriding research question for Part II of the dissertation, introduced in section 7 
above, informed four data analysis questions, which are each dealt with in their own 
section below. Firstly, there was the question of whether a simple cross-sectional 
analysis, using just recent data, would reveal interesting patterns, along the lines of 
the work of Mingat and Tan (2003). Secondly, what patterns would the historical data 
display, and to what extent would these patterns support the more simplistic cross-
sectional approach to understanding country development? Thirdly, are there 
correlations between economic growth and the various education indicators which 
reveal anything new, even if just suggestive, about the role of education in 
accelerating development? Fourthly, how could one practically use the patterns found 
in the data to inform policymaking in a specific country?  
10.3 Cross-sectional analysis of recent values 
Table 26 below offers a useful first view of the cross-sectional relationships between 
the eleven indicators listed in Table 25 above, on the one hand, and per capita income 
(in PPP terms) in 2009, on the other, on the basis of purely bivariate regressions. 
Income is expressed as log to the base 2, so coefficients point to the change in the 
indicator value associated with a doubling of income. To pick out a rather striking 
example, increasing the secondary level gross enrolment ratio (GER) by 14 points is 
associated with a doubling of income, and this education indicator is able to explain 
61% of the variation in the income variable. Amongst the enrolment variables, the 
primary GER displays a poor correlation with income, largely because all countries 
have achieved relatively high levels of primary enrolment and poor countries tend to 
have more grade repeaters. A poor correlation is also observed for the three variables 
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dealing with post-secondary non-tertiary, vocational and engineering enrolments. 
These three last variables will be discussed mainly within sections 10.4 and 10.5.   
Table 26: Regression of indicator values on income 
Variable Countries 
Coefficient 
on log of 
income to 
base 2 R2 
GER primary 183 1.2 0.023 
GER lower secondary 182 12.0 0.608 
GER upper secondary 181 12.9 0.663 
GER secondary 181 14.4 0.614 
GER tertiary 173 8.5 0.443 
Vocational ISCED 2/3 161 2.3 0.138 
Post-secondary non-tertiary 104 -1.9 0.039 
Tertiary engineering 123 1.0 0.084 
Per student expenditure primary* 144 0.8 0.042 
Per student expenditure secondary* 141 -1.1 0.027 
Per student expenditure tertiary* 132 -51.8 0.177 
Note: * all per student expenditure values expressed as a ratio of GDP per 
capita in 2009. Each row in the table refers to a separate two-variable 
regression.  
 
Given the kinds of concerns that education policymakers have, it seemed worthwhile 
to come up with a graph that could effectively display, for several countries or several 
groups of countries, enrolment and spending patterns across the three main levels of 
the education system. For this purpose, the format shown in Figure , with its 
magnification in Figure 38, was developed. Each curve displays where the means for 
the GER and expenditure indicators are situated, at the primary, secondary and 
tertiary levels, by four levels of country development: low, lower middle, upper 
middle and high income. For enrolments, secondary schooling was broken down into 
lower secondary and upper secondary as the data allowed for this, though not for a 
similar breakdown when it came to spending. Income classifications are those of the 
World Bank (2011b). To deal with the problem of missing values, in the case of each 
country data from the last year after 1999 with the lowest extent of missing values 
were used. Data from 194 countries are used for the graphs, the average number of 
non-missing values per country being 5.9, out of a possible maximum of 7 (3 
enrolment values, 4 spending values). For 112 countries, all 7 values were present. 
The mean year of the country data used was 2007.0.  
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Figure 37: Educational level prioritisation ±2007 
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Source: Own calculations from dataset described in section 10.1. Values from 
194 countries are used. Mean year across countries is 2007.0.  
Figure 38: Magnification of Figure  
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The patterns in the graphs seem unsurprising. On the expenditure side, the especially 
high level of resourcing devoted to each tertiary student, relative to GDP per capita, in 
low income countries stands out. This one might expect, given the globally 
competitive nature of tertiary education (developing country elites often send their 
young to rich country universities), meaning there is pressure to approximate the per 
student spending found in high income countries in absolute terms. To a lesser degree, 
this dynamic would influence the middle income tertiary spending ratios as well. On 
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the enrolment side, if one examines the data points in the graphs against the horizontal 
axis, it is clear that as countries develop (keeping in mind, however, that these are 
cross-sectional data), the point at which large numbers of students leave the system 
shifts from primary schooling, in low income countries, to upper secondary schooling, 
in high income countries.  
How much dispersion is there in the country values around the means behind the 
points of, say, Figure 38? The coefficients of variation in the next table indicate that 
there is more dispersion around the spending means than the enrolment means. 
Moreover, within each of the developing country categories, there is a particularly 
large degree of variation with respect to the tertiary spending indicator. A graphic 
illustration of the dispersion with respect to the two dimensions of one of the data 
points, namely that for upper secondary education in upper middle income countries, 
is given in Figure 39.  
Table 27: Coefficients of variation for enrolment and spending statistics 
Gross enrolment ratio 
Per student spending over 
GDP/capita 
Country 
category Primary 
Lower 
sec. 
Upper 
sec. Tertiary Primary Sec. Tertiary Countries 
LIC 0.24 0.43 0.69 1.34 0.64 0.79 1.52 44 
LMC 0.14 0.33 0.49 0.91 0.64 0.73 1.01 52 
UMC 0.08 0.14 0.23 0.54 0.37 0.43 1.29 51 
HIC 0.07 0.08 0.20 0.46 0.37 0.37 0.49 47 
Overall 0.14 0.34 0.50 0.83 0.52 0.63 2.18 194 
 
Figure 39: Figure 38 with dispersion illustrated 
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Note: Smaller points illustrate the dispersion of upper secondary values for 
upper middle income (UMC) countries.  
 
To gain a better sense of the dispersion of country values with respect to the graphs 
appearing above, a calculation was run where it was determined whether each 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Part II 208 
country-specific two dimensional point was closer to the correct mean point or some 
other mean point within a specific education level. For instance, if the upper 
secondary point for Zambia was closer, in a two-dimensional sense, to the lower 
middle income country mean point than the mean point for one of the other 
development categories, this Zambia point was given a score of 1 (Zambia is a lower 
middle income country). If not, it was given a score of zero. The mean across all the 
scores was 0.51, meaning that half of the time the country-specific points were closest 
to the mean point of their development category, the other half of the time they were 
not. What all this indicates is that the dispersion is substantial and that simplistic 
interpretations of the aggregate multi-country statistics, even where relatively robust 
patterns are found, should be avoided.  
The previous three graphs, which are actually different views of the same graph, 
illustrate one of two key graph formats that will be used frequently in the analysis that 
follows. The second graph format is shown below and simply involves joining the 
points of the previous graphs differently, so that curves represent levels of education, 
where previously they represented country development categories. In Figure 40 
below, we could say that curves point to the trajectory or pathway that, say, tertiary 
education can be expected to take as a country develops.  
Figure 40: Figure 38 viewed transversally   
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Note: The points referring to development category (LIC etc.) indicate the 
means along the horizontal and vertical axes for the countries in the category 
in question.  
 
It seemed worthwhile to explore a variation of the previous graph where more detail 
on the pathways would be seen, using not just the development categories of 
countries, but exact per capita income. The result was the following graph, admittedly 
not a very visually appealing graph, but it serves as a point of departure for a better 
graph that will be discussed below. Countries were placed in a list in ascending order 
of income, where this was GDP per capita in 2005 USD PPP terms (using the Penn 
data source discussed in section 10.1). As above, only data from a recent year not 
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earlier than the year 2000 were used. This list was used to calculate moving averages 
with respect to the education indicators, where each average covered 21 countries. 
The lines in Figure 41 are lines joining the averages. Markers have been inserted at 
points along the pathways corresponding to countries with more or less the median 
income for a specific development category.    
Figure 41: Moving average pathways for enrolment and spending   
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Note: Each marker is situated on a point reflecting the median per capita GDP 
value for each of the four development categories. 
 
One problem with the foregoing graphs is that they do not consider patterns across all 
seven indicators within individual countries. Figure 41 does to some extent reflect the 
relationship across two indicators at a time within individual countries, for instance, 
primary enrolments and per student spending. A further problem with the last graph is 
that it assumes that income per capita is a reliable measure of a country’s level of 
development. One way of dealing with these deficiencies is to completely ignore the 
income variable and the World Bank’s development category and to seek a 
development trajectory using just the seven education variables. Factor analysis, using 
the factor command in Stata, allows us to do this. The ‘principal factor’ option for the 
command was used, and then using the post-estimation predict command, a single z-
score was produced for each of the 112 countries included in the analysis, where this 
z-score in a sense summarised the seven indicator values. Only 112 countries could be 
included as each country had to have all seven values. The factor statistical outputs 
include uniqueness values for each of the seven input variables, which if below 
around 0.5 point to a high correlation between the variable and the z-score (StataCorp, 
2011: 297). As one may expect from the above discussion, the primary GER is not a 
good predictor of a country’s development status, but nor are the secondary and 
tertiary spending ratios. The other four variables, however, do display trends moving 
in the same general direction as the z-score. What is striking is that the z-score 
displays a high correlation with what would normally be considered a key indicator of 
country development, namely income per capita. The correlation coefficient if the 
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untransformed income variable is used is 0.67, but it rises to 0.86 if the natural 
logarithm of income is used. The following graph illustrates the relationship.  
Figure 42: Income and a measure of education development   
300
780
2,028
5,273
13,709
35,644
92,675
-2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
G
D
P
 p
e
r 
c
a
p
it
a
 P
P
P
 in
 2
0
0
5
 U
S
D
 (
lo
g
a
ri
th
m
ic
 s
c
a
le
)
z-score of level prioritisation
MDA
MNG
ARE
 
Note: R2 for the trendline is 0.74.  
 
Examining the outliers in the graph can be informative for policymakers. If one 
compares the seven values for United Arab Emirates (ARE) against those of countries 
with similar levels of income per capita, one finds that this country is an outlier 
because per student spending is low relative to GDP per capita. This fact, combined 
with other evidence, might point to spending on specific levels of education being too 
low. To the right of the trendline, Mongolia (MNG) and Moldova (MDA) are more 
developed according to their z-scores than their income largely because their level of 
tertiary enrolment is higher than that of other countries with similar incomes. The 
governments could use this fact to attract foreign investors, on the basis of their 
quality of human capital. Of course these kinds of policy conclusions can be drawn 
without the use of the graph, but the graph represents a novel and compact method of 
identifying whether countries are possible laggards or pioneers with respect to the 
global pattern, and with respect to the seven indicators in question.  
Figure 41 can now be redrawn with countries ranked in the list according to a more 
educationally-focussed summary indicator of development, namely the z-score. The 
result is Figure 43 below. As one would expect, the curves now display fewer random 
movements because the ‘noise’ previously caused by the use of income as an indicator 
of development has been removed.   
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Figure 43: Moving average pathways without use of income   
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Note: Here, as in Figure 41, curves are smoothed using moving averages that 
cover 21 countries at a time. The points labelled ‘LIC’ etc. are positioned 
where they represent the median z-score per development category produced 
by the factor analysis. 
 
One striking pattern seen above is that at the secondary levels there is a clear decline 
and then increase in spending per student relative to GDP per capita. Of course it 
should be kept in mind that this is a cross-sectional view of the data. When historical 
patterns are examined in the following section, different patterns are seen. 
To conclude the analysis of cross-sectional patterns, the next graph takes the per 
student spending ratios from the previous graph and converts them into absolute 
monetary terms by multiplying them by GDP per capita. In absolute terms, there is a 
continuous increase in per student spending as countries develop, but the difference 
between the spending levels of upper middle income countries and high income 
countries is stark.  
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Figure 44: Figure 43 with absolute per student spending   
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10.4 Analysis of historical trends 
Using cross-sectional data almost as if they revealed historical development trends, as 
was done in the previous section, is common. This is the approach employed by 
Mingat and Tan (2003), for instance. Of course historical trends should ideally be 
examined using historical data, and this is what is attempted in this section. One 
difficulty posed by a historical analysis is that even inflation-adjusted purchasing 
power parity per capita income values are not necessarily comparable over longer 
periods of time. This becomes clear if one examines, for instance, the income 
thresholds separating low income countries from middle income countries in the 
1970s and in the 2000s. As will be seen below, they are very different. But before this 
complexity is discussed, the breakdown of countries according to development 
category appearing the World Bank’s World development report for 1978 will be 
compared to that appearing in the 2012 report to bring to the fore complexities around 
inconsistent classifications, and inconsistent sets of countries (World Bank, 1978: 76; 
World Bank, 2011b).  
The 1978 report of the World Bank used as its main categories ‘industrialised 
countries’, ‘middle income countries’ and ‘low income countries’, but these excluded 
25 countries classified as ‘centrally planned economies’ and three classified as 
‘capital surplus oil exporters’. The following table shows the degree to which 
countries moved between the three main 1978 categories and the 2012 categories, 
where for the latter lower and upper middle income countries have been collapsed into 
one category, middle income country. The seven countries which moved from the 
middle income status in 1978 to the low income status in 2012 were six Sub-Saharan 
Africa countries plus Nicaragua. The five that moved in the opposite direction, from 
low to middle income status, were all South Asian or Southeast Asian countries. The 
one country that moved from industrialised country to middle income country status 
was South Africa, but an examination of income values reveals that in 1978 South 
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Africa’s per capita income was well below that of any other industrialised country, 
suggesting that anomalous criteria were used when South Africa was classified. All 
other industrialised countries in 1978 can clearly be considered high income countries 
too. Finally, the ten countries that moved from the middle to high income status 
included five Southern European countries, four East Asian countries and Israel.  
Table 28: 1978-2012 country classification changes I 
2012  
1978  LIC MIC HIC 
Totals 
1978 
LIC 28 5 33 
MIC 7 44 10 61 
IC 1 18 19 
Totals 2012 35 50 28 113 
Note: In this and the following table, ‘IC’ refers to ‘industrialised 
countries’.  
 
For the historical analysis it seemed important to impute, where possible, 1970s 
country development categories according to the three main income groups, where 
such categorisations had not been made for 1978. The first step was to take the 1978 
categories of countries that ceased to exist, in particular the Soviet Union, and to 
assign the same categories to the ‘splinter country’, for instance Ukraine. The next 
step was to identify income levels that could be used to separate low from middle, and 
middle from high income, in 1970, the earliest year for which the education data were 
available, but also 2009, the last year for which the Penn income data were available, 
using the 1978 and 2012 categories respectively. It was thus assumed, for instance, 
that categories would not have changed between 1970 and 1978. The Penn income 
values from 1970 and 2009 were taken and points found at which the least number of 
countries would find themselves on the wrong side of the divide. For instance, in 
establishing an income value to divide low income countries from middle income 
countries in the 1970 data, a value was found that minimised the number of low 
income countries with an income above that level plus the number of middle income 
countries with an income below that level. It was found that the income level dividing 
low from middle income countries was 1,200 USD in 1970 and 2,300 USD in 2009. 
This is despite the fact that income values were real inflation-adjusted PPP values, 
which might create the impression that thresholds between country development 
categories should remain static over time. That this should not be the case is 
unsurprising if one considers the great conceptual and technical difficulties that exist 
in making prices comparable over time and space. This was discussed in Part I of the 
dissertation.  
The division between the middle and high income categories was found to be 10,000 
USD for 1970 and 24,000 USD for 2009. Here industrialised country was considered 
as synonymous with high income country, but South Africa was considered a middle 
income country in the 1970s. The 1970 income thresholds were used to place the 7 
‘centrally planned economies’, or their splinter countries, which had Penn income 
data for 1970, into one of the three income categories. Then the remaining centrally 
planned economies and ‘capital surplus oil exporters’ were categorised using the 
earliest available income value (the mean year was 1991) and the 2009 income 
threshold values. This method was not ideal, but the resultant 1970s classifications 
seemed appropriate. Finally, 43 countries, mainly from Africa, which did not appear 
in the World Bank’s 1978 list but which did have 1970 Penn income values were 
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categorised, using the 1970 income thresholds. The result, shown in Table 29 below, 
was 184 countries which had categories for both 1978 and 2012.  
Table 29: 1978-2012 country classification changes II 
2012  
1978  LIC MIC HIC 
Totals 
1978 
LIC 34 13 47 
MIC 9 86 14 109 
IC 2 26 28 
Totals 2012 43 101 40 184 
 
The left-hand graph below is a reproduction of Figure 37. The right-hand graph 
represents the comparable situation using the oldest UIS data available and the 
country categorisations for the 1970s, derived as explained above. Along the lines of 
the approach used for the 2007 graph, for the right-hand graph a score of data 
availability per country and per year was calculated and the earliest year with the 
maximum score, as long as the year was before 1980, was used for each country. The 
mean year used across countries was 1973.0. The 1973 graph reflects 168 countries, 
against 194 for 2007. If one were to use the assumption, clearly a problematic one, 
that income values from 1970 are comparable to those of 2009, and that one can thus 
use the same thresholds between income categories in 1973 as one does in 2007, the 
resultant 1973 would look different, but it would still be closer to the right-hand graph 
below than the left-hand graph. The conclusion we can thus draw is that however one 
views the data, there have been large shifts in recent decades in the way similarly 
developed countries prioritise education levels.    
Figure 45: Education levels in 2007 and 1973   
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The following table presents the values behind the above graphs. The general trend is 
that the enrolment values have risen and that expenditure values have dropped. On the 
enrolment side the move towards universal primary schooling is not surprising, given 
the prevailing policy pressures, but that secondary and tertiary GERs should have 
increased to the extent they have is remarkable. For instance, enrolment at the tertiary 
level more than tripled in all three development categories. Enrolments at the 
secondary level in low and middle income countries more than doubled. As seen in 
the last three rows of the table, the reductions in the spending indicator values are 
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proportionally strikingly similar to the increases in the GERs, suggesting that there 
has been a trade-off between high spending and higher enrolments. If one ignores 
changes in the distribution of the population over ages, the closer the ratios in the 
bottom left panel of the table are to the corresponding ones in the bottom right panel, 
the stronger the likelihood that the overall level of investment in education relative to 
GDP remained the same, and that similar proportions of GDP were simply spread out 
over more students. As will be discussed in the conclusion in section 11, historical 
trends of the kind displayed here have received considerable attention in the economic 
literature, yet how optimal they have been remains an unresolved matter.     
Table 30: Education levels in 2007 and 1973 
Gross enrolment ratio Per student exp. / GDP per capita 
Primary Sec. Tertiary Primary Sec. Tertiary 
2007 
LIC 103.0 39.5 9.2 12.5 24.8 276.9 
MIC 104.5 79.1 30.1 16.2 20.1 61.1 
HIC 103.0 100.6 54.8 19.0 23.5 35.3 
1973 
      LIC 55.2 12.0 1.4 19.3 85.0 1314.3 
MIC 95.8 38.0 8.1 12.1 43.4 322.1 
HIC 102.5 79.0 17.7 17.3 20.4 75.6 
Change 2007 over 1973 1973 over 2007 
LIC 1.9 3.3 6.8 1.5 3.4 4.7 
MIC 1.1 2.1 3.7 0.7 2.2 5.3 
HIC 1.0 1.3 3.1 0.9 0.9 2.1 
 
One complication if one wants to analyse the income and education indicator data 
described in section 10.1 as a panel dataset is that the meaning of the income values 
change over time, as mentioned previously. The same supposedly real income value 
can mean a middle income in 1970, but a low income in 2009, for example. The 
complication is not insignificant if one considers that the shifting thresholds referred 
to above imply roughly a halving the value of the supposedly constant USD over four 
decades, if one assumes that, for instance, the difference between a low income 
country and a middle income country means in the 2000s what it did in the 1970s. An 
attempt was made to use the income thresholds separating the development categories 
discussed earlier to adjust the Penn income data so that, say, 10,000 USD would mean 
the same thing in 1970 and 2009, in terms of the its location within the country 
development categories. However, this attempt was abandoned as the adjusted values 
obtained introduced counter-intuitive results, in particular negative GDP per capita 
growth for many countries and many years where the original values reflected 
positive growth.   
A more serious and fundamental complication if one wants analyse the historical 
patterns in a manner that goes beyond a simply descriptive approach, as seen in Table 
30, is that the historical period reflected in the data is too short to provide a robust 
picture of what typically occurs to the education indicators of a country over a longer 
development trajectory. This is not just a data problem. Country development as one 
might understand it in development economics has not been occurring long enough 
for very neat patterns to be extractable from the historical data. It is of course 
debatable whether changing technologies and the more recent phenomenon of a 
changing ecology would ever allow neat and consistent patterns of country 
development to emerge. This is why development economics has so often turned to 
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cross-sectional analysis in attempting to identify the development trajectories that 
appear to prevail at a specific historical point. Yet the short historical series we have 
in the data present some opportunities, in particular the opportunity to examine 
whether the cross-sectional patterns are replicated in the longitudinal patterns.  
In the data we have, the cross-sectional patterns would tend to dominate over the 
historical patterns if, for instance, one simply regressed the secondary GER on 
income. The coefficient on income would describe differences across countries to a 
much larger degree than differences within countries across years. The intraclass 
correlation coefficient if one takes all the historical values and treats country as one’s 
class is high, for instance 0.817 for the secondary GER and 0.621 for the tertiary 
GER. Thus 82% of the variation of one’s secondary GER values is explained by the 
country, as opposed to the year. The econometrics answer to the need to separate 
cross-sectional from historical trends is a fixed effects model. The fixed effects model 
represented by equation (88) below was used. W is the indicator value for country i 
and year t. Apart from the overall intercept λ0, each of the n countries except for one 
also has an intercept S. Thereafter there are three slope coefficients β linked to the 
natural logarithm of income per capita I, growth g in I between t and t minus 1, and 
the interaction between I and g.  The results are presented in Table 31. For each of the 
11 indicators, one of four variants of equation (88) was used. Both the untransformed 
version of the dependent variable and its natural logarithm were tested. Models were 
moreover run with and without the interaction term. The model with the interaction 
term was rejected if this term’s coefficient was not significant at the 10% level. 
Thereafter the model with the highest R2 value was used. One thing that should be 
noted about the results is that annual growth in income displays a statistically 
significant and independent association with all the indicator values. This points to 
different trajectories for the indicator values for faster and slower growing economies. 
The shape and magnitude of this association will be explored further in the next 
section.  
( ) itititititniniit ugIgISSW ˆlnˆˆlnˆˆ...ˆˆ 121,220 +++++++= == βββλλλ  (88) 
Table 31: Regression of indicator values on historical income 
  Coefficient on... 
Variable 
Obser-
vations 
Cons-
tant 
Nat. log of 
income 
Growth Interaction 
of prev. 
two R2 
GER primary (ln) 5562 3.9 0.1*** 1.4*** -0.2*** 0.02 
GER lower secondary (ln) 1780 1.0 0.4*** 1.3*** -0.2*** 0.19 
GER upper secondary (ln) 1697 0.2 0.4*** 1.5*** -0.2*** 0.15 
GER secondary 4832 -178.1 28.1*** 37.8** -7.2*** 0.34 
GER tertiary (ln) 4008 -9.3 1.4*** 2.5*** -0.4*** 0.40 
Vocational ISCED 2/3 4193 27.2 -1.4*** -2.6*  0.01 
Post-secondary non-tert. (ln) 750 12.4 -1.2*** 1.2***  0.13 
Tertiary engineering 733 61.8 -5.2*** -3.4*  0.10 
Per student exp. primary (ln) 2087 0.7 0.2*** -0.3**  0.04 
Per student exp. sec. 2021 66.7 -4.4*** 89.1* -10.2* 0.01 
Per student exp. tertiary (ln) 2013 12.4 -0.9*** -0.6***  0.24 
Note: ‘(ln)’ refers to the fact that the dependent variable was expressed as a natural logarithm. The per 
student expenditure values expressed as a ratio to GDP per capita. Regression results are from a model 
with fixed effects for countries. *** indicates that the estimate is significant at the 1% level of 
significance, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. Growth in the model was expressed as a fraction, 
e.g. 0.03. R2 values refer to within-country explanatory power. The overall R2 would be higher.  
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The following two graphs illustrate the average annual gains or losses for the 
indicators dealing with the three key education levels, at different income levels, 
using the slope coefficients from the previous table. An annual growth in income per 
capita of 2.5% was assumed. The patterns seen in the graphs are broadly in agreement 
with the cross-sectional findings discussed in section 10.3 in the sense that secondary 
and tertiary enrolment GERs increase with development and that the spending ratios 
decrease. One anomaly, however, is that the conclusion one may draw from the cross-
sectional picture (Figure 43, for instance) that the primary and secondary spending 
ratios increase at high levels of development, is not supported by the historical trends 
in the graphs appearing below, and nor is it suggested by the non-parametric analysis 
presented below. Moreover, the large relative magnitudes of the secondary enrolment 
and spending shifts seen below are not supported by the cross-sectional picture. For 
instance, if one uses just the 2007 values in Table 30 and assumes an annual growth in 
income of 2.5%, between the LIC and LMC medians one might expect the annual 
increase in the secondary GER to be 0.8, against the 2.0 suggested by the historical 
trend in Figure 46.  
Figure 46: Historical trends for education indicator (parametric)   
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Note: Income values on the horizontal axis are expressed on an exponential 
scale based on a 2.5% annual growth rate.  
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Figure 47: Magnification of Figure 46  
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The ‘Vocational ISCED 2/3’ indicator, for which we have values covering four 
decades (Table 25), comes with a negative coefficient on income in Table 31. 
However, this indicator refers to the percentage of secondary level enrolments in 
vocational streams. If one multiplies it by the secondary GER and then re-runs the 
model, the coefficient on income is positive. Vocational enrolments at the secondary 
level thus tend to increase relative to population as a country develops, but not as fast 
as non-vocational secondary enrolments. To illustrate the general trend, across all 
countries the mean percentage of secondary enrolments which are vocational dropped 
from 16% to 14% between the 1970s and the 2000s, but secondary vocational 
enrolments relative to the population increased from 6% to 12% over the same period.  
A similar pattern is seen for the post-secondary non-tertiary and tertiary engineering 
indicators, for which data are available only since 1998. For the former, the shift 
between the 1998 and 2012 was from 15% to 13%, whilst as a percentage of the 
population enrolments moved from 3.5% to 4.0%. Tertiary engineering enrolments as 
a percentage of the age-relevant population moved from 5.7% to 6.5% over the same 
period. 
One limitation of the fixed effects models discussed above is that the coefficients on 
income can be said to capture both a time invariant income correlation and the 
historical effect discussed earlier whereby, for instance, large increases in tertiary 
enrolments occurred in developed countries beyond what seems attributable to 
income. The models reflected in Table 31 were rerun with three decade dummy 
variables inserted: whether a year was 1980 or later, 1990 or later, or 2000 or later. 
These dummies might provide an indication of the magnitude and timing of historical 
effects. Obviously the correlation between the dummy variables and income within 
each country would be high and thus multicollinearity in the explanatory variables 
would be high. This should caution one against reading too much into a comparison 
between the coefficients on the income variable and those on the dummies seen in 
Table 32. Yet it seems noteworthy that in general the coefficients in all columns are 
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simultaneously significant, across all indicators. What is perhaps most telling about 
the results is when the large historical trends occurred. Primary enrolments received a 
boost, beyond what income levels would predict, in the 1980s, and again after 2000. 
For secondary enrolments, both the 1980s and 1990s saw large upward movements. 
Tertiary enrolments increased above all in the 1990s. In general, the downward trends 
in the expenditure ratios occurred when the upward trends in the GERs occurred, 
making it plausible that enrolments could expand partly because trends in spending 
per student were contained, or did not increase as fast as GDP per capita. 
Table 32: Regression of indicator values on income and decades 
Coefficient on... 
Variable 
Nat. 
log of 
income 
Growth Interaction 
of prev. 
two 
Dummy 
for 
since 
1980 
Dummy 
for 
since 
1990 
Dummy 
for 
since 
2000 R2 
GER primary (ln) -0.1*** 69.7*** -7.4*** 7.3*** 1.4*** 6.9*** 0.164 
GER lower secondary (ln) 17.0*** 29.4 -4.2*   4.0*** 0.213 
GER upper secondary (ln) 10.6*** 1.9 -0.2   0.1*** 0.178 
GER secondary 11.9*** 11.9** -2.9* 8.8*** 8.3*** 0.2*** 0.586 
GER tertiary (ln) 13.0*** -7.5 -0.2 3.0*** 5.5*** 0.4*** 0.680 
Vocational ISCED 2/3 0.2*** 16.9* -2.5** -0.1*** -1.0*** -0.2*** 0.043 
Post-secondary non-tert. (ln) -1.1*** 70.9*** -6.7**   -0.1 0.128 
Tertiary engineering -0.2*** -9.5 0.7   0.0 0.105 
Per student exp. primary (ln) 1.9*** 21.8 -3.3** -0.1 0.1 0.1*** 0.045 
Per student exp. sec. 0.2*** 114.3 -14.3*** -10.6*** -3.7* 0.0 0.087 
Per student exp. tertiary (ln) -0.3*** 941.5 -127.9 -0.3*** -84.7*** -0.2*** 0.361 
Note: ‘(ln)’ refers to the fact that the dependent variable was expressed as a natural logarithm. The per 
student expenditure values expressed as a ratio to GDP per capita. Regression results are from a model 
with fixed effects for countries. *** indicates that the estimate is significant at the 1% level of 
significance, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. Growth in the model was expressed as a fraction, 
e.g. 0.03. R2 values refer to within-country explanatory power. The overall R2 would be higher. 
 
What might be more useful for policymakers than the parametric patterns described 
above would be a non-parametric, or semi-parametric, graphing of the indicator trends 
over time, relative to income, to reflect irregular variation. A convenient tool for this 
are curves with lowess smoothing. The next two graphs use such curves, with the 
‘bandwidth’ set at the Stata default of 0.8, meaning that the locally weighted 
regression analysis run for each point on the curve uses 80% of all observations, with 
more distant observations, with respect to the x-axis, being weighted much less4. The 
x values are the Penn USD income values at 2005 PPP prices. The y values were 
obtained by running multiple regressions in the dataset. In each regression, data from 
just five consecutive years within one country were used, with the indicator values 
being regressed on year to obtain the slope. The resultant coefficient on year would 
then be attached to the last year. So, for instance, the 2006 secondary GER slope for 
South Africa would be the slope of the indicator values on year for 2002 to 2006.  
                                                     
4
 Of course there must be enough observations on either side of the value within the sorted independent 
variable to fulfil the 0.8 condition. In fact, below the 40th percentile of the independent variable and 
above the 60th percentile, fewer than 80% of observations will be used in the local regression.  
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Figure 48: Lowess curves for historical indicator trends against income  
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Figure 49: Magnification of Figure 48  
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The pattern seen earlier of decreasing secondary and tertiary expenditure ratios as 
income rises appears again, except here these decreases are reduced over time whilst 
in Figure 47 they appeared to become larger over time. Moreover, decreases in the 
primary GER as income increases, presumably as inefficiencies in the form of high 
grade repetition are resolved, become clear in the above graph, whilst this did not 
emerge from the parametric analysis.  
If we redo the last two graphs using only the y values for 2000 and later, in order to 
provide a picture of what can be considered current trends, we obtain the following 
two graphs. Using only the recent data results in larger secondary and tertiary GER 
increases and smaller reductions in the expenditure ratios for these education levels.  
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Figure 50: Lowess curves for just 2000 and beyond 
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Figure 51: Magnification of Figure 50 
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What has been presented above is important in terms of uncovering basic patterns in 
the data. A more policy-oriented discussion using the graphing methods developed 
here appears in the next section. One region-specific policy matter concludes this 
section, namely the question of whether the past prioritisation of primary schooling by 
international agencies in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) led to the under-
prioritisation of the secondary and tertiary levels. Some examination of the GER 
values suggests that one’s answer to this policy question could be yes or no, 
depending on how one interprets the data. The following two graphs use GER values 
for countries that are not high income countries. Figure 52 uses all the values 
available, whilst Figure 53 uses the values of just those countries where at least 80% 
of the values were non-missing5. The similarity of the two graphs is remarkable if one 
considers that only a quarter of the number of SSA countries is used for the second 
                                                     
5
 Specifically, 126 possible values per country were considered, as there were three indicators and 42 
years. If no more than 25 values of the 126 were missing, the country was included in the calculation 
(25 being 20% of 126).   
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graph compared to the first graph. The graphs use data from up to around four Sub-
Saharan African upper middle income countries, and around half of the countries from 
the other regions are upper middle income countries. However, this fact does not 
influence the overall picture. If upper middle income countries are excluded from the 
graphs, leaving just low and lower middle income countries, the picture remains 
virtually unchanged.  
Figure 52: Sub-Saharan Africa’s prioritisation of education levels I   
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Note: The average number of countries per yearly data point for SSA is 38, 30 
and 21 for the primary, secondary and tertiary levels. The figures for non-SSA 
are 72, 64 and 54. 
 
Figure 53: Sub-Saharan Africa’s prioritisation of education levels II   
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Note: The average number of countries per yearly data point for SSA is 8, 7 
and 6 for the primary, secondary and tertiary levels. The figures for non-SSA 
are 25, 24 and 23. 
 
In defence of the actual historical trend, one could argue that the SSA region 
succeeded in bringing its primary GER up to the level of other developing regions 
over the four decades, whilst tertiary enrolments also increased substantially, albeit 
off a low base. Specifically, tertiary GER values increased by a factor of 6.5 over the 
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four decades in the region against 4.5 for other countries (ratios taken from the second 
graph). Similarly, the increase in secondary enrolments was steeper in SSA than 
elsewhere. The ratio of the primary GER to the secondary GER declined from 59 to 
14, whilst the ratio of the secondary GER to the tertiary GER declined from 6 to 2. 
These ratios shifted to a greater degree in the region than elsewhere. The proportion of 
SSA students enrolled at the primary level, as opposed to some other level, was thus 
far greater in 1970 than in 2011. But one could also use the data to support the 
opposite argument. By 2011, whilst the SSA region was no longer behind with respect 
to primary enrolments, its secondary enrolments were at around half of the level 
found in comparator countries, whilst it lagged even further behind with respect to 
tertiary enrolments. One may ask whether the priority should not rather have been to 
close the gaps in a manner that focussed less on universal primary schooling, and 
more on balancing enrolments across levels, using international patterns as a norm, 
and thus for instance accepting that universal primary schooling would not be reached 
whilst secondary enrolment levels were still so low. The last two years in the first 
graph, 2010 and 2011, display a situation where the primary GER in SSA was slightly 
higher than that elsewhere. If this trend continues, the argument that the region has 
over-prioritised primary schooling could be strengthened.    
10.5 Growth and education prioritisation patterns 
Sections 10.3 and 10.4 have explored ways of viewing and analysing the UIS data in 
combination with the Penn income data. They also served as an important check of 
anomalies in the data, for instance the changing meaning of the real income values 
over time. On the whole it was found that the UIS data, despite gaps, are sufficiently 
complete and correct to produce meaningful patterns that could be of interest to 
policymakers. Below, how the patterns seen in the UIS data differ by level of 
economic performance is examined. The implications for policymakers are also 
discussed. Economic performance is mostly defined in terms of increases in the Penn 
income per capita values. However, where indicators are inserted into the semi-
Bayesian model of Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004), performance is 
gauged in terms of overall GDP growth.  
The following graph follows the format of Figure 38, but provides separate curves for 
the top and bottom terciles of performers. Performance per country is the average 
annual percentage increase in income per capita, found by regressing the natural 
logarithm of the Penn income values on year. The top and bottom terciles were 
identified within each of the four development categories applicable in 2012. The data 
behind the next graph are presented in Table 33. The table is perhaps most convenient 
for interpreting the trends. The last four rows of this table show the difference with 
respect to the indicator values between the faster and slower growing countries after 
income has been controlled for. Specifically, within each development category, and 
with each observation being one country, the indicator value was regressed on the 
natural logarithm of 2007 income and two dummies, one indicating that the country 
was a fast grower, the second that the country was a slow grower. Each difference 
value at the end of the table is the coefficient on the fast growth dummy minus the 
coefficient on the slow growth dummy.  
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Figure 54: Educational level prioritisation ±2007 by growth category 
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Note: This graph is a modification of Figure 38. Solid lines represent better 
performing counties, whilst dotted lines represent worse performing countries.  
 
 
Table 33: Indicator values ±2007 by growth category 
Gross enrolment ratio 
Per student spending over 
GDP/capita 
Country 
category Primary 
Lower 
sec. 
Upper 
sec. Tertiary Primary Sec. Tertiary Countries 
Within top tercile with respect to 1970-2009 growth 
LIC 103 61 39 15 15 26 254 14 
LMC 103 90 72 30 19 16 55 18 
UMC 103 105 82 34 17 20 53 18 
HIC 103 102 93 53 19 25 35 15 
Within bottom tercile with respect to 1970-2009 growth 
LIC 95 41 24 6 9 20 534 13 
LMC 103 60 42 12 16 25 117 16 
UMC 110 96 69 39 13 15 40 16 
HIC 103 100 100 53 16 20 32 14 
Difference between top and bottom terciles (positive means value in best tercile is higher) 
LIC 7 20 14 9 6 6 -280 
LMC 0 30 30 18 2 -8 -62 
UMC -7 9 13 -5 5 5 13 
HIC -1 2 -7 0 3 4 4 
Difference between top and bottom terciles after controlling for income 
LIC 9 11 7 2 10 14 -189 
LMC -4 18 15 4 -3 -8 -24 
UMC -6 8 9 -7 3 3 16 
HIC -1 2 -7 -2 3 5 7 
 
The general patterns hold whether one controls for income or not, though differences 
are, as one might expect, reduced when the income control is introduced. What are 
these general patterns? Better performing countries tend to have tertiary education 
indicator values, on both the enrolment and spending sides. These countries thus 
prioritise education more. The pattern becomes more pronounced the lower the 
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development category. There is one notable exception. Amongst lower income 
countries, those that grow slowly tend to have a higher tertiary education spending 
ratio. The fact that the general pattern of higher spending ratios, at all education 
levels, in faster growing economies should apply in high income countries, seems 
noteworthy. Work such as that by Krueger and Lindahl (2001) suggests that high 
income countries stand to gain little from investing more in education. Of course the 
statistics in Table 33 say nothing conclusive about cause and effect. But one plausible 
interpretation is that well-governed countries, in terms of growth, are also better at 
managing their education systems, and understand that certain spending thresholds 
must be met if the education system is to support development optimally.  
The fact that low and lower middle income countries that grow slowly display higher 
spending ratios for tertiary education warrants some closer scrutiny. One hypothesis 
would be that these countries are smaller countries where costs are inflated because 
economies of scale cannot be attained. The following correlation matrix, which 
ensures that for every pair of variables all observations with non-missing values in the 
pair are included, provides some initial answers. As already seen, lower growth is 
associated with higher spending ratios at the tertiary level. Moreover, lower growth is 
indeed associated with smaller populations and population is negatively correlated 
with the tertiary spending ratio. But correlations are extremely low. Moreover, smaller 
countries also have higher primary and secondary spending ratios and here one would 
not expect an economy of scale problem.  
Table 34: Correlation matrix for LIC and LMC education spending 
Natural 
log of 
income 
Average 
annual 
growth Population 
Primary 
spending 
Secondary 
spending 
Tertiary 
spending 
Natural log of income 1.00 
Average annual growth 0.58 1.00 
Population 0.04 0.11 1.00 
Primary spending 0.34 0.14 -0.10 1.00 
Secondary spending -0.10 -0.04 -0.10 0.26 1.00 
Tertiary spending -0.33 -0.23 -0.08 -0.06 0.29 1.00 
Note: Education indicator and income values used were those of around 2007. Growth is for the period 
1970-2009.  
Source: As for previous tables, but with population being 2010 estimates drawn from the online data-
querying facility for the 2008 World Population Prospects of the UNSD.  
 
What is revealing is to examine the regional dynamics behind the high tertiary 
spending phenomenon. The natural logarithm of USD tertiary spending per student, 
where the USD value was found by multiplying the tertiary spending ratio by GDP 
per capita, was regressed on the natural log of income, total population and dummies 
for world regions used by the World Bank. Only countries with an income value of 
7,000 or below was included in the model. The coefficient on population was found to 
be insignificant. However, the coefficient on the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) dummy 
was positive and significant, regardless of the excluded dummy, whilst Eastern 
Europe, Latin America and East Asia and Pacific emerged as having low tertiary 
spending values. Even if all the regional dummies were excluded, population was still 
not a statistically significant predictor. The phenomenon of high tertiary unit costs 
amongst poorer nations seen in the data seems to be driven largely by what happens in 
the SSA region. This can be seen in Figure 55 below. The patterns point to a need 
within many SSA countries to restructure the way tertiary education is offered. There 
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could be an artificial economy of scale problem in these countries in the sense that 
enrolments at the tertiary level have been low, partly for structural reasons which 
include low secondary enrolments (see Figure 52), which in turn could have 
contributed towards uneconomically small universities.   
Figure 55: The SSA region and spending on tertiary education 
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Note: Trendlines are only for countries with less than a per capita income of 
USD 7,000 in 2005 PPP terms in ±2007. The graph magnifies the bottom left 
part of the graph and does not display all pairs of data points. Country codes 
are ISO codes – see Appendix A of Part I of the dissertation for explanations.  
 
The graphs reflecting historical trends in the data discussed in the previous section 
were reproduced for better and worse economic performers (using the performance 
criteria explained earlier). The following graphs (which are comparable to Figure 48 
and Figure 49 above) are interesting mostly with respect to secondary and tertiary 
spending trends. At the low and lower middle income levels, it is the faster growing 
economies that have seen the largest annual reductions in their tertiary spending 
ratios. This would agree with the pattern seen earlier of on average lower tertiary 
spending ratios for less developed countries in the 2000s that had grown faster. The 
secondary spending ratio, in contrast, has declined faster in economies that grew more 
slowly, at least at the low and lower middle income levels. Table 33 revealed a mixed 
picture for the 2000s, with low income countries displaying a positive correlation 
between growth and the secondary spending ratio, whilst the correlation in lower 
middle income countries was negative.  
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Figure 56: Lowess curves for historical trends by economic performance 
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A rather good way of testing the conditional correlation between the education 
indicators discussed in the previous sections and economic growth is to insert these 
indicators into the Bayesian averaging of classical estimates (BACE) model of Sala-i-
Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004), henceforth referred to as SDM. This 
technique was discussed in detail in Part I of the dissertation. If early values for the 
indicators are prioritised by the model, this could have policy implications and 
provide guidance for the kinds of explanatory variables to select in cross-country 
growth regressions.  
In proceeding with the BACE analysis, it was necessary to consider the trade-offs 
between keeping education variables and keeping countries in the dataset to be used, 
given that the model cannot handle missing values. Moreover, various permutations of 
the indicator values were tested. In the end, after some preliminary testing of various 
education variables in the BACE process, it was decided to insert five variables into 
the original SDM model: the average annual change in the secondary and tertiary 
spending ratios (over the four decades), and the natural logarithm of the absolute USD 
value of per student spending in the 1970s for the primary, secondary and tertiary 
levels. The last three variables were obtained by multiplying the UIS spending ratio 
by GDP per capita, and the mean across the earliest three values from the 1970s was 
used. Enrolment ratios did generally not perform well in the SDM model, and clearly 
not as well as the derived spending variables. The 1970s primary GER did perform 
relatively well, but not as well as the 1960 primary GER used in the original SDM 
work.  
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Results for explanatory variables displaying high probabilities of being included in an 
optimal model, according to the BACE methodology, are displayed in Table 35 
below6.  
Table 35: BACE regression outputs – growth on UIS and other data 
New calculation Original SDM 
Var. PIP Coeff. PIP Coeff. 
East Asian dummy 0.970 2.5E-02 0.823 2.0E-02 
GDP in 1960 (log) 0.945 -1.2E-02 0.685 -9.0E-03 
Initial spending per secondary student in USD logged 0.836 7.1E-03   
Real exchange rate distortions 0.736 -1.2E-04 0.082 -7.9E-05 
Life expectancy in 1960 0.655 7.5E-04 0.209 8.0E-04 
Malaria prevalence in 1960s 0.495 -1.5E-02 0.252 -2.0E-02 
African dummy 0.372 -1.4E-02 0.154 -2.0E-02 
Fraction Confucian 0.229 4.3E-02 0.206 5.0E-02 
Fraction GDP in mining 0.167 4.2E-02 0.124 4.0E-02 
Primary schooling in 1960 0.133 1.8E-02 0.796 3.0E-02 
Fraction of tropical area 0.116 -9.5E-03 0.563 -2.0E-02 
N  76 
iterations 50.2m 
Note: Dependent variable is average real GDP growth between 1960 to 1996, expressed as a fraction, 
as in 0.024. 
 
If one compares the above results with the original SDM results, what stands out is 
the very high inclusion probability (PIP) of initial spending per secondary level 
student. This variable is likely to be reflecting much of what was captured in the one 
education variable that emerged as important in the original SDM work, namely the 
primary level GER in 1960. The secondary spending variable appears to have pushed 
the primary GER variable down the ranking. The latter variable came in second after 
the Asian dummy in the original SDM results7, whilst in the above table the PIP for 
the primary GER is just 0.133. Early spending per student at the secondary level 
appears to be a far better proxy for a well organised education system and general 
commitment to education, than the primary GER. The results point to an increase in 
the initial spending per secondary student of 50% being associated with a 0.3 
percentage point improvement in annual GDP growth. It should be noted that the 
coefficients for the 1960 GDP per capita and secondary spending variables (variables 
2 and 3 in the list) have opposite signs. This is remarkable partly because the two 
variables display a high and positive correlation with each other, of 0.718. We can 
interpret the results as meaning that countries with especially low incomes but which 
also displayed exceptionally high per student spending in the initial period, were those 
countries most likely to grow fast.   
An added variable plot graph can assist in understanding the role played in a 
regression by specific observations, or countries in our case, when a new variable, 
such as spending per secondary student, is introduced. In Figure 57, the vertical axis 
represents the residual, or estimated error term, when the growth variable used for the 
Table 35 results is regressed on seven key explanatory variables listed in Table 35, but 
                                                     
6
 The threshold was a PIP, or posterior inclusion probability, of 0.097, derived by dividing an assumed 
7 variables for an optimum model by the actual 72 explanatory variables used in the BACE process, the 
72 being comprised of 67 original SDM variables and the five new education ones. The PIP refers to 
the probability that the variable in question would be included in the optimum growth regression. 
7
 In the original SDM model, the PIP for the primary schooling variable was 0.796, against 0.133 in the 
results shown here.  
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not the secondary spending variable, using a simple OLS regression. The seven key 
variables are the first seven listed in Table 35, excluding the secondary spending 
variable, plus the primary GER variable. The horizontal axis represents the residual 
when the secondary spending variable is regressed on the seven key explanatory 
variables. The utility of the graph can be explained through reference to Botswana 
(BWA). This country lies to the right because its secondary school spending was high 
in the 1970s when controlling for a number of factors. It also carries a high value 
against the vertical axis because there is considerable positive growth which is not 
explained by a typical growth regression, in this case a regression that excludes 
secondary school spending. What all this suggests is that the greater predictive power 
brought about by including the secondary spending variable would rely strongly on a 
country like Botswana, where secondary spending would ‘predict away’ much of the 
residual growth, thus making Botswana less of an outlier in the graph. Similarly, 
Philippines (PHL), with negative residuals on both axes in Figure 57, would end up 
with a far smaller residual because of the introduction of the secondary spending 
variable in the regression. However, the introduction of the secondary spending 
variable, which raises the adjusted R2 value from 0.682 to 0.759, would reduce the 
residuals of many countries to some extent. In fact all countries to the top right and 
the bottom left of the intersections of the two zero origins in the centre of the graph 
would see their residuals reduced. The influence of, say, Botswana on its own would 
not be large. If one excluded Botswana from the regression that included the 
secondary spending variable, the positive coefficient on this variable would be 
reduced only by around a fifth. If Philippines were also excluded, the impact would be 
larger. Overall the magnitude of the secondary spending coefficient would be cut by a 
half. Thus spending per secondary student in the 1970s emerges as a predictor of 
growth in the subsequent decades, largely because it explains, in a statistical sense, 
what occurred in a number of developing countries. From a policy angle one can 
speculate that ensuring that the secondary level attracted sufficiently talented teachers, 
through adequate salaries, and was sufficiently equipped with books and other 
materials, was important for the overall economic development process.      
Figure 57: Added variable plot for spending on secondary students 
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10.6 Guidance for a country’s policymakers 
The preceding sections have identified patterns in the cross-country data relating to 
the prioritisation of the various sub-sectors of the education sector. Examining where 
a specific country lies in relation to these patterns can strengthen or challenge 
prevailing understandings amongst policymakers. In this section, South Africa’s 
position is examined, partly with a view to checking the utility of what has been 
presented above. However, considerable attention also goes towards examining the 
reliability of the UIS statistics and recalculating these statistics where necessary. In 
fact, it will be seen that getting the basic facts, or accounting, right, and possibly 
arguing that firmly entrenched statistics are seriously incorrect, can represent a large 
portion of the work that must be done by anyone wishing to advice policymakers.  
Gustafsson (2012b) points to serious problems in the way the UIS and others have 
calculated the gross enrolment ratio (GER) values for South Africa, relating to the 
incomparability of official population estimates and official enrolment estimates. The 
suggestion made is that accurate GER values should be calculated from one source, 
household survey data. This calculation is done below. Moreover, key spending 
values are recalculated, and here too it is found that the UIS values are problematic. 
All this raises the question of the extent to which UIS values in other countries are 
reliable, and thus the validity of the kind of cross-country analysis presented in 
previous sections. In defence of the UIS data it can be argued that the patterns seen in 
the previous sections seem sufficiently non-random and intuitively right to warrant 
faith in the data. One can assume that to some degree country-specific errors are 
randomly distributed and thus cancel each other out, producing aggregates that are 
usable. Gustafsson (2012: 6), in comparing GER-type errors in South Africa to those 
found elsewhere, concludes that those for South Africa are particularly large, which 
also counts in favour of the overall reliability of the UIS statistics.  
Trends for all the UIS variables out of the 11 UIS variables that have received 
attention above and for which values existed for South Africa, are shown in the next 
three graphs8.  
                                                     
8
 An anomaly that applies to very few countries is found if one compares one of the trends, that for 
tertiary GER in Figure 58, to several issues of the Global monitoring report produced by UNESCO (for 
instance UNESCO, 2005). Whilst the UIS data described in section 10.1, and downloaded in 2012 off 
the UIS website, contain no tertiary GER values for South Africa beyond 1994, the UNESCO reports 
do have post-1994 values, though the Global monitoring report is supposed to be based on the same 
UIS data source as that used for the previous sections, and in the case of virtually all countries the 
reports do mirror the online data exactly. Specifically, the Global monitoring report issues for the years 
2003 to 2010 all have recent tertiary GER values for South Africa (though the 2011 and 2012 reports 
have no tertiary GER statistics at all, for South Africa or any other country). The tertiary GER values 
for South Africa published in the UNESCO reports are in line with figures presented below, for 
instance 15.2 for 2000 and 15 for 2007. South Africa is not the only country where this strange gap in 
the UIS data occurs with respect to the tertiary GER, yet this problem seems highly unusual. An 
analysis of the 2007 tertiary GER values published in the 2010 Global monitoring report reveals that 
only Ecuador displays a similar anomaly of a value in the report, but not the UIS database. One could 
speculate that statistics were not submitted by the South African government to UNESCO through the 
usual route and that UNESCO, realising the importance of South Africa, then used publicly available 
reports to construct the GER values. Such patching of the data would be relatively easy. However, if 
one considers that a few very important countries, with much publicly available data, notably Germany 
and Singapore, have missing tertiary GER values for recent years in both the Global monitoring report 
and the UIS database, it seems curious that UNESCO should produce a special patch for South Africa 
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Figure 58: South Africa gross enrolment ratio values 
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Source: Own calculations using data from UIS online querying facility, 
downloads from September 2012. 
 
According to the above graph, 1989 is a watershed year in terms of the quality and 
availability of GER values. Before that year there are hardly any tertiary GER data 
points, there are no secondary GER values, and the primary GER trend looks 
suspicious. One might have expected some negative effect on primary enrolments of 
the civil unrest occurring in the 1976 and 1988 period, but the likelihood that these 
troubles cut primary enrolments by a fifth, as suggested by the graph, and that a 
recovery should have occurred so quickly, between 1988 and 1989, seems unlikely. In 
fact, a historical enrolment dataset compiled by Crouch (1999), using a variety of pre-
1994 sources, points to a steady increase in absolute primary level enrolment numbers 
between 1981 and 1994, with increases each year in the range of 0.4% and 6.6%. The 
precipitous dip in primary enrolments after 1976 seen in the above graph is moreover 
not seen in the form of a kink in the later attainment statistics amongst adults in Louw, 
Van der Berg and Yu (2006: 30) or Case and Deaton (1999: 1055). The large dip in 
the primary GER seen in the UIS dataset for South Africa is almost certainly nothing 
more than a manifestation of the serious measurement problems applicable to South 
Africa during the pre-1994 period, when officially the country was considered to be 
split into several independent republics and data collection processes were 
fragmented. The rather sharp decline in the primary GER for the post-1994 period 
seen in the above graph is also deceptive. This matter receives some attention below.    
An analysis using fresh data presented below will indicate that the primary and 
secondary spending ratios seen in Figure 59 are more or less right, though the real 
trend is almost certainly less erratic than what is seen in the UIS data9.  
                                                                                                                                                        
outside the normal data collection procedures. The absence of proper metadata reports for the UIS data, 
of the kind one finds for the Penn income data, obviously makes it difficult to resolve questions of this 
kind. The answer is probably only obtainable by interviewing UIS staff. 
9
 The problem in relation to South Africa’s tertiary GER discussed in the previous footnote does not 
apply in the case of the tertiary spending ratio, though here too there are no post-1994 values. The 
Global monitoring report has never published any tertiary spending statistics, for any country, so here 
it seems clear that what is in the online database represents all the data there is. 
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Figure 59: South Africa UIS education expenditure indicator values 
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Source: Own calculations using data from UIS online querying facility, 
downloads from September 2012. 
 
The proportion of secondary level enrolments that is vocational has grown over the 
long term, according to the following graph, though the trend since around 2000 has 
been uneven. This UIS pattern agrees roughly with what is seen in official 
publications (for instance South Africa: Department of Higher Education and 
Training, 2013), though here the absence of UIS metadata poses a serious problem as 
vocational enrolment statistics can be derived in two very different ways. They can 
represent actual people enrolled at some point in the year (headcounts) or such people 
converted to full-time equivalent students. It appears as if the UIS statistic reflected 
below is derived from headcounts and not full-time equivalent students.  
Figure 60: South Africa UIS vocational secondary education enrolment values 
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Source: Own calculations using data from UIS online querying facility, 
downloads from September 2012. 
 
The enrolment and spending indicator values for all three levels of the education 
system in South Africa are now recalculated, going back to around the middle of the 
first decade of the 21st century. For education planners to understand whether current 
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trends are moving in the right direction, data for just over five years are generally 
enough. Gustafsson (2012b) points out that dividing official enrolment values by 
population values results in under-estimates of the GER because population estimates 
appear to be over-estimated by around 14%. Table 36 presents what can be considered 
more or less accurate GER figures, derived from just one data source, the sample-
based General Household Surveys (GHS) (Statistics South Africa, 2012), meaning the 
problem of a numerator that is not comparable to a denominator is avoided. The Table 
36 GER values are indeed 5 to 10 points higher than the GER values of the UIS seen 
in Figure 58. The age ranges and school grades used for the Table 36 ratios are the 
same as those used by the UIS.  
Table 36: South African gross enrolment ratios from household data 
2003 2006 2009 2010 2011 
2006-
2011 
slope 
Primary (7-13) 112 115 115 115 116 0.1 
Lower secondary (14-15) 107 104 109 111 115 2.2 
Upper secondary (16-18) 93 99 95 93 97 -0.7 
Secondary (14-18) 99 101 101 100 105 0.4 
Tertiary (19-23) 15 13 14 13 15 0.2 
Note: Values in brackets refer to the age range used for the denominator.  
Source: Own calculations using General Household Survey datasets (Statistics South Africa, 
2012). 
 
From 2009, the GHS started asking what grade each child was attending. Responses 
to this question were used in the calculation. However, before 2009 the grade attended 
had to be derived indirectly through responses to two questions, firstly what the 
highest grade was that the child had successfully completed and, secondly, whether 
the child was enrolled in a school. This would result in an inflation of a few points in 
the pre-2009 GER values at the primary level, due to ambiguities in the data in 
relation to pre-schooling10. Even if one takes these measurement problems into 
account, it remains clear that the GER values for South Africa are in fact higher than 
what is reflected in the UIS database, and that with the exception of the lower 
secondary level, they have been relatively stable in recent years. The lower secondary 
level (grades 8 to 9) ratio has seen an average annual increase of around 2.2% in the 
2003 to 2011 period.   
The next table presents statistics needed to calculate fresh spending ratios for South 
Africa, for the years 2006, 2009 and 2012. The process of obtaining these ratios 
illustrates the complexity of the exercise and, by implication, how easy it is for 
spending ratios in the UIS data collection system to be corrupted. Non-bold values in 
                                                     
10
 If a child had successfully completed grade 2 and was currently enrolled in a school, it was assumed 
the child was attending grade 3. The indirect approach could also be followed in the case of the 2009 
data and if this was done, the secondary GER would be 100, against 101 if the direct method were 
used. At the primary level, however, the two approaches yielded more different ratios: 119 if the 
indirect approach was used and 115 in the case of the direct approach. This is not surprising if one 
considers the problems posed by the indirect approach when grade 1 enrolments are calculated. The 
approach dictates that a child enrolled in a school and with a response to highest grade attained being 
‘no schooling’, would be considered a grade 1 pupil, but this child may also be enrolled at a level 
below grade 1 in an institution considered a school by the respondent, even if the strict definition would 
be a pre-school or a crèche. Grade 1 enrolments, and hence the primary GER, are thus over-estimated if 
the indirect approach is used, though this problem would have been smaller in, say, 2003 than 2009 as 
enrolments below grade 1 would have been lower in 2003 than in 2009. 
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Table 37 are source values used to calculate the values in bold. GDP per capita values 
in the table are actually drawn from two different sources: GDP from official 
Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) reports is divided by official Stats SA mid-year 
population estimates (Statistics South Africa, 2010,  Statistics South Africa, 2011, and 
so on)11. Total current spending on schools is taken from National Treasury 
publications, and only figures for the budget programme dealing with public ordinary 
schools are considered (http://www.treasury.gov.za). Thus the effect of public funding 
on private school students, which would diminish the average spending per student 
(by around 2% only), and the effect of public funding on special needs students, 
which would increase average spending per student slightly, are ignored. The strong 
possibility that some pre-school spending, or spending on grade R, a grade below 
grade 1, is erroneously included in the budget programme on public ordinary schools, 
and not in the separate budget programme created for grade R, is a further complexity 
that is not explicitly dealt with. Moreover, it is assumed, for instance, that for the 2006 
school year, which lasts from January to December, one can use figures for the 
2006/07 financial year, which lasts from April 2006 to March 2007.  
Spending on the primary level is seldom accurately separated from spending on the 
secondary level partly because per student spending on these two levels is rather 
similar and is driven by the same set of policies, and partly because there are many 
schools with a mix of primary grades (1 to 7) and secondary grades (8 to 12)12. For 
Table 37 a ratio of 1.12 for per student spending at the secondary level, relative to the 
primary level, was used, based on analysis put forward in an unpublished report of the 
national education authorities (South Africa: Department of Education, 2006). This 
report contains what is perhaps the most in-depth analysis available of how costs at 
the secondary and primary levels differ, using to a large extent differences seen in the 
payroll data and differences in pupil/teacher ratios. Though the same set of policies 
governs primary and secondary school funding, secondary schools tend to be funded 
somewhat more, in per student terms, because of the way the teacher allocation norms 
treat the secondary school curriculum and because secondary schools tend to be 
larger, which helps them secure more publicly paid administrative and support staff, 
and higher salaries for school principals.  
                                                     
11
 The possibility that the inaccuracies in the latter figures, discussed above, cause inaccurate GDP per 
capita figures is not be discussed here, as this would be a complex matter beyond the scope of this 
dissertation 
12
 National Treasury publications do in fact report different spending figures for the primary and 
secondary levels, within two sub-programmes falling under the public ordinary schools programme, but 
this is largely done to satisfy International Monetary Fund reporting demands, not because this 
breakdown is used by local analysts. In fact, some basic analysis, by province, of the published primary 
and secondary spending values against official enrolments will reveal that there must be serious 
inaccuracies in this split of the public ordinary schools totals. 
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Table 37: Calculating South African per student spending ratios 
2006 2009 2012 
2006-
2012 
slope 
GDP per capita at current prices (Rand) 37,295 48,791 63,115  
Total current spending on schools (million R) 59,934 93,527 121,438  
Enrolment primary (grades 1 to 7) (thous.) 7,078 6,917 6,744  
Enrolment secondary (grades 8 to 12) (thous.) 4,400 4,263 4,406  
Ratio of secondary to primary unit cost 1.12 1.12 1.12  
Per student spending primary 5,000 8,012 10,415  
  Ratio to GDP per capita 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.005 
Per student spending secondary 5,579 8,940 11,621  
  Ratio to GDP per capita 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.006 
Subsidies to universities (Rm)  10,986 15,297 20,903  
Subsidies to university students (Rm) 926 1,444 3,875  
Enrolment universities 741,000 837,779 909,716  
Per student spending university 16,076 19,983 27,237  
  Ratio to GDP per capita 0.43 0.41 0.43 0.000 
 
Turning to public spending per student at the tertiary level, here much of the 
complexity relates to public funding for student loans and bursaries occurring through 
the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS), captured in the line ‘Subsidies 
to university students’ in Table 37. As for pre-tertiary education, a key source for 
tertiary spending are the publications of National Treasury. This source is used for the 
fairly straightforward line ‘Subsidies to universities’. A problem with the National 
Treasury figures for subsidies to students is that these figures, expressed as transfers 
to NSFAS, do not distinguish between funds that flow to tertiary or university 
students, and funds that flow to non-tertiary vocational college students. By 2012, the 
proportion of NSFAS spending flowing to college students seemed to have reached 
25% (South Africa: Financial and Fiscal Commission, 2012: 45; South Africa: 
National Student Financial Aid Scheme, 2012: 53). In 2006 the figure was 0%, and in 
2009 around 17%. Though NSFAS is able to provide loans and bursaries in excess of 
its receipts from National Treasury, as loan repayments get recycled into new 
subsidies, only the portion of National Treasury’s contribution considered to be 
flowing to non-college students was counted. The would be in line with the UIS 
approach of counting only public funding, meaning revenue from private loan 
repayments should be ignored. The approach followed gives one what is probably the 
closest one can get to counting just subsidies, and not loans, in the sense that in a 
context of stable enrolments and prices, the National Treasury contribution would 
more or less amount to subsidies excluding loan amounts, as loans would be funded 
by the debt repayments of former students. The sum of the subsidies to universities 
and subsidies to students lines of Table 37 agrees broadly with other estimates of the 
total public funding of university students (South Africa: Financial and Fiscal 
Commission, 2012: 45; De Villiers, 2009). What seems to be the most recent UIS 
guide on how to calculate several (but not all) the UIS indicators, UNESCO (2003), 
indicates that the denominator for the tertiary spending ratio should be headcounts and 
not full-time equivalent students. This is important as if one uses full-time equivalent 
students, the denominator drops by around 35%, meaning the ratio would rise by 
around 50% (South Africa: Department of Higher Education and Training, 2013)13.   
                                                     
13
 One calculation that was not done was to remove the public spending associated with capital 
investments from overall spending values, to produce recurrent spending figures, the ideal for the 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Part II 236 
The previous two tables present enrolment and spending indicator values for South 
Africa which we can consider sufficiently reliable for a meaningful comparison to 
global trends, using the Figure 37 graph. For South Africa, 2009 values are used and 
global values are on average from 2007, as in Figure . The graph is magnified below 
to provide a focus on values of relevance for South Africa (ZAF).  
Figure 61: Educational level prioritisation in South Africa 2009 
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Source: Own calculations using data from UIS online querying facility, 
downloads from September 2012.  
Note: The expenditure levels used for lower and upper secondary are those 
that apply to secondary schooling as a whole.  
 
The spending levels in South Africa are more or less like those in other upper middle 
income countries, according to the graph. The graph indicates that South African 
primary and secondary spending levels are marginally above the average, whilst the 
tertiary spending level is marginally below. The more interesting comparison relates 
to enrolments. Here South Africa lies considerably above the average UMC level 
when it comes to schooling, and considerably below this level when it comes to 
tertiary enrolments. In fact, the primary and lower secondary GER values for South 
Africa lie to the right of the corresponding averages of all development categories. At 
the tertiary level, South Africa’s GER of 14 is closer to the low income average of 9 
than the lower middle income average of 25, let alone the upper middle income 
average of 35.  
Figure 62 below offers a more continuous view of the global patterns and South 
Africa’s position within them. This is a reproduction of Figure 43, meaning 
development trajectories are depicted not primarily on the basis of income, but on the 
basis of a factor analysis of the education indicators. South Africa’s actual position is 
indicated by the solid triangles, whilst the positions one might expect South Africa to 
                                                                                                                                                        
indicator according to UNESCO (2003). No analyst appears to have done this and doing this would 
involve examining the financial records of all the individual universities. 
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be at are indicated with the non-solid triangles. South Africa was not one of the 112 
countries for which sufficient UIS data existed for inclusion in the factor analysis, 
thus South Africa’s expected positions along the curves were calculated by using 
Figure 42 to translate South Africa’s income value to the z-score discussed earlier.  
Figure 62: Average pathways with South African points 
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Source: Own calculations using data from UIS online querying facility, 
downloads from September 2012. 
Note: The points labelled ‘LIC’ etc. are positioned where they represent the 
median z-score per development category produced by the factor analysis.  
 
How might the above graph assist the South African policy debates? It can reinforce 
the notion that South Africa is at the lower end of the upper middle income category, 
meaning that a simple comparison to UMC averages can be deceptive. In fact, along 
several of the curves South Africa is closer to the LMC median point than the UMC 
median point. But above all the graph underlines a fundamental structural problem 
with the South African education system, namely that relatively speaking it has over-
prioritised schools and under-prioritised tertiary education, both with respect to 
enrolment numbers and per student spending. To some extent, the Sub-Saharan Africa 
problem of an under-sized tertiary sector exists in South Africa too, though South 
Africa does not experience the problem of an extremely high spending ratio. At the 
tertiary level, spending per student in South Africa seems a bit low. But the key 
problem is that tertiary enrolments should be around 70% higher than they were in 
2009. 
In Table 38 below, the global ‘norm’ is represented by the non-solid triangles in 
Figure 62 above, or where South Africa perhaps should have been in 2009. The 
question is whether overall this would have implied a more or less costly education 
system, relative to the actual situation in 2009. We can use the enrolment and 
spending indicator values to calculate the overall public cost of the education system 
relative to GDP, if we introduce just one statistic, namely each age-specific 
population group’s share of the total population. This is provided in the last column. 
For instance, youths aged 19 to 24, the ages used for the tertiary GER by the UIS, 
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accounted for 10.1% of the total population in 2009. Clearly, South Africa has not 
achieved a less costly education system by over-prioritising primary and secondary 
education relatively to tertiary education. Total spending came to 5.3% of GDP in 
2009 (if one considers just the main education sub-sectors listed in the table), and it 
would have come to around 4.4% of GDP had South Africa’s enrolment and spending 
patterns been closer to global trends. One could use the figures in the table to point 
out that if a more ‘normal’ degree of prioritisation towards tertiary education were to 
be achieved in South Africa, this would raise public spending in this level from 0.6% 
of GDP to 1.1%, but to 1.0% if 2009 per student spending ratios were maintained. To 
free up the additional 0.5% (or 0.4%) of GDP needed for this, within the existing 
budgetary envelope, it might be possible to reduce the schooling GERs over time 
through quality-related efficiency gains, specifically reductions in the primary level 
GER through less grade repetition. In fact, moving from the actual primary GER of 
115 to a more efficient, yet attainable, GER of 104, would free up around 0.3% of 
GDP, not much less than the percentage of GDP needed to expand the tertiary level. 
In fact, this type of solution may be missed by policymakers because primary GER 
values for South Africa published by the UIS, but also others, tend to be under-
estimates.       
Table 38: Total spending patterns for South Africa 
 Actual Global ‘norm’  
 
GER 
Exp. per 
cap./ 
GDP per 
capita 
Total 
exp./ 
GDP GER 
Exp. per 
cap./ 
GDP per 
capita 
Total 
exp./ 
GDP 
Fraction 
of total 
pop. 
Primary 115 16 2.8 104 13 2.0 0.148 
Lower secondary 109 18 0.8 95 14 0.6 0.043 
Upper secondary 95 18 1.1 69 14 0.6 0.064 
Tertiary 14 41 0.6 24 46 1.1 0.101 
Overall 82 18 5.3 74 17 4.4 0.356 
Source: Stats SA mid-year population estimates broken down to single ages as explained in Gustafsson 
(2012b) were used to calculate the proportions in the final column.  
 
New analysis can provide a needed reinforcement of existing analysis and 
perceptions, and it can assist in overturning misperceptions and ‘myths’. What 
contribution may the above analysis make in the case of South Africa? Amongst 
analysts, the point has been made before that there is an under-prioritisation of post-
school education. This is done by, for instance, Gustafsson (2011), using cross-
country comparisons but in a manner that differs to what was presented above. 
Crouch and Vinjevold (2006) have argued that Southern Africa is an unusual region in 
its combination of high enrolment ratios at the primary and secondary levels and 
exceptionally poor performance in international tests. They speculate that the region 
has perhaps over-prioritised enrolment at the cost of quality, a hypothesis that would 
complement the tertiary under-prioritisation argument, partly because a robust tertiary 
education sector relies on there being sufficient quality in the schooling sector. The 
policy documents do reflect a concern with the low levels of tertiary enrolment. For 
example, as discussed in Part III of the dissertation, the government aims to increase 
post-school enrolments, including university enrolments, by a factor of 4.7 by 2030. 
However, this target is unrealistically high and can be considered a reflection of the 
fact that the necessary planning has not occurred. With respect to the high secondary 
level enrolment values in South Africa, there is no plan to reduce these, as one might 
expect. However, there appear to be risks inherent in the policy uncertainty governing 
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this area, and intermittent signals that enrolments should grow even further at this 
level. A 2009 set of targets released by the Presidency referred to ‘enrolment ratios’ of 
95% by 2014. If this was simply taken to mean the gross enrolment ratio, then this 
95% had already been reached by 2009 at the upper secondary level (see Table 36). 
However, in the South African context the target is more likely to have been 
interpreted as the percentage of youths reaching Grade 12 at school. In 2009, this was 
around 60%, which could be broken down into around 40% successfully completing 
Grade 12 and a further 20% participating in the grade but not passing (South Africa: 
Presidency, 2009: 23; Gustafsson, 2011). A clearer but different target emerges from 
the 2011 sector plan for basic education, where it is envisaged that by 2019 60% of 
youths would be successfully completing Grade 12 at a school, whilst the remaining 
40% would be achieving something equivalent in the vocational training sub-sector 
(South Africa: Department of Basic Education, 2011b: 175). The 2012 national 
development plan, on the other hand, puts forward as a target twelve years of 
compulsory schooling by 2030 (South Africa: National Planning Commission, 2012: 
296). The very strong focus on completing Grade 12, or at least twelve years of 
education, a commitment which could result in even further growth in the secondary 
schooling level, needs to be understood against the fact that there is no national 
qualification below the Grade 12 level, so amongst policymakers and the public there 
is a sense that someone who has not completed twelve years of schooling is 
essentially uneducated. This represents an unrealistic and extreme position that 
ignores the fact that even in some high income countries there are youths who enter 
the labour market with less than twelve years of schooling. For instance, in recent 
years around 10% of youths in the United States have completed just grade 11 or a 
lower grade14.  
Turning to per student expenditure, the perception that spending is high at the school 
level relative to what is found in other countries is commonly found in both the 
analytical and policy texts. For instance, the 2011 sector plan quotes figures indicating 
that USD PPP spending per secondary student is 2.9 times the level found in Latin 
America (South Africa: Department of Basic Education, 2011b: 28). If one uses per 
student spending over GDP per capita, as is done in the above analysis, the figure of 
2.9 is reduced to 1.4. Clearly the magnitude of the difference is influenced by the 
measure one uses. The policy challenge, if one takes into consideration analyses of 
what drives costs in schools, seems to be to ensure that teacher pay is not allowed to 
rise uncontrollably and to crowd out other priorities. Moreover, the structure of the 
teacher pay system needs to become more oriented towards incentivising improved 
educational outcomes (Gustafsson and Patel, 2009; South Africa: Department of Basic 
Education, 2011b: 16). One way of explaining to policymakers and teacher unions 
that there is something wrong with the recent school spending trajectory is to refer to 
the fact that per student spending over GDP per capita ratios have been rising, for 
instance by 0.5 points a year for the primary ratio (see last column of Table 37) when 
the general trend for middle income countries is for these ratios to fall (see Figure 49).  
                                                     
14
 Specifically, a table available on the United States Census Bureau site at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/ indicates that for several age groups between 25 and 
39 around 10% of the population had completed grade 11 or a lower grade and nothing else in 2012 
(viewed October 2013).   
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11 CONCLUSIONS FOR PART II 
Part II of the dissertation is the part most focussed on extracting new findings from 
the data. In this task, a relatively well-known but arguably under-utilised data source, 
the country-level education data of the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), was 
used. The UIS enrolment data have been used fairly extensively, by for instance Lutz, 
Cuaresma and Sanderson (2008), to fill in gaps where country-specific household data 
were not able to provide educational attainment values, but the kind of analysis of 
cross-sectional and historical enrolment and expenditure trends provided in this part 
of the dissertation is new. As speculated in section 10.1, a reason why the UIS data 
have not been subjected to more comprehensive analysis of this nature could be that 
obtaining a usable dataset off the UIS online data querying facility is cumbersome.  
The central question for this part of the dissertation was: What new patterns can be 
found in the historical country-level enrolment and per student spending data to 
inform policymakers on how to prioritise the various levels of the education system? It 
should be emphasised that comprehensive and reliable guidance to policymakers on 
how to identify and resolve imbalances in the spread of resources and policy emphasis 
across the levels of the education system has been scarce in the economics and 
education planning literature, despite the obvious importance of the topic. As will be 
seen, the patterns observed partly validate understandings policymakers and analysts 
already held, partly challenge some of these understandings, and to some extent offer 
a few complete surprises. 
That there are in fact sufficiently robust patterns in the UIS data that relate to country 
development is perhaps most strikingly seen in the factor analysis described in section 
10.3. Of the 194 countries with at least one value since 2000 with respect to seven key 
indicators, four gross enrolment ratios for four levels of the system, and three 
expenditure values for three levels of the system, 112 countries had all seven values. 
For these 112 countries, factor analysis allowed for the generation of a single z-score 
summarising relatively well the trajectory of country development. Four of the 
variables displayed uniqueness scores indicating particularly strong correlations. This 
appeared to support the viability of depicting comparable convex or ‘boomerang’ 
curves, each representing the cross-sectional configuration of enrolment and spending 
across education levels of a single country or a group of countries (see for instance 
Figure 61), as well as ‘development routes’ for each level of the education system (see 
for instance Figure 62). It has been argued that these graphs represent devices that 
policymakers may find useful for describing and comparing education systems and 
specifically prioritisation across levels.  
The historical analysis presented in section 10.4 has confirmed that there has been a 
striking increase in enrolments at all education levels in the decades since 1970. This 
increase clearly exceeds what one may expect in a normal country development 
trajectory where particular levels of development correspond to particular enrolment 
patterns. It is this trend which in many ways inspired Pritchett’s (2001: 368) 
hypothesis of massively inefficient over-enrolment across the world. The analysis 
presented above found that the enrolment expansion trend clearly holds even when 
changes in the classification of country development status over time are taken into 
account. Importantly, the trend has been accompanied by a large fall in per student 
expenditure relative to GDP per capita, at least at the secondary and tertiary levels, 
even within specific country development categories. For instance, for middle income 
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countries the average gross enrolment ratio (GER) at the tertiary level more than 
tripled, whilst per student expenditure relative to GDP per capita was by the 2000s a 
fifth of what it had been in the 1970s. An attempt was made to disentangle the 
influence of rising income and the influence of historical forces on enrolment 
increases and it was found that the surge in secondary level enrolments occurred 
largely in the 1980s and 1990s, whilst that for tertiary enrolments occurred largely in 
the 1990s. What the data cannot tell us is what these historical forces were, but one 
can speculate that changes in technology pushed up the demand for, say, tertiary 
education, whilst the political emphasis on universalising primary school education 
would have increased the number of young people demanding secondary and then 
tertiary education.  
The historical trends beg the question of whether the same increases in GDP per 
capita could have been achieved with fewer structural changes in education, in other 
words with less expansion of the education system and without falls in per student 
spending relative to GDP. This question is essentially about the relative strengths of 
screening effects and productivity enhancement effects. We can be rather certain that 
the latter effects have occurred, on the basis of the work of for instance 
Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2006), discussed in section 9.2 above. But could 
a large portion of the expansion, perhaps most of it, have been a question of 
‘education for show’, or the effect that Pritchett (2001) worried about? It is instructive 
to keep in mind a few empirically informed magnitudes. The interpretation in section 
9.2 of the models of Vandenbussche et al (2006) pointed to an improvement in the 
growth rate, in terms of per adult output, of 0.1 percentage points arising from a 2 
percentage point improvement in tertiary attainment levels amongst adults, from 13% 
to 15%. Table 30 pointed to expansions in the tertiary GER that would roughly 
correspond to growth improvements of 1.1 percentage points for middle income 
countries and 1.9 for high income countries between the 1970s and 2000s. Average 
annual improvements in GDP per capita between the 1970s and 2000s were slightly 
negative for high and upper middle income countries, and effectively zero for lower 
middle income countries, even if one excludes the especially poor growth figures of 
2009. These are trends seen in the Penn income data used in the foregoing analysis 
and obviously ignore the fact that there were some countries that did grow rapidly. 
Yet at the aggregate level they suggest that much of the enrolment expansion was ‘for 
show’, though empirical certainty on this matter may never be achieved given data 
constraints and the complexity of the dynamics at work. 
The analysis in Part II focussed partly on whether there were differences in the 
education trends between faster and slower growing countries within each country 
development categories. In general, it was found that faster growers prioritised 
education more in the sense that they had higher gross enrolment ratios and higher 
levels of per student spending relative to GDP per capita. One exception to this 
pattern was that amongst less developed countries, more rapid growth was associated 
with lower values in the per student spending indicator at the tertiary level. In terms of 
trends over time, the Mingat and Tan (1998: 9) finding, using just cross-sectional 
data, that there is a large drop in spending on every tertiary student relative to GDP 
per capita as countries develop was confirmed using longitudinal data, but it was 
furthermore found that the drop with respect to this spending indicator occurs faster in 
countries that grow more rapidly. It could be that better governed countries are better 
at managing unit costs at the tertiary level in a manner that protects the quality of 
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education whilst permitting the enrolment of more students. These countries are thus 
better at employing a rationalist planning approach as opposed to succumbing to the 
variety of less rationalist pressures described in section 8 above.  
One intriguing finding is the explanatory power that spending on each secondary 
student in the 1970s, expressed in logged USD PPP terms, has with respect to growth 
in subsequent years. The semi-Bayesian growth regression of Sala-i-Martin, 
Doppelhofer and Miller (2004), discussed in depth in Part I of the dissertation, was 
used to gauge the explanatory power of various education indicators derived from the 
UIS data. The only indicator that emerged as having a high probability of being 
included in a growth regression, using the criteria of Sala-i-Martin et al (2004), was 
the abovementioned secondary school spending indicator. In fact, the inclusion 
probability of this indicator was considerably higher than the inclusion probability of 
primary school enrolments in the 1960s, the key education indicator considered by 
Sala-i-Martin et al (2004). The analysis presented above points to a 50% increase in 
initial spending per student at the secondary level being associated with a growth 
improvement of 0.3 percentage points. This finding runs contrary to some other 
evidence that per student spending has mattered very little for development. For 
instance, Hanushek and Woessman (2007: 60) make the latter argument strongly, but 
using OECD data from a smaller set of mainly high income countries. That secondary 
schooling indicators can display surprisingly strong conditional correlations with 
growth has also emerged from the analysis by Lutz, Cuaresma and Sanderson (2008), 
discussed in section 9.2, though the finding here related to the importance of 
expanding secondary school enrolments. Indicators on secondary enrolments did not 
emerge as significant predictors in the semi-Bayesian approach used in section 10.5.  
A popular perception that Sub-Saharan Africa has over-prioritised primary schooling, 
relative to other levels of education, is only partially supported by the analysis 
presented above. What the UIS data show is that although Sub-Saharan Africa did see 
large increases in its primary level GERs, up to around 2009 countries in the region 
were still behind other comparable countries with respect to this indicator. At the 
same time, over the 1970 to 2011 period, the tertiary GER for the region increased by 
a larger factor than elsewhere, albeit off a low base. In a similar vein, secondary level 
enrolments grew faster in the region than elsewhere. The ratio of the primary GER to 
the tertiary GER dropped in Sub-Saharan Africa to a greater degree than it did in other 
regions. On the other hand, to support future prioritisation of the secondary and 
tertiary levels in the region, one could point to the fact that whilst by around 2010 
Sub-Saharan Africa had caught up to the rest of the world with regard to primary 
enrolments, its secondary GER values were around half of those found in comparator 
countries, whilst its tertiary GERs were on average only one-sixth of what one finds in 
other countries with comparable levels of income.  
One matter that was investigated was whether the correlation between country 
population and spending on each tertiary student suggested high spending was an 
economy of scale problem. One might expect a country such as Swaziland with a 
population of around a million and one small university to experience exceptional 
pressures associated with fixed costs related to, for instance, libraries and small 
classes in more specialised subjects. Yet the analysis suggested that rather than 
population, being in Sub-Saharan Africa was the critical factor driving tertiary 
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education unit costs. This finding suggests that a binding constraint on expansions to 
tertiary enrolments in the region are solvable inefficiencies within the tertiary sector. 
Partly in order to test the utility of the graphs and frameworks developed in the 
analysis, South Africa’s statistics were compared to global trends. One thing this 
exercise confirmed was the importance of not taking individual country statistics 
distributed by the UIS at face value, without considering distortions that may have 
occurred, in particular due to the incomparability of national enrolment and 
population statistics. Data problems would of course also bias the global statistics, but 
one hopes that to some extent country-specific errors would cancel each other out, 
resulting in global patterns that are sufficiently reliable. Moreover, the errors in the 
South African values appear to be exceptionally large. Recalculated South Africa 
statistics were used to confirm what a number of policy documents and analyses have 
said, directly or indirectly, namely that there is an imbalance between relatively low 
tertiary enrolments and relatively high secondary enrolments in South Africa. The 
South African policy is perhaps most confusing when it comes to successful 
completion of Grade 12, with some public targets advocating twelve years of 
compulsory education and thus an even higher GER at the secondary level, when 
what is probably needed is better completion rates with the current GER. Put 
differently, the bottleneck created by insufficient numbers of secondary school 
graduates ready for university is implicitly said to be best solved through quantitative 
expansion when qualitative improvements seem more appropriate. The kind of 
analysis presented above can thus be useful in pointing out to decision-makers that the 
key problem in South Africa is not one of an insufficient number of secondary school 
students.  
To conclude, whilst the analysis of Part II has not produced an all-encompassing and 
empirically informed model of how enrolment and spending, by level, evolve in the 
country development process, it has, one might argue, brought to the fore patterns that 
would be informative for policymakers and can be used to persuade experts and voters 
that cross-country data analysis can be useful and does clarify where structural 
problems lie and what kinds of changes are possible.         
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Appendix D  
The following table provides values from the dataset used for the main analysis 
above. Countries are classified as low income, lower middle income, upper middle 
income and high income countries. The values are the means across the various years 
for which data were available for that country and that variable. The minimum and 
maximum years, across all variables, are indicated in the last two columns. 
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Table 39: Levels of education data by country 
ISO 
code Country Cat. 
GER 
prim. 
GER 
LSec. 
GER 
USec. 
GER 
sec. 
GER 
tert. 
Voc. 
2/3 PSNT 
Tert. 
eng. 
Exp. 
prim. 
Exp. 
sec 
Exp. 
Tert. 
GDP 
cap. 
Min. 
year 
Max. 
year 
AFG Afghanistan LIC 45 34 15 16 1 4 27  11 30 317 728 1970 2010 
BDI Burundi LIC 60 21 8 7 1 35  5 18 115 941 391 1970 2010 
BEN Benin LIC 73 38 15 17 3 7  4 12 23 145 1,063 1970 2010 
BFA Burkina Faso LIC 34 19 7 7 1 11 32 3 27 69 1,391 718 1970 2011 
BGD Bangladesh LIC 71 65 35 33 5 1 5 3 6 13 40 879 1970 2010 
BTN Bhutan LIC 61 60 33 30 4 28 35 13 9 46 222 1,933 1970 2011 
CAF Central African Republic LIC 72 17 8 11 1 8  4 9 22 446 773 1970 2011 
CMR Cameroon LIC 95 38 22 22 4 23 7 3 7 48 430 1,825 1970 2010 
COD Democratic Rep. of the Congo LIC 85 43 24 23 2 32   4 31 362 585 1970 2010 
COG Congo LIC 118 52 23 50 4 10  2 11 34 618 2,033 1970 2010 
COM Comoros LIC 91 46 27 28 3 1 20  20 27  1,214 1970 2010 
ERI Eritrea LIC 49 42 19 24 1 1 18 15 11 25 599 737 1989 2010 
ETH Ethiopia LIC 45 31 10 17 2 3 10 10 19 42 640 453 1970 2010 
GIN Guinea LIC 50 32 17 20 3 5  10 12 33 399 833 1970 2010 
GMB Gambia LIC 60 53 46 19 2 7   16 30 341 901 1970 2010 
GNB Guinea-Bissau LIC 70 23 16 11 2 13      496 1970 2010 
GNQ Equatorial Guinea LIC 121 41 10 24 3 10   1 3  4,412 1970 2010 
HTI Haiti LIC 75   14 1 3      1,719 1970 2009 
IND India LIC 91 69 40 41 8 1 5  11 21 74 1,525 1970 2010 
KEN Kenya LIC 101 79 31 35 2 2 18 19 17 25 721 1,118 1970 2009 
KGZ Kyrgyzstan LIC 104 91 73 91 33 6 11 11  32 24 1,764 1981 2010 
KHM Cambodia LIC 134 42 17 28 2 3 18 3 6 8 60 939 1970 2010 
LBR Liberia LIC 63 37 28 19 4 9 28 5 9 67 644 1,025 1970 2009 
LSO Lesotho LIC 103 45 22 25 2 4 16 1 22 91 1,346 928 1970 2010 
MDA Moldova LIC 95 91 75 86 34 8 1  37 39 42 1,935 1981 2010 
MDG Madagascar LIC 113 33 13 21 3 5  7 8 30 346 833 1970 2010 
MLI Mali LIC 41 34 17 13 2 12  2 27 69 630 686 1970 2011 
MMR Myanmar LIC 105 52 35 32 5 1  5 3 7 36  1971 2010 
MNG Mongolia LIC 100 85 69 76 27 7 4 17 14 19 22 2,180 1970 2010 
MOZ Mozambique LIC 81 21 6 9 1 14  10 15 85 1,409 465 1970 2011 
MWI Malawi LIC 93 40 15 21 1 1 79 33 11 33 2,029 672 1970 2010 
NER Niger LIC 31 12 4 6 1 4 3 2 32 89 432 578 1970 2011 
NIC Nicaragua LIC 92 71 50 42 9 13   11 17 93 2,722 1970 2010 
NPL Nepal LIC 85 59 25 28 4 3  4 13 12 81 883 1970 2010 
RWA Rwanda LIC 90 24 13 15 3 28   14 39 1,142 768 1970 2011 
SDN Sudan LIC 49 43 23 21 2 4      1,490 1970 2009 
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ISO 
code Country Cat. 
GER 
prim. 
GER 
LSec. 
GER 
USec. 
GER 
sec. 
GER 
tert. 
Voc. 
2/3 PSNT 
Tert. 
eng. 
Exp. 
prim. 
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sec 
Exp. 
Tert. 
GDP 
cap. 
Min. 
year 
Max. 
year 
SLE Sierra Leone LIC 56 44 26 15 1 5 80 1    883 1970 2011 
SOM Somalia LIC 20 10 7 7 2 18   46 58 132 671 1970 2009 
TCD Chad LIC 56 20 11 10 1 5 14  10 26 294 839 1970 2010 
TGO Togo LIC 105 56 22 26 2 7   10 38 756 1,012 1970 2010 
TJK Tajikistan LIC 97 92 54 85 19 3 20 10  25 18 1,284 1981 2010 
TLS Timor-Leste LIC 111 56 38 50 13 5     84 1,132 2000 2010 
TZA Tanzania LIC 77   4 1 10  13 12 94 1,092 717 1970 2010 
UGA Uganda LIC 82 26 11 12 2 11 18 8 9 123 942 728 1970 2010 
ZWE Zimbabwe LIC 95   27 3 2  12   75 328 1970 2010 
AGO Angola LMC 99 24 14 15 2 16  9  42 76 2,539 1970 2010 
ARM Armenia LMC 99 94 79 90 28 2 27 7 15 20 11 3,321 1986 2010 
BGR Bulgaria LMC 102 87 95 93 31 28 2 21 19 19 27 6,182 1970 2010 
BLR Belarus LMC 99 104 65 94 51 10 21 26 12 31 23 7,654 1971 2010 
BOL Bolivia LMC 105 96 74 65 26 7  17 14 12 44 3,138 1970 2009 
CIV Côte d’Ivoire LMC 70 30 15 17 3 10  9 21 144 624 1,511 1970 2011 
CPV Cape Verde LMC 111 100 67 46 8 13 18 10 17 19 131 1,908 1970 2010 
CUB Cuba LMC 106 96 80 75 30 29 5 2 34 44 70 8,623 1970 2011 
DJI Djibouti LMC 35 27 15 14 2 20 16 6 24 33  3,204 1970 2011 
EGY Egypt LMC 83 96 65 58 19 23 8   50 129 2,824 1970 2010 
FJI Fiji LMC 108 99 64 74 5 4 7  17 19 135 3,630 1970 2009 
FSM Micronesia (Federated States 
of) 
LMC 185 100 74 136 19 2      3,086 1970 2009 
GEO Georgia LMC 95 90 70 85 38 4 15 16 15 27 11 3,246 1981 2010 
GHA Ghana LMC 79 68 26 42 3 4 14 8 10 26 708 897 1970 2011 
GTM Guatemala LMC 84 51 40 28 7 29  17 8 8 49 5,158 1970 2010 
GUY Guyana LMC 101 109 64 82 6 7 14 7 13 15 143 2,471 1970 2010 
HND Honduras LMC 103 66 64 32 10 31  18 12 20 75 3,099 1970 2010 
IDN Indonesia LMC 106 79 50 43 9 16   12 14 40 2,334 1970 2010 
IRQ Iraq LMC 95 55 30 42 10 8 7 14 9 13 107 5,814 1970 2009 
JAM Jamaica LMC 100 96 83 71 12 4 54  12 18 91 7,721 1970 2010 
KAZ Kazakhstan LMC 109 99 84 95 39 7 34   22 11 7,067 1981 2011 
KIR Kiribati LMC 123 88 75 41  28   20 88  2,786 1970 2009 
LAO Laos LMC 103 50 29 27 4 9 35 8 7 19 81 1,208 1970 2010 
LKA Sri Lanka LMC 101 100 71 65 3 1   9 23 149 2,117 1970 2010 
MAR Morocco LMC 81 64 31 32 8 5  5 20 66 165 2,338 1970 2011 
MHL Marshall Islands LMC 109 109 70 82 16 4   23 28 73 7,456 1970 2011 
MRT Mauritania LMC 58 24 19 17 3 5 18  11 29 148 1,330 1970 2010 
NGA Nigeria LMC 85 35 29 23 4 15     2,113 1,413 1970 2010 
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code Country Cat. 
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PAK Pakistan LMC 62 40 24 22 3 3 1  10 23 191 1,730 1970 2010 
PHL Philippines LMC 109 84 68 69 25  17 14 9 8 15 2,136 1970 2009 
PNG Papua New Guinea LMC 59 27 3 11 2 19  25 21 116 401 2,046 1970 2009 
PRY Paraguay LMC 106 76 51 39 13 8 1  10 15 45 3,353 1970 2009 
PSE Palestine LMC 93 92 69 84 34 1 8 7     1995 2010 
ROU Romania LMC 101 96 78 84 21 31 10 20 15 14 27 6,662 1970 2010 
RUS Russia LMC 104 87 90 92 53 13 2    12 10,773 1970 2009 
SEN Senegal LMC 59 27 12 17 4 6   15 29 184 1,239 1970 2010 
SLB Solomon Islands LMC 86 52 15 20  21   10 119  1,578 1970 2010 
SLV El Salvador LMC 98 74 43 43 16 20  12 8 8 14 4,869 1970 2010 
SRB Serbia LMC 102 99 81 90 49 36 1 16 58 14 41 8,102 1999 2010 
STP Sao Tome and Principe LMC 134 67 22 37 4 4      1,211 1970 2011 
SUR Suriname LMC 125 87 55 56 8 35  10    8,499 1970 2009 
SWZ Swaziland LMC 94 55 34 39 3 2 11 5 11 38 351 2,662 1970 2010 
SYR Syria LMC 105 80 31 52 14 6   12 20 103 3,117 1970 2010 
TKM Turkmenistan LMC     17       4,740 1981 2009 
TON Tonga LMC 113 108 96 97 5 5 33  13 14 100 5,258 1970 2009 
TUR Turkey LMC 102 92 73 54 17 21  13 9 11 57 6,959 1970 2009 
UKR Ukraine LMC 104 97 95 95 53 12 7 23   34 5,045 1971 2010 
UZB Uzbekistan LMC 101 95 105 98 13 15  16    1,659 1981 2011 
VNM Vietnam LMC 107 85 54 63 8 4  20 19 17 61 1,218 1970 2010 
VUT Vanuatu LMC 114 47 31 23 4 20 53  14 61 176 4,820 1970 2010 
WSM Samoa LMC 104 100 74 80 4 3 30 5 10 10 188 5,041 1970 2010 
YEM Yemen LMC 82 51 37 44 8 1 12     1,951 1989 2010 
ZMB Zambia LMC 98 51  17 2 6  22 10 96 751 1,430 1970 2010 
ALB Albania UMC 103 99 61 84 11 19  7 20 6 37 3,347 1970 2010 
ARG Argentina UMC 109 102 69 69 39 57  9 8 15 20 8,617 1970 2009 
ATG Antigua and Barbuda UMC 97 113 83 91 16 5   8 12 15 10,533 1970 2010 
AZE Azerbaijan UMC 101 88 69 84 19 6 49 6 6 16 16 4,187 1981 2010 
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina UMC 109 101 81 91 35 35      4,273 1990 2010 
BLZ Belize UMC 112 78 51 64 13 3 34  15 21 32 6,438 1970 2010 
BRA Brazil UMC 134 118 88 68 12 10  8 15 14 56 7,385 1970 2010 
BRB Barbados UMC 106 101 110 93 27 2 26  17 24 100 20,234 1970 2010 
BWA Botswana UMC 94 88 59 43 4 11 52  14 98 877 5,312 1970 2009 
CHL Chile UMC 110 97 81 74 26 20  21 12 10 44 6,942 1970 2009 
CHN China UMC 118 90 51 51 8 9 5  5 22 729 2,013 1970 2010 
COL Colombia UMC 114 89 66 57 17 20 1 29 12 13 34 4,938 1970 2010 
CRI Costa Rica UMC 106 92 56 54 21 19  15 12 18 62 8,247 1970 2010 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Part II  248 
ISO 
code Country Cat. 
GER 
prim. 
GER 
LSec. 
GER 
USec. 
GER 
sec. 
GER 
tert. 
Voc. 
2/3 PSNT 
Tert. 
eng. 
Exp. 
prim. 
Exp. 
sec 
Exp. 
Tert. 
GDP 
cap. 
Min. 
year 
Max. 
year 
CZE Czech Republic UMC 106 98 85 91 23 40 12 18 18 22 38 17,843 1971 2009 
DMA Dominica UMC 111 123 80 86 4 8   15 14  3,713 1970 2010 
DOM Dominican Republic UMC 109 77 64 50 18 6   6 5  5,582 1970 2010 
DZA Algeria UMC 98 110 54 47 12 8  9 13 36 331 4,900 1970 2010 
ECU Ecuador UMC 114 70 53 53 25 19  13 4 8  5,036 1970 2009 
EST Estonia UMC 100 102 94 97 49 20 13 13 20 31 35 11,640 1981 2009 
GAB Gabon UMC 154 64 31 36 3 21      11,507 1970 2011 
GRD Grenada UMC 112 116 94 82 13 9 23 3 9 10  7,630 1970 2010 
HUN Hungary UMC 100 100 94 88 26 25 17 14 30 15 71 11,926 1970 2009 
IRN Iran UMC 101 96 69 64 13 7 31 29 12 17 104 8,130 1970 2010 
JOR Jordan UMC 104 93 74 76 21 6  13 14 27 69 3,946 1970 2010 
KNA Saint Kitts and Nevis UMC 104 100 85 87 6 4   9 20 77 6,976 1970 2010 
LBN Lebanon UMC 106 91 70 67 34 13  12 14 4 15 13,099 1970 2010 
LBY Libya UMC 121 122 97 67 17 17  21   23 17,291 1971 2009 
LCA Saint Lucia UMC 117 87 74 55 7 5 53  17 31 91 8,484 1970 2010 
LTU Lithuania UMC 96 98 101 96 49 13 5 19 16 24 31 10,636 1981 2010 
LVA Latvia UMC 99 96 94 95 42 20 4 11 24 30 27 9,710 1981 2010 
MDV Maldives UMC 126 104 10 39 13 8 91  16   2,162 1970 2011 
MEX Mexico UMC 113 105 54 58 16 15  19 11 15 40 9,250 1970 2010 
MKD Macedonia UMC 97 95 72 82 25 27  17 38 10 61 6,439 1971 2010 
MNE Montenegro UMC 114 106 82 94 28 31      5,736 1990 2010 
MUS Mauritius UMC 103 92 74 59 7 4 22  12 19 172 5,179 1970 2010 
MYS Malaysia UMC 95 93 50 56 17 4 18 22 14 24 130 6,631 1970 2009 
NAM Namibia UMC 118 80 32 53 6 1 15 3 19 26 116 4,210 1970 2010 
OMN Oman UMC 65 89 73 41 11 6  9 14 24 116 13,863 1970 2010 
PAN Panama UMC 108 85 54 62 28 29 6 12 11 15 43 5,979 1970 2010 
PER Peru UMC 116 96 74 68 24 11 24  7 10 19 5,266 1970 2010 
PLW Palau UMC 107 101 93 97 39     9 81 15,143 1980 2009 
SAU Saudi Arabia UMC 93 99 90 84 15 4  7 19 19 165 17,603 1971 2010 
SVK Slovakia UMC 99 92 83 88 32 35 2 18 16 14 32 13,536 1987 2010 
SYC Seychelles UMC 108 115 99 90  13   16 30  13,379 1970 2010 
THA Thailand UMC 93 84 58 43 23 17 1 10 13 19 60 4,357 1970 2011 
TTO Trinidad and Tobago UMC 101 84 76 73 5 2 45 19 13 19 151 13,271 1970 2010 
TUN Tunisia UMC 108 106 65 50 13 16 2 10 16 30 128 3,776 1970 2009 
URY Uruguay UMC 110 109 87 79 31 16  10 8 10 26 6,929 1970 2009 
VCT Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
UMC 115 110 73 63 5 8   19 20  3,346 1970 2010 
VEN Venezuela UMC 104 83 56 58 27 7  18 7 8 89 8,910 1970 2010 
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ZAF South Africa UMC 100 97 86 85 11 4   14 18 97 5,844 1970 2010 
ABW Aruba HIC 112 111 86 96 29 17 4 23 13 19 32  1999 2010 
AND Andorra HIC 93 91 70 60 8 7 43  12 11 28  1971 2010 
ANT Netherlands Antilles HIC 139 122 69 99 23 40 11 33     1972 2002 
ARE UAE HIC 97 94 76 60 9 2   5 7 21 41,971 1971 2009 
AUS Australia HIC 105 115 198 139 46 39 15 11 17 16 41 27,412 1970 2010 
AUT Austria HIC 101 102 96 98 35 39 20 14 20 26 50 27,155 1970 2010 
BEL Belgium HIC 103 137 126 108 40 45 9 11 17 29 40 25,607 1970 2009 
BHR Bahrain HIC 110 107 95 86 9 14  8 15 16  22,772 1970 2010 
BHS Bahamas HIC 102 93 85 91 19 6      21,281 1970 2010 
BMU Bermuda HIC 99 91 71 84 16 6  12 11 16 28 35,302 1970 2010 
BRN Brunei Darussalam HIC 118 119 78 78 9 6 1 6 6 18 142 62,215 1970 2010 
CAN Canada HIC 101 99 106 98 77  22 10   35 27,621 1970 2009 
CHE Switzerland HIC 93 111 83 96 28 35 11 14 24 30 56 32,597 1970 2010 
CYM Cayman Islands HIC 102 93 84 89 21  8 8     1972 2008 
CYP Cyprus HIC 100 99 94 96 29 9  6 17 26 46 12,797 1970 2010 
DEU Germany HIC 102 101 99 101 41 24   13 27 39 25,318 1970 2010 
DNK Denmark HIC 99 120 126 113 43 28 1 10 32 30 60 26,613 1970 2009 
ESP Spain HIC 108 109 127 99 39 20 8 17 15 18 24 19,986 1970 2010 
FIN Finland HIC 98 101 132 110 54 28  26 22 26 42 23,027 1970 2010 
FRA France HIC 108 108 113 97 39 23 1 13 15 25 33 24,415 1970 2010 
GBR United Kingdom HIC 104 101 102 91 36 12 0 9 16 26 57 24,504 1970 2009 
GRC Greece HIC 100 98 95 88 36 17 9 15 7 12 26 19,085 1970 2009 
HKG Hong Kong HIC 104 97 69 66 22 5 17 16 10 13 56 21,337 1970 2010 
HRV Croatia HIC 92 97 83 88 33 37  17   31 10,749 1981 2010 
IRL Ireland HIC 103 102 121 100 33 11 23 11 13 22 47 20,696 1970 2010 
ISL Iceland HIC 99 99 118 97 34 22 2 7 23 20 33 27,703 1970 2009 
ISR Israel HIC 102 97 110 91 40 22 4 18 21 22 45 18,797 1970 2009 
ITA Italy HIC 102 106 92 82 38 35 2 16 20 24 26 23,342 1970 2010 
JPN Japan HIC 101 102 101 97 37 14 0 17 20 21 26 25,594 1970 2010 
KOR Korea HIC 104 100 96 85 47 17  31 15 15 18 12,193 1970 2010 
KWT Kuwait HIC 99 108 102 84 14 2 30  21 11 103 40,968 1971 2009 
LUX Luxembourg HIC 97 107 87 77 5 47 26 12 24 25 84 45,205 1970 2009 
MAC Macao HIC 93 109 73 65 44 12  2 8 11 28 21,424 1970 2010 
MCO Monaco HIC      19   3 7   1971 2010 
MLT Malta HIC 104 97 85 81 14 16 8 8 11 20 93 13,363 1970 2010 
NLD Netherlands HIC 103 131 112 110 41 44 2 9 16 24 62 28,980 1970 2010 
NOR Norway HIC 100 99 130 103 46 28 3 7 29 22 45 34,047 1970 2010 
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NZL New Zealand HIC 103 103 135 98 48 6 15 7 16 17 41 20,945 1970 2010 
POL Poland HIC 100 99 101 89 32 42 7 14 24 21 28 9,594 1970 2009 
PRI Puerto Rico HIC 108 89 78 83 79  21  31  66 17,799 1970 2010 
PRT Portugal HIC 119 114 93 78 29 18 1 21 16 23 35 14,258 1970 2009 
QAT Qatar HIC 110 100 80 77 17 3  4 8 15 30 73,367 1971 2010 
SGP Singapore HIC      9 36 29 8 14 56 24,725 1970 2010 
SMR San Marino HIC 94 97 96 96  14 53 15 23 22   1975 2010 
SVN Slovenia HIC 100 96 102 92 43 38 1 17 23 24 33 19,190 1981 2009 
SWE Sweden HIC 101 106 142 104 45 31 3 17 30 25 48 26,345 1970 2010 
TWN Taiwan HIC            14,823 1970 2009 
USA United States HIC 98 102 89 92 68  5 7 21 23 24 31,449 1970 2010 
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12 INTRODUCTION FOR PART III 
Where Part I of the dissertation has focussed largely on the existing cross-country 
growth modelling and what this means for policymakers, and Part II has presented 
some new analysis relating to the prioritisation of the different levels of the education 
system, Part III focuses on understanding the institutional realities of developing 
country education systems and the thinking of education policymakers. Part III is 
important for the dissertation as a whole because if economics is to be employed to 
improve education policymaking, then a clear understanding of the contexts and 
mindsets of education policymakers is needed. A key question that shapes Part III is 
thus the following: What tends to be the policy thinking and the frames of reference of 
education policymakers, and what are the implications of this for the conversation 
between economists and education policymakers? The economics of education scope 
in Part III is broader than in the previous two parts of the dissertation. It would have 
been too limiting to consider just the degree to which policymakers have been 
receptive to the economic growth literature. Instead, examining how receptive they 
have been to the full range of economics findings relating to education creates a more 
complete picture of the people and institutions that economists wanting to influence 
education must understand.  
What are the economics topics which are of particular relevance to education 
policymakers? There are many ways of answering this question. For instance, Part III 
of the dissertation sees the economics of education largely in terms of two large 
concerns: the external efficiency of the education system, or education’s contribution 
to income and development; and the internal efficiency of education institutions, or 
the ability of these institutions to produce the expected education outcomes. An 
alternative breakdown is that of Gustafsson and Mabogoane (2012), who see the 
economics of education broken down into five key analysis areas: labour market rates 
of return to schooling (in other words, external efficiency); production functions 
describing how education institutions produce education (internal efficiency); models 
of teacher incentives; benefit incidence analyses dealing with the equity of public 
investment in education as well as the equity of rates of return; and cross-country 
models that compare education systems.  
Section 13 below discusses the practical and conceptual hurdles that researchers are 
likely to encounter if they try to identify the policies of an education system. Partly to 
create an analytical framework, the policy advice of the economists is also discussed, 
first with respect to the external efficiency and then the internal efficiency of the 
education system. Alongside efficiency, educational and socio-economic equity are 
also dealt with. All this is done in preparation for the analysis of four countries in 
section 14. Given the relatively strong presence in the literature on education policy 
(but not really in the policies themselves) of positions that are fairly strongly opposed 
to those of the economists, a few examples of these positions are discussed. This is 
done partly to test, at least in a theoretical sense, how well the economics framework 
holds out against its critics.  
Section 14 focuses on the policy positions of the policymakers largely through an 
examination of selected policies and policy discussions relating to South Africa and 
three other developing countries: Brazil, Chile and China. The rationale for this 
selection of countries is explained. What policymakers appear committed to is 
compared to the policy positions of the economists. Whilst a variety of education 
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policy areas are explored, the area that is of special importance to the dissertation is 
given prominence, namely the overall gearing of the education system towards 
national development. The treatment of the four countries could of course have been 
much deeper, to the extent of becoming a dissertation on its own. However, it will be 
argued (in the conclusion in section 15) that even an apparently cursive coverage of 
the education policy dynamics of a few countries of this nature is original and 
valuable for highlighting policy approaches that should be better known in education 
policymaking circles. It is also argued that systematic comparisons of country 
education systems, or even one-country system descriptions within an economic 
framework, are much rarer than they should be.  
Matters of epistemology receive some attention in Part III, specifically how the 
knowledge of education policymakers is influenced, or not influenced, by economics 
of education, but also more broadly how empirical evidence and ideology in a sense 
compete within the policymaking process. What one may mean when one refers to the 
influence of ideology in policymaking, or in research, is also discussed.  These 
matters are crucial for understanding how economics can make a positive contribution 
to the education policy discourse. For instance, in using economics to dispel 
misperceptions where ideology may have clouded views of what is possible, it is 
important to know where the most serious misperceptions lie. Moreover, a careful 
examination of what knowledge policymakers need, and the planning and welfare 
implications of not having the required knowledge, should guide the economists when 
they decide where to invest their analytical efforts.  
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13 HOW TO IDENTIFY AND DESCRIBE POLICY PRIORITIES 
Part III of the dissertation focuses on how education policymakers in developing 
countries deal with internal and external efficiency issues. More precisely, what this 
means is that the policies pursued in a few developing country education sectors are 
examined, using an economics-oriented framework of internal and external efficiency, 
both to arrange and evaluate the policy information. The term ‘policy’ is used in a 
fairly standard manner here, to refer broadly to the guidance provided by documents, 
mostly (though as will be seen, even by informal understandings), in order to ensure 
that a public administration behaves in a certain way and pursues certain priorities. 
The documents providing the guidance could be anything from a national constitution, 
to a law, to a five-year plan, to a public funding regulation. A search through the 
literature reveals that there is in fact no widely accepted definition of ‘policy’, though 
the term may have a specific meaning within one country’s tradition and legal system. 
This absence of a strict definition is understandable, given the very different 
institutional make-up of different governments and legal systems. What may be 
captured in a national constitution in one country may be captured in a regulation in 
another. Moreover, it is assumed in the policy analysis that follows that although it is 
preferable to refer to documents, such as laws or plans, it is also possible to consider 
actions as a proxy for the policy. If policymakers continuously ‘push’ the education 
system in a particular direction, one can assume they are doing this because there is 
policy of some sort, possibly formal and documented, possibly more informal, such as 
the pronouncements of influential politicians, which compels or allows them to do 
this.  
In preparing the ground for the policy analysis of the following section, this section 
discusses the multi-layered nature of policies, in particular in developing countries, 
through reference to three key contributing factors: corruption, foreign donor funding 
and what will be referred to as a culture of institutional ritualism and mimicry. A 
proper understanding of these matters is vital, it will be argued, for a sufficiently 
realistic policy discussion. These phenomena are not unique to developing countries, 
but they tend to be more pronounced in these countries. A narrow definition of policy, 
for instance a legalistic one, would not be useful in many developing country contexts 
given that policy takes so many different forms. This section also discusses what 
economists advise education policymakers, as the economists’ view of optimal 
education sector policies is used as the framework for the policy analysis of the 
following section.  
The policy recommendations of the economists are relatively easy to identify. They 
are commonly expressed in the academic literature, as an examination of regular 
academic articles published in the Economics of Education Review during 2011 
suggests. Of the 67 articles published in this journal in 2011, 53 included policy 
recommendations. However, only six of these had policy recommendations relating to 
developing countries. The World Bank is perhaps the most quoted source of 
economically-focussed education policy recommendations applicable to developing 
countries. Key recent publications in this regard are the World Bank’s (2011a) 
Education strategy 2020 and the review of best practices for improving the internal 
efficiency of the education system produced by Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos (2011). 
Certain UNESCO publications promote the positions of the economists. Notably, the 
2005 Education for All global monitoring report of UNESCO was informed by 
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background papers of the education economists Eric Hanushek and Martin Carnoy 
and included substantial coverage of the production function work of the former 
economist (UNESCO, 2005). The UNDP’s annual Human development report has 
promoted the positions of, for instance, the development economist Amartya Sen, 
with respect to the centrality of human capital in the country development process. 
For instance, the 2010 report in many respects re-affirms the human capital model, 
whilst emphasising the need to update it with a clearer treatment of the role of human 
capital in dealing with new environmental challenges (UNDP, 2010). At the country 
level, in South Africa a series of working papers of the Department of Economics at 
Stellenbosch University deals to a large extent with economics of education analysis 
and associated policy challenges: 9 of 24 papers in 2011 and 11 of 29 in 2010 deal 
with education1. A similar series of working papers, also with a considerable 
education focus, is maintained by the University of Sao Paulo in Brazil2. A recent 
collection of articles examining basic education questions in Brazil includes articles 
by 18 Brazilian economists (Veloso et al, 2009). Despite these efforts, what stands out 
is still a large gap between the volume and quality of economics of education papers 
in developing countries, relative to developed countries. What the policy positions of 
the economists are is discussed below in this section.  
What is far more difficult than identifying the policy positions of the economists, is 
identifying the policy positions of policymakers themselves, particularly in 
developing countries. Part of the reason is simply that education policies are not as 
systemically published as academic articles. It is often difficult to find the education 
policies of developing countries on ministry websites, for instance. An important tool 
that to some degree fills the gap for those wishing to compare policies across 
countries is the online Planipolis facility of UNESCO’s International Institute for 
Educational Planning (IIEP)3. This facility provides an archive of national policy 
documents and plans. To provide an idea of size, there were around 1,700 documents 
in early 2012, 23 of which were from South Africa.  
More insuperable obstacles to effective identification of the actual policies of 
countries exist, however. Policies, especially in developing countries with weak or 
non-existent democratic institutions, tend to exist on two levels. On one level, highly 
publicised and idealistic policies, designed more to satisfy current aspirations than to 
serve as practical guidance, exist. Inbar (1996: 92) refers to these policies as the 
outcome of a ritualistic process. On a second level, less publicised and more realistic 
policies are found which are the policies that implementers actually use. In short, the 
policy analyst must take care to separate ritualistic documents from documents that 
actually guide what people do. Where democracy of some form exists, ritualistic 
policies may be released whose intention is to outdo the promises of a previous 
government and which are informed by political aspirations rather than empirical 
analysis of what is doable.  
Psacharopoulos (1996: 343), arguably one of the founders of the current economics of 
education tradition, has argued that ‘In the field of education, perhaps more than in 
any other sector of the economy, politics are substituted for analysis.’ Implicit in this 
observation is the point that education policymakers tend not to appreciate the multi-
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 See http://ideas.repec.org/s/sza/wpaper.html. 
2
 See http://www.cpq.fearp.usp.br/conteudo/seco2.html. 
3
 See http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org. 
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layered nature of policymaking, and start to believe that the more idealistic policies 
are actually implementable, and not simply political window-dressing. One can 
imagine a rational policymaker faced with the need to maintain an overly idealistic 
view of the future on one level of the policy process to operate at two levels: the 
idealistic and the realistic levels. The policymaker would, say, produce idealistic plans 
to satisfy political principals, but would proceed with his day-to-day work on the basis 
of more realistic plans, in the full knowledge that idealistic goals would not be 
attained. If the incentive to produce idealistic plans was stronger than the 
disincentives associated with failing to reach goals, it would be completely rational 
for the policymaker to contribute towards the setting of unrealistic targets. The 
scenario painted here of the rational policymaker working on two levels is perhaps 
optimal, within a given political context. However, what one imagines 
Psacharopoulos (1996) was complaining about, was a scenario in which policymakers 
fail to make the distinction between the realistic and the idealistic, between analysis 
and politics, and behave according to a set of criteria which are unsustainable and 
dishonest. The problem with such a scenario would be that realistic work would 
receive no attention as it would be work considered unworthy of attention, because it 
fell so far short of the ideal. Pritchett, Woolcock and Andrews (2012) offer a 
compelling account of the problem being described here, in an article titled ‘Looking 
like a state: Techniques of persistent failure in state capability for implementation’. 
Their term ‘isomorphic mimicry’ is more or less a synonym of the term ‘ritualism’ 
used by Inbar (1996). Pritchett, Woolcock and Andrews (2012) explain how the 
problem is often compounded by advice given to developing countries by reputable 
policy experts, who inadvertently undermine institutions by encouraging the over-
stretching of existing and very limited institutional capacity, the result being 
‘mimicry’, or a world of pretence removed from a sense of what can be realistically 
done.  
The discussion would be incomplete without some explicit reference to ideology, 
given how frequently the problems described above are expressed in terms of the 
undue influence of ideology on policymaking. The Oxford Dictionary defines 
ideology as ‘a system of ideas and ideals, especially one which forms the basis of 
economic or political theory and policy’4. Downs (1957) presents an economics-
focussed description of ideology, which deals with a few of the more value-laden 
aspect of the term, specifically what one could refer to as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ ideology. 
In a democracy, ideology becomes a tool for organising voter choice in a context of 
information asymmetries. People are unable to understand the full range of policy 
choices made by specific parties, and hence parties construct ideologies as shorthand 
descriptions of what voters can expect from any party should it become or remain the 
governing party. Ideology is thus a necessary device to deal with policy complexity. 
Ideology becomes ‘bad’, or malign, when rent-seeking politicians pay too much 
attention to maintaining and adjusting the ideology in the interests of attracting votes, 
as opposed to paying attention to actual policies. It is not difficult to imagine how this 
may result in the ritualism already referred, in particular if the maintenance of 
ideology through continuous production of highly idealistic policies, combined with 
tactics to detract from real issues such as the persistence of poverty, become pervasive 
not just amongst politicians, but most senior government bureaucrats.  
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Ideology, including ‘bad’ ideology that detracts from facts and how the population in 
general experiences the world, is pervasive and not just present in the minds of 
politicians and bureaucrats. Economists of course need ideology as a system to 
organise their ideas and ideals. But they sometimes allow ideology to take over and 
cloud the facts. There is lively debate within economics about this problem. The 
arguments made by Pritchett et al (2012) are partly a rebuke aimed at fellow 
economists guilty of promoting overly idealised, and thus impractical, notions of the 
kind of state that can be realised within developing countries. Ideology has blinded 
these economic advisors to the realities of capacity constraints and institutional factors 
working against greater government effectiveness. But an excess of ideology not only 
detracts from fact, ideology also has a tendency to create the impression of large 
differences in policy standpoints when actually these are rather small. In the language 
of Downs (1957), political parties in democracies need to create sufficient 
distinctiveness in their ideological ‘brand’, even if their policy positions may not be 
that different from each other. Differences across the policy bundles of different 
parties are thus emphasised, and similarities are downplayed. It will be argued below 
that the language of ideology has created an impression of a deep rift between certain 
educationists and certain economists, which to a large degree disappears when one 
examines the policy detail. This is not to deny that differences in policy positions 
exist, or that people who have studied economics tend to adopt rather specific sets of 
policy values, values which would tend to be considered on the right of the political 
spectrum, for instance a preference for fewer trade restrictions (Allgood, Bosshardt, 
Van der Klaauw and Watts, 2012). However, if there is a fundamental ideological 
difference between the educationists and economists in the apparent stand-off that will 
be discussed below, it is arguably that economists, with their rather strong insistence 
that policy advice must be based on empirical evidence, combined with their interest 
in data analysis techniques, tend towards an empiricist conservatism, and a rejection 
of romanticism. Economics is the dismal science. Economists, with their attachment, 
through data, to empirical realities of the past and present, combined with their 
theoretical emphasis on constraints, are not inclined to believe that human behaviour 
will be fundamentally different in the future to what it is now. This stands in stark 
contrast to the emphasis in the field of education, which is not just on educating 
people, but often also on changing human behaviour in fundamental ways.  
Returning to Psacharopoulos’s complaint about the amount of politics, as opposed to 
analysis, in education, arguments made in Part III of the dissertation will partly be 
based on the assumption that economics in general, and in particular good economics, 
is less clouded by ideology, and more practically oriented toward problem-solving, 
than much of the literature in the field of education. Obviously there is some very 
practical advice emerging from the education specialists, and economists are 
sometimes guilty of giving impractical advice. Yet some of the focus in Part III of the 
dissertation is on building a case for more economic thinking within education 
policymaking, not just because the opportunities for this seem promising, but also 
because the use of economic analysis and thinking to strengthen education 
policymaking in the past have borne fruit.  
Corruption and, related to this, a slack approach to policymaking, can result in a 
situation where policies, insofar as they exist at all, do not guide practice and practice 
is instead guided by informal, and often inequitable, conventions. Figure 63 illustrates 
the correlation between corruption and level of educational quality, using for the 
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former values from the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators, which agree to a 
high degree with the corruption perceptions index of Transparency International 
(2011) (the correlation coefficient is 0.985). The graph suggests that to some degree 
less corruption is associated with better educational quality in the development 
process, though the graph also points to notable exceptions, such as Russia (high 
corruption and high educational quality) and Qatar (low corruption but also low 
educational outcomes). China, which is not included in the graph because average test 
score data are not available, carries a value of -0.6 on the vertical axis, in other words 
it is viewed as more corrupt than either South Africa or Brazil. One might expect 
greater difficulties in identifying what policies guide governments in more corrupt 
countries, given that corruption by its nature requires a high degree of informality and 
deviation from rules and laws.  
Figure 63: Corruption and quality of education 
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Sources: World Bank, 2010 (control of corruption); United Nations Statistics 
Division, 2009 (population). See section Part I of the dissertation for details on 
how average test scores were calculated.   
Note: The area of each bubble reflects population size. The trendline reflects 
the quadratic function, with adjusted R2 being 0.355. 
 
A further complicating factor when policies are identified in the case of many 
developing countries is the strong presence of aid donors. Such a situation may result 
in a fragmented policy landscape in a country where the unifying role of the state is 
undermined by multiple policy agendas of several donor countries. The following 
graph underlines how widespread the presence of donors is in Africa. Of the 33 
countries where 20% or more of the education budget is funded by donors, 24 are in 
Africa.  
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Figure 64: Percentage of education budget that is donor-funded 
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Source: UNESCO, 2011a (variables used were total population, GNP per 
capita, public expenditure on education as a percentage of GNP, and total aid 
to education). 
Note: The horizontal axis refers to overseas development aid received for 
education divided by public education spending, all in 2008. Discrepancies 
between values results in the percentage exceeding 100% for certain 
countries. Countries represented are those with a population of over 1.0 
million and with a percentage exceeding 1%. 
 
Poor document availability and the multi-layered nature of education policy in 
developing countries discussed above are obstacles that make the identification of 
policy priorities in developing countries difficult. The methodology implicit in the 
OECD’s series of reviews of national policies for education provides some idea of 
what methodologies are possible and informative. A few of these reviews deal with 
non-OECD countries, notably reviews for South Africa, Chile, China, Dominican 
Republic and Russia have been produced5. These reviews suggest that both the more 
idealistic policies and the policies, explicit or implicit, that actually govern 
implementation should be analysed. The former, though possibly unrealistic, reflect 
important signals that are being sent through the education system and could point to 
the direction that will be taken in future policy reforms. The latter, on the other hand, 
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are important for understanding what concrete choices a country has made within its 
resourcing and political constraints. Law and Pan (2009: 228) put forward the terms 
‘law of book’ and ‘law in action’ to describe the two levels of policy. It seems 
convenient to think of the second layer of policy, the ‘law in action’, as consisting of 
two elements. On the one hand, the systems, which could be partly informal, that 
allocate public and private funding within the education sector are a concrete 
expression of a country’s policy priorities. On the other hand, the presence or absence 
of incentives (and disincentives) built into the education system to organise principal-
agent dynamics, for instance rewards (monetary or non-monetary) recognising 
effective management, and sanctions against poorly performing teachers, represents a 
further concrete expression of policy choices made.  
The specific policy positions of the economists will be discussed in this section in 
terms of external and internal efficiencies. This framework will also inform the 
analysis of policy positions when the four developing countries are discussed. This 
latter discussion is partly aimed at demonstrating that the economic framework used is 
a practical and informative one if one wants to identify key elements of what are 
ultimately highly complex systems. One could of course delve much deeper into the 
policy positions of the economists than what is done below, but the aim is to offer a 
discussion that is sufficient to create a framework for the discussion of actual country-
specific policies.   
With respect to external efficiency, or the degree to which the education system 
contributes towards individual income improvements and national development, the 
World Bank’s (2011) education strategy document emphasises the need for a stronger 
focus on qualitative improvement at all levels of a country’s education system. The 
importance of quality improvements at the basic education level receives special 
emphasis. Using the kinds of statistics dealt with extensively in this dissertation, the 
magnitude of the effect is explained within the World Bank document as an additional 
two percentage points in annual GDP growth resulting from a one standard deviation 
improvement in learning outcomes in schools, where the reference is to a standard 
deviation across individual pupils in an international testing programme such as 
PISA6. But the World Bank (2011) also places emphasis on improving the quality of 
education at the post-school level, particularly in tertiary education. Education’s role 
in development is not seen as limited to improvements in national income. It also 
contributes to better employment rates, including more self-employment, and 
improved human capital in health terms. Education as an equaliser in terms of socio-
economic status and gender disparities is emphasised not only from a justice 
perspective, but also because, it is argued, more equity is associated with better mean 
values in the development indicators. For instance, societies with a more equitable 
distribution of income tend to be societies with higher overall levels of income. In 
education, higher and more equitable participation rates in post-school education are 
seen as an increasingly important policy priority for developing countries. 
The 2010 Human development report of the UNDP (2010), sub-titled The real wealth 
of nations: Pathways to human development, provides an interesting indication that 
the appreciation of the centrality of educational quality is not always present in the 
way advocated by most of the recent economic literature, such as the World Bank’s 
(2011) strategy and Hanushek and Woessman (2009). The 2010 UNDP report in fact 
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focuses mainly on levels of participation in schooling, with rather little focus on the 
quality of schooling received, in a manner that is reminiscent of the economic 
literature prior to around 2000. Clearly, an adequate focus on the quality of education 
can still not be taken for granted, even in the policy statements of bodies of the UN. 
Two key external efficiency questions that should be important to education 
policymakers seem to be insufficiently explored in economically-focussed policy 
statements such as that of the World Bank (2011). One is the degree to which 
streaming, or the special nurturing of more talented individuals through interventions 
such as schools for the gifted, are important for national development. As will be seen 
in the discussion on China, clearer guidance from economists in this regard seems 
needed. Some advice is provided by Hanushek and Woessman (2009), who, in 
considering the trade-off between ‘rocket scientists or education for all’ conclude on 
the basis of their data analysis that both excellence at the top end of the range of 
educational outcomes, and better average results, are separately important for 
economic growth. The second question relates to vocational education. What kind of 
balance between more academic post-school education and more vocationally 
oriented education should policymakers maintain? This appears to be a question that 
has been under-analysed by economic think tanks such as the World Bank. 
The tension between politics and analysis in education is evident in some of the 
critique directed at economic interpretations of education. With respect to what the 
economists would refer to as external efficiency issues, the oppositional literature 
tends to reject the notion that the education system should be designed in a way that 
best serves the broader economy and the labour market. There are two rather different 
arguments behind this opposition, a professional one and a political economy one. 
The professional argument is, roughly, that trying to align the education system to 
economic needs tends to result in crude educational solutions that ultimately fail 
because they do not appreciate the many facets, including non-economic ones, of any 
education system. Very crudely, the argument runs that the economists do not know 
enough about education to tell the educationists how to do their job. The political 
economy argument, again somewhat roughly, sees the capitalist economy as unjust 
and considers that the education system offers a key opportunity to change this 
economy through the creation of a post- or anti-capitalist generation. On ideological 
grounds then, instead of getting the education system to maintain and grow the 
existing economy, the education system should be used to bring about fundamental 
structural change in that economy. Delandshere and Petrosky (2004: 2), who generally 
support this argument, describe education reforms as conservative attempts aimed at 
preventing questioning of the economic status quo:       
Workers with critical thinking and problem-solving skills might not easily adapt to the 
economic requirements of business. In the face of uncertainty, contradictions, and the 
unknown, reformers have rallied around predefined standards, strict policies, and strategies, 
so that we have the illusion of knowing where we are, where we are going, and what and how 
we should teach.  
Where Delandshere and Petrosky (2004) seem correct is in assuming that government 
reformers of the education sector in the United States are ‘pro-business’ in the sense 
that they have no intention of changing the basic capitalist system. But these 
ideological matters should not cloud the key fact that the existing education system 
has tended to fail in its attempts to generate problem-solving skills amongst sufficient 
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numbers of students, in particular socio-economically disadvantaged students. Anti-
reform arguments of the kind offered by Delandshere and Petrosky (2004) often 
ignore the evidence on past successes and failures, and consider the intentions of 
teachers to be a sufficient sign of success. What is also absent in Delandshere and 
Petrosky (2004) is an acknowledgement that the reformers in fact do prioritise more 
problem-solving, partly because business in fact requires more, not less, of this skill.  
Turning to internal efficiency issues, or how well education institutions (supported by 
households) produce desired educational outcomes, the World Bank’s (2011) strategy 
emphasises using a variety of measures affecting human development, starting from 
the pre-natal stage, in a manner that promotes health and optimal cognitive 
development. Child nutrition and quality pre-schooling are thus important policy 
priorities. At the primary and secondary schooling levels, improving the quality of 
learning outcomes through, in particular, more effective teacher training and 
educational assessment systems is seen as key. Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos (2011) 
stress that in developing countries a back-to-basics approach that includes practical 
accountability systems linking schools to the administration and schools to 
communities should be promoted. Robust accountability systems should be 
accompanied by sufficient freedom for schools and teachers to organise their work in 
ways that respond to local needs whilst they promote system-wide learning goals. In 
more economic terms, principal-agent relationships between, on the one hand parents 
and teachers and on the other between the administration and teachers, should be 
improved through the resolution of existing information asymmetries whereby, for 
instance, parents do not understand whether their children are in fact learning to read 
as they should. Better accountability systems are also needed at the tertiary education 
level, according to the World Bank (2011) strategy. Moreover, in the developing 
country context there need to be enough second-chance opportunities for youths who 
fail their first attempts at obtaining a post-school education.    
These internal efficiency proposals have also attracted opposition, as explained by 
Loveless (2005: 25) in the context of the United States: 
Formidable political factors are arrayed against accountability. Progressive education 
supplies an ideology hostile to test-based accountability. Politically powerful teachers unions 
represent actors with interests divergent from the aims of accountability systems. Governance 
in education is both open and porous, providing multiple venues for challenging 
implementation. Parents, students, and individual teachers (that is, teachers acting alone, not 
as union members) are the opponents of accountability most prominently featured in the 
press.  
Very significantly, the recent 2011 education policy position paper of Education 
International (EI), the largest international federation of teacher unions (and according 
to the EI website7, the largest international federation of unions across all trades), 
strongly opposes the policy positions of, for instance, the World Bank.  
The social values of education require public authorities to protect the education sector from 
the neo-liberal agenda of privatization and commercialisation. This negative agenda includes 
marketisation and trade in education and intellectual property, the casualisation of 
employment in the education sector, the application of private-sector management models on 
education institutions, the privatisation of provision, and the intrusion of for-profit motives or 
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business interest in the governance of education institutions. (Education International, 2011: 
2) 
Here it appears as if ideological differences relating to the kind of society one wants at 
some point in the future, specifically whether a more socialist economy is preferable, 
cloud the more immediate and practical issues, and make it appear as if there are stark 
divisions with respect to the latter, when these divisions are perhaps not so large. In at 
least two senses, the EI and the ‘neo-liberal’ reformers are closer to each other than 
what the above extract would suggest. Firstly, both advocate a change towards a more 
equal society, though the EI sees this change coming about more through changes in 
the patterns of physical capital ownership, whilst the reformers have emphasised a 
more equitable distribution of human capital. Secondly, though the reformers may be 
proponents of ‘privatization and commercialisation’ in the economy as a whole, the 
literature that guides them as far as the education sector is concerned acknowledges, 
on the whole, the difficulty and even the undesirability of bringing about deep 
structural change, such as privatising entire public schooling systems, and generally 
focuses on more marginal changes of procedure, such as those brought about my more 
regular accountability. 
The fact that teacher unions from a large range of countries, both developed and 
developing, are members of EI, added to the fact that teacher unions tend to exert 
strong pressure on policymakers, makes the EI position particularly noteworthy. (The 
most noteworthy gap in the IE members list is the absence of any teacher union from 
the People’s Republic of China. In the case of South Africa three different unions are 
members.) Perhaps the most serious area of possible contention relates to assessments 
aimed at improving the accountability of education institutions. Such assessments are 
strongly promoted by the economic literature as a means of tackling the considerable 
information asymmetries inherent in education systems, but at the same time face stiff 
opposition. The EI’s 2011 policy statement argues: 
EI believes that a widespread abuse of the notion of quality to justify standardised forms of 
testing is harmful to the education system as a whole, as it attempts to reduce the teaching 
and learning process to quantifiable indicators. It is the standardization and one-dimensional 
approach to testing and evaluation of the teaching and learning processes to which EI objects 
strongly. ... Public authorities should guard against the potential misuse of the Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) in the administration and planning of education 
systems. (Education International, 2011: 4) 
Yet in another part of the EI’s statement, a more conciliatory stance is taken. Here 
there is less of an outright rejection of standardised assessments, and more an implicit 
acceptance that if used correctly, standardised assessments have a role to play.  
When one form of evaluation designed for a particular purpose is used to serve a different 
purpose, the consequences can be unforeseen and damaging. (Education International, 2011: 
4) 
The thrust, however, of the EI’s statement is that standardised testing is bad for 
education, and, implicitly, for the struggle for a better and more equal society. 
Reference can be made to three arguments that education economists would 
commonly make, which render the EI’s arguments largely invalid. The first is the 
argument, supported by much evidence, discussed in for instance Bruns, Filmer and 
Patrinos (2011), pointing to the fact that education systems have been notoriously bad 
at educating the poor, in fact much worse than is commonly believed. The second 
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argument is that evidence points rather clearly towards inequalities in human capital 
being the fundamental underpinning of other inequalities, in particular income 
inequality. What the EI is thus ignoring is that much of the social change they would 
like to see must be achieved through better educational outcomes for the poor. 
Thirdly, the EI ignores the empirical evidence suggesting that the accountability 
reforms it rejects have in fact succeeded in improving education for the poor.  
The methodological debates surrounding the kinds of impact evaluations that inform 
the policy conclusions of Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos (2011) are so important they 
need to be taken into account in any examination of education policy. A country’s 
education policies are not just about what actions to take, but also how feedback and 
research are used to inform and fine-tune actions. Formal impact evaluation 
techniques, using treatment and control groups, along the lines of research in the 
medical profession, offer a compelling ideal for how to generate the knowledge 
needed for policy reform and action. However, any practical national strategy on 
policy evaluation would have to acknowledge that the costs and logistical and 
political complexities associated with formal impact evaluations such as randomised 
control trials are substantial and that at best one can subject a small minority of 
policies and interventions to formal impact evaluations. Added to this, is the fact that 
certain interventions are not amenable to formal impact evaluations in the first place. 
These problems are acknowledged by many impact evaluation proponents, such as 
Duflo, Glennester and Kremer (2006), who warn, for instance, that impact evaluations 
are not appropriate where there are large expected general equilibrium effects 
resulting from the expansion of an intervention from a project to a system-wide 
programme. For instance, a small pilot project experimenting with the impact of 
monetary incentives for teachers might render positive results, but the benefits may be 
outweighed by social costs if the intervention is taken to scale and teacher unions 
object to the incentives on ideological grounds. The literature suggests that the good 
policymaker needs to do two things. On the one hand, formal impact evaluations need 
to be employed with respect to carefully selected interventions where evaluation 
results are likely to be relevant and externally valid, meaning applicable on a larger 
scale. On the other, the policymaker needs to ensure that there are enough ‘second-
best’ and practical evaluation activities, even if they do not reach the ‘gold standard’ 
of, say, the randomised control trial (Schlotter, Schwerdt and Woessman, 2010: 6). 
The literature on ‘second-best’ approaches is not large, though there appears to be an 
increasing realisation that this is a gap that needs to be filled. An example of an 
interesting contribution would be Pritchett, Samji and Hammer (2013), who 
acknowledge institutional and incentive problems around the implementation of fully-
fledged and formal impact evaluations, and advocate novel approaches that are more 
sensitive to the way policymakers actually reform systems, and focus on what can be 
learnt from variation within interventions.  
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14 POLICY PRIORITIES IN FOUR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
14.1 Introduction 
What policy positions have developing countries governments adopted, relative to the 
recommendations of the economic literature but also the opponents to these 
recommendations? This question is answered in section 14 with reference to a group 
of four important but also diverse countries. South Africa is included because South 
Africa is dealt with elsewhere in the dissertation. Brazil was selected as it has 
increasingly been considered a best practices model for poverty alleviation within a 
non-centralised and democratic governance structure. Chile has often been considered 
an innovator amongst developing countries in the area of education policies. China 
was selected due to its rising geo-political importance and because favourable human 
capital conditions are believed to lie behind its rapid economic growth since the 
1980s.  
The following graph provides some economic development context to the discussion. 
Of the four countries, Chile and China have experienced particularly strong growth in 
GDP per capita. Such patterns should influence these countries’ education policy 
priorities. One might expect Chile and China to pay more attention to the question of 
how to allocate additional public funding towards substantial growth in the education 
sector. In Brazil and South Africa, on the other hand, one might expect a stronger 
emphasis on educational improvement achieved through efficiency gains. Brazil and 
South Africa should also pay close attention to the degree to which human capital 
constraints have impeded faster growth and attempt to remedy this situation, partly by 
learning from the experiences of countries such as Chile and China which have 
experienced rapid growth.    
Figure 65: GDP per capita trend in key developing countries 
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In part, the discussion and comparison of the four countries is intended to demonstrate 
an effective way of undertaking a comparison of different education systems. The 
complaint made by Psacharopoulos (1990) about the unsystemic and unquantitative 
nature of many articles published in arguably the world’s foremost journal dealing 
with comparative education studies, namely the Comparative Education Review, is a 
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good reference point. A short meta-analysis of articles from the journal from the years 
1981 (a year within the time range that Psacharopoulos’s was presumably thinking of) 
and 2012 was undertaken to explore the dimensions of the alleged problem with the 
journal. Results, based on an attempt to answer a few basic questions about each 
article, appear in Table 40 below. Psacharopoulos’s complaint is at least partly 
supported. In 1981, no articles includes all the features looked for: an actual 
comparison, some discussion of specific policies, statistics, and some new analysis of 
microdata. In 2012, 19% of articles had all these features. However, the majority of 
articles in 1981 had at least some statistics, even if they were drawn from other 
sources, so the accusation of insufficient quantification is not strongly supported. 
What seems more striking is that fewer than half of the 1981 articles included an 
actual comparison. By 2012 this had improved to 75%.  
Table 40: Patterns in Comparative Education Review articles 
 Is there a 
comparison 
between 
different 
education 
systems? 
Are the 
effects or 
problems of 
specific 
policies 
discussed? 
Are statistics 
that provide 
a sense of 
magnitudes 
included? 
Are some of 
the statistics 
derived from 
new analysis 
of 
microdata? 
% of 2012 
articles with 
this comb-
ination 
% of 1981 
articles with 
this comb-
ination 
Combinations of ‘yes’ responses (just 3 most common combinations from 2012 shown) 
Comb. A 1 0 1 1 25 10 
Comb. B 1 1 1 1 19 0 
Comb. C 1 0 0 0 13 10 
% of articles with response ‘yes’ 
2012 75 44 81 56 
1981 45 50 70 15 
Source: Own analysis of Comparative Education Review. 
Note: For each of the two years, all articles from three quarters which did not have quarterly-specific 
special topics were examined. In total, 16 articles from 2012 and 20 from 1981 were examined.  
 
This brief Comparative Education Review analysis suggests that there have been 
improvements over time in comparative education methods. However, none of the 
articles examined has what is presented below, namely a policy comparison of a few 
countries within an economics of education framework. The benefits of such a 
framework are discussed, in particular in the conclusion of section 15. It should be 
added that the piecing together of elements of even one country’s education system, 
with no intention of any cross-country comparison, in order to answer over-arching 
questions around internal and external efficiency, and equity, is surprisingly rare. In 
particular, the description of China’s education system included below can be 
considered a modest contribution towards the filling of an important gap, namely the 
absence of analytical and critical descriptions of China’s education system in English.  
14.2 South Africa 
The policy position on education’s role in the economy has become clearer in South 
Africa over time. The 1995 White paper on education and training, which was seen as 
a basic blueprint for post-apartheid education, referred in general terms to the role 
played by education in preparing youth for economic participation (South Africa: 
Department of Education, 1995). Educational quality is referred to in a way that is 
likely to result in multiple interpretations of the concept. One could be dealing with a 
disciplined system, a well-resourced one, one with well-qualified teachers or, as the 
economists would now emphasise, a system where there is sufficient learning 
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amongst pupils. More recent policy documents are much clearer and are far more 
aligned to the learning outcomes definition. The minister of basic education’s 
‘delivery agreement’ includes the following in its introduction (South Africa: 
Department of Basic Education, 2010a: 4): 
...the President referred to the vital role of the education system in improving productivity 
and competitiveness in the economy. The President also underlined that ‘our education 
targets are simple but critical’. The need is fairly straightforward as far as the basic education 
sector is concerned. Our children and youths need to be better prepared by their schools to 
read, write, think critically and solve numerical problems. These skills are the foundations on 
which further studies, job satisfaction, productivity and meaningful citizenship are based.  
One key national policy document expresses the educational targets in terms of 
standardised test score improvements: the average performance of mathematics pupils 
in grade 8 should increase by 140 TIMSS8 points in 15 years, meaning an 
improvement of 1.4 standard deviations across TIMSS pupils (South Africa: 
Department of Basic Education, 2010b: 51). The minister’s delivery agreement argues 
that increasing per pupil spending is not a high priority, mentioning that this spending 
is considerably higher than in the comparable Latin America region. The need to 
reach a 100% participation rate in pre-school in the year immediately before the first 
grade is emphasised. The current rate (in 2010) is said to be around 80%. A national 
development plan produced by the country’s national planning commission goes 
further and prioritises full participation for two years of pre-school (South Africa: 
National Planning Commission, 2011: 270, 279).  
The delivery agreement considers failings and gaps in the accountability and 
incentives mechanisms of the schooling system an important obstacle to 
improvements in learning outcomes. Here the policy emphasis for the immediate 
future falls on strengthening a standardised assessment system introduced in 2008. 
This system is intended to reduce the over-reliance on the national examinations at the 
end of upper secondary schooling as means of holding schools accountable for the 
quality of their services. The need for strengthening both accountability routes, one to 
parents and the other to the administration, partly through the new assessments 
system, is acknowledged. Other priorities include a proposed system whereby 
teachers would be more accountable for the use of their time, specifically their pacing 
of sections of the national curriculum across the school year. Some reverse 
accountability is proposed in the form of ratings by schools of the quality of support 
received by the administration. 
The delivery agreement acknowledges the importance of pre-service and in-service 
training for teachers, but how this should be strengthened, for instance with respect to 
optimal in-service training methodologies and the selection of youths for pre-service 
training, is insufficiently clear. A separate teacher development plan published in 
2011 provides some additional details and a few insights into how economics of 
education could play a greater role in informing teacher development, not just in 
South Africa (South Africa: Department of Basic Education, 2011a). The plan does 
acknowledge the importance of providing, to a greater degree than in the past, in-
service training that responds to demand and real needs amongst teachers. It also 
implicitly acknowledges the need to consider cost through an emphasis on distance 
education. However, the plan also displays gaps that are commonly found in 
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education policies. Above all, the importance of monitoring impact is not 
acknowledged. In the case of teacher training impact could be measured in terms of, 
for instance, changes in teacher knowledge, teacher behaviour on the job, or the 
learning outcomes of pupils. An insufficient focus on understanding the impact of 
costly interventions is also evident in a 2011 policy on standards that should be 
applied in teacher pre-service training. The weak emphasis on the monitoring of 
impact seems to be less an unintended omission than a conscious scepticism towards 
the measurement of outcomes, as suggested by the following extract from the 2011 
standards document (South Africa: Department of Higher Education and Training, 
2011: 7):  
A purely skills-based approach, which relies almost exclusively on evidence of demonstrable 
outcomes as measures of success, without paying attention as to how knowledge must 
underpin these skills for them to impact effectively on learning, produces technicists who 
may be able to replicate performance in similar contexts, but who are severely challenged 
when the context changes.  
Teachers need to be trained in a manner than assists their adaptability to different 
contexts, but why measurement of outcomes should be in conflict with this principle 
is not clear. Better measurement of outcomes in teacher training within the tertiary 
education system in fact seems necessary given the suspected degree of inequality 
between institutions discussed in a 2011 green paper on post-school education (South 
Africa: Department of Higher Education and Training, 2012). A further indication that 
the benefits of monitoring quality in teacher training are not fully appreciated can be 
found in a comprehensive 2010 review, by the government, of teacher training 
programmes. This review evaluates programmes in terms of their intent and design in 
an attempt to compare training institutions, but includes virtually no consideration of 
outcomes, something that could have been partially dealt with through, for instance, 
an examination of the written work of teacher trainees (South Africa: Council on 
Higher Education, 2010). Even better, however, though more costly, would have been 
a consideration of more downstream outcomes, implemented for instance through 
interviews with graduates already working as teachers and observations of classroom 
practices.  
The national development plan pays attention to a matter not often dealt with 
explicitly in education plans, namely corruption. Specifically, nepotism in the 
appointment of teachers and school principals is identified as a problem. One solution 
put forward by the plan to deal with this is competency tests for anyone applying for a 
school principal position (South Africa, 2011: 270, 281).  
The green paper on post-school education emphasises enrolment growth, in particular 
as far as socio-economically disadvantaged students are concerned, and quality 
enhancement in the sector. However, the magnitude of the enrolment growth 
envisaged seems to be informed more by political aspirations than empirical analysis. 
There is no benchmarking of the envisaged enrolment trend against those in other 
countries, or consideration of cost implications in terms of, for instance, total 
spending over GDP. More or less, the green paper envisages a situation in South 
Africa in 2030 where post-school enrolments would be around 4.7 times as large as a 
single youth age cohort, a level twice that currently found in Chile, a developing 
country with particularly high levels of post-school enrolments. However, the 
envisaged South African level would still be half of the level found in the United 
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States (Gustafsson, 2011: 189). The need for growth in the post-school sector is 
clearly needed as suggested by the skills shortage in the labour market. Gustafsson 
(2011: 14), using household data for eight developing countries, shows that whilst 
attainment of up to twelve years of education is exceptionally high for South Africa, 
attainment of thirteen or more years of education is exceptionally low. Relatively 
speaking, there has been over-investment in enrolments in schooling and under-
investment in enrolments in post-school institutions. There is a strong emphasis on 
increasing the number of PhDs in critical areas within the green paper. For instance, 
in engineering a target number of PhDs in 2030 that is five times the 2011 level is put 
forward. The need to produce enough lecturers that can sustain the envisaged growth 
is also emphasised, though specific strategies in this regard are not explained and the 
important matter of whether growth in lecturers needs to be proportional to the growth 
in students is not discussed.  
The need for improving the quality of learning outcomes in universities and other 
post-school institutions is recognised. That this partly depends on better learning 
outcomes in schools is mentioned, but not sufficiently explored. The green paper 
argues that the problem is not that official standards set by government and 
universities are not high enough. Instead, the problem is that quality assurance 
mechanisms and institutions are too complex and insufficiently developed. The exact 
nature of this critical problem and proposed solutions are not clear in the green paper, 
however. What is made clear is that universities should continue to quality assure 
themselves whilst other post-school institutions should continue to be subject to 
centralised quality control mechanisms, such as national examinations. A key 
question that is implied is how university autonomy with respect to quality assurance 
is compatible with qualitative improvements in the future, if the existing quality 
assurance mechanisms for universities have clearly not functioned well in the past, in 
particular as far as academically weaker universities are concerned.  
Do the policy positions of South African policymakers concur with those found in the 
economic literature? At a strategic level, there appears to be concurrence, especially 
as far as the primary and secondary education policies are concerned. At these levels, 
the importance of learning outcomes and accountability of institutions to the 
administration and parents, is emphasised. At the tertiary level, and in the policies on 
teacher training, there appears to be a lesser awareness of having the right 
accountability structures in place. At all levels, what appears to be lacking is 
operational depth in the form of detailed operational reports, impact evaluations or 
sufficiently clear medium-term plans. This is perhaps not surprising given the 
newness of many of the strategic documents. Achieving sufficient operational depth 
should be a priority for the education authorities.  
14.3 Brazil 
To gain an idea of how education policy thinking has evolved in Brazil in recent 
years, it is informative to compare the national education plan of 2001 to a proposed 
national plan released in 2010 (Brazil: Ministério da Educação, 2001, 2010). The 
2001 plan focussed largely on increasing enrolment ratios and hours per day spent at 
school. In the case of Brazil the latter priority is closely linked to a desire to reduce 
double and triple shifting in schools, which remains high. For instance, in 2010 
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around 41% of pupils at the Grades 1 to 8 levels were attending a shift which was not 
the morning shift, generally the afternoon shift (the third shift is the evening shift) 10. 
By the time of the 2010 plan, however, the emphasis had largely shifted from 
enrolments to learning outcomes, partly because the previous decade had seen major 
advances in the enrolment ratios.  
The 2010 plan is specific about the monitoring of educational quality in schools. At 
the centre of the monitoring process is an index, the Index of Basic Education 
Development, or IDEB11. This index value combines a measure of pupil performance 
with a measure of grade progression. The latter is included to counteract perverse 
selection effects arising out of the focus on pupil performance, for instance in the 
form of the pushing out or excessive grade repetition of academically weaker pupils. 
IDEB values are calculated according to the following formula: 
βα PNIDEB =  (89) 
N is the average score for a grade (for instance nationally or in a single school) and P 
is an indicator of grade attainment based on the grade promotion rates of the grades in 
the curriculum phase leading up to the tested grade. α and δ are weights attached to 
the two factors, whose sum is 1.0. P, the indicator of grade attainment, is calculated as 
follows: 
∑
=
=
n
r rp
nP
1
 (90) 
where p is the promotion rate for a specific grade, in other words the percentage of 
pupils who do not drop out or repeat, and n refers to the number of grades within the 
phase (Fernandes, 2007). IDEB values from the national to the school level are 
published on the federal ministry of education website12. There is a downloadable 
report for each school where the school’s results are compared to those of the 
municipality as a whole, the state and the country. The pupil performance values in 
IDEB draw from Prova Brasil, a programme introduced in 2005 which involves the 
testing of pupils from all schools in selected grades. Prova Brasil emerged out of a 
sample-based national assessment system that evolved over more than a decade before 
2005. The IDEB, introduced in 2007, has come to be used by a number of states and 
municipalities as a basis for monetary incentives that reward schools whose 
performance improves (Parandekar, Amorim and Welsh, 2008; Bruns, Filmer and 
Patrinos, 2011). More generally, however, economists such as the World Bank’s 
Barbara Bruns have attributed Brazil’s performance improvements over the years in 
PISA to better accountability and the counteracting of information asymmetries 
brought about by Prova Brasil, even without the introduction of monetary incentives 
(Bruns, 2010). (PISA assesses pupils aged 15 regardless of the kind of education 
institution in which they are enrolled.) A similar interpretation is found in an OECD 
(2012) report on Brazil’s educational improvements. The 2010 plan explains that the 
pupil performance component of IDEB is benchmarked against PISA results and 
envisages a PISA improvement of 80 points, or 0.8 of a standard deviation, by 2020. 
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A key enrolment target in the 2010 plan is to universalise participation for the 
population aged 4 to 17 by 2020. Moreover the aim is for 25% of enrolment at the 
secondary level to be vocational. There is considerable emphasis on recruiting more 
teachers and improving the existing workforce through in-service training. Brazil is 
one of very few developing countries where the academic literature points to success 
in teacher in-service training (Bof, 2004). Specifically, Brazil is said to have achieved 
a degree of success in reaching a large number of teachers with a mix of distance and 
contact training, characterised by regular testing of trainees and monitoring of 
processes such as participation. Moreover, Brazil’s in-service training efforts are 
noteworthy for their success in bringing together different public and private training 
organisations. The 2010 plan envisages better pay for teachers, free pre-service 
training for those wishing to become schoolteachers and, in an attempt to improve the 
quality of teaching, an entrance examination for those wishing to enter the profession. 
As in South Africa, a special entrance examination for those wishing to become 
school principals is envisaged.  
At the post-school level, substantial enrolment growth is planned. The gross 
enrolment ratio for the population aged 18 to 24 is expected to increase to 50% by 
2020 according to the 2010 plan. This is probably unrealistic if one considers that the 
figure for the United States in 2010 was 47%13. Enrolment growth is expected to be 
possible due partly to more extensive state guaranteeing of student loans. To promote 
quality in universities Brazil employs standardised testing of all university graduates. 
Tests are discipline-specific, thus for instance economics students write a common 
economics examination, apart from examinations that the particular university may 
set. Results from the standardised tests are used, amongst other things, to assess 
whether private universities should continue to operate (Rezende, 2010). Average 
scores per institution are publicly available and individual students are given a report 
with their scores. These reports are commonly used by students to communicate their 
competencies to potential employers. This intensity of institutional accountability at 
the tertiary level is unusual amongst both developing and developed countries. The 
number of Masters and PhD graduates per year is expected to reach 60,000 and 
25,000 by 2020. This translates into around 1.7% and 0.7% of the age 25 cohort 
(United Nations, 2009). The corresponding figures in the United States are 8.5% and 
1.6%. Here Brazil’s goals appear to be more realistic.  
Brazil is in a number of ways where South Africa’s policies say South Africa would 
like to be. It could be argued that Brazil is around ten years ahead of South Africa, 
assuming South Africa’s plans are implemented in the near future. Brazil has around 
ten more years of experience than South Africa in terms of national testing systems. 
Prova Brasil is similar to what South Africa would like to realise through its national 
assessment system. Brazil has had greater success than South Africa in rolling out 
large-scale in-service training for teachers.  
14.4 Chile 
What is striking about Chile’s education policies and systems is how clear the policies 
are, how deeply rooted a tradition of accountability (of the type World Bank 
economists would espouse) is, and the relatively large volumes of research available 
on Chile’s education strategies. The greater availability of research and 
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documentation (in English or the national language) in the case of Chile relative to 
Brazil is particularly noteworthy. A manifestation of Chile’s commitment to 
democracy and evidence-driven policymaking (not just in education) was the 
country’s acceptance into the OECD in 2010, making Chile the third non-high income 
country to join the organisation, after Turkey and Mexico. Crouch (2005) has argued 
that in education Chile’s success could be attributable to the exceptionally strong 
presence of economists and economically-minded leaders in the sector, as well as a 
mature and constructive relationship between the government and the largest teacher 
union.  
McEwan, Urquiola and Vegas (2008) argue that Chile’s strong emphasis on 
educational innovation has not paid off in the form of better learning outcomes. 
However, they make use of international testing programmes stretching just to 1999. 
As pointed out by Gustafsson (2012), if results up to 2009 are taken into account, 
Chile, together with Brazil and Tunisia, are exceptionally good improvers amongst 
developing countries with respect to the international testing programmes (but Chile’s 
level was considerably above that of the other two countries in 2009). What this 
suggests is an impact lag which has been longer than what McEwan et al (2008) may 
have assumed.  
In contrast to Brazil and South Africa, Chile’s most recent policies for the education 
sector emphasise not so much radical change as a continued focus on strategies that 
are not new. This is clear in, for instance, Chile’s 2011 ‘law on quality and equity’ 
(Chile: Congreso Nacional, 201114).   
In the schooling system, policies that explicitly promote educational quality include a 
funding system that treats public and private schools equally, thus allowing them to 
compete on an equal footing, and monetary incentives that reward schools with 
exceptional improvements. Pre-school participation ratios are good even by developed 
country standards: 62% of Chile’s children aged 3 to 5 are enrolled, against an OECD 
average of 77% (the figures for Canada, Australia and the United States are lower 
than Chile’s) 15. The school funding system, often referred to as a ‘voucher system’, 
has been the subject of much analysis. Following West (1996), the term ‘voucher 
system’ has been used to describe such a wide variety of funding systems and is cause 
for so much confusion and ideological polemic, that the term is perhaps best not used. 
In short, what makes Chile’s funding system noteworthy and unusual is that exactly 
the same funding rules are applied to all schools, whether public or private, meaning 
that, at least in urban areas, public schools which under-perform face a real risk of 
losing all their funding to better performing private schools. The usual protection thus 
afforded to public schools is largely absent in Chile. The private sector is large: by 
2005 around half of all primary school pupils were in private schools (McEwan, 
Urquiola and Vegas, 2008: 5). Though this funding system may lie behind the 
progress made in Chile’s learning outcomes, it may also have exacerbated social 
stratification across schools (McEwan, Urquiola and Vegas, 2008).  
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Chile’s standardised testing system in schools, SIMCE16, has a long and interesting 
history. Started in 1988, the specifications of the system were legislated into a 
strongly binding ‘constitutional law’ in 1990 one day before the end of military rule 
(Meckes and Carrasco, 2010: 237). Policymakers have focussed not just on improving 
the reliability of the results of the system, but also its use as an accountability tool. An 
illustration of this are the 40-page reports generated for every school with a number of 
different analyses and comparisons and simpler four-page reports directed at parents. 
These reports are available on the ministry of education website17. The system has 
been allowed to evolve, with more rigorous accountability processes only being 
introduced when the measurement rigour and degree of trust in the system permitted 
this. Taut el al (2009) have pointed out the importance of not equating policy 
intention with reality: they find that only half of school principals fully understood the 
SIMCE reports and that parent knowledge about the system was lower than official 
reports would suggest (Taut, Cortés, Sebastian and Preiss, 2009: 135). Despite such 
shortcomings, SIMCE appears to come close to being a best practice case with respect 
to such systems in developing countries. Details on the system are far more accessible 
than details on Prova Brasil, for which more information should be available in the 
public domain. The national incentive system rewarding schools for good 
performance in SIMCE is known as SNED18. SNED bonuses are paid to around a 
quarter of schools every second year. One of several factors considered is the size of 
year-on-year improvements.  
Binder and Contreras (2008) find that at least when the programme was introduced, 
SNED was able to bring about improvements of around 0.3 standard deviations to the 
average of all schools due to what the analyst’s call a tournament effect, or the effect 
of knowing that one may win the reward. This effect was found using a matching 
procedure. However, the data were not able to provide evidence on the sustainability 
of this effect over time. What was not found to be significant was the ‘gift-exchange’ 
effect, or the effect of continuing improvements after receiving the reward almost as a 
type of gratitude response to the reward. Here a regression discontinuity analysis was 
used. The magnitude of the tournament effect appears sufficiently large to warrant 
serious interest amongst policymakers, not just in Chile, in SNED-type rewards. 
Moreover, the analysis techniques put forward have important implications for the 
types of data that should be collected in these kinds of programmes.  
Another incentive programme where Chile appears to have put the economic 
emphasis on incentives into practice is the Variable Allocation for Individual 
Performance or AVDI19 programme. Here teachers are paid a bonus if they pass an 
examination they enter on a voluntary basis (Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos, 2011: 179; 
Taut, Santelices and Stecher, 2011). This is an innovative way of dealing with a 
problem most education systems devote considerable attention to, often with limited 
success, namely the design of in-service training approaches supplied by the state to 
teachers. The Chilean approach shifts the problem to the teacher and obviates many 
complications relating to the matching of supply with demand and need. Teachers 
                                                     
16
 National Evaluation System (original in Spanish is Sistema de Medición de Calidad de la 
Educación). 
17
 See http://www.mineduc.cl. 
18
 National System for Performance Evaluation of Subsidized Educational Establishments (original in 
Spanish is Sistema Nacional de Evaluación del Desempeño de los Establecimientos Educativos 
Subvencionados). 
19
 Asignación Variable por Desempeño Individual. 
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themselves obtain, perhaps by making a private financial investment, the capacity 
building they believe they need. In fact, Chile’s education policies lack the relatively 
strong emphasis found in South Africa and Brazil on large-scale teacher in-service 
training. Implicitly, they support the recommendation made in an IIEP guide on in-
service training that an over-reliance on traditional top-down training methods is not a 
good thing: ‘It is important to recognise that not all aspects of teacher professional 
development can be (or should be) addressed in courses. There are many other models 
of professional development which support teachers’ development on a regular basis 
in the workplace.’ (Villegas-Reimers, 2003: 142)  
Post-school participation in education in Chile is particularly high for a developing 
country and is almost on a par with that of the United States (Gustafsson, 2011: 17-
18). An OECD report on Chile’s tertiary education system highlights as a remarkable 
success the five-fold increase in the participation rate in the poorest 40% of society in 
just one generation (OCDE, 2009: 13). This rapid expansion is partly due to 
considerable growth with respect to private universities (OCDE, 2009: 81). One 
recently introduced intervention aimed at improving competition amongst post-school 
institutions, in an attempt to raise quality, is the publication of information on labour 
market returns associated with education and training received in different 
institutions. This rather unusual and innovative approach to tackling information 
asymmetries, specifically the problem of youths not knowing the implications of the 
specialisation and institutions they select, involves the publication on the ministry of 
education ‘My Future’ website of the average pay and employment rates of graduates 
of specific institutions (including vocational training institutions) in specific 
occupations20. Other information provided includes the drop out rates of different 
institutions. The data are obtained from the institutions themselves, which are obliged 
to conduct tracer studies covering at least the first year that graduates spend in the 
labour market. The website publishes the methodology that institutions must follow.  
The OECD report argues that what is noteworthy is that the rapid expansion in access 
to post-school education has occurred without any major compromising of quality. A 
further quality enhancement initiative is a partnership project with the World Bank 
that ran from 1997 to 2005 and was specifically focussed on promoting quality 
through the rationalisation of curricula, training of tertiary education staff and new 
information systems (OCDE, 2009: 191). However, the OECD report also points to 
problems in Chile’s tertiary education system. The largest structural problem is that 
degree programmes in Chile are spread out over too many years and are too 
theoretical. On average, students take seven years to complete their first degree. 
Moreover, despite policies aimed at fostering competition between universities, 
mechanisms such as a peer reviews tend to amount to little more than a ‘checkbox 
ticking’ exercise. By law certain universities enjoy an effective monopoly in certain 
academic fields. Inefficiencies and relatively low levels of public spending result in a 
high reliance on private fee income, which limits the degree to which inequities in the 
participation ratios can be reduced. There is no countrywide system targeting poorer 
households with loans and bursaries for university studies. One symptom of these 
problems is that too few students obtain PhDs (OCDE, 2009: 12, 16). These problems 
are serious ones and suggest that overall Chile has been more successful at tackling 
structural problems at the basic education level than at the post-school level.  
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 See http://www.mifuturo.cl. 
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14.5 China 
With regard to education’s role in society, Chinese policies have been relatively 
consistent for a quarter of a century. Hu (2012: 86), in an analysis of four important 
sector policy statements in the 1985 to 2010 period, concludes:  
Worth noting is the fact that one thing never changes in any of the four documents: the values 
of education are directed toward serving the economy, in other words, ... prominence is given 
to positioning people as ‘trained talent’ and using education as an instrument. 
The centrality of economic development is thus strong. However, the emphasis on 
how to optimise education outcomes has shifted from fundamental change and reform 
initiatives to improvement and maintenance. There has also been an increasing 
propensity towards self-criticism by the government, within the constraints imposed 
by China’s one-party system of governance. A 2010 policy review process was 
unprecedented insofar as it involved the collection of public inputs, which took the 
form of around 14,000 letters to the authorities (Walker and Qian, 2012: 163). Hu 
(2012) identifies two key turning points in the recent development of Chinese 
education policy: 1999 saw a strong shift towards improving educational quality in 
the sense of what children learn, in other words in the sense understood by the World 
Bank. Thereafter, 2010 saw a re-focus on improving educational equity following a 
period of deterioration in this area, something considered a threat to political stability 
as well as a violation of socialist principles.  
China’s very different history and culture relative to the three countries considered 
previously results in often rather fundamental differences in the way problems and 
solutions need to be understood, or are understood by the Chinese government. For 
instance, what is widely regarded as an over-emphasis on public examinations in the 
past has led to a situation where initiatives to improve educational quality often focus 
largely on how to reduce the influence of examinations. The typical emphasis found 
in other developing countries on improving the work ethic in education institutions 
and increasing time on task is largely absent in Chinese policies given that time on 
task is often of a level that would be considered excessive in other countries. 
According to Jing and Yu (2006: 259), in lower secondary schools pupils typically 
devote themselves to schoolwork from 6 in the morning to 11 at night, six or seven 
days a week. This seems to be an exaggeration, yet the fact that a claim such as this is 
publishable in an academic journal is telling. The levels of effort seen in China’s 
schools are often attributed to the strong policy and cultural emphasis on 
examinations in the past.  
There are three key examinations. The zhongkao examination occurs at the end of 
lower secondary schooling, at the end of the ninth grade. The huikao occurs at the end 
of upper secondary schooling, at the end of the twelfth grade. The gaokao is used to 
determine who may enter what types of post-school education and is generally 
administered by upper secondary schools at the twelfth grade (Hannum, Xuehui and 
Hua-Yu, 2011: 272).   
The hypothesis that Chinese school pupils perform well, a hypothesis often based on 
the academic performance of Chinese schooled students attending universities outside 
China, appears to have been confirmed by the fact that in the 2009 run of PISA the 
city of Shanghai, the only part of China to participate in PISA, obtained results that 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Part III  277 
 
exceeded those of all other countries, including the city states of Hong Kong and 
Singapore, in reading, mathematics and science. The People’s Republic of China has 
never participated as a country in an international assessment programme and there is 
no Chinese national assessment system along the lines of Brazil’s Prova Brasil. As a 
result, our understanding of the educational outcomes of China’s schooling system 
must remain speculative. Analysts such as Hongqi and Xiu (2012: 180) have warned 
against the temptation of over-stating the abilities of Chinese pupils and assuming that 
the country has reached an efficiency frontier. Specifically, some evidence suggests 
that Chinese pupils under-perform relative to their non-Chinese peers with regard to 
areas requiring more critical thinking or complex interpretation, for instance the 
interpretation of graphs. Despite an absence of nationally representative data on 
learning outcomes, local research involving the collection of test and background data 
for the purposes of production function analysis has become increasingly permitted 
and seems to point to an interest on the part of the Chinese government to use 
empirical evidence when formulating policies to strengthen educational quality 
(Yuhong and Zhiyong, 2008).  
Some dismantling of the examinations system that schools were subject to occurred as 
part of the government’s efforts to improve learning. In the 1990s, examinations in 
primary schools (Grades 1 to 6) were abolished with a view to making learning more 
oriented towards problem-solving and less towards rote learning (Han and Yang, 
2010). Recent research suggests that some success has been achieved in getting 
teachers to move away from simple rote-learning and to focus more broadly on 
cognitive development and the creative use of information (Yee, 2010). The literature 
on the reforms to the vital gaokao examination, the examination determining access to 
post-school education, is less clear on what the purpose and impact of the reforms 
have been. There has been a significant movement away from national standardisation 
and towards provincial design of the gaokao (China has 22 provinces) (Hannum, 
Xuehui and Hua-Yu, 2011). Moreover, there has been a move towards examination 
questions requiring more critical thinking. The importance of the gaokao has 
moreover diminished somewhat as universities, in particular new private ones, have 
been permitted to administer their own separate entrance examinations. One risk, 
generally not addressed in the literature, is that these reforms would lead to inequities 
insofar as provinces with different standards could result in schools aspiring to 
different standards. Another is that universities will make inefficient admissions 
decisions due to the information asymmetries arising out of having different 
examinations in different provinces. Some of the decision-making difficulties, but not 
the inefficiency problem, are reduced by the fact that many universities have quotas 
for the number of students from different provinces. A new assessment unit 
established in the national ministry in 2007 has as a key objective the establishment of 
a national monitoring system.  However, whether this means the establishment of a 
Prova Brasil type system is not clear. World Bank thinking would suggest that such a 
system is necessary to improve knowledge about which parts of the country are 
lagging behind educationally and whether progress is being made over time. As 
argued in a World Bank guide to national assessment systems (Greaney and 
Kellaghan, 2008), traditional examinations are unable to provide this information for a 
number of reasons, for instance because they are sensitive to fluctuations in who 
writes the examinations each year.  
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One policy aimed at improving labour market returns to schooling has been the 
consolidation of vocational training at the upper secondary level after the large-scale 
undermining of this training during the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. 
Vocational training constituted half of upper secondary schooling before the Cultural 
Revolution and after dropping to 14% of enrolments during the revolution, the ratio 
has been maintained at around 50%, despite large increases in the upper secondary 
enrolment gross enrolment ratio, for instance from 43 to 74 between 2000 and 2008 
(Hannum, Xuehui and Hua-Yu, 2011: 271). Demand for vocational training at this 
level has been kept high by a perception amongst students and households that income 
returns in the labour market are high (Jing and Yu, 2006).  
Better systems to promote the accountability of school principals and teachers to the 
authorities (but not to communities, as discussed below) has been a further area of 
policy focus. During the 1980s a school inspectorate was re-established after having 
been dismantled in the 1950s. Figures referred to by Law (2002: 584), viewed in 
combination with UNESCO figures, suggest that by 1998 a ratio of around 10 schools 
per inspector had been reached, in other words a relatively favourable ratio. The 
widely quoted 1993 Teachers Law21 introduced accountability rules for teachers 
which appear to follow good practices in other countries, if one ignores the parts of 
the law dealing with teachers’ duties to promote the ruling party. The performance 
assessment of teachers should take into account self-assessment. Teachers who 
perform well should be rewarded with salary promotions and greater management 
powers within the school. Sanctions include dismissal and could arise out of 
‘intentionally not accomplishing educational and teaching tasks and thus causing 
losses to educational and teaching work’ (article 37), as well the insulting and 
corporal punishment of pupils. 
The introduction of a legal framework for private education institutions in the 1980s 
was largely motivated by concerns that the public system would not be able to expand 
fast enough to serve the rapidly growing economy. By 2009, 10% of basic schooling 
enrolment was in private institutions, though most of this was in private pre-schools. 
It appears as if private institutions will play an increasingly important role (Law and 
Pan, 2009).  
One type of accountability promoted strongly by many education reform proponents, 
including the World Bank, but not by the Chinese government, is accountability to 
communities. This gap in the Chinese reform programme is a serious one and is 
indicative of the wider problem of China’s attempt to achieve economic development 
and modernisation without a movement towards a more democratic and participatory 
political system (Han and Yang, 2010). Brock (2009: 359) refers to Chinese schools 
operating like ‘spaceships’, in isolation from the surrounding community. The 
absence of school structures where parents can participate to some degree in the 
governance of the school means the absence of an accountability line that many would 
argue is necessary to make up for weaknesses in the line of accountability between the 
school and the authorities. Serious defects in this latter line of accountability in China 
are well documented. There is a widespread culture whereby schools fake compliance 
with government reform programmes because principals and teachers do not see these 
reforms serving their own interests. To illustrate, school principals will often maintain 
two school timetables, one that complies with official rules and is shown to the 
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 See http://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/en/b/1993-10-31/13698.shtml, also Law (2002). 
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authorities, and another one actually used in the school. The latter one will ignore 
curriculum innovations that the authorities consider necessary but school staff are 
unwilling to implement due to the work implied by the change (Walker and Qian, 
2012). Assuming that these curriculum changes are changes that parents would 
support, the authorities could utilise pressure from parents to bring about the desired 
change. One might expect that China’s one-child policy would make parents 
particularly willing to play a role in school governance, both because fewer children 
gives parents more time for such activities and because the policy makes it impossible 
to spread the risk of poor education across several children. If the only child is poorly 
educated, there is no recourse in the form of a well educated second or third child. 
Arguably, the absence of independent teacher unions represents a further inefficiency 
and accountability problem insofar as this leads to abuses where local government 
officials withhold the salaries of teachers in order to devote funds to non-personnel 
items that were originally not budgeted for or because they are corrupt. Such abuses 
appear to be widespread and can be expected to discourage teachers and make the 
teaching profession unattractive for youths (Law, 2002).  
Turning to the matter of equity within the schooling system, we should differentiate 
between inequity resulting from China’s strong emphasis on streaming (this inequity 
is easier to justify) and inequity resulting from corruption and privatisation in the 
system (this is less easy to justify). With regard to the first, China has for some 
decades promoted ‘key’ schools, or elite schools into which the best performing 
pupils would be streamed with a view to optimising the abilities of the country’s 
future intellectual elite. In the early 1980s around 4% of secondary schools were key 
schools. In the mid-1980s there was an official policy shift against this type of elitism, 
yet since then the practice of key schools has continued in some form or another (Han 
and Yang, 2010).  
Less defensible forms of inequity include the dropping out from compulsory level 
schooling of many poor children, high public funding inequities across schools, in 
particular depending on the province of the school, and the use of private funds by 
households to buy better schooling for their children within the public system. 
Inequality in schooling, as in society generally, is greatly exacerbated by severe 
restrictions on free movement within China effected through the hukou system, not 
unlike the influx control system of apartheid South Africa. This system is largely 
designed to restrict urbanisation by rationing access by rural workers and their 
families to cities.   
Evidence on participation in pre-schooling in China is not easily available, but official 
figures suggest that China is more or less on a par with other developing countries. 
The gross enrolment ratio of 44 in 2008, assuming ages 4 to 6, in China is somewhat 
above the developing country average of 38, but below Brazil’s 65 (also for ages 4 to 
6) (UNESCO, 2011a). Participation in Grades 1 to 9 was made compulsory in a 
landmark 1986 law. By 1996, 75% of children were reaching at least the start of lower 
secondary schooling, or grade 7 (Jing and Yu, 2006: 259). Analysts generally believe 
that participation up to grade 9 is now close to 100%. Thereafter, it declines sharply, 
however. Hongqi and Xiu (2012), using official figures, argue that participation in 
upper secondary schooling, or Grades 10 to 12, is 70% in urban areas and as low as 
10% in rural areas. Chengfang, Linxiu, Renfu and Scott (2009) offer an important 
critique of the generally accepted enrolment statistics and argue that the situation is in 
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fact better and more equitable than what these statistics suggest. It is argued that 
vocational training enrolments are under-estimated. But a larger issue is the fact that 
despite hukou restrictions, migration from rural to urban areas to access better upper 
secondary schooling is said to be much greater than what is generally believed. Thus 
many rural youths do get to access upper secondary schooling by migrating to cities. 
Chengfang et al (2009) estimate that in fact around 25% of rural youths access this 
level of schooling and that official participation rates for urban youths must 
consequently be adjusted downward to some degree.  
The 1986 compulsory schooling law banned school fees up to the end of grade 9. Yet 
contraventions of this ban have been widespread and loopholes have been exploited to 
a large degree. To illustrate, many public schools demand that parents contribute fees 
to cover bicycle parking at the school (Law, 2002). Brock (2009: 454) argues that 
there is a widespread belief amongst government officials that fees are a necessity, 
even for the poor, as they signal the commitment of households to schooling and 
hence make it easier for the education authorities to argue for better public funding. 
Chengfang et al (2009) argue that at the upper secondary level fees reach levels that 
seriously undermine educational equity. These fees often amount to over 500 USD per 
year. If one adds to this the fact that the opportunity cost is high as employment 
opportunities for youths leaving lower secondary schooling are relatively good, it 
becomes clear why the government should consider low participation in upper 
secondary schooling a serious ‘bottleneck’ in the education system (Jing and Yu, 
2006). Jing and Yu (2006) see this problem as a manifestation of poorly designed 
decentralisation, where powers are devolved to a lower level but in the absence of 
sufficiently clear policy parameters that can protect the national interest. All schooling 
up to grade 12 was devolved from the national to the provincial level in the mid-
1980s, but whilst it was made clear that schooling up to grade 9 would be compulsory, 
there was little guidance relating to upper secondary schooling.   
Policy creates the impression that the central government will subsidise provincial 
authorities sufficiently for national school participation goals, where they exist, to be 
pursued. However, in reality existing funding systems are clearly inadequate. The 
demand for funding, in particular as far as poorer households is concerned, is 
aggravated by the fact that upper secondary schooling often occurs in boarding 
schools. In the more rural western provinces, even lower secondary schools tend to 
have boarding facilities. Grants to support attendance of the poor in upper secondary 
schools exists, but only around 8% of eligible pupils receive these grants and, what is 
even worse, they reportedly only cover around 2% of the costs incurred by households 
(Chengfang et al, 2009). One area where there has been considerable success in 
targeting educational resources towards the poor is textbooks. Since 2000, free 
textbooks have been widely distributed to all pupils in the west and to rural pupils in 
the east of the country (Brock, 2009). That education should be seriously under-
funded in China seems to be confirmed by aggregate spending figures. During the 
1990s the ratio of public education spending over GDP, which was already low at the 
start of the period, declined according to Law (2002). Government has acknowledged 
this as a problem and committed itself to raising the ratio, for instance to 4.0% by 
2000, a fairly average level by developing country standards. However, by 2000 a 
level of just 2.5% had been reached (Brock, 2009: 455). There is clearly a public 
accountability problem, evidenced by the fact that the UNESCO international 
database contained no ratios of education spending to GDP, or some other related 
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statistic, for any year after 1999, in 2012 when the database was queried22. What 
makes this apparent under-investment in human capital more remarkable is the fact 
that China’s investment in physical capital in recent years, as measured by gross 
capital formation as a proportion of income, is above the world average and at least 
twice as high as what has been seen in the three other countries dealt with above 
(World Bank, 2011b: 398). For Brock (2009), a key factor underlying China’s under-
investment in human capital is the highly corrupt and nepotistic practices 
characterising the distribution of funds intended for schools. There is a political 
unwillingness to direct more funds into a corrupt system, but at the same time there is 
an unwillingness or an inability to root out the corruption causing the problem in the 
first place. Notwithstanding these problems, overall the funding of schools has been 
improving in recent years, according to Ding (2012), and analysis suggests that lack 
of funds is no longer the largest reason why poor pupils drop out of school. Instead, 
more educational problems such as the poor quality of schooling and the difficulty of 
the curriculum play a larger role.  
It appears as if one factor that kept the demand for private schools relatively low is 
that the illicit purchasing of advantages within the public system by the rich is 
widespread. In one city studied by Law (2002), 20% of pupils enrolled in 
academically elite schools were there not because they had complied with the strict 
academic entrance requirements, but rather because parents had paid an additional fee, 
often reaching 8,000 USD, to secure a place in the school for their child. Law (2002: 
591), in lamenting the inability of the authorities to enforce educational rules, argues 
that in China ‘there is an emerging belief in the magic power of law to rectify 
irregularities in education and society.’ 
As is the case in Brazil and South Africa, generous subsidies exist for students 
wishing to become teachers (Hannum et al, 2011). The length of training for different 
teachers varies greatly, with upper secondary teachers undergoing four years of post-
school training, whilst primary school teachers only need to complete grade 12 at a 
vocational secondary school specialising in the training of teachers23.  
At the post-school level, China has seen a phenomenal increase in enrolments since 
the early 1990s, from around 4 million to 31 million in 201024. The gross enrolment 
ratio increased from 3 to 26 during the same period. The number of graduates in the 
labour market has been further boosted by the arrival every year of thousands of 
Chinese graduates returning home after completing their tertiary education outside the 
country. The OECD estimated the annual figure to be 20,000 (Gallagher, Hasan, 
Canning and Newby, 2009: 6). China now has the second-highest number of 
researchers of any country, after the United States. According to Hannum et al (2011), 
China’s extraordinary expansion of its tertiary education sector was partly made 
possible as a result of marketisation of this sector. In around 1990 two key policy 
changes occurred. Firstly, tertiary institutions were granted permission to supplement 
their grants received from the state with fees charged to students. In effect, 3% to 8% 
of overall costs could be covered by fees from students. Secondly, it became possible 
for institutions to admit certain students who did not fulfil the academic entrance 
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 Online data-querying facility of UNESCO: UIS, consulted 2012.  
23
 See http://www.edu.cn/20010101/21925.shtml. 
24
 Online data-querying facility of UNESCO: UIS, consulted 2012. Also Shujie, Bin, Fang and Jianling 
(2010: 841) and Hannum et al (2011: 269).  
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requirements, if they paid privately for the full cost of their education. The 
establishment of a few completely private universities contributed to the trend, but 
only to a limited degree. One further critical explanation for the very rapid increase in 
enrolments, an increase that reached 30% per year for the three years 1998 to 2000, 
was that the previous student to lecturer ratio had been remarkably low. There was 
thus spare capacity, at least in terms of lecturers, to accommodate a rapid increase. 
The student to lecturer ratio went up from a low level of 3:1 to 17:1 following the 
1990 changes (Jing and Yu, 2006: 257). Access to tertiary education became 
considerably less equitable in the process, despite the introduction of targeted loans 
and scholarships for exceptionally performing students from poor households (Shujie 
et al, 2010; Gallagher et al, 2009: 6). For instance, there is evidence that amongst 
students in elite key universities, the proportion of students from poorer backgrounds 
has declined (Hannum et al, 2011: 276). Hannum et al (2011: 276) argue that reforms 
to bring about more pupil-centred learning have had the unintended consequence of 
making academic achievement amongst the socio-economically disadvantaged 
relatively more difficult. They also argue that second-chance schemes favour the rich.  
Whether the rapid expansion in post-school education has led to greater inequalities in 
the quality of education is a matter that is not resolved. What has occurred is that 
earnings differentials amongst graduates have increased, but it is not clear to what 
extent this reflects an increasingly competitive labour market, where earnings have 
become more sensitive to the quality of human capital, and to what extent it reflects 
greater inequality with respect to the quality of education (Zhong, 2011). The 
OECD’s review of China’s tertiary education sector emphasises the need for greater 
national government involvement in benchmarking and enforcing standards across 
China’s universities to counteract increasing incoherence within the system, in 
particular at the undergraduate level. Moreover, given China’s rising importance as a 
world power, benchmarking against major existing quality frameworks elsewhere is 
regarded as a necessary improvement. Quality benchmarks, according to the OECD, 
are likely to incentivise more innovative teaching practices and greater awareness of 
employer needs. In one key respect China’s universities are rather unusual: in the 
1980s permanent employment tenure, also known as the ‘iron rice bowl’, for 
university lecturers was stopped, resulting in a situation where all academic staff were 
placed on temporary contracts. How this arrangement impacts on the quality of 
university teaching is not clear (Gallagher et al, 2009: 6-10, 37). 
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15 CONCLUSIONS FOR PART III 
The shift from focussing just on grade attainment to both grade attainment and the 
quality of educational outcomes may not be complete, as suggested by the 2010 
UNDP Human Development Report discussed in section 13, yet education 
policymakers appear to have made a critical shift in this direction. Of the four 
countries examined in section 14, Chile has the longest history of monitoring learning 
outcomes according to standardised indicators, but Brazil has accumulated several 
years of experience in this area since national standardised tests were first introduced 
in the mid-1990s. South Africa has recently embarked on the use of standardised 
testing for accountability purposes. China, however, has followed a different and 
arguably less scientific and systematic approach to monitoring learning outcomes. An 
established tradition of examinations at various levels of the schooling system appears 
to have maintained a strong focus on what pupils learn. However, this has not 
permitted a proper understanding of how the quality of basic education in China 
compares to that of other countries and, perhaps more importantly, whether this is 
improving over time within China. Moreover, the partial dismantling of some of the 
national standardisation of the examinations in recent years, added to the fact that at 
least in 2012 there appeared to be no plans for a Prova Brasil-type national assessment 
system, raises the possibility that monitoring and thus accountability will become 
more elusive. In particular, the absence of a sufficiently standardised national system 
of quality monitoring could result in greater human capital inequality across the 
country. This poses a serious challenge, especially given concerns around rising 
inequality in China with respect to income.     
The scepticism towards standardised assessments expressed by Education 
International, the world federation of teacher unions, seems not to be influencing 
current policy strongly, at least not in the four developing countries discussed above 
(three of which have teacher unions). Why would teacher unions, which are said to be 
so influential, not have undermined the development of national assessment systems 
to a greater degree? Judging from the available literature, a likely explanation seems 
to be that despite the positions held by Education International, unions at the country 
level are not strongly opposed to standardised assessment, at least not in Chile, Brazil 
and South Africa. It is possible that they see the need for them and realise that 
opposing the assessment systems and the associated accountability mechanisms would 
evoke public criticism of the unions.  
What does the discussion in the preceding sections suggest should receive special 
attention within the economics of education field? Innovative but very different 
approaches taken in both Brazil and Chile to use information for institutional 
accountability purposes in the post-school sector point to a potentially important 
means of addressing quality problems in this sector. The economic literature has paid 
considerable attention to the impact of different accountability interventions at the 
school level, but such literature dealing with post-school education is scarce. Here it 
seems as if the policymakers have been a step ahead of the economists. Economic 
analysis of the impact of standardised information emerging from university testing 
systems (Brazil) and publicly available information on labour market returns linked to 
specific post-school institutions (Chile), in both cases generated as part of government 
programmes, seems warranted. The fact that the Brazilian programme appears not to 
be seen as a violation of academic freedoms is significant for a country such as South 
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Africa, where sensitivities around academic freedom are strong though institution-
driven quality control mechanisms appear not to be having the desired impact.  
Corruption within the education sector is a further area that may warrant a stronger 
focus. The World Bank has paid considerable attention to corruption relating to 
financial flows, specifically through its public expenditure tracking survey (PETS) 
methodology25. However, education corruption is a broad topic that includes nepotism 
in the appointment of managers, a problem acknowledged explicitly in South Africa’s 
policies, and the non-payment of teachers by corrupt administrators, a problem found 
in China with its absence of teacher unions and mechanisms for parent representation. 
A significant move is Transparency International’s new focus on reporting on 
corruption within the education sector. The organisation’s 2011 report on corruption 
in the primary school sector in South Africa is an indication of this move (Døssing, 
Mokeki and Weideman, 2011). Heyneman (2004b) offers a rare and apparently useful 
framework for understanding corruption in the broad sense within the education 
sector. At the highest level, three areas in which corruption occurs can be identified: 
the selection of students for promotion to a higher level; the accreditation of education 
institutions, giving them the right to operate; and the supply of public funds and goods 
within the education system. The World Bank’s PETS work has focused on the last of 
these three. One advantage with using corruption as an organising framework for 
one’s analysis of education sector inefficiencies is that corruption is an emotive topic 
that appears to be receiving increasing public attention. It is thus a framework that can 
assist in attracting a wider audience for one’s analysis.  
Targets for expanding the education sector, specifically post-school education 
enrolments in Brazil and South Africa, were found to be unrealistic and poorly 
informed by trends in other countries. This could simply be a manifestation of 
ritualistic planning, where targets are intentionally aspirational rather than realistic 
and empirically informed. However, even if intended to be ritualistic, unrealistic 
targets carry risks as they could impact in perverse ways on, for instance, institutional 
planning. There is little guidance in the economic literature for policymakers who do 
wish to specify realistic sector expansion targets. As explained with reference to 
Glewwe’s (2002) discussion of rates of return and education planning in Part I of the 
dissertation, part of the challenge lies in a more careful application of existing 
economic evidence to the question of education sector growth. But part of the 
challenge is also to make use of analysis such as that presented in Part II to establish 
benchmarks for the spread of resources and efforts across the different levels of the 
education system.  
What is it in the existing economic research on education systems that should be 
underlined when researchers communicate with policymakers? As highlighted by 
Bruns, Filmer and Patrinos (2011: 62), the evidence that the multitude of in-service 
teacher training programmes (and other types of quality enhancement interventions) 
have had a positive impact on learning is extremely weak. Government in-service 
teacher training programmes tend not to include any impact evaluation component, 
perhaps because it is incorrectly assumed that the designed activities must inevitably 
lead to improvements. Even Brazil’s ambitious programme appears to be severely 
limited with respect to an impact evaluation element. This is a serious gap given the 
obvious importance of teacher capacity in the school improvement process. Where 
                                                     
25
 See for instance Reinikka and Smith (2004). 
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impact evaluations have been conducted in developing countries, they have tended to 
emerge out of experimental interventions driven by non-government stakeholders. 
One message that economists need to emphasise is that impact evaluations are 
important, with regard to in-service training but also other policy areas, partly because 
the little evidence that exists indicates that many interventions that seem to do the 
right thing at face value, in fact result in very little change. What this points to is a 
need to challenge more explicitly the received wisdom in education policymaking 
circles around what interventions work. Perhaps because it is so difficult to get even 
the basics, such as large-scale in-service training programmes, in place when it comes 
to improving a schooling system, the perception has arisen that achieving this is 
enough. A step forward would therefore be to promote the understanding that though 
having the basics in place is indeed important, this is not enough. Those basics need to 
be introduced with much caution and with an awareness that appearances may 
deceive.  
There is perhaps something to be said for a better packaging of the economics of 
education messages within a clearer political economy framework. Given that some of 
the resistance to accountability reforms, in particular on the part of teacher unions, 
uses a political economy argument, it may be of value for economists to deal 
specifically with this aspect of the policy debate. This is what the World Bank analyst 
Benveniste (2002: 106) does when he argues in favour of standardised testing systems 
because such systems encourage not just institutional accountability, but also 
government accountability to the electorate. In this sense, he argues, these testing 
systems can be considered a necessary element of the welfare state.  
Part III can be said to make a methodological contribution towards comparative 
education approaches, a research area that Psacharopoulos (1990) has argued needs 
fixing. What Part III has done is to attempt to evaluate policies through the 
comparison of several education systems within an economic framework dealing with 
external efficiency, internal efficiency and equity. These kinds of analyses are rare. In 
particular, there seems to be very little work on evaluating China’s education system 
holistically, at least in the literature available in English, despite this education system 
being the world’s second-largest in terms of the annual intake of pupils at the primary 
school level26.  
 
 
                                                     
26
 Despite China’s population still exceeding that of India’s in 2008, India’s primary school intake 
figure of 32 million was almost twice the 17 million of China (UNESCO, 2011a). In 2008, the total 
primary and secondary enrolments for the two countries were virtually equal.  
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16 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 
Each of the three parts of the dissertation has its own conclusion. Part I moreover had 
conclusions for four sub-sections dealing (1) the theory of economic growth, (2) the 
measurement of human capital and national development, (3) existing empirical 
models of growth and (4) ways of communicating the economic knowledge to 
education policymakers. In Part II, the conclusion assessed what had been learnt about 
the prioritisation of education levels from a series of analyses of UNESCO Institute 
for Statistics (UIS) country-level data. The conclusion to Part III discussed the views 
of education policymakers and their receptiveness to research produced in the field of 
economics. These conclusions were aimed partly at answering a number of questions 
that had been posed. At the start of Part I, an over-arching question for the dissertation 
as a whole was proposed: What is the utility of the economic growth literature and 
models using country-level data for education policymakers and to what extent have 
these policymakers made use of the available evidence?   
The aim in this overall conclusion is not simply to repeat or summarise what has 
already been said in the separate conclusions that have appeared above. Rather, the 
aim is to draw from those conclusions to answer the over-arching question reproduced 
above.  
So what is the utility of the economic growth literature for education policymakers? 
This literature undoubtedly serves as a vehicle for emphasising that how countries 
organise their education systems matters hugely for future income and well-being. But 
is this not something everyone knows, one may ask. Is education’s vital role in human 
development not self-evident? As discussed in the introduction to section 2, many, 
though not all, philosophy of education lecturers who educate future schoolteachers 
are not comfortable with the notion that schooling is an activity that serves future 
welfare improvements. And the philosophers of education are not alone. The 
discomfort is not so surprising if one considers that it was only in the 1960s that 
economists themselves started to pay serious attention to the causal link between 
human capital growth and welfare improvements. Using the evidence we now have on 
this link to underscore the importance of education for economic and social 
development seems like something we cannot do too much of.  
It can be argued that the economic growth literature has since around 2005 become 
even more interesting and important for education policymakers, due to the shift in 
emphasis from years of schooling attained as a measure of human capital, to average 
test score results. The earlier growth models using years of schooling did point to the 
vital role of education. Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1991), who can be said to have  
pioneered the use of a years of schooling variable in a growth regression concluded 
that without this variable, the growth model would not make sense, it would display 
too many internal inconsistencies. The work of Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller 
(2004) aimed at ranking the importance of 67 variables that seemed important 
explanatory variables for growth, concluded that initial level of enrolment at the 
primary school level was the second-most important variable.  
However, the finding of Hanushek and Woessman (for instance 2009) that the 
introduction of an education quality measure in a growth model renders any education 
quantity measure essentially insignificant, has justifiably excited a range of 
organisations and individuals concerned with how to improve education systems. One 
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can speculate that much of the excitement arises out of the realisation that such basic 
things as the ability to read and a person’s numeracy explain to a large degree such a 
complex phenomenon as economic growth. If our only measure of human capital 
were years of schooling, there would be far less certainty around the components of 
this input. Years of schooling could represent many things: basic skills, but also 
socialisation, or a person’s range of subject knowledge. Hanushek and Woessman’s 
work has narrowed down the essence of human capital. It is about basic skills. The 
implication is that the central challenge for education systems is to maximise these 
skills. Socialisation, or the creation of social capital, and curriculum diversity, are 
likely to also be important components of human capital, but it is implied that these 
things flow almost naturally from the initial investment in the achievement of basic 
skills.  
But some of the excitement must arise not just from the apparent simplicity of what 
lies at the core of human capital, but also the ease with which this can be measured, 
and the fact that we now have mature international testing programmes that have been 
improved over many years of trial and error. Getting education systems to rally 
around improvements in internationally standardised measures of literacy and 
numeracy is a relatively uncomplicated idea, even if realising the improvements 
remains a highly complex matter. The value of a degree of simplicity on the outcomes 
end of the education production process for policymakers, and voters and parents, 
should not be under-estimated. Evidence of the kind put forward by Hanushek and 
Woessman helps to counteract the notion that education outcomes are too elusive to 
allow for measurement and simple goals, a notion that is widely embraced, for 
instance by the world federation for teacher unions, Education International. Of 
course education outcomes are not a simple matter and one can expect an increasingly 
nuanced, and less excited, response to the Hanushek and Woessman findings as these 
findings become entrenched as mainstream thinking within policy circles. Hanushek 
and Woessman (2009: 22) do themselves provide an initial exploration of an 
important policy question, namely the degree to which equity in learning outcomes 
matters, relative to average performance. Is it a matter of ‘rocket scientists or 
education for all’, they asked. This complexity, and others, are likely to receive more 
attention in future. Moreover, as argued in Part I of the dissertation, it must be 
acknowledged that though Hanushek and Woessman’s (2009) work represents a 
major step forward, relative to previous work where the distinction between 
participation in schooling and learning outcomes was blurred, Hanushek and 
Woessman (2009) remains not fully conclusive due to unavoidable data problems. 
Specifically, it will be necessary to repeat their work as time passes and we obtain 
longer historical series of statistics on country-level educational performance.  
The more innovative parts of the dissertation dealt with how theory and empirical 
findings, expressed within economics texts, can be communicated to policymakers 
and a wider audience beyond researchers. The assumption here was that the utility of 
research for policymakers needs to be assessed not just in terms of the original 
research, but also in terms of the means by which researchers and others communicate 
research findings to governments. Existing modes of communication were critically 
assessed and new devices were developed that could serve to underscore and, to a 
reasonable degree, simplify the messages of the economists.  
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To a large degree, the work by Hanushek and Woessman served as a point of 
departure, given that they have been exceptionally successful at bridging the often 
serious gap between researchers and education policymakers. Two new devices, 
building on Hanushek and Woessman, stand out. One is the expansion of Hanushek 
and Woessman’s list of 77 countries with comparable measures of educational 
quality, to a list of 113 countries, through the inclusion of more developing country 
data drawn from an African and a Latin American testing programme which had not 
been considered by Hanushek and Woessman (section 3.3 in Part I). The expanded list 
adds value partly because it allows a larger number of national governments to see 
where they are located in the global rankings of educational outcomes, and what 
opportunities exist for improving income per capita through better schooling.  
The second device put forward in the dissertation (section 5.5 in Part I) is an Excel-
based ‘growth simulator’ tool aimed at informing policymakers not only of the likely 
impact of better educational quality on income (something that Hanushek and 
Woessman had dealt with), but also how important improving education is relative to 
other interventions, such as reducing ethnolinguistic fractionalisation, promoting trade 
openness and combating malaria. The dynamic nature of the Excel tool allows users 
to compare countries rather easily, something that would be more difficult in a more 
static report. The tool confirmed the relative importance of investing in educational 
improvement. But the relative strengths of other interventions are noteworthy too, 
even for education policymakers, given the potential impact of education policies on 
non-education variables. For instance, in South Africa improving educational quality 
emerged as the second-most promising stimulator of growth, after improving life 
expectancy. This points to the importance of health education in South Africa’s 
schools, including effective education around the prevention of HIV/AIDS. In South 
Africa, reducing linguistic fractionalisation also emerged as important. Language is a 
matter that seems to receive inadequate attention in South Africa’s policies. In 
examining these dynamics, use was made of what appears to be the only dataset 
available in South Africa on people’s (self-reported) competencies in the country’s 
eleven official languages.  
One area that is of particular importance for education policymakers, and which one 
might expect to be dealt with in the growth literature, is the balancing of budgets and 
policy attention across the levels of the education system, in particular the primary, 
secondary and tertiary levels. Despite the availability of a couple of interesting studies 
focussing on the relationship between levels of educational attainment in the 
population and income, this area has received little attention. What seemed missing 
was a systematic analysis of patterns in the historical enrolment and spending figures 
in education systems across the world, by education level, and correlations between 
these patterns and income. For instance, have faster growing economies prioritised 
resources differently across the levels of the education system?  
The country-level data of UNESCO’s Institute for Statistics (UIS) seemed to offer the 
opportunity to produce a novel analysis in this regard. Part II of the dissertation was 
largely devoted to presenting such an analysis. One key finding was that faster 
growing economies do indeed display different education investment patterns. Their 
gross enrolment ratios across all education levels are higher, as are their per student 
spending levels. Interestingly, given scepticism around the benefits of tertiary 
education spending in rich countries amongst economists, the analysis in Part II found 
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that faster growing rich economies have spent more on each student. It was also found 
that one cannot conclude unequivocally from the data that Sub-Saharan Africa has 
over-invested in primary schooling, relative to secondary and tertiary education. This 
is important given the strong presence in the literature of the argument that aid donors 
have forced Africa to neglect the secondary and tertiary levels.  
In Part II it was also demonstrated how comparing one country’s prioritisation across 
the education levels to global patterns can help to underscore imbalances in the 
education system. The demonstration made use of the South African situation and 
confirmed what has been argued elsewhere in different ways, namely that South 
Africa has over-prioritised secondary schooling and under-prioritised tertiary 
education. In line with the dissertation’s concern around ways of communicating 
patterns in the data to policymakers, Part II paid considerable attention to devising 
new graphs able to represent prioritisation across education levels.  
To what extent have education policymakers made use of the evidence emerging from 
the field of economics? Given that economists claim to offer evidence-based insights 
not only into the size and nature of the causal relationship between educational 
improvement and average income, but also on ways in which the inner workings of 
the education system can be improved, one might expect education policymakers to 
pay attention. The question was addressed in Part III by looking at the receptiveness 
of education policymakers to the economics of education literature in general (not just 
the literature on growth models). There is a sense amongst the economists that 
policymakers should be more receptive. The examination in Part III of actual policies 
in developing countries, and in Part I (section 5.2) of the literature dealing with the 
‘research-policy nexus’, or communication between researchers and policymakers, 
suggests that the complaint of the economists is partly justified, but partly not. On the 
one hand, there are powerful ideological tendencies in the education sector, as well as 
less noble tendencies such as rent-seeking, which would resist the penetration of 
economic thinking. On the other, researchers could pay more attention to 
communicating single research findings in easily readable formats, and to formulating 
meta-analyses of the vast body of literature, partly in order to distinguish the more 
credible research from weak research.  
Part III drew a distinction between education researchers with close commitments to 
the teaching profession, and perhaps teacher unions, and education policymakers. The 
former tend to be far less accepting of the economics literature than the latter. The 
way the economic findings are communicated should depend partly on what audience 
one is aiming at. The examination of four developing country education systems in 
Part III suggests that the economic literature could be better communicated to 
policymakers, but not that there is any noteworthy resistance to this literature amongst 
the policymakers. Both education economists and policymakers seem to share the 
opinion that basic learning outcomes, or cognitive skills, need to be measured through 
properly standardised testing systems, both for monitoring and accountability 
purposes. Where economists could be more insistent, is in explaining the implications 
of the emergence of more and better impact evaluations focussing on interventions to 
improve schooling. These evaluations have brought to the fore an inconvenient truth, 
namely that interventions such as in-service teacher training programmes that 
policymakers place so much faith in tend not to make any significant positive 
difference to the learning outcomes of pupils (World Bank, 2003: 114, 123). A better 
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awareness of this is likely to bring about more caution in the design of these 
interventions, and a greater use of formal impact evaluation techniques.  
Lastly, education economists, for understandable reasons, tend to want to plan their 
research work around the microdata they have access to. There is nothing wrong with 
this. But economists could strengthen their own impact on education policymaking if 
they paid more attention to glaring anomalies in government plans, and how these 
anomalies could be corrected through the application of economic principles and the 
available evidence. One area apparently plagued by these anomalies is the expansion 
of the post-school sector. This was seen in both South Africa and Brazil. What is 
needed here, in particular in the case of South Africa, is a clearer acknowledgement of 
the technologies by which the capital intensity (in particular human capital intensity) 
of tertiary education could be reduced, the role of institutional accountability and how 
the public and private sectors can complement each other.       
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